The Ethiopian Federation

Formation, Features, and Challenges

Deribie Mekonnen Demmeksa

This book is a result of an independent study to explain the Ethiopian federation: its making, its features, and its theoretical and practical challenges. The constitutional pact theory of federalism guided the study. The analysis followed the political and ideological approach to the study of federalism. The constitutional recognition of the national diversity, where not only all the nations, nationalities, and peoples of the federation have the right to self-determination but also all equal, and each is sovereign, was the animating element throughout the study. It is written with reserved judgments to allow general-purpose readers and students of federalism to make a well-informed understanding out of the dissertation. The work could be a contribution to the study of federalism.

. . .

"Metaphorically speaking, modern Ethiopia is a living one body with many souls. The body is a multinational federation. The souls are the multiple nation, nationalities, and peoples (multinationalism). The body and the souls are united by national diversity recognition federalism (recognition federalism). The single united body and souls is the Ethiopian Federation. Politics of nations, nationalities, and peoples (nationalities politics) is the blood of the Ethiopian Federation. Currently, it may be bad blood, but it is not immutable. It could be fused progressively with good blood and become better. The body could also be ameliorated: it is mutable. But it is delicate. Whoever would have the audacity to ameliorate it must be guided by sagacity and work steadily and altruistically. The immutable are the souls. The only guarantee for continued existence of modern Ethiopia is to leave them as are."

Deribie Mekonnen Demmeksa was born in Oromia, Ethiopia. He studied at Jimma and Addis Ababa Universities in Ethiopia and at the University of Vechta in Germany.

ISBN 9798617584327

90000

9 798617 584327

THE ETHIOPIAN FEDERATION

Formation, Features, and Challenges

Deribie Mekonnen Demmeksa

Horten, Norway

2018

ISBN: ISBN: 979-8617584327

Bibliographic Information

Title: The Ethiopian Federation
Subtitle: Formation, Features, and Challenges
Author: Deribie Mekonnen Demmeksa
Year of Publication: 2018
Place of Publication: Horten, Norway
Publisher: Independently published
ISBN: 9798304835442
Language: English
Length: 269 pages

Abstract

Ethiopia's transition from a centralized imperial and socialist state to a federal political order in the 1990s marked one of the most consequential constitutional transformations in modern African history. The Ethiopian Federation examines the formation, structural features, and enduring challenges of Ethiopia's federal system through a political and ideological approach to federalism. Guided by constitutional pact theory, the book traces the international and domestic legal foundations of self-determination, the collapse of the Derg regime, and the political bargains that shaped the 1995 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. It analyzes Ethiopian federalism as an institutionalization of the sovereignty of Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples, combining self-rule and shared-rule within a dual system of governance. The study interrogates the conceptual ambiguity of federalism, the tension between decentralization and centralization, and the gap between constitutional promises and political practice. Drawing on historical analysis, constitutional interpretation, and political theory, the book offers a critical and balanced account of Ethiopian federalism's achievements and limitations.

Keywords

Ethiopian federalism; Multinational federalism; Self-determination; Constitutional pact theory; Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples; Ethnic federalism; African politics; Comparative federalism; Decentralization; Post-conflict constitutionalism

Table of Contents

Chapter 1. Introduction
Chapter 2. Backgrounds for Self-Determination: International and Local
Chapter 3. The Transitional Period of Ethiopia, 1991–1995
Chapter 4. Federalism and Ethiopian Federalism
Chapter 5. Features of Ethiopian Federalism
Chapter 6. Conceptual Challenges of Describing Ethiopian Federalism
Chapter 7. Practical Challenges of Ethiopian Federalism
Chapter 8. Concluding Remarks
References
Index

Author Information

Deribie Mekonnen Demmeksa is an independent scholar, political analyst, and author. He specializes in Ethiopian politics, federalism, constitutional governance, Gadaa System, political history of Ethiopia, and political economy of indigenous governance, including the Gadaa system. He holds a doctorate degree in Political Economy and has lectured at universities in Ethiopia and Germany. He currently resides in Oslo, Norway.

Peer Review Statement

This monograph underwent independent scholarly peer review by subject experts prior to publication, and the manuscript was revised in response to substantive academic feedback.

Citation Information

APA:

Demmeksa, D. M. (2018). *The Ethiopian federation: Formation, features, and challenges*. Horten, Norway.

Chicago:

Demmeksa, Deribie Mekonnen. *The Ethiopian Federation: Formation, Features, and Challenges*. Horten, Norway, 2018.

MLA:

Demmeksa, Deribie Mekonnen. *The Ethiopian Federation: Formation, Features, and Challenges*. 2018.

Rights and Access

© 2018 Deribie Mekonnen Demmeksa.

Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0).

The Ethiopian Federation

The Ethiopian Federation

Formation, Features, and Challenges

Deribie Mekonnen Demmeksa

Horten, Norway. 2018

Copyright © 2018 Deribie Mekonnen Demmeksa

Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0).

ISBN: 979-8617584327

Inquiries and comments may be sent to demmeksa1@gmail.com

Dedecation

In memory of
Jorgie Qamisa Tuli (1901-2003), my grandmother, and my fathers: *Mekonnen Demmeksa Demie* (1940-1976) and *Erenso Demmeksa Demie* (1940-1991).

For his much-lamented brother had not begotten a child before he departed, the best his surviving identical twin and his wife could do for him were giving him their newborn child to carry on his name and memory for posterity. Also, nothing could be more comforting to a grieving mother than being entrusted with a grandchild of the living identical twin adopted posthumously to her suddenly departed son. It has been an honor to be that historic child and carry on the sentimental consequence of the family. It was a privilege to have two identical twin fathers. Also, it was a privilege to be raised jointly in the combined love and care of a selfless mother and an overly involved sentimental grandmother in a traditional family home. May my cherished *Akkoo* and her adorned twins rest in peace.

To
Bedhasie Lata Lubie

My truly selfless mother. You have always placed yourself last so that your children could become first. You raised your children almost singlehandedly and helped five of them graduate from universities and colleges so far, some of them with honors and distinctions, and some of them multiple times. You are my hero! May you live long and relish your success.

Table of Content

Acknowledgments	ix
Preface	xii
Chapter 1 Introduction	1
Chapter 2 Backgrounds for Self-determination: International and Local	13
Chapter 3 The Transitional Period of Ethiopia, 1991-1995	46
Chapter 4 Federalism and Ethiopian Federalism	109
Chapter 5 Features of Ethiopian Federalism	148
Chapter 6 Conceptual Challenges of Describing Ethiopian Federalism	179
Chapter 7 Practical Challenges of Ethiopian Federalism	206
Chapter 8 Concluding Remarks	226
References	233
Index	248

List of Tables and Figures

Tables

Table 1 *Approaches to federalism and the respective central arguments* 10
Table 2 *Member of the Council of Representatives and the number of their seats in 1991* ... 62
Table 3 *List of Recognized NNPs before the Ratification of the 1995 Constitution* 66
Table 4 *Population, area, and administrative divisions* 102
Table 5 *Distribution of National groups in the City Governments* 102
Table 6 *Federal political orders* 114
Table 7 *Distribution of NNPs in the Federal States* 141
Table 8 *Number of MPs and Population per MPs* 161
Table 9 *Types of administrative units in Ethiopian Federation* 165

Figures

Figure 1. Ethiopian population distribution in States and City governments..... 73
Figure 2. Sketch map of states and city governments in the Ethiopian Federation 101
Figure 3. Ethnic groups in 1963 and Federal States Since 1995..... 149
Figure 4. Top ten populous nations in the Ethiopian Federation..... 201

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Aksel Bjune, Anne-Sloot Bjoru, Annemik Snaphan, Arne Kvernvik Nilsen, Egon Spiegel, Eliann Holtung, Friedbert Ottacher, Gaby Middlbeck, George Mutalemwa, Gunnar Sørby, Hans E. Olav, Henriette Lehmann, Hilde Beate Tørnby, Isabelle Dutard, Jon Magnus, Karl Johnny Solberg, Lise Løndal, Monika Råvm Julikssen, Øyvund Lunde, Solveig Tenden, Tor Arne Bårnes, Monica L. Kalsen-Ravlo, Per Christian Riise Ophus, Thor Inge, Tina Malén Hansen, Tom Binder Kalvik, Tommy Sundstrøm, Trine Dalen, and Uve Mellert for their technical and moral supports.

I would also like to thank Abera Fayisa, Admasu Nadew, Alemnesh Benya, Almaz Shiferaw, Ararsa Edosa, Ashenafi Erenso, Asnakech Regassa, Berhanu Erenso, Dereje Zewde, Elias Redai, Emanuel Eba, Firaol Muktar, Fireselam Teklemariam, Fikirte Shiferaw, Gadisie Erenso, Gezahegn Abera, Gizachew Ashagrie, Hailu Guta, Naol Erenso, Obsetan Erenso, Sena Erenso, Tadelech Kebede, Tariku Atomsa, Muktat Osman, Kedir Mohammed, Kefyalew Ayana, Lensa Taye, Melaku Tesfaye, Muna Petrose, Rahel Yohannes, Shiferaw Legesse, Sintayehu Erenso, Woinishet Tadesse, Yemaneberhan G., Yonas Erenso, Zewdu Amde for their moral support during the difficult years when I was working on this book.

I am also grateful to all family members, friends, colleagues whose names are not mentioned here but have contributed to the success of this work.

My truly special thanks go to Edom and Moa for their patience and understanding and to Ol and Kenna, for I owe them the world.

Galata Waaqaa!

Deribie Mekonnen Demmeksa
November 21, 2018
Horten, Norway

Acronyms

AAPO — All Amhara Peoples Organization
AESM — All Ethiopian Socialist Movement
ALF — Afar Liberation Front
APDM — Agew People's Democratic Movement
BCE — Before Common Era
BGLM — Benishangul People's Liberation Movement
BPDO — Burji People's Democratic Organization
CE — Common Era
EBC — Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation
EDAG — Ethiopian Democratic Action Group
EDC — Ethiopian Democratic Council
EDU — Ethiopian Democratic Union
ELF — Eritrean Liberation Front
ENDO — Ethiopian National Democratic Organization
EPLF — Eritrean People's Liberation Front
EPRDF — Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front
EPRP — Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party
ESM — Ethiopian Students' Movement
FDRE — Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
GPDF — Gambella People's Democratic Front
GPDO — Gedeo People's Democratic Organization
GPDO — Gurage People's Democratic Organization
GPLM — Gambella People's Liberation Movement
HNDO — Hadiyya National Democratic Organization
HNL — Harari National League
IFLO — Islamic Front for Liberation of Oromia
IGPM — Isa and Gedebursi Peoples Movements
KPC — Kembata People's Congress
KPDM — Kaffa People's Democratic Movement
KPDU — Kaffa People's Democratic Union
LFSW — Liberation Front for Somali West.
MAP— Moa Anbessa Party
MLLT — Marxists-Leninist League of Tigray
MTWA — Maccaa-Tulama Welfare Association
NNPs — Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples
OILF — Oromo Islamic Liberation Front

OLF — Oromo Liberation Front
ONC — Oromo National Congress
ONDO — Oromo National Democratic Organization
ONLF — Ogaden National Liberation Front
OPDF— Omo Peoples' Democratic Front
OPDO — Oromo People's Democratic Organization
OPDU — Omo People's Democratic Union
OPLF — Oromo People's Liberation Front
OPLO — Oromo People's Liberation Organization
OSCE — Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PDO — People's Democratic Organization
PDTCE – Peaceful &Democratic Transitional Conference of Ethiopia
PMAC — Provisional Military Administrative Council (Derg)
SALF — Somali Abo Liberation Front
SLM — Sidama Liberation Movement
SNNP — Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples
SPDP — Somali People's Democratic Party
TGE — Transitional Government of Ethiopia
WPDF — Wolaita People's Democratic Front
WPE — Workers' Party of Ethiopia
WSLF — Western Somali Liberation Front
WSLM — Western Somali Liberation Movement
YNDM — Yem National Democratic Movement

Preface

Ethiopia has been through two momentous political changes of late: the abolition of the Abyssinian monarchy in the 1970s and the transition of Ethiopia from a spurious unitary state to a federation in the 1990s. These changes inaugurated the People's Republic of Ethiopia and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, respectively. Both changes transformed the political character and the soul of Ethiopia. It is an opportunity to live through and witness when one of such fundamental political transformations takes place in one's country.

I was a teenager, attending secondary school when the socialist government was toppled by armed liberation fronts in May 1991, but I was not uninformed about the politics of the days. My uncompromising socialist father had fed me constantly with all sorts of reading materials on socialist ideology and anti-secessionist propaganda at home. Added to this was political indoctrination at school and on the state-controlled media. As a teenager, I absorbed more politics than I should.

As a result, I could not have a different opinion either about the "infallibility" of socialism or the "high treason" of the armed national liberation fighters against the unity of Ethiopia. This perception was the lenses through which I looked at the political transformations that took place during the first two years of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia. Towards the end of the transition period, in the immediate post-independence of Eritrea, however, I was able to refresh my lenses and see beyond the old propaganda. This helped me to let go of my preoccupation that Eritrea must always remain Ethiopia.

By the time the Ethiopian federation was formed officially in 1995, I was convinced that it was the best available choice for Ethiopia. I followed keenly the constitution-making process and attended rounds of the local debate on the draft. The draft constitution addressed the fundamental political problems of the country and furnished columns of human and democratic rights. It sounded unique, progressive, and fair. I was persuaded

that its implementation would usher peace, justice, and equitable share of the national resources among all the peoples who call modern Ethiopia their motherland.

Gradually, however, I became anxious as the ruling party's promises of democratic transformation stalled and withholding of constitutionally granted human and democratic rights by the government became unexceptional. The avoidable war with Eritrea and the exceedingly high death toll from the barbaric battles traumatized me during my undergraduate study years when my involvement in the leadership of the university student union compounded my daily follow-up on the political situation in the country. The continued harassment, intimidation, imprisonment, torture, and extra judiciary killings of people suspected of being members or sympathizers of the Oromo Liberation Front or other opposition parties that were disfavored by the incumbent party (Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)) became a constant trauma. The authoritarian tendencies of EPRDF and its veteran elites were alarming.

By the time I was in graduate school, both participants of the political elites in the opposition parties and the abuses of human rights by the government security forces had increased. Formal policy debates on the national policies and programs between the incumbent party and the opposition parties had begun. At the same time, selective crackdown, mass incarceration, and widespread human rights abuses had continued particularly in Oromia State and Addis Ababa City Government. Amid this, the election campaign for the 2005 national election was promising. The government allowed live broadcasting of political debates on the only television channel in the country for the first time. Ethiopia hoped to have its first free and fair election.

Nonetheless, the hope was dashed soon when the incumbent party resorted to the use of excessive lethal force and mass detentions to manage the post-election crisis of its own making. Government security forces massacred hundreds of citizens on streets, rounded up thousands of youths and detained them at multiple remote military training camps for months and years, and imprisoned opposition political leaders in mass, and forced a face-saving apology from them after long torturous imprisonment. These all took place under the command of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, Chairperson of EPRDF. The incumbent party became an unflinching tyrant: its high-ranking officials became unrepentant corrupts. Ethiopia entered a very dark and disturbing political state.

After the post-2005 national election, I realized Ethiopia lacks what it needs most: informed grassroots democratic political participation of its citizens. In early 2006, I resigned from my position at the University of

Gondar and joined an international non-governmental development organization based in multiple countries in Europe. This allowed me to focus on development cooperation work. My frequent travels to Europe and other African countries helped me to have a better understanding of political and economic disparities between the two continents and between Ethiopia and other African countries. In general, Ethiopians are not serious about their politics and harnessing the power of it to improve their lives. They view it as a useless hostile game that only a few would like to play. They rarely take part in political discussions and community-level political debates are rare. As a result, they miss the opportunity to decide on issues that matter to them at the community and national levels. In the end, I was convinced that the grassroots democratic political participation of citizens could be the key to resolve Ethiopia's political and economic problems and unleash its huge economic potential. Yet, by the time I left the country in 2010 for a lectureship scholarship at the University of Vechta in Germany, I had little hope that a peaceful change of government that would follow from democratic, free, and fair national election could be possible in Ethiopia. So far, the last years have proved so but I keep hope alive that I will be able to see one in my lifetime.

Nonetheless, living through the political transition of Ethiopia to a federation during my youthful ages and maturing during the takeoff of the new political order has been an opportunity. It has been an opportunity to gain knowledge about the Ethiopian federation and its unique federalism. It has also been a wonderful opportunity and honor to record important aspects of the political transformation, particularly the background, the process, and the result of the inimitable Ethiopian federalism. The first is recounting the underlying political and legal backgrounds at local and international levels regressively. The second is explaining the process through which the existed political forces reshaped the old processes and introduced a new one to inaugurate a new political order. The last is an attempt to position the outcome of the first and the second and setting out features and challenges of the Ethiopian federation and its federalism. Doing so would require follow-ups and analyses that help ensure presenting balanced accounts of events from the point of view of an independent outsider and useful analysis that would advance better understanding.

This book is a result of an independent study to explain the Ethiopian federation: its making, its features, and its theoretical and practical challenges. The constitutional pact theory of federalism guided the study. The analysis followed the political and ideological approach to the study of federalism. The constitutional recognition of the national diversity, where not only all

the nations, nationalities, and peoples of the federation have the right to self-determination but also all equal, and each is sovereign, was the animating element throughout the study. The book recounts the international and local backgrounds to national self-determination and the political dynamism during the process of the formation of the federation. It explicates the conceptual underpinnings of the federalization process and defines Ethiopian federalism with a new recognition theory of federalism that it suggests. It articulates the features of the federation in detail. Also, it analyzes the conceptual and practical challenges of the federation. It is written with reserved judgments to allow general-purpose readers and students of federalism to make a well-informed understanding out of the dissertation. The work could be a contribution to the study of federalism.

Deribie Mekonnen Demmeksa
November 9, 2018
Horten, Norway

Chapter 1

Introduction

The mid-1970s was a tempestuous period in Ethiopia. The Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC), commonly known as *Derg,* deposed *Atse* Haile Selassie I on 12 September 1974. This revolutionary act effectively ended the Abyssinian monarchy, which claimed direct descent from King Solomon of Israel in its legends. Politically, there was a popular revolution, but very short-lived. Socially, the class distinction between the feudal lords and the commoners was collapsing. Economically, the change soon turned the country from an emerging Western model of Capitalism to the Russian model of Socialism. This led to the transposition of an alliance of the country in Cold War blocks. *Derg* declared 'Scientific socialism' the political ideology of the provisional government. Culturally, the people started to manifest their long-suppressed language, beliefs, customs, traditions, and arts. These changes, so fundamental, quivered the *status quo* and laid the country at a crossroads. Reactionary anarchy, hostile ideological factions, questions of identity, armed rebellions, the formation of secessionist movements, political assassinations, civil unrest, and war with Somalia characterized the immediate few years of post-Imperial Ethiopia. Most notably, the cold-hearted "White Terror" of the opposition was met with the hard-nosed "Red Terror" of *Derg.* Under the motto of "Ethiopia First," its peoples started to descend into chaos.

The chaos, however, served the mission of one man. By the end of the 1970s, Mengistu Haile-Mariam, chairperson of *Derg*, had made himself the unchallenged leader of the country. He became increasingly brutal. Through the elimination of potential contenders, he became an incontestable head of state and government. He took control of the country and began to introduce less of the needed radical but more of upkeep changes.

Consequently, there was only a minor change in the feeling of the people for the figure of the head of the state and government. In the views of the

public, it was only a slight shift from one form of authoritarianism to another: only the symbolism of *Atse* Haile Selassie I was replaced by that of Comrade Mengistu Haile-Mariam. Both were perceived as undemocratic, tyrants, and illegitimate. Clapham (2006) observes:

> in just the same way that, in the imperial era, authority was conceived in official iconography as descending from above to an emperor whose titles included that of Seyum Egziabher, or Elect of God, so in the era of revolution it could be viewed as descending from the socialist trinity of Marx, Engels and Lenin to the anointed General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Ethiopia. (p. 114)

Though *Derg* acknowledged that Ethiopia was "a multi-national country with various nationalities at different levels of development, different aspirations and expectations" (Haile-Mariam, 1988, p. 38), it had trouble time ruling Ethiopia. Selassie (2003) argues: *Derg* had little legitimacy in both traditional or democratic politics and "its claim to rule was, from the beginning, highly precarious" (p. 62). To build legitimacy, but a decade after the revolution, *Derg* formed the Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE) in 1984 through the Commission for Organization of Workers' Party of Ethiopia (COWPE). Derg established COPWE on 18 December 1979. Its sole purpose was to organize the WPE. After the formation of WPE in 1984, COWPE was dissolved. Through the WPE, the military rule transformed itself, at least cosmetically, to civilian rule by establishing a single popular party in the country. It did so by ratifying the constitution that would establish the Peoples' Democratic Republic of Ethiopia in 1987.

After the ratification of the constitution, WPE tried to demonstrate *Derg* had been reformed. The Chairperson of WPE and the president of the republic, the former chairperson of *Derg*, announced: "The economy is mixed of state, cooperative, and private sectors" (Haile-Mariam, 1988, p. 35). In his press conference with international media in 1988, he also tried to downplay the national liberation struggles which were gaining momentum. He said that his country is not "a penal colony" but "a class society to which conflicts and struggle are intrinsic" (Haile-Mariam, 1988, p. 24). However, he publicly admitted for the first time that there were political prisoners in the country and promised that the last of them would be freed but only after reviewing individual cases according to the new constitution that was ratified the year before (Haile-Mariam, 1988). He also made a U-turn on his long-held policy when he stated, "[W]e have never believed nor do we believe in [a] military solution for the problem of the north" (Haile-Mariam, 1988, p. 30).

After this confessed transformation of *Derg*, not all efforts would fail to build the badly needed legitimacy nor the last-minute U-turn of the socialist

government under President Mengistu Haile-Mariam would produce any meaningful effect. By March 1990, the government had declared that socialism would not work in Ethiopia and the WPE should be changed to the Ethiopian Democratic Union Party. It also showed interest and good intention to open the political space for dialogue. It also had declared the economic policy of the country a "mixed economy." These declarations were understood as signs of openness for change on the part of the regime. There was hope that the economy would be open to the local and international investors and the government pursues only peaceful means to resolve the civil war that was raging in the north. Optimistic political thinkers and leaders of the national liberation fronts regarded the moves as good gestures but not enough. Everyone hoped for any sort of change, any change that could help restore national peace.

However, the hope for change was never to materialize in any form. Instead, the inevitability of the fall of the government was noticeably clear. The good intentions and plans to reform the economy and change the lives of the citizens for the better were cut short mainly because it was busy fighting many armed groups in the disturbing civil war. As a result, little of the intended good plans could materialize. The late declarations of the socialist government served neither its short-term target of resolving the intensified liberation struggle nor the long-term signal of the shift of allegiance from East Block to West Block of the Cold War divide. Most importantly, it was never enough to bring about even a semblance of peace in the country. The armed insurgencies not only continued but also intensified their offensives after the self-remodeling of *Derg* from military dictatorship to socialist party in 1987. By mid-1991, the successful rebel TPLF/EPRDF forces had won both the ideological and the strategic battles, and the days of the regime were numbered.

Interested scholars forward multiple reasons for the military and ideological successes of the TPLF/EPRDF. Berhe (2009), one of the founders and veteran fighters of TPLF, provides a long list of agreeable factors that contributed to the military success of the TPLF/EPRDF. These factors include (1) experience and example of insurgent movements around the world; (2) highly motivated guerrilla army; (3) successful mobilization of ordinary people; (4) early victories over rival organizations; (5) growing unpopularity of the authoritarian, deeply undemocratic *Derg* government; (6) moral and material support and direct participation of ordinary people at crucial moments of the war; (7) the conformity of the army to centralism and strict discipline (p. 329). Abraham (1994) adds high moral and firm commitment of the TPLF's soldiers that were sharply contrasted with less

determined, less trained, less experienced, and reluctantly recruited soldiers of the regime were the key to the success of EPRDF to win the civil war easily (p. 166).

By the end of May 1991, the extent of the devastation of the protracted civil war was clear. It had cost immensely the lives of civilians and the armed forces of both sides. The seventeen years of civil war resulted in an estimated death and disappearance of 1,050,000 national army members, and the government expended an estimated 17.24 billion USD (Abraham, 1994). No one knows the total number of deaths from the rebel army and associated civilians and the financial costs of the rebel groups. It is however not difficult to make estimations. By taking an arbitrary estimation of half of what is known as the number of dead or missing government soldiers for the dead of the rebel soldier, and adding ten percent estimation for civilian casualties, one can estimate that the long civil war may have caused a total death of over 1,680,000 citizens. If the opposition fighters spent a quarter of the government's expenditure, one could estimate that the civil war may have cost over 21.55 billion USD. From these conservative estimations, one can understand that the human and financial cost of the civil war was so immense.

After such devastation, the TPLF/EPRDF and few other rebel groups overthrew the government of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia on 28 May 1991. That was just a week after the president of the republic, Mengistu Haile-Mariam, fled the country inexplicably to Zimbabwe. Later, Mengistu Haile-Mariam would claim his fleeing was a colluded arrangement by the West (the USA in particular) rather than his consented decision to leave the country in such a manner and at that moment in time. Former US ambassador to Ethiopia, David H. Shinn, admitted that the US facilitated the deal for Mengistu Haile-Mariam to flee the country (Shinn, 2014). The USA, through its chief negotiator Herman Cohen, an assistant Secretary of States for African Affairs, had advised Mengistu to resign ahead of the London conference scheduled on 27-28 May 1991. The purpose of the Conference was to negotiate a peaceful political settlement between his falling government and the advancing armed fronts (EPRDF, EPLF, and OLF) to the state capital. The government representatives led by the newly appointed Prime Minister, Tesfaye Dinka, walked out of the conference learning that the USA had advised EPRDF to move into the capital and take the state power (Lewthwaite, 1991; Minorities at Risk Project, 2004).

Many factors contributed to the mortifying defeat of the government by the armed fronts. Hameso (2004) attributes the control of state power by the TPLF/EPRDF in Addis Ababa as "a combination of luck, manipulation, and political deception" (p. 170). Political analysts would agree that these

ascriptions were mostly true. It was partly luck, due to the global change of political tides. On one hand, it took place at the time the main backer of the socialist regime (USSR) and the political ideology based on which *Derg* and WPE were built had collapsed. On the other hand, it took place at the time the apparent strong backer of the rebel group, the USA, had emerged triumphant of the Cold War. The realization of these changes must have imposed the psychological burden of "flight" than "fight" upon both the national army and its generals. The number of generals who declined their regime was increasing. It was partly the result of the determination of national liberation fighters. Their determination was based on their desire to change the political order in the country by ensuring the rights of self-determination of NNPs. The manipulation was evident in the formation of instrumental shadow organizations for other peoples of Ethiopia, such as Amhara, Oromo, and others, whose leaders were only to serve TPLF leaders as their honest disciples having little to do more than mechanically acting and serving the interests of TPLF.

Two decades later, this manipulation appears to have remained at work except for the formation of many more of such disciples, one for each NNP. The political deception has to do with the unrealized promises of full self-determination, full freedoms, observance of democratic and human rights, and democratic governance, which are, by many standards, yet to be realized by the NNPs of Ethiopia more than two decades later.

The determined TPLF/EPRDF however contentedly set on the driver's seat not only for the realization of self-determination of NNPs but also for the attainment of its other social, political, and economic goals. The public knew that the TPLF agenda was more about grievances than secession of the Tigray region; some suspect that the goal of TPLF has always been different. The grievance has been on loss of power after the onset of the dominance of the Shewan Amhara after *Atse* Menelik II's succession to the Abyssinian throne and the subsequent marginalization of Tigrayan elites from state power under the *Derg* that had maintained the experienced Amhara in its bureaucracy. Outwardly, the ambition of Tigrayan elite is reported as "to build Tigray to a greater, prosperous and wealthy nation and the Tigray people to a first-class people in every aspect in the Horn of Africa" (Ali Idris of AAPO in May 2000 in Addis Ababa, quoted in Aalen, 2002, p. 45). It intends to achieve this through the institutionalized dominance in the ideology and governance mechanisms of EPRDF.

In connection to such public suspicion, Záhořík (2011) observes:

> Already at the end of 1980s, the leading military-political party, Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), prepared for political

> dominance by establishing Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Party [Front] (EPRDF), a seemingly multi-ethnic party [front] representing the free will of all Ethiopian peoples. The reality was much different as the EPRDF served only as a platform for the TPLF to reach its political and economic goals by increasing its coalition potential. (p. 374)

On the other hand, the fall of the socialist government marked the return to a mix of both Western model of political economy and "a revised Marxism distinguished especially by adherence to Stalin's theory of the 'national question'" (Clapham, 2006, p. 108). Both were, however, customized to the national line of the diverse Ethiopian societies. By the beginning of 1991, the manifestation of socialist ideology had left the country. The future political orientation of the country had already started to tune towards the Western world. This was because of the declaration of 'mixed economy' by the *Shengo* (parliament) of the Mengistu Haile-Mariam regime. It was an attempt by the *Shengo* to have a transitional economic policy for its intended transfer from Socialism to Capitalism.

In the TPLF led EPRDF camp, the ideals of Stalinism, particularly the "National Question" and the aspiration of a centralized multinational state, have always been kept warm in the heart of the TPLF/EPRDF leaders. "National self-determination" has been the ruminant of MLLT central ideology, an ideology that has been eroded significantly by the events that have unfolded following the beginning of the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the USSR. Just as a centralized multinational state was the *alpha-omega* of Stalin (Ree, 1994), TPLF/EPRDF visualized the formation of such a state in Ethiopia with its leaders at the apex of the state power. The aspiration began when it changed the fundamental goal of the armed struggle from the secession of Tigray *from* Ethiopia to the internal self-determination of Tigray *in* Ethiopia in 1985.

In preparation for the realization of its *alpha-omega*, the TPLF helped the formation and organization of national armed forces under its command and ideological leadership. In the process of positioning itself as an indisputable leader, it would manage to dismantle and destroy the EPRP, negotiate the secession of Eritrea with EPLF, degrade the political program of EPDM and harmonize it with its program, plan to transform EPDM to ANDM, form OPDO, a counter-armed opposition to the OLF, and groom another dependent party that could represent the southern peoples. Through this process, TPLF was aiming for its *alpha omega,* a multinational Ethiopia that it would control centrally.

The uniquely interesting combination of the conviction of TPLF/EPRDF to answer the 'National Question' of self-determination and

its aspiration to join the Western capitalist economic system, while holding revolutionary democracy as the core of the party's ideology, was high up in the political air of the country but as hope and worry. In the moments that followed the 1991 revolution, there was real political and existential fear and hope among the Ethiopian public, lest national polarization and confrontation could emerge and the country could descend to deeper civil war or a better future could be dawning for oppressed Nations and Nationalities of Ethiopia. The stake could not be higher: both the fear and the hope were equally strong. In post-May 1991 Ethiopia, uncivilized national politics, primarily driven by emotional competitive self-rediscovery of national identity, mushroomed. Besides, national polemics with a retaliatory orientation towards the historically dominant national groups dominated every media. Particularly the *nafxanyaa* Amhara (armed Amhara settlers outside of Abyssinia Proper) were both direct targets and catalysts of the political and national polemic. The nationalists cogitated the *nafxanyaa* as having had an oppressive, abusive, and demeaning attitude towards other NNPs of Ethiopia and known for undemocratic political character and self-centered historical belief. The OLF, on its part, started to question the legitimacy of the northern settlers, former settler colonizers, to continue their relatively privileged life without retribution in its stronghold regions. The same was the question of a considerable number of minorities in the south. The state had oppressed these minorities, or they had developed such a mentality. These formerly oppressed nations and nationalities opted for national self-determination. Formerly privileged nations, particularly the Amhara, opted for national unity. Except few, the nations and nationalities of Ethiopia have always wanted to support Ethiopian national unity. The conviction of TPLF and some rebel liberation groups on one hand and the wish and aspiration of most of the nations and nationalities, on the other hand, stood in a tag-of-war with disastrous consequences for both, should only one side loses/wins. The passive majority, lest it implodes in indiscriminate national clashes, feared the political and social atmosphere of those days. It was in this fearful political atmosphere that the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE), Ethiopian Federation, which I have decided to study independently, was to be formed.

The study of federalism has been one of the challenging experiences for scholars. This partly owes to the fact that, as Burgess (2006) summarized, federalism is a "microcosmic" and "multifaceted" concept. It overarches the whole field of political and social sciences that require wider comprehension of sociological, legal, ideological, political, constitutional, and institutional approaches for better understanding. It involves sensitive issues of moral,

economic, socio-political, peace and security, rights and freedoms, and identity of the people. It has been "a topic of intense intellectual debate" (Inman & Rubinfeld, 1997, p. 661) around the world.

However, there is no universal theory of federalism. Scholars of federalism are yet to develop a whole encompassing theory of federalism. Federalism is one of the most studied but theoretically obscure forms of political arrangement. There is no single theory of federalism that satisfies all its claimed characterizations and supply an overarching analytical framework for modern federal states. But it spans multiples of established fields of study, including legal, political, sociological, and economic. Furthermore, federalism has a global character and diverse forms and approaches. The interdisciplinary and global character of federalism has made it one of the most studied fields; yet, paradoxically, with not even a common definition of federalism, and "a 'global theory' of federalism remains absent" (Gamper, 2005, p. 1317). In agreement with Gamper (2005), Burgess (2006) states that "while a thing as federal theory does exist, there is, as yet no full-fledged theory of federalism" (p. 1). Similarly, Gamper (2005) holds the global theory of federalism is lacking and despite a "plethora of literature" there is not even "a clear and commonly used definition of the term" (p. 1297). Federalism has proved to be "an ambiguous concept that is difficult to define" (Babalola, 2015, p. 77).

Then, what is a theory of federalism, which is missing? Feeleya and Rubin (2008) have tried to offer a contextual description of what this missing theory of federalism is:

> A theory of federalism is a general account of the structural arrangement of dual-level of government, one that goes beyond simple description of a particular federal system, a paired comparison of two or more federal systems, a legal analysis that seeks to formulate workable rules for defining boundaries and providing a convincing rationale for them once they have been drawn, or a historical analysis that traces changes in the relationship between central state and constituent units. Such discussions are useful and necessary in defining and describing particular federal system or the difference among them. But theory should do something more; it should link together the component parts of a concept into an integrated whole, to show how they fit together. Thus, a theory of federalism should provide a general rationale for federalism–a general explanation for why federations are established, why some succeed, and why some fail. (Feeleya and Rubin, 2008, p. 3)

Even though such a general (universal) theory of federalism is missing, there have been several useful sub-optimal theories of federalism. The current theories of federalism that have been adopted by federalism students are mainly based on the analysis of groups of concepts that emerged during the founding era of US federalism in the 1780s. They are interrelated within the process of federal arrangement in the USA and their idealistic and highly abstract interpretations. Since then, throughout the development process of the concept, the American classical concepts of federalism have attracted many more innovative approaches that have been shaping the concept both in the USA and in other parts of the world where federalism has been adapted as an alternative solution or as a variable political arrangement. Throughout its progressive evolution, federalism has produced multiple of its versions, at times fundamentally challenging the original intention of the concept. Throughout these evolutionary or transformative processes, one thing stays clear: *it has been an inductive process*. Also, it is a multifaceted subject by its nature where it "is constitutional, political, social, economic, cultural, legal, philosophical and ideological" (Burgess, 2006, p. 1). This has further exacerbated the already arduous task of the study of federalism, making it an ever demanding endeavor.

From among the sub-optimal theories of federalism, I find three of them relevant to the case of Ethiopian federalism. These are dualistic, constitutional pact, and decentralization theories of federalism. The dualistic theory of federalism assumes "the constituent parts of a federal state were states themselves" and "the classical (dualistic) theory of federalism conceives a federal state as a dual system that consists of the federation and the states (Gamper, 2005). This theory de-emphasizes the local government and the option that metropolitan polities, such as capital cities, could also be a constituent part of the federation (Gamper, 2005). This is clear in the case of Ethiopian federalism where local governments have constitutional recognition, and two city governments are chartered by the constitution to administer themselves as a mid-way between local governments and state governments. Constitutional pact theory of federalism assumes "only the constituent units, and not the federal state, as the true bearers of sovereignty" (Gamper, 2005, p. 1303). This is closely related to Ethiopian federalism. According to the Constitution, all the nations, nationalities, and peoples (NNPs) of the federation are sovereign. The federation is a constitutional pact among these sovereign NNPs. Besides, according to Article 50(3) of the constitution, the state councils have supreme powers in as much as it appears the federation is remarkably close to confederation in its constitutional foundation. Thus, the constitutional pact theory of federalism

may better explain Ethiopian federalism. This theory is an overall guide in this work. The decentralization theory of federalism holds that "the constituent units are neither states nor sovereign, but just decentralized units on a scale that makes no qualitative difference between local government and a constituent unit of a federal system" (Gamper, 2005, p. 1303). This theory is less relevant to Ethiopian federalism. However, it is important to emphasize that constituent units of the Ethiopian federation have the elements of both statehood and sovereignty; and some local governments in the states of the federation are the result of self-determination of a nation, a nationality, or a people while in the vast majority, they are decentralized units of a national state.

Table 1

Approaches to federalism and the respective central arguments

Approach	Central arguments	Proponents
Legal and institutional approach	Federalism is conceived in terms of the constitutional division of power between two levels of government	Wheare, 1963
Sociological approach	Federal government is a device by which the federal qualities of society are articulated and protected	Livingston, 1952
Federalism as asymmetry and symmetry	The diverse way (symmetrical and asymmetrical) in which each member state in a federal system can relate to the system as a whole, the central authority and among each other	Tarlton, 1965
Political and ideological approach	Federalism as a bargain. The federal bargain caused by military and/or diplomatic needs	Riker, 1964
	Federalism as an ideology of decentralism, centralism, and balance	King, 1982
	Federalism as an alternative to exclusive state-sovereignty by combining 'self- rule' and 'shared-rule'	Elazar, 1987

Note. Adapted from Kefele (2009, p. 36).

The most important element of these and many other sub-optimal theories of federalism is that all agree "federalism is a principle that applies to systems consisting of at least two constituent parts that are not wholly

independent but together form the system as a whole" (Gamper, 2005, p. 1299). This is one of the fundamental elements of federalism that help the study of federal systems.

Despite the missing universal theory of federalism, there have been multiple approaches to the study of federalism. Scholars developed the approaches based on sub-optimal theories of federalism which have been enough to describe common forms of federalism. These approaches have been suggested by Wheare (1963) who focused on legal and institutional arrangements of federalism and defines *federal principle* as the "method of dividing powers so that the general and regional governments are each, within a sphere, co-ordinate and independent" (p. 10), Livingston (1952) who focused on sociological qualities, Tarlton (1965) who focused on symmetry and asymmetry, and Riker (1964), King (1982), and Elazar (1987) who focused on political and ideological aspects of federalism (see Table 1).

The current work is based on the political and ideological approach to federalism. This approach combines: (a) federalism as a bargain (Riker, 1964) necessitated by the revolutionary overthrow of the central government by a coalition of national liberation fronts and organizations who were determined to achieve national self-determination within or without Ethiopia, (b) federalism as an ideology of decentralism, centralism and balance (King, 1982) where decentralization of the power of the multi-national state was necessitated by the ideology of national-self-determination of NNPs (where some balance should be maintained to continue as a single political community), and (c) federalism as an alternative to exclusive state-sovereignty by combining 'self- rule' and 'shared-rule' (Elazar, 1987) where NNPs are nominally sovereign for self-rule (state government) but yield some part of their sovereignty for the effect of shared-rule (federal government).

However, much emphasis has been placed on Riker's and Elazar's approaches: federalism as a bargain and federalism as ensuring states' sovereignty (in the Ethiopian case, the sovereignty of NNPs) under 'self-rule' and 'shared-rule' arrangement, respectively. A close look at the Transitional Charter that established the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (1991-1994) and the Constitution that formed the federation reveals that the federal arrangement was based mainly on political bargain among the armed forces, which had just toppled the socialist government, and other invited members of the National Peace and Reconciliation Conference of 1-5 July 1991 in Addis Ababa. Besides, the Ethiopian federation is demonstrably an institutionalization of the sovereignty of the NNPs into a dual system of

national 'self-rule' (national states) and the federal 'shared-rule' (federal state). Also, Riker's theory of federalism is one of the enduring theoretical perspectives on federalism thus far (Feeley & Rubin, 2008). Therefore, the political and ideological approach to the study of federalism guided this work.

Chapter 2

Backgrounds for Self-determination: International and Local

It is imperative to have a closer look at the backgrounds of the formation of the Ethiopian federation. This could help to understand the dynamics during the making of the Ethiopian Federation. The backgrounds were international and local, and they were legal and political. They span the time before and after the 1991 change of government in Ethiopia. These backgrounds within which the framers conceived the Ethiopian Federation are part of the making of the federation. They have influenced greatly the underlying politics and the making of the Constitution that established the FDRE.

This chapter discusses these backgrounds. The discussion on the international background highlights the evolution of the concept of self-determination. It, however, focuses on the legal and political resolutions on self-determination that have been enshrined in the Charter and Resolutions of the United Nations, the Charter of African Union, the Charter of Paris for New Europe, and the Vienna Declaration and Program of Actions. The discussion on the local background focuses on multiple issues. It begins by highlighting the history of the formation of modern Ethiopia in the late 19th century. It recaps the political movements and the armed struggles in the country since the mid-20th century by focussing on a brief history of the struggle of OLF and TPLF. It also discusses the formation of EPRDF and the collapse of the *Derg* government. Finally, it elaborates on the ethnicity and the origin of politics of ethnicity in Ethiopia.

International Background

From 'National Question' to 'National Self-Determination'

By the late 19th century, the political idea of self-determination was emerging on the global stage. Nationalists considered it as a liberation idea for the oppressed peoples and classes. The global socialist movement took up the idea of self-determination of oppressed nations everywhere as the cause of the international struggle. Workers and trade unions in the oppressive countries embraced the emerging political idea. Socialist congresses were interested in advancing the idea. They saw it as a particularly important mechanism of fighting global imperialism and government suppression of nationalities. They resolved that the right to self-determination is universal; it must be respected everywhere without preconditions. The fourth congress of Socialist Workers and Trade Unions of *The Second International* (1889-1914), which was held in London from July 26- August 1, 1896, for example, resolved:

> This Congress declares that it stands for the full right of all nations to self-determination and expresses its sympathy for the workers of every country now suffering under the yoke of military, national or other absolutism. This Congress calls upon the workers of all these countries to join the ranks of the class-conscious workers of the whole world in order jointly to fight for the defeat of international capitalism and for the achievement of the aims of international Social-Democracy. (Lenin, 1914, "On the Question of National Policy")

Nevertheless, the true meaning of "self-determination" was not clear. It remained vague until Lenin would elaborate on it in the early 20th century (from 1903-1916). According to Lenin's elaboration, it meant the right to political secession, complete national liberation, and the liberation of colonies or freedom from annexation. Yet, the concept remained evolving. It, oftentimes, meant a slightly different thing at different critical moments throughout the international political discourses and the legal frameworks in the mid-20th-century.

The 20th century was a century of multiple global political changes. These changes include the fall of many empires, the independence of many colonies, the increase of national liberation movements and struggles, the

formation of most of the federations, the formation of international and continental unions, the declaration of human rights, and the bourgeoning movement for the equality of rights and equality of opportunities for all nations and nationalities. These were remarkable political achievements. As a result, humanity appeared to be converging politically and building a communal society. This is mainly because of the equality of human and democratic rights of individuals and groups, which appeared to be the goal of the progressive politics of the century.

In connection to this, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels envisioned an inevitable global society of communal life of equal rights and equitable share of resources in the early 1900s. A decade later, the idea was starting to take root among revolutionary politicians. By 1913, Stalin started voicing on "National Question" and social democracy with his definition of the nation. According to him, a nation is a "historically formed, stable community of people, united by community of language, of territory, of economic life, of psychological make-up, which expresses itself in a community of culture" (Stalin cited in *Ree*, 1994, p. 214). The 1916 conception of the concept of national self-determination by Vladimir Lenin, which would become the precursor for the political ideal of ethnic/national statehood, followed. Henceforth, the flames of the concept of national self-determination started to burn brighter.

The Evolution and Expansion of the Concept of "Self-Determination"

The concept of national self-determination continued to shift to denote specific aspects of self-determination. It, however, supported a central element of political liberation. The elevation of the concept to a universal right and, hence, to the arena of international law is attributed to President Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924) in 1918 (Baissa, 1998; Vyver, 2011) where his concept included the "notion of self-governance of people" (Nawaz, 1965, p. 84) who were under the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires (Baissa, 1998).

The two World Wars have assisted the spread of the concept of national self-determination around the world. After the end of World War I in 1918, the national self-determination of nations in the defeated empires became the mandate of the League of Nations (Vyver, 2011). This boosted nationalism and national identities. It, in turn, resulted in the faster disintegration of the

empires into multiple nations with far-reaching consequences. Multiple new nations and contesting nationalism emerged in eastern Europe and the Middle East in particular. The consequences of the truly global effect of the concept of self-determination however appeared after the end of World War II. One of these consequences was the culmination of the principle of self-determination as a matter of free choice of people enshrined in the founding charter of the United Nation and the Statute of the International Court of Justice in 1945, immediately after the end of World War II.

In fact "self-determination occupies a far more important position in the United Nations than it did in the League of Nations"(Nawaz, 1965, p. 88), by explicitly mentioning "self-determination" in two of the articles (Art. 1(2) and article 55) of its charter. The 1945 founding charter of the United Nations, in chapter 1 article 1, sub-article 2, states that one of the purposes of the UN is "to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples." Besides, article 55 calls for the "creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples" (United Nations, 1945). Furthermore, the UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, of International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic Social and Cultural Rights states, in its first part and the first article, "All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right, they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development" (United Nations, 2015).

After the end of World War II, the principle of political self-determination shifted from self-rule to liberation (from colonial rule) and kick-started its political globalization process. After the 1960s, particularly in post-colonial Africa, it made another slight twist to denote the demand for equal rights and equality of nations (nationalities) against racist regimes and ethnic-based dominance.

During the Cold War Era, the central focus of the concept of self-determination appeared to have changed. The concept came to denote the self-determination of national, religious, and linguistic minorities within national states. In the post-Cold War era, self-determination became one of the political mechanisms for de-unionization from the forcefully imposed ideological union, for liberation from the tyranny of certain national or elite groups, and to some extent for liberation from some form of fragments of colonialism. Decades later, UN resolution number 2625 of 1970 reaffirmed the provision of self-determination by resolving, "[e]very State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples referred to in the

elaboration of the principle of equal rights … right to self-determination, and freedom and independence." It further resolved:

> nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember, or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction to race, creed or colour. (United Nations, 1970, resolution number 2625)

Since then, the rights of nations, nationalities, and peoples for their self-determination continued to be strengthened. The African Charter of July 1981, in its article 20, affirmed "the unquestionable and inalienable right to self-determination of peoples" by confirming that people "shall freely determine their political status and shall pursue their economic development according to the policy they have freely chosen" (Art. 20). Heads of the states of the member state adopted the Charter in Nairobi on Human and Peoples' Rights. It entered into force in October 1986.

The global groundwork for self-determination, which would allow nations, nationalities, and peoples to secede from a "mother state" if they wish so, has been developed progressively through time. According to Baissa (1998), it has been through several stages: First, from World War I and World War II, it referred to the self-determination of peoples in the former Austro-Hungary and Ottoman empires. Second, in post-World War II, it expanded to include territories that came under the trusteeship of the victors of World War II, which were known as "trust territories." Third, in 1960, it included countries under conventional colonies. Fourth, in 1966, it came to include, ideally, the self-determination of all peoples. Fifth, in 1970, the UN further expanded and strengthened the concept of self-determination but conditioned it to the maintenance of territorial integrity of sovereign and independent states governed by indiscriminate representatives of the people. Sixth, in 1986, the African Charter further elevated the right to self-determination of peoples to include not only political independence but also freedom of development policy choices.

The concept of self-determination evolved and expanded from the 1920s to the 1980s and step by step included in international laws, union charters, and in regional and international conventions' resolutions, mainly through the UN and the OAU, where it now in summary and simply mean:

> people, who experience gross injustice, domination, massive violation of human rights, and exploitation under alien rule, are morally and legally justified [in] exercising their rights of self-determination and freely determine their political status and pursue their economic, social, and cultural development, even in breaking away from a sovereign state. (Baissa, 1998, p. 94)

Charter of Paris for New Europe

In addition to the above backgrounds for self-determination of NNPs, elsewhere, in Europe, the issue of national, ethnic, cultural, religious, and linguistic minorities was hotly discussed and resolved in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (CPNE) (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 2012). This was in 1990, just one year before the EPRDF would take state power in Addis Ababa. It was at the time when the life of the circumstantially obliged and half-transformed socialist incumbent government was hanging on a single thread of personal patriotism of President Mengistu Haile-Mariam. The NNPs, which were under any form of dominance or subjugation, were engaged in an armed struggle to improve their situation. In a way that would mirror the concocting demand in Ethiopia, the Charter of Paris affirmed:

> the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of national minorities will be protected and that persons belonging to national minorities have the right to freely express, preserve and develop that identity without any discrimination and in full equality before the law. (OSCE, 2012, p. 4)

The Charter (CPNE) was not limited only to this affirmation. It further reaffirmed that the deep conviction of the member states that not only "peace, justice, stability, and democracy, require that the national, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of national minorities be protected" but also "conditions for the promotion of that identity be created" (OSCE, 2012, p. 4). The charter also declared, "questions related to national minorities can only be satisfactorily resolved in a democratic political framework" and acknowledged that "the rights of persons belonging to national minorities must be fully respected as part of universal human rights" (OSCE, 2012, p. 7).

The repercussion of such a move in the developed part of the world was felt fully in Ethiopia across both the majority and the minority national groups who were aspiring for self-determination and independence by

secession. Most of these groups held the belief that they had been colonized by Abyssinian settlers or nationally oppressed by the dominating Amhara national group or institutions or state agencies controlled by them. They hold that they were colonized by the kingdom of Abyssinia in the last decades of the 19th century because of the support of some European states like France, Italy, and Great Britain. They also believe that, since the first decades of the 20th century, they have been oppressed through the *Amharaization* policy of the Imperial state. The oppression included cultural, religious, political, economic, and linguistic domination, and the paradoxical sentiment of being colonized by neighborly black people in the country that boasts itself of never being colonized by any foreign force has been an ever-growing momentum for liberation. Under such sentiment and aspiration, the EPRDF, EPLF, and OLF overthrew the government of the Peoples' Democratic Republic of Ethiopia in May 1991. This was a great victory for the NNPs of Ethiopia.

However, this victory was not necessarily a real victory by itself but an emergence of regional force in the center at the displacement of the central force to the periphery (Tibetu, 1995) with the potential of the displaced soon regrouping to challenge the center if full attention is not given to the regions and all regional forces. After the easy win of the war, the revolutionaries faced the difficult and enduring process of listening to the voices of divergent groups of NNPs of Ethiopia and addressing their aspirations and grievances. All armed groups hungry for freedom, democracy, rule of law, and self-determination, and the dominant political groups distrusting each other, including some members of EPRDF themselves, the country seemed to have come to the brink of falling apart and civil war looming over the horizons of Ethiopia again.

The Vienna Declaration and Program of Action

In addition to the UN Charter, African Union Charter, and Charter of Paris for a New Europe, with the promotion of self-determination of nations, nationalities, and peoples, another declaration that would reaffirm the direction of EPRDF led TGE and would add an accelerating impulse emerged from Vienna. The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (VDPA), which was adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna on 25 June 1993, declared, "all peoples have the right of self-determination" and "[b]y virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development" (United Nations, 2013, p. 18). Further, it recognized "the right

of peoples to take any legitimate action, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to realize their inalienable right of self-determination," and considered "the denial of the right of self-determination as a violation of human rights and underline[d] the importance of the effective realization of this right" (United Nations, 2013, p. 18). In its articles 26 and 27, the declaration urged for the promotion and the protection of "the rights of persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities" (United Nations, 2013, p. 36). It also advised that measures should be taken for "their full participation in all aspects of the political, economic, social, religious and cultural life of society and in the economic progress and development in their country" (United Nations, 2013, p. 36).

Local Background

Settler Colonization and National Oppression

Modern Ethiopia was formed in the last decades of the 19th century. It was the result of the conquest of the south, southwest, and southeast by the kingdom of Abyssinia. This is the view of scholars who ascribe to the colonial thesis on the formation of modern Ethiopia. The kingdom, under the leadership of *Atse* Menelik II, embarked on massive territorial expansion and military conquest. This was conducted under the auspice of "unifying former territories," promoted by the scholars who ascribe to the unification thesis. The latter thesis is merely an apologist thesis. Formerly independent Oromo republican states and kingdoms, kingdoms of Kaffa, Wolaita, Yanjero, Benishangul, Hadiyya, Sidama, Emirate of Harar, etc. fell under the Kingdom of Abyssinia. By the end of the 19th century, the kingdom had expanded its territory three folds and the Empire of Abyssinia-cum-modern Ethiopia was formed. The first modern constitution of the Empire was renamed it Empire of Ethiopia in 1931.

Until 1974, settler colonization of the south, east, and west of the country and oppression of the non-Abyssinian NNPs had continued. The social, cultural, religious, and linguistic remnants and reminders of the settler colonization are abundant, even at present, in those regions. Since then, there have been changes but the oppression and marginalization of the formerly settler colonized NNPs continued, though with lesser intensity, until the change of government in 1991. These resulted in the continued struggle of

the non-Abyssinian NNPs for national self-determination. The national domination by Amhara also became the cause for the inauguration of national liberation struggles by a number of NNPs, including in Abyssinia Proper (former territory of the Christian kingdom of Abyssinia). Both have been the cause of the armed struggle of national self-determination of many oppressed groups.

Nonetheless, not every group could agree on what self-determination means in the Ethiopian context before the 1974 revolution. When the concept of self-determination, a possible political solution to the oppression of the non-Amharans, emerged in the political sphere of Ethiopia in the 1960s, particularly among the leftist members of the Ethiopian Student Movement (ESM), it did not only immediately drove wage between those who opted for self-determination within the Empire State except Eritrea (EPRP), as a possible solution, and those who opted for national self-determination of nationalities, including cessation (MEISON), but also the support for the revolution aspired by the ESM remained divided along these two lines, even after the 1974 revolution that abolished the monarchy (Baissa, 1998).

After the fall of the monarchy and the deceleration of the Ethiopian republic, however, what it meant in the Ethiopian context became clear. It meant secession. It was clear that the majority of the leaders of the NNPs wanted to liberate their nation from Ethiopia. This was not because it was their first choice but because the national oppression and the effects of the settler colonization were allowed to continue in the post-Abyssinian Monarchy. As the socialist regime chose to keep the political *status quo,* save some shiny but less effective reforms, and it chose to govern the country by an iron fist and its leader became a tyrant as never seen before in the country, the only option to do so was through armed struggle.

The Armed Struggles: The Big Players

By the late 1970s, multiple national groups had picked up arms to liberate their nation from the Ethiopian state. Liberation fronts of three nations had been formed. The pioneer was the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), a letter overawed by the Eritrean Peoples' Liberation Front (EPLF). Its goal was the liberation of Eritrea from Ethiopia after the latter annexed the autonomous territory under unclear and dissatisfactory arrangements, which hugely disappointed the Eritrean influential elites. Others were the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Tigray People's Liberation Front

(TPLF). OLF and TPLF began the armed struggle in 1973 and 1975, respectively. The Ogden and the Sidama people had also formed liberation organizations.

In my discussion here, I shall be very brief and extremely limited. Because of its reduced relevance to Ethiopia after the independence of Eritrea in 1993, I shall not discuss the liberation struggle of Eritrea nor can I discuss every liberation organization and its struggle, even if it is relevant to Ethiopia. Because of the limited scope and purpose of this work, I shall discuss only two exemplary liberation struggles motivated by the concept of national self-determination. These would be the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). They have been the big players in the political and military life of Ethiopia.

Oromo Liberation Front

The Oromo in modern Ethiopia fell under the complete settler-colonial rule of the kingdom of Abyssinia in the late 19th century. This was due to the sheer power of European firearms in possession of the army of *Atse* Menelik II. In thirty-two years (from 1869-1900), Menelik had amassed a total of 715,000 rifles and 50,000,000 ammunitions from Great Britain, France, Italy, and Russian Empire (see Melbaa, 1988; Delebo, 1999 Eth. C). The Oromo, on the other hand, depended on traditional weapons, such as spears, swords, shields made of skin. Rifles and ammunition were extremely rare among them. Their defeat was foretold from their armaments. Since their defeat in several battles, where they faced a modernized army equipped with modern firearms with a traditional army equipped with spears and shields, the Oromo continued to resist subjugation in different forms, including armed uprisings in some regions in Oromia.

Yet, the struggle of the Oromo did not bring any momentous change for years. The Oromo elites soon understood that it would take the mobilization of the entire Oromo nation to bring about political change. To this effect, despite being under the stringent control of the imperial regime which monitored every Oromo or Oromo-related movement or association, the Oromo political elites in central Oromia formed the Matcha-Tulama Welfare Association (MTWA). They formed it as a clandestine organizing entity for the Oromo political movement in addition to its overt mission, self-help. The *Atse* Haile Selassie regime continued to harass the founders of the association until it finally banned the association and imprisoned its leaders.

When *Atse* Haile Selassie I banned the MTWA in 1967, some of its prominent members went underground. One of them, Hussein Mohamed

Ali (Hussien Sora) went to Somalia and became the general secretary of the Liberation Front of Somali West (LFSW). The LFWS changed its name in the Middle East and became Ethiopian National Liberation Front (ENLF) in 1971 and tried to enter Ethiopia to establish a liberation army. However, it succeeded, two years later, in 1973 when it set up a guerrilla base in Chercher, East Oromia. By then the name ENLF had become Oromo National Liberation Front (ONLF). In late 1973, the banned members of MTWA, who went underground, organized a disguised founding conference in Finfinnee (Addis Ababa) where Hussien Sora and Baker Yusuf (Elemo Qilxu), among other prominent Oromo nationalists, took part. The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) was born in December 1973. In summary, MTWA conceived, nurtured, and gave birth to OLF.

OLF began its political struggle with challenges. The 1973 conference also adopted the first political program of OLF. The program reiterated the anti-colonial struggle of the Oromo nation and opted for the breakaway of Oromia from the Empire State of Ethiopia. OLF launched its first armed struggle in Chercher under the leadership of Hassan Ibrahim, who became a martyr. Despite the heavy-handed attack by the imperial army, with the goal of total elimination, the OLF army was able to avert annihilation. However, dividing elements started to appear. Few Oromo nationalists and their friends formed Organization for Oromo People's Liberation Struggle (OOPLS) in 1975 in Yemen. It continued to work side by side with ENLF until the next year. This had a dividing effect on the Oromo liberation struggle at its early stage.

To solve this problem and to organize the Oromo struggle effectively against the Ethiopian empire, OLF held a historic conference in *Finfinnee* from 13-14 June 1976. This was after Derg deposed the Abyssinian monarchy. The conference was the first official "Founding Congress" of OLF. The conference organized the fragmenting liberation struggle of the Oromo and united them under the OLF. It also revised the political program that was adopted at the disguised conference three years earlier and issued a detailed and updated political program.

Following the coming together of organizations in their name, the Oromo started to join OLF in large numbers. An armed struggle resumed in Gara Mul'ata in Harargie, East Oromia, the following year. OLF continued to gain the support of the Oromo public in the late 1970s and early 1980s as if it had entered the blood of every Oromo. The Oromo looked up to OLF as the true liberator of the Oromo people and Oromia. Meanwhile, the mass arrest and torture of Oromo for suspicion of having a connection with it and

the attack of the Ethiopian national army on OLF posts and command units continued.

In 1977, OLF restructured and strengthened itself. It elected a forty-one-member central committee. It also elected the five-member executive committee. This committee formed the Supreme Politico-Military Command (SPMC). SPMC, in turn, commanded five functional committees. With this restructuring, it became better organized and started to grow stronger both in political stature and guerrilla operations.

However, the Ethio-Somali war of 1977-1978, which was fought partly in East Oromia, the then strongholds of OLF, weakened it very significantly. Nevertheless, the OLF got more weapons, capturing from both the Cuban and Soviet-backed Ethiopian army and the American-backed Somali army while they were transacting the region. This helped OLF to expand its guerrilla operations to most parts of Harargie and parts of Arsi and Bale districts in the following years. By 1981, OLF had expanded its operations to West Oromia, Wallagga region.

In the early 1980s, OLF started to reach out to other armed groups that were fighting the same enemy. The purpose was to have reasonable cooperation and concerted political alliance against the Ethiopian state. Fort this, TPLF was one of the strongest candidates. At the time, TPLF was emerging as a strong-armed group in the north. At the early stage, the relationship between OLF and TPLF appeared to be cordial and promising. Soon, however, the latter acted in bad faith and the relation broke down.

A former OLF chairperson reports the rise and the tumble of the relation between OLF and TPLF:

> Of all the groups, apart from EPLF, the OLF came closer to having friendly relations with TPLF. In the early 1980s, both fronts met repeatedly to discuss how to coordinate their political and military activities. At one stage in the mid-1980s, contact between the two had matured to a level of military cooperation and assisting each other in training and other matters. But when the TPLF drew up its own agenda for the whole of the empire and decided to project itself as the sole champion of the Oromo cause, the relationship started to sour. It reached an all-time low in the late 1980s after the TPLF formed its own wing whose members were prisoners of war of the TPLF and EPLF. (Lata, 1998a, p. 53)

By the end of the 1980s, armed groups, which were based mostly in the northern part of the country, estranged OLF. It was the major opposition armed force in the eastern, southern, and western parts of the country. The northern strongest armed forces, the TPLF, and the ELF saw it as an

adversary to their political program and competitor to the state power lest the central government falls. This motivated the TPLF and EPDM, a splinter group from EPRP, to form a counter organization to OLF. The formation of the Oromo People's Democratic Organisation in 1989 in Tigray, northern Ethiopia, by TPLF-EPDM for a strategic purpose had an undermining effect on OLF and divided the Oromo liberation struggle. The TPLF formed the EPRDF to consolidate its dominance and future state power grab.

Nevertheless, OLF continued to work together with TPLF-EPRDF and EPLF. They would overthrow jointly the authoritarian government of Mengistu Haile-Mariam in May 1991. OLF would take an active part in the National Peace and Reconciliation Conference which would issue the Transitional Charter that would establish the TGE. The Charter would become the basis for the formation of the Ethiopian Federation.

Tigray People's Liberation Front

The people of Tigray have a long history of revolt against the central government in Shewa. It began in the immediate aftermath of the death of *Atse* Yohannes IV and the shift of the political center to the south. Since then, the Tigray people were not satisfied with the social and political position in Shewan-controlled Ethiopia. This was aggravated under the Amhara-centered government of *Atse* Haile Selassie I. Like other oppressed nations, the Tigrayans revolted multiple times against the marginalization they endured. The revolts were however not well organized and lacked effective leadership.

The revolt of the Tigrayan people started to take sharp political shape within the Ethiopian Student Movement (ESM) of the 1960s and 1970s through the Tigrayan University Student Association (TUSA) that was formed in the early 1970s. The activists of the TUSA formed the Tigrayan National Organization (TNO) in 1974. The TNO became the precursor of the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) with the objective of self-determination of Tigray People within the Ethiopian state. Around the same time, an organization known as the Political Association of Tigray (PAT) was formed to set up an independent state of Tigray. PAT later became Tigrai Liberation Front (TLF). TLF and TPLF established political relations with their matured Eritrean counterparts, Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), and Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), respectively. They continued to work together against the Ethiopian government until both TLF and ELF

were later eliminated by TPLF and EPLF, respectively. ELF was founded in 1961. EPLF was a splinter group from ELF that emerged in the early 1970s.

The armed struggle of the Tigraian people for self-determination under TPLF started on 18 February 1975 by few determined founding members. However, TPLF adopted the political goal of TLF and produced a political program commonly referred to as "Manifesto 68"[1] in July 1976. The Manifesto proclaims the secession of Tigray as an end. The secessionist agenda of the Manifesto led to controversy among the TPLF and soon it was dropped in the 1979 first congress of TPLF. It, however, paved the way for the emergence of a communist core group within the leadership. A Marxists-Leninist League of Tigray (MLLT) was inaugurated within the TPLF in 1985.

MLLT was formed to provide leadership and an ideological guide to the national democratic revolution that would pave the way for a planned socialist economy (Berhe, 2009). Hence, the political ideology of "revolutionary democracy", an idea copied from Lenin's thesis of 1919, emerged. MLLT took over the TPLF and tried to establish nation-wide Marxist-Leninist Party of Ethiopia in the late 1980s with the name Ethiopian Marxist-Leninist Forces (EMLF), the precursor to EPRDF.

Multiple political, military, social, and economic changes that favored TPLF took place between 1985 and 1989. The inevitable fall of the central government was clear by the end of 1989. There were obvious signs that it will fall sooner. The devastation of the country due to the horror of the 1985 Great Ethiopian Famine had shocked the core of the nation. The fracturing of the national army starting from 1987 was an abysmal danger. The waning military and economic support from the USSR starting from 1988 was equivalent to a loss of one arm to the government. The dissolution of *Derg* as junta and the post-*Derg* economic policy dilemma after February 1987 were indications of policy confusion. The increased dissent in the ranks and file of the military since Mengistu Haile-Mariam had become President in 1987, which led to the May 1989 attempted coup, were obvious signs that the regime had begun to implode. The post-military coup execution of many prominent generals and defection of some of them was a noticeably clear sign that Mengistu Haile-Mariam was losing semblance of control. In the meantime, the TPLF had out-grown its initial political and military goal of liberating Tigray from Ethiopia and had started to contemplate the total control of Ethiopia to save the province of Eritrea (Lata, 1998a).

The fundamental drive for this outgrowth was the fortune that the 1984/85 Ethiopian famine and its worldwide response threw into the hands of TPLF. The uprooted peasants became cheap army recruits, and the international financial donation enabled the TPLF to import arms and ammunition from China and elsewhere (Lata, 1998a). The famine brought

financial fortune that the TPLF suddenly found itself in it. The fortune would not only help TPLF to become the most armed rebel group to dominate others in almost every aspect of power but also would give it the momentum to overthrow the government and save some of the "fortune" to establish some of its "endowment companies." In mid-1985, when it held the founding congress of MLLT within it, TPLF had just obtained USD 100 million in cash (Berhe, 2018). Berhe (2018), in the article *Famine and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF)*, explains that money was received as part of the international emergency relief fund, including from the famous Band-Aid. TPLF had also received some more through a scheme of deception, where donors who came to the territory it had "liberated" to purchase some grains for the dying victims were cheated by its impostor[2] veterans as grain traders (Berhe, 2018). This was an audacious act of TPLF to grab money from the donors and it was an utter disregard to the thousands of people, who were dying of the worst famine in the history of the country (Berhe, 2018). For the money-hungry TPLF and its leaders, this was an unexpected fortune. While tens of thousands of people succumbed to the famine before their eyes, the TPLF/MLLT leaders were intoxicated with hard currency. The TPLF/MLLT that turned rich overnight would use 95% of the money for the civil war project leaving only 5% for the famine aid (Berhe, 2018). The new fortune and the new political goal had demanded a new strategy and new goal: the formation of the subsidiary organizations under its tight military and ideological control using loyal proxies from among the prisoners of war and the total control of Ethiopia, respectively. The new strategy and goal set, and the fall of the central government was sufficiently clear, by 1889, the leadership of MLLT/TPLF started to prepare for total control of the Ethiopian political power by organizing other fronts around its ideology.

Five years later, TPLF formed Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Front (EPRDF). EPRDF was formed from the coalition of unequal, from MLLT-TPLF and Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (EPDM). EPDM was a minority splinter group from EPRP that survived due to the support and protection of MLLT-TPLF. Being the junior partner and very dependent on TPLF for its survival, EPDM had no choice but to buckle under the political programs of its sustainer accepting it as its own.

TPLF was successful in forming and deploying proxy organizations in the process of toppling the central government. In 1990, the leadership of MLLT founded Ethiopian Proletarian Organizations' Unity (EPOU) (Berhe, 2009). The little known EPOU would soon form the basis for the formation of multiple People's Democratic Organizations (PDOs) that would become a member of EPRDF representing the NNPs. The same year, MLLT-TPLF

formed the Oromo Peoples' Democratic Organization (OPDO) and extended its ideological control over the Organization that is formed in the name of the largest nation of the country. The formation of OPDO estranged the political competitor of TPLF, the OLF, and divided the Oromo. OPDO was formed from former Oromo captives of the national defense forces who were mostly Oromo and mostly members of the EPDM. Thus, OPDO was formed within EPRDF. MLLT-TPLF, now armed with the newly adapted but very vague ideology of *revolutionary democracy* and assured itself on the total control of the nominal EPDM and OPDO, started to present itself more in its new name and form, EPRDF. It started to portray itself as representing not only the minority Tigray nation but also the majority of the Ethiopian peoples through the token representation of the Oromo by OPDO and the Amhara by EPDM (later ANDM).

EPRDF, together with EPLF and OLF, would heroically but unexpectedly, overthrow the *Derg* government on 28 May 1991 and play the decisive role of forming the TGE and engineering the Ethiopian Federation.

Ethnicity and the Origin of Politics of Ethnicity

Austerely speaking, all countries in the world are composed of nations, nationalities, and peoples. Every nation-state has minority nationalities and peoples within it. No professed nation-state is exclusively built from a single nation or a single sub-national group, nor does there exist any nation-state that was built and has survived as an exclusively mono-national state. They are divers. The level of diversity of the nation-states, however, varies significantly. Many countries have tried to build a mono national state but failed. The failed attempt on building a mono-national nation from biblical history that humanity could learn from comes from the history of the ancient Israelites, where an attempt was made to build a nation exclusively of the twelve tribes of Israel. Those nations which instituted national (ethnonational) identity as the early form of national self-determination within expansive empires (for example Babylonians, the Assyrians, the Romans, the Ottomans, etc.) and became one of the reasons for the disintegration of those empires were not able to form an ethnically exclusive or a mono-nation state. Instead, they continued to be unions of nations, nationalities, and peoples to a varying degree. The fact that there is a current national question, for example, in Europe (in Spain, Germany, Ireland), in the Middle East (in Israel-Palestine, Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Syria, Yemen), in Asia

(in China, Myanmar, India), in Africa (in Nigeria, Niger, Algeria, Central Africa Republic, Mali, Burkina Faso, Sudan, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo), in South America (in Colombia, Brazil), in North America (in Canada), all motivated by the notion of national self-determination and self-rule shows that national diversity is present and still dynamic.

Most of the states that were formed based on national identity from the gradually disintegrated Roman Empire in Europe, however, were relatively less diverse compared to some states in sub-Saharan Africa in the post-colonial era. The Sub-Saharan African states are exceedingly diverse. The contributors to the deep diversity of such states may include:

- the colonial borders were demarked arbitrarily based on the power and will of the colonizers than that of the national and linguistic markers in the society
- natural challenges to the movement of people and national or ethnic groups constrained the socio-cultural integration among the nations
- there was a little attempt by the traditional leaders to build broad-based united identities for the integration of nations, nationalities, and peoples
- the livelihood of the nations did not require the cooperation and the strength of the unity of a large population to survive
- the traditional leaders were not expansionist and hence there was no need to bring together many nations, nationalities, and peoples; instead, they encouraged the maintenance of unique national or ethnic identities
- the traditional leaders supported and promoted the preservation of the local socio-ecological identities
- there was little integration of cultures, values, and traditions because of the absence of extensive trade, large urban settlements, and large central administration
- there were extensive geographical isolations of peoples due to natural terrain and natural borders like big rivers, deserts, and valleys
- absence of organized religion that crosscuts multiple nations, societies, and communities until recently
- limitation of understanding and experiences about the other neighborly nations beyond one's nation
- limited or no transport and communication facilities that would help the nations to know about each other and help them to learn how to form a common identity until very recently

- the practice of subsistence-oriented socio-political and economic model that focussed more on differences than similarities, and self-reliance than interdependence
- The influences of other divisive practices of isolationist cultural, economic, as well as socio-political traditions

As one of the Sub-Saharan African countries, these factors, partly or in total, had affected the nations, nationalities, and peoples of the Ethiopian Federation however partly. This may have contributed to the deep diversity of the present federation that has more than eighty nations, nationalities, and peoples and more than seventy-two languages. This deep diversity has multiple national identities within it. These identities are both recent (constructed) and ancient (primordial). They mark starkly the social distinctions among the people of the federation.

There are multiple social distinctions in any community. These distinctions include language, culture, kinship, race, religion, skin color, the myth of decent, history, and way of life. A group of these social distinctions, when jointly shared by a significant group of people, forms an ethnic identity. This ethnic identity clearly distinguishes one group of people from another group of people. In so doing, ethnic distinction serves the purpose of social distinction in a multi-ethnic society. The origin of ethnicity could be the transformation of such ethnic identity beyond the purpose of social distinction. When ethnic identity becomes the basis of political identity, the basis of the political process, or the basis of political power in a multi-ethnic society, ethnic identities are transformed into ethnicity (Ghai, 2000).

Though some of its elements like culture, language, and kinship are old, "ethnicity is a recent analytical construction" that may mean "an essence of an ethnic group" or "the quality of belonging to an ethnic community or group" (Hutchison and Smith cited in Kefele, 2009, p. 36). Ethnicity, as such, may be understood as "a named human population with the myth of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more element of culture, a link with a homeland and a sense of solidarity among at least some of its members" (Smith cited in Kefele, 2009, p. 37). In this context, ethnicity has been serving as a mode of belongingness and affectionate community throughout human societies.

In most African societies, belonging to an ethnic community "provides the primary form of membership and personal identity" perhaps because "it provides individuals with a cultural context in which they can make meaningful choices about how to lead their lives, set their goals, and establish relationships" (Selassie, 2003, p. 71) in their social, economic, and political

lives. It has been the source of will for larger traditional social organizations, common security, and territorial defense.

Ethnicity had no significant political influence in the socio-political life of the ancient world. Neither the Babylonians nor the Egyptians were nations or empires of the same ethnic group nor were other great empires that came and passed after them. Their history and archaeological findings suggest that they were built characteristically from mixed races, cultures, languages, and modes of life. Political leadership, except the royal line, was based more on personal heroism than on ethnic affiliation in those days.

Similar features were present in Ethiopia. In the old core of Ethiopia, Abyssinia Proper, history reveals that ethnicity was neither highly emphasized nor significantly mattered in the politics and social life of the people. Intelligibility of language, confession of the same faith, and practice of the same culture was prevalent uniting or dividing factors than were ethnicity and language. The *Habasha* identity evolved based on the intelligibility of languages which are based on *Geez*, Orthodox Christianity, and Christian culture.

Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that, throughout its political history, Ethiopia has never been a homogeneous polity or a nation-stat. The legendary pre-Aksumite polity itself was a composite of multiple nations. Latter during the Aksumite time, expansive conquests added more nations both from Africa and from the southern Arabian Peninsula. The nations that constituted the kingdom in 3rd century CE during the reign of King Ezana[3], whose name cannot be found in the list of the Aksumite kings (Selassie, 1972), for example, included Himyar, Raidan, Saba, Salhin, Siamo, Bega, and Kasu (Jones & Monroe, 1935). Except for the last three, these places were in Southern Arabia. The aggregation of more nations into the kingdom of Aksum, later known as Abyssinia, on the African continent continued, particularly after the so-called "restoration" of the "Solomonic" Dynasty in the late 13th century. The kingdom of Abyssinia, under the "Solomonic" Dynasty, incorporated the kingdoms of Damot and Gojam from its south-west and the Jewish kingdom of the Simen/Falasha from the west from the 15th-17th centuries. By the beginning of the 18th century, the Kingdom of Abyssinia was composed of Tigre, Siemen, Gojam, Begemeder, Lasta, and Shewa. Diverse ethnic groups populated each of these provinces. Its further expansion since the late 19th century increased the ethnic composition of the kingdom exponentially. In the late 1890s, the powerful Abyssinian kingdom under *Atse* Menelik II was able to conquer most of the many dozens of independent nations, nationalities, and peoples in the southern Ethiopia of today through bloody wars and threats of annihilation.

The conquest at least tripled the size of Abyssinia Proper. By the time it became the Empire of Abyssinia at the beginning of the 20th century, it had about eighty different NNPs. By the early 1930s, the Empire had its political border officially mapped and completed. *Atse* Menelik II's expanded Empire became the present multi-ethnic, multilingual, multicultural, and multinational highly heterogeneous political society of the Ethiopian federation on the eve of the 21st century.

The first major ethnic rivalry in Abyssinia Proper started between the Semitic (Amhara-Tigre) and Cushitic (Agew) groups. For the Agew people, keeping their new dynasty in the socio-religious society built by the Aksumite kingdom was a challenge. After the decline of the Aksumite kingdom around the end of the seventh century CE following the advent and rapid expansion of Islam in the Middle East and the subsequent conquest of the kingdom by the so-called pagan Queen that lasted for a couple of centuries, the Kushite Agew were able to have political control by inaugurating the Agew Kingdom, aka the Zagwe Dynasty, in place of the crumbled kingdom of Aksum. The Tigre-Amhara group, on the other hand, started an ardent struggle to regain political power. The struggle between the two groups resulted in multiple claims and counterclaims of legitimacy to the throne. The former established a myth of decent for their kings from Moses and his "Ethiopian" wife (House of Moses).[4] The latter advanced the legend of the descent of their kings from the union of King Solomon and Queen of Sheba (House of Solomon) and revised the history of the Aksumite kingdom accordingly[5]. After more than two hundred years of struggle, with the extraordinarily dedicated support of the clergy, the latter group took the power and "restored" the "rightful" heirs of the "Solomonic" Dynasty in 1270 CE. This "restoration," with a further expanded territory, came to form the Abyssinian kingdom as the successor of the Aksumite kingdom.

Though the main ethnic groups, Tigre, Gafat, Beja, Amara, Agew, Kimant, and Falasha (Bete Israel) have been living together as a nation-state at least since the formation of the Abyssinian kingdom, the societies were however by no means homogeneous. The heterogeneous unity was perceived wrongly by some scholars as may have been achieved because "Abyssinian society was not 'tribal' and not based on a mythology of descent" (Clapham, 1994, p. 28).

However, neither this assertion is correct nor is Abyssinia blind to ethnicity (or tribalism). The masking feature that may have misled scholars to conceive Abyssinian society as such is the unity of religion. During its isolation from another Christian world for a thousand years (from the 6th – 16th century) the highland Christian kingdom had developed an extraordinarily strong unity with its priest-kings. The only exceptions were

the Falasha, Ethiopian Jews, who unwaveringly remained with their practice of early Judaism[6] and the small Muslim communities that were tolerated within and around the territories of the kingdom. The diverse populations, as a result, developed a unitary religious culture, a unitary way of life, and a unitary mode of education, a religious education. Under such developments, though the ethnic markers have always been supported under the current of the overall effect of religion, the kingdom appeared to be one nation. Hence, uninformed outsiders have perceived it as a nation-state.

Since the 16th century, however, there was notable diversity among the Abyssinian society. The source of the diversity was both from inside and from outside. From inside, string identities of the forcefully suppressed peoples of the kingdom started to emerge and further develop. These include Falasha, Kimant, Bilen, Quara, Beja, and Agew, Kunama, Afar, Gafat, and Waito. The Tigre and the Amhara started to engage in a rivalry for the "Solomonic" throne based on claims of direct succession. The expansion of the kingdom into other nations and the expansion of other nations, notably the Oromo in the 16th century, into the strongholds of the Abyssinian kingdom resulted in a mix of the peoples and related diversities. The mix of these peoples resulted in more diversity between both the peoples of the kingdom and among other peoples of other nations. The diversity manifested itself in language, religion, culture, tradition, and political history. The anarchical notable historical period, known as the *Zamane Masafent*[7] (Era of the Princes) from 1769 to 1855 was one of the marks that diversity had left in Abyssinian history.

Among the dominant Amhara and Tigrie groups of the Abyssinian kingdom, historically, regionalism was politically more important than ethnicity. The regions of Shewa, Wollo, Tigre, Begemdir (Gondar), and Gojam were what the *Atses* tried to unite as Abyssinia after the end of the *Zemene Mesafent*. Bahiru Zewde (cited in Aalen, 2002), for example, characterized the reign of Tewodros II (r. 1855-1867) as "controlled regionalism." Each of these regions also had districts that are used to name people within the region.

It was however during this "controlled regionalism" of *Atse* Tewodros II that politicization of ethnicity and ethnic hatreds started to emerge as a deeply troubling problem in Abyssinia. *Atse* Tewodros' ethnic hatred towards the northern Oromo, who were integrated into the kingdom had become its masters, was visible in his policies at home and his correspondences with Great Britain, for example, and in his actions. He had declared the Oromo enemy: he was at war with them. He even massacred hundreds of Oromo soldiers from his army (Marcus, 1994). Hundreds of

thousands of Oromo became his victims in multiple ways. All this was in his effort to build an exclusive Abyssinian archaic nationalism founded on Christianity, Amharic language, and Abyssinian identity.

In post-Tewodros II Abyssinia, under *Atse* Yohannes VI (r. 1872-1889), regionalism continued. Yohannes IV, however, emphasized more on the unity of religion than his predecessor did. He wished every "subject" professed his religion, Orthodox Christianity. As a result, he attacked the Wollo Muslims (mainly Oromo) when they rejected his order of mass conversion to Christianity. The Oromo once again became the victim of ill-conceived national identity building. *Atse* Yohannes IV massacred tens of thousands of Oromo and others for refusing to abandon Islam.

The death of *Atse* Yohannes IV offered the opportunity to the Shewan *Nəgus* to become an *Atse*. *Nəgus* Menelik of Shewa had built a strong army and expanded his territory greatly already while serving his *Atse*, Yohannes IV, as *Nəgus* of the province of Shewa. Soon he declared himself *Atse* and engaged other Abyssinian kings who declined submission in battles. With the might of his firearms, that he had imported through the assistance of the French at the then newly established French territory at the Gulf of Aden, now the Republic of Djibouti, he emerged triumphantly. With little effort, he became the *Atse* (r. 1889-1913), the regionalism continued, and Shewan dominance of the Abyssinian kingdom, which would soon transform the kingdom into a very large empire of many folds of the ancient kingdom, started.

With added extensive territory under *Atse* Menelik II, the old regionalism could not serve the new political purpose. *Atse* Menelik II now had not regions but multiple nations under his control. The regional characterization of the territory of the Empire was soon found to be not satisfactory. The territories, particularly the newly gained vast territories started to be named by their peoples. The new empire reduced the indigenous nations to an ethnic group in the new social structure. Ethnicity started to emerge as a political identity in Ethiopia after it had been promoted primarily by Shewan-Amhara elites among the conquered nations.

In modern Ethiopia under *Atse* Menelik II, ethnicity was rather a Shewan Amhara tendency of using it as a tool of suppression, segregation, and dominance. By the time, *Atse* Menelik II was in power, and the territorial expansion successfully added many formerly independent nations as the subjects of the *Atse* and his people, ethnicity as a fundamental analytical tool of distinction was introduced to differently rank the masters and the subjects as well as the diverse subjects. This purposive otherness encouraged the sense of distinctiveness and national identity among the subjects of the *Atse*.

Hence, it became the source of ethnonational or national questions, depending on the historical backgrounds of the "subject" peoples.

The present geographical territory of Ethiopia is a result of a multi-phase territorial expansion of the Kingdom of Abyssinia from the central highland hinterland by conquest in the mid and late nineteenth century. The conquest carved an expansive territory from NNPs in the south, south-west, and southeast of present-day Ethiopia. The expansion had transformed the kingdom into an Empire by, at least, doubling its size, though there are people who claim that it added two-third of the territory, on the eve of the twentieth century. The vast territory and the diverse people of the new Empire may have demanded effective social stratification and clustering of the society. To do so, an existing ethnic identification of the people of the Empire may have served the purpose very well. It was at this stage in the mid of the second half of the 19th century that ethnicity started to play a vital role in governance structure, social organizations, and public interactions.

Gradually, however, because of the total assimilation policy it had adopted, the empire started de-emphasized the ethnic stratification and clustering of the people of the new territories. Towards the end of the 19th century, *Atse* Menelik II had started the total assimilation project. The project continued intact under Etege Zewditu who reigned from 1916-1930 with *Ras* Tafari Mekonnen as her regent. *Ras* Tafari, coming to power in 1930 and crowned as *Atse* Haile Selassie I, further intensified the assimilation project by incorporating some of its elements into the first modern constitution that he offered to his "beloved" people of Ethiopia. The constitution banned other languages making Amharic the state language. This was at the time when Amharic was the language of only twenty percent (one-fifth) of the population (Cohen and Weintraub, 1975). He also proclaimed Ethiopian Tewahdo Christianity state Church and Christian holidays and cultures as national holidays and cultures.

After sensing the danger of the international tendency of self-determination of nations and minority ethnic groups, the political elites of the Empire tried to metamorphose the Empire into an aspired unitary nation. This was following World War II and ratifications of the UN international legal frameworks for decolonization and self-determination of nations under oppression. To suppress the quests of many nations and nationalities for national self-determination as per the ratified UN frameworks, the leaders of the Abyssinian Empire promoted aggressively one national identity through forceful Amhara-centred nation-state building projects. The unitary state project relied heavily on the shadowy and shallow impacts of decades of cultural, religious, linguistic, and social assimilation projects of the centrist

imperial political elites. The goal was to transform the diverse Empire into a unitary identity, culture, language, religion, and traditions of the dominant Amhara group through the rule of absolute monarchy that claimed a divine mandate to rule.

The nation-state building project, with the dominance and oppression of one group, was seen by most of the affected NNPs as no less than colonization by another black fellow brothers. They found themselves as belonging to second-class citizenship in aspects of their life in a country they accepted as home. The rule of many ethnic groups under one central government dominated by one ethnic group with the liberty of exercise of political and economic powers, Kimenyi (1997) rightly pointed out, provides an ideal condition for ethnic discrimination, favoritism of privileged group, and oppression of another ethnic group, which ultimately prompts violence. Such was the socio-political and economic background of non-Amhara NNPs of the Empire from the 1880s to the 1940s.

The post-Abyssinian Empire multinational Ethiopia, with sizeable diverse minority nationality and peoples, the politics of ethnicity started to thrive in Ethiopia. It appeared first as a leeway from the historical rivalry between *Habasha* highlanders of Amhara and Tigray in the north. The two had been competing for ethnic (national) supremacy and political dominance since the formation of the kingdom of Abyssinia. In modern Ethiopia, however, it was mainly the consequence of deprivations of the rights of NNPs to their identity, freedom, and equality in the Empire State of Ethiopia. The continued socio-political policy of massive assimilation of language, culture, religion, mode of life and social structure of the occupied or settler colonized NNPs aggravated ethnicity in Ethiopia.

Consequently, the long-suffering NNPs started to raise the political question of self-determination. To this effect, ethnonational and multi-ethnic politics started to emerge in Ethiopia. The peasant uprisings against feudal oppressions in the north, south, and southeast of the country from the 1930s onward followed this politics of nationalism. Particularly after the defeat of the occupying Italian force, which introduced some political consciousness among non-Amhara in southern regions, the southern nation had begun to question the legitimacy of the imperial government. Besides, the post-World War II spirit of liberation of oppressed nations around the world was an aspiration. Furthermore, the wave of independence that followed the armed struggle of African nations against European colonialism that resulted in national independence across the continent was an emulation. After all, these circumstances, the national self-determination motive of the oppressed southern, western, and eastern Ethiopian nations, nationalities,

and peoples heightened the quest for national self-determination very alarmingly.

In the 1960s, ethnic nationalism started to dominate the emerging political views among the Ethiopian Student Movement (ESM). Its primary objective was redressing ethnic-based domination and oppression (Debelo, 2012). The ESM claimed the dominations and the oppressions were committed by the politically dominant Amhara, and Amhara and Tigrie landed nobility and the settled *nafxanyaa*[8] in the south. It accused the imperial government and its cronies of systemic suppression, oppression, human rights violations, and political and economic marginalization of the non-Abyssinian nationalities. In this process, the ethnic affinity of the leading members of the ESM started to emerge particularly on the solutions they recommend as a correction to the deep-rooted political, economic, and social injustice. The more ethnically influenced, the more radical they became, particularly on their view on the role of the Amhara-Tigrie alliance on the oppression of the southern nationalities.

The Amhara-Tgrie elites and nobility owned about a third of the land outside of their regions. They were allotted land in the annexed territories. Except in few places, the Amhara have also appointed chiefs over the subjugated peoples. The land tenure system turned the indigenous people into landless farmworkers or tenants of the settler colonizers where they were forced to pay tribute to up to two-thirds of their produce from the land to the new landowners. The owners had the right to evict the tenant whenever they wished. The Amhara (and very few Tigraway) aristocrats and the appointed chiefs and proprietors, however, were enjoying luxury life. Furthermore, the history, language, culture, traditions, and identity of the other peoples were suppressed very much, and they were forced to assimilate totally to the Amhara-Tigre identity. The ESM primarily opposed this open national injustice and set a national self-determination agenda against the monarchy aspiring for change of the monarchy to a republic, as its short-term goal.

The imperial regime considered the question of national self-determination as a national threat. It was determined to crush the ESM. In this effort, the imperial regime killed prominent leaders and imprisoned vocal members. It forcefully crushed opposition demonstrations and installed spies among the students. These actions only make the ESM resolute.

Among the ESM, the ethnic-nationalist and multi-ethnic perspectives on the national questions competed for dominance on Ethiopian political dialogue for some time. The two perspectives were debated hotly in the 1960s and 1970s among the radical student movements (Turton, 2006) in Haile

Selassie I University, now Addis Ababa University. Both had the common understanding that Ethiopia was a multi-ethnic society where most were oppressed by the imperial regime that must be removed; both professed Marxist ideological orientation; and both competed for the "hearts and minds of the Ethiopian youth" (Gudina, 2006, p. 127).

The ESM started a revolution that, regardless of the differences in perspectives, championed the promotion of the rights of nations, nationalities, and peoples in Imperial Ethiopia. The revolution, aided by the military and other oppressed and revolting parts of the Ethiopian society, was successful in toppling the old and fragile monarchy and the extremely exploitative *Gabbar system*[9] of imperial noble land ownership in 1974. However, there was no organized political party to lead the country. *Atse* Haile Selassie had banned the formation of any political party. The lack of an organized Democratic Party led to the hijack of the popular revolution by the *Derg* and its objective was curtailed and self-deflatingly modified to serve the power-hunger of the military.

All Ethiopian Socialist Movement (AESM), better known as *MESON* from its Amharic acronym transliterated to Latin, a determined party with a multi-ethnic perspective, first presented the idea of national self-determination. It presented it as a national program in the immediate aftermath of the deposition of the monarch. It was proposed as internal self-determination of nationalities and minorities. AESM offered it as a solution to the realization of equality and self-rule of the oppressed Ethiopian societies while keeping the unity of the nation. The proponents of the idea were mostly intellectuals. They were educated in Europe, mostly in France. An Oromo nationalist, Haile Fida, who has gone missing since 1978, founded AESM.

Though its influence was short-lived under *Derg*, AESM is credited for the rural and urban land reform[10], the establishment of a political training school, mass organization of the peasants, and filling the new bureaucracy with apposite personnel (Marcus, 1994). The multi-national perspective on the national question, despite its initial success during the 1974 revolution through 1974-78, was brutally crushed by the *Derg* that wanted to consolidate power and establish a unitary socialist republic aborting the goal of the popular revolution.

Ethnicity and the quest for national self-determination of nations, nationalities, and peoples of Ethiopia, however, remained the driving force for all the liberation struggles before and after the revolution. Thus, the ethnic-based political mobilization in the country continued in the post-1974 revolution of Ethiopia by drawing its ideological foundations on three distinctive perspectives: the "nation-building", the "national oppression,"[11]

and "the decolonization (colonial) perspectives" (Gudina, 2006). The nation-building perspective was mainly in support of the historical mechanism by which the Ethiopian state was formed and the nation-state building project that aspires to the maintenance of a central state. The national oppression perspective emphasized the Amhara nation, through the agency of its elites oppressed the rest nations of Ethiopia (including some Amhara) and aspired for an equalizing federation that would accommodate unity and diversity. The decolonization perspective emerged from the belief that the Ethiopian state formation in the late 19th century was a settler colonization project by the kingdom of Abyssinia that must be decolonized, and the "colonized" nations must be liberated fully.

The political orientation in Ethiopia has been diverse. From among the early parties of the 1970s, Ethiopian Democratic Unity (EDU) was the pioneer in the nation-building perspective. In 1992, AAPO has overtaken this perspective. EPRP, and initially TPLF, followed the national oppression perspective. OLF, EPLF, ELF, WSLF, and partly TPLF belonged to the colonial perspective. Early in the 1960s, AESM had championed the perspective of national oppression and sought a federation that accommodates unity and diversity of the Ethiopian state, but with little success. Gudina (2006) argues that these different perspectives for political mobilization are still at work in the political sphere of federalist Ethiopia and continued to divide political opinion among political elites resulting in the crisis that divested Ethiopia from a national consensus.

Towards the mid-1980s, however, the national liberation movements gained colossal momentum and became the solution subscribed by most of the armed ethnonational liberation fighters. Ethiopia effectively entered the nationalist era where ethnic nationalism became an overriding ideology to civic nationalism. The political philosophy of ethnic nationalism and the rallying cry for the right to self-determination of nations, nationalities, and peoples that dominated the Ethiopian Students' Movement (ESM) in the 1960s continued to serve as the origin and source of politics of ethnicity. Ethnic (nationalities) nationalism was legitimate redress to the injustice of the feudal system, ethnic-based national oppression, and Abyssinian colonization of formerly independent states and kingdoms.

The national liberation fighters and ethnic organizations drew aspirations from the famous ESM. Their aspirations were based on their choice of one of the three common perspectives (nation-building, national oppression, and national liberation) that dominated political thinking in ESM. Through time, the "national oppression" perspective emerged as a winning perspective of the insurgents. This was, perhaps, because of the policies of

the *Derg* regime that further repressed the cultural, linguistic, religious, and traditional diversity of the NNPs of Ethiopia. It did so by continuing to force them to develop a singular identity and singular nation-state orientations that had been started by the deposed monarchy.

The present form of politics of ethnicity in Ethiopia could be traced directly to the ESM. Ethnic nationalism and the quest for self-determination of NNPs have continued to influence and guide the political dynamics in Ethiopia both during the armed struggle of oppressed NNPs throughout the 1970s and 1980s and during the post-1991 revolution. The present ethnicity and its politicization and ethnic-based self-determination and state formation, as well as the growing tendency of ethnic citizenship, can be seen as the culmination of the 1974 ESM-led revolution of nationalities.

The socialist government might have inadvertently boosted ethnicity in Ethiopia. Vaughan and Tronvoll (2003) argue that ethnicity reached political maturity in Ethiopia during the socialist military rule. They attributed its "maturity" to multiple factors. These include (a) the collapse of the imperial regime, (b) the rapid expansion of state educational system, (c) the increased participation of minorities through special programs and quotas, (d) the expansion of military establishments, (e) the promotion of ethnic cultural emancipation (manifested in the establishments of the Institute for the Studies of Nationalities in 1983), (f) the introduction of local languages in literacy campaigns, (g) the accounting of religious and linguistic diversity in the national census, and (h) proclamation of the equality of all groups and the rights of nationalities to self-government (Vaughan & Tronvoll, 2003, p. 83). These suggest that the socialist regime had entertained ethnicity and hence advanced it inadvertently.

The socialist regime however ignored the political significance of the growth of ethnicity. It took it mistakenly as an ordinary cultural diversity issue of the country. By the time the government recognized that it was a fundamental issue in the country, it was too late. Even then, the reaction from the military government was mixed. On one hand, it realized that the issue of ethnic (national) self-rule had become pivotal. On the other hand, the same issue was, in its consequence, what the military government had been fighting against. This was because the primary objectives of most of the national liberation organizations were oriented towards the national self-determination of ethnic groups that they represented. The regime could not grasp fully the ramification of its activities in advancing ethnicization until it finally realized ethnic politics and sub-national identity were the key issues that the government must have addressed exceedingly early. By then, ethnicity had emerged as the central element that must be addressed by the new constitution.

To strike a middle ground, *Derg* introduced selected autonomous administrative regions in the 1987 constitution. This initiative also failed to satisfy the elites of ethnic-based national self-determination organizations and fronts and the ethnically enlightened mass. It, however, opened Pandora's Box in the Ethiopian political sphere. It inadvertently endorsed the fundamental basis of political mobilization of armed liberation groups and their political agenda. As a result, every "politically matured" ethnic mobilization gained more momentum and became the unrivaled singular mode of political mobilization in Ethiopia. Ethnicity, otherwise known as nationalism, became the *de facto* political organization of the Ethiopian nations, nationalities, and peoples in the post-*Derg* era.

EPRDF, the main armed front that toppled the *Derg* government in 1991, has been not only a master of ethnic-based political organizations but also the master of using them to its intents and purposes. The international legal and political backgrounds and the local political dynamics, together with the underlying questions of national identities of nations and nationalities were harvested through the political strategies and tactics of TPLF/EPRDF. TPLF/EPRDF made use of them all along its seventeen years of the liberation struggle to its benefit. The danger of such was clear in the immediate aftermath of the resolution when the country was on a course of no return. The course was either secession, which would result in the disbandment of the country and dispersal of the NNPs, or some form of federalization. The former was likely to result in a dreadful total civil war in the country. The country was rescued from the looming danger, at least temporarily, by effectively forming a transitional government in which the ethnonational groups that represented almost all of the significant political forces were incorporated. That transitional government helped the formation of the Ethiopian Federation. Presently, there exist in the federation, at least one political organization standing for every national group. Accordingly, one would expect more than eighty such political organizations.

Summary

In this chapter, I have discussed backgrounds for self-determination and ethnicity and the politics of ethnicity in connection to Ethiopian politics. The concept of national self-determination had evolved. And its political meaning and implications were set straight. The vague "Questions of Nationalities" had become "National Self-determination." Some legal frameworks, such as the Charter of Paris for New Europe, Vienna Declaration and Program of

Action, were in support of the national self-determination of nations who have the good cause. Locally, the radical political perspectives, particularly "national oppression" and "national liberation," that was introduced by the Ethiopian Students' Movement became the organizing and mobilizing principles of the armed national liberation groups. These ethnonational liberation forces fought for the self-determination, internal or external, of their nations against the Ethiopian state. Among these forces, OLF and TPLF were the prominent ones. Their liberation struggles and that of similar others resulted in the defeat of the central government. Their success lies in the employment of ethnicity and ethnic politics. In the Ethiopian context, the origin of ethnicity could be traced to the diversity of its people and the national and class oppressions that had been practiced in the history of the country, particularly in the part that was Abyssinia Proper. However, its birth as a political principle can be traced directly to the ESM and its perspectives on the cause and solution of the "national question" in Ethiopia during the last decade of the Imperial Era. Some ethnic-based national liberation fronts and organizations, particularly TPLF, were exceptional in making use of ethnicity (nationality) as an effective mechanism of political mobilization both before and after the change of government in 1991. Since the formation of the Ethiopian Federation, ethnicity, more aptly nationalism, has become the fundamental organizing principle of politics in Ethiopia.

Note to Chapter 2

[1] It carries the year it was produced in the Ethiopian (Geez) calendar. Otherwise, it is Manifesto 1976.

[2] According to an admission by Mr. Gebremedhin Araya, TPLFF cheated millions of dollars from donors. Mr. Araya was one of the former rebels who himself had acted in the cheating tens of millions of pounds from Band-Aid. He did so by dressing up as a Muslim merchant and acting as if in possession of hundreds of sacks of grains; whereas the sacks were filled with sand but presented as filled with grains. He would later hand the cash he received for the "grains" from unsuspecting white men to the leadership of TPLF that included Meles Zenawi, the late Prime Minister of Ethiopia. The BBC reported its investigation found "Millions of dollars in Western aid for victims of the Ethiopian famine of 1984-85 was siphoned off by rebels to buy weapons." The money was raised from the hit song "*Do They Know It's Christmas?*" The BBC later apologized under pressure, from Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and Bob Geldof. See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8535189.stm for the full report. In fact, from more than 100 million USD in cash that TPLF had obtained in the name of famine aid, according to Aregawi Berhe, 50% went to MLLT and 45% went to TPLF. See http://www.satenaw.com/politics-famine-media-activism-donor-aid-horn-aregawi-berhe/

[3] The 4th-century trilingual inscription of King Ezana indicates that he is from the Hellenistic (Greek) tribe. It reads, "Ezana the son of Alameda of the tribe of Helen, king of kings of Aksum, Hymire, Reydan, Ethiopia, Habeset, Saba, Selhen, Tsiyamo, Kasu, and Bejja," (quoted in Delebo, 1999 Eth. C., p. 232) (Translation from Amharic). Note that an Aksumite king claims he is Greek.

[4] Sellassie (1972) wrote, "To justify their legitimacy as a dynasty with Solomonic origin as well, they recounted another legend. When the queen of Sheba went to Jerusalem she was accompanied by many maids, one of whom Solomon knew before the queen on the same night. On their return, both the queen and the maid gave birth to baby boys on the same day on Ethiopian territory. The queen's son was called Menelik while the child of the maid was later named Zage" (p. 241).

[5] Similarly, *Atse* designate, Lij Iyasu who was uncrowned ruler from 913-1916) would claim descent not from King Solomon but Prophet Mohamed and have his genealogy constructed for him accordingly. The king of the late kingdom of Shewa also had their genealogy reconstructed to connect themselves to the so-called Solomonic line.

[6] There are two contradicting positions as to who the Ethiopian Jews are: Samuel Mercer holds that the Ethiopian Jews immigrated to Egypt and then to Abyssinia before the Babylonian captivity because they know nothing about the Babylonian captivity or Talmud, but preserved their faith in Judaism based on the laws of Moses, whereas, Wolf Leslau claims that they were "Hamites who were converted to Judaism either by Israelites from Elephantine in Egypt or more probably from South Arabia" (Sellassie, 1972, p. 96).

[7] *Zemene Mesafent* was an era where many princes ruled their small territory autonomously with little obedience to the central monarch. The princes governed territories based on traditional regionalism in the kingdom. Some of the princes were from different ethnic backgrounds and religions than the traditional kings. The princes were so powerful that they were able to dictate their interests to the kings and rule the kingdom themselves while the kings served as pupates.

[8] It means "one that is armed with a rifle." Refers to firearm armed soldiers or ordinary Abyssinian (and rarely non-Abyssinian) who, because they had participated in the wars of colonization or because of the strategic settlement of the Abyssinians in the newly conquered land in the non-Abyssinian territory and became feudal overlords to the native people who were attenuated to tenants. In the socio-political context of late 19th and 20th century Ethiopia, it had a bigger and wider contextual meaning. It stands for armed forerunners of the Abyssinian Empire-building project. They were primarily from Amhara ethnic. Some were from other ethnic groups who had fully acquainted themselves to the Amhara culture, language, tradition, and politics of assimilation and hence assigned by the central political administration to a designated newly conquered or annexed territories to administer the subject people and their land, oftentimes by localized arbitrary rules of their own. The *nafxanyaa* played a significant role in the Amhara-centric assimilation project and helped to maintain the annexed and concurred nations and people under the rule of the monarchy for which they were rewarded consciously and continuously by the Monarchy.

[9] Gabbar System was a land tenure system where the first owners of the land were reduced to *Gebers* and *Tisegnas* by the armed colonizers (*nafxanyaa*). Lapiso G. Delebo (1983 Eth. C., p, 33) explains: Gabbar is a farmer who owns some chunk of agricultural land as a residue of his former vast land. Hence, he owns some property but serves the imperial army and the army of the regional chief, the appointees of the regional chief and the king, the regional chiefs, the king, the bureaucratic administrators (government), the Abyssinian Orthodox Tewahdo Church using his own means of production (land, lobar, and other production materials). Whereas *Tisegna* is someone who does not own land but enters in an agreement with the owner of the land to work on a plot of land using his own lobar and means of production and share his produces with the owner of the land according to the agreement. He could be uprooted from the land without any considerations for his life and the life of his family whenever doing so pleases the owner. It is recorded amply in the historical literature of the Empire of Abyssinia (Ethiopia) that the new land "owners" treated the former owners, particularly the *Tisegna*, in a manner little better than animals. From what the *Tisegna* produce from the land, he could take for himself only a quarter of it. He had to give away the rest to the new landlords. Moreover, the landlords had the right to evict the *Tisegna* whenever he wanted or whenever he is displeased with him. Both the head of the family (*Tisegna*) and his family were obliged to work for the landlord at his residence or on his farm whatever he wanted them to work. Because of the absence of rule of law both the Gabbar and the *Tisegna* were exposed to arbitrary and abusive exploitations by the *naftenyaa* nobility and their families, including being sold as slaves.

[10] Lencho Lata (1999, pp. 191-192) retells the story: the first-ever Ethiopian Students demonstration in February 1965 on land reform under the motto of "Land to the tiller!" that shook the foundation of the imperial government was organized by two determined Oromo. They were Tesemma Negeri (then president of the imperial rubber-stamp parliament that rejected land reform bill before his eyes) and Baro Tumsa (the then chairperson of Haile Selassie I University Students' Union, now Addis Ababa University).

[11] There are two views of the Ethiopian State among Ethiopians in post-Abyssinian Ethiopia: one sees Ethiopia as an Amhara-ethnocentric state, the other as a nation-state. The former view is predominant. Modern Ethiopia has been considered as a classic example of an 'an ethnocentric state' (Vaughan & Tronvoll, 2003, p. 82). On the other hand, in an attempt to indicate that Ethiopia has not been an ethnocentric state based on the hegemony of Amhara and that the ruling class has not been ethnically exclusive, Donald Levine and Christopher Clapham argue that Ethiopia should be perceived as a nation. Whereas H.S. Lewis asserts Ethiopia is an ethnocentric state. Others argue that the belief that it has achieved nationhood is the view of limited but influential Amhara elites (Fessha, 2010, pp. 182-183). Though it may be difficult to conclude that there was ethnicity in the sense that it had resulted in unitary national oppression, it is clear that there were always traditions of "rankings" among the ethnic (national) groups in the Abyssinian old center of Ethiopia, used as a marker of social class. The higher social class always belonged to the Amhara nobility and the *nafxanyaa* since *Atse* Menelik II. These groups were surely oppressors. However, they could not stand for the whole of Amhara people to consider the Amhara nation as a national oppressor.

Chapter 3

The Transitional Period of Ethiopia, 1991-1995

The transitional period in Ethiopia was the period of political transition from socialism to federalism. It covers the duration between May 1991 and August 1995. It was a politically tumultuous time. During these four years, Ethiopia experienced a dangerous change of government. In May 1991, the socialist dictatorship of Mengistu Haile-Mariam was toppled by armed national liberation fighters. This ushered very divisive politics of nationalities in the country that had been pulled together for over a century to build one nation-state from the conglomeration of nations. The sudden change of the political *status quo* and the determination of most of the national liberation fighters to institute a multinational state structure alarmed the Ethiopian societies which were not ready for it. In this chapter, I shall discuss important political events that took place during the transition and the role of nationalities' politics in redesigning the Ethiopian state.

The London "Negotiation" and the fall of the Socialist Government

The USA Involvement

For over a decade, from 1974 to 1985, the USA could not have a strong political entity that it could use for its agendas. After 1985, however, it started to build acquaintance with the TPLF. This was during and after the national crisis in Ethiopia, which was caused by famine in the northern part of the country. The connecting linchpin was the Relief Society of Tigray (REST), based in Sudan at the time. After the demise of *Atse* Haile Selassie I, the USA

always had a profound interest to regain influence in Ethiopia. It lost influence to the USSR in the post-1974 revolution that deposed the very friendly monarchy. Its interest was, however, not only related to winning the strategic battle of the Cold War by charming the alliance of the country from the Socialist block but also to reinvigorate the elements of capitalism that it had planted in Ethiopia during the reign of *Atse* Haile Selassie I, jointly with few western European powers.

As the global support for the socialist ideology starts to wither away and many socialist countries began to introduce some sort of liberal democracy and free-market system, the USA developed stronger hope that the fortune was turning its way in Ethiopia. It must have foreseen that the socialist government was to fall. And, it also must have foreseen that the successor could be a government set up by the strongest of the rebel fronts. TPLF/EPRDF was the strongest of these fronts by all measures. The USA might, then, hope that a future government of TPLF/EPRDF could become its ally.

However, the fact that the TPLF still believed in Stalinist ideology and envisaged a different version of socialist Ethiopia, with its brand of socialism, was an ideological challenge to the USA. This was only until the much-anticipated disintegration of the USSR became a reality in 1989. At the same time, it became clear to the leadership of TPLF that supporting the same ideology would also likely take it down. The lesson was clear and simple: the regime that depends on socialist ideology would fall evidently. This lesson and its political calculation could force the TPLF-EPRDF to reform its political ideology and economic policy. This was a clear sign that a TPLF-EPRDF government could take the country on a different path than the *Derg*. The TPLF-EPRDF started to signal that it could change its ideology and the corresponding presumed economic policy. Now, the USA became very hopeful that its primary agenda of regaining influence in Ethiopia could succeed by working very closely with the TPLF/EPRDF.

The USA also had similar interests to work with the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). It saw the EPLF as a better and unperturbed candidate to advance its interest. However, the tiny would-be country with a debased economy would be less significant in terms of the power it could have in the region. The simplicity of its cause and goals and its strategic location, nonetheless, attracted the USA. Unlike the TPLF/EPRDF, EPLF was a simple organization and it was pursuing one clear goal. Its goal was to liberate Eritrea from Ethiopia. For this goal, EPLF had reached political consensus with the TPLF/EPRDF: the path for the independence of Eritrea has already been paved. EPLF, however, had little diplomatic support, none

from a major power like the USA. It needed diplomatic support from the USA very badly. These were very encouraging developments for the USA. It meant that the USA could start practical cooperation with Eritrea at once and, by the time Eritrea would become independent; its strategic operations would be fully functional.

At the time, recent history, however, was a forewarning. The USA had supported *Atse* Haile Selassie I's government for the takeover of Eritrea from the British protectorate after World War II. It had supported the *Atse* politically in his bid to annex Eritrea under the token confederal arrangement with the Empire of Ethiopia. It also supported, diplomatically, *Atse* Haile Selassie's position at the UN for the annexation. As a token of appreciation of such support and later cooperation of the USA with his government, *Atse* Haile Selassie I had granted the USA to establish its North Africa and the Middle East military observatory center, commonly known as *Kagnew cent*er, in Asmara. The USA lost the station and left the country when the Socialist government severed economic ties with the capitalist world, including with the USA.

Nevertheless, for the time being, the USA and the EPLF had a mutual interest to cooperate. Despite its contrary historical position, the USA opted to build new friendships with the new Eritrea and regain the *Kagnew* center by supporting the Eritrean cause, which, by the time, was already set for indubitable success. Having the most powerful state in support of its cause, EPLF wanted a smooth symbolic referendum and swift international recognition when it would declare the province of Eritrea independent from Ethiopia. Full support from the USA in the formation of the State of Eritrea, on one hand, and regaining access to the old strategic military center, on the other hand, were the key interlocking mutual interests. The mutual interests were so strong that the EPLF gained dedicated support for its political cause from the USA in the run-up to the formation of the State of Eritrea.

On the other hand, after 1989, the EPRDF, on its part, realized that its fixation with its version of Stalinism would not work unless systematically remodeled to the fast-changing local and global context. It could observe that the world was speedily falling under the hegemony of American capitalism and global imperialism. The TPLF/EPRDF was unsure of what post-*Derg* Ethiopia would look like and what its own role would be in the post-Mengistu government of Ethiopia if it keeps hold of socialist ideology. It was, however, filled with enthusiasm to take the state power and dominate both the antagonistic armed groups and the unarmed pan-Ethiopian parties that it had been excluding systematically by forming substitute shadow organizations. It wanted a powerful strategy and a powerful backer to achieve its political goals, including its ambition for domination.

After the collapse of the USSR, the TPLF/EPRDF had no other better choice for the much-needed international support for its ambition of remodeling Ethiopia but the USA. Following the collapse of the USSR and the beginning of the change of order in the socialist blocks, no political analyst could doubt the inevitability of the collapse of the socialist government in Ethiopia. The only question was when? Thus, it was high time that the EPRDF has a strategy for the post-Mengistu Haile-Mariam state structure, type of government, and economic system. This ambitious task would require not only having control of the state power in Ethiopia but also having extraordinarily strong international support. As a result, EPRDF decided to pursue strong friendship and cooperation with the USA.

The USA, giving up hope on Somalia at the time, saw a formerly diehard socialist state, Ethiopia, now ready to become the new potential candidate. This great African country standing third in terms of population size at the time (next to Nigeria and Egypt) was so tempting to the USA. Similarly, the USA endorsement to take state power in Ethiopia and the support afterward in its ambition of remodeling the country was equally tempting to the EPRDF. EPRDF tumbled right into the hands of the USA. The cooperation between EPRDF and the USA soon gained enormous momentum, just as did the cooperation between the USA and the EPLF.

The objective of cooperation between the USA, on one hand, and the EPRDF and EPLF, on the other hand, were therefore strategic. It was hegemonic ambition with strategic control of the Middle East from Africa for the former, and protective, supportive, and mentoring for the latter two. This strategic cooperation, with its background and objective, would reveal itself in the preparations in the months and weeks before the gradual fall of the socialist government and right in the eve of the fall of the capital at the "London Negotiation."

Inevitable fall of the Government

The overall standing of the country during the few months before the London "Negotiation" was in favor of the rebels. The EPLF and EPRDF already had a signal from the Rome Peace Negotiations of 1989 and 1990 that the military regime was between a stone and a hard place.

By the end of 1990, EPRDF had secured victory in the field of military intelligence over the national army and the central government. The EPRDF had infiltrated the ranks and files of the national army of the military government. This had been achieved already before the failed May 1989

coup d'état against President Mengistu Haile-Mariam. It did so by systematically forcing captured high-ranking military commanders to write letters to their colleagues. In the letters, their colleagues in the national army were implicated intentionally in a planned defection so that they could be suspected of having the intention to desert and hence prone to be charged with treason, which was punishable by death. Such a dreadful plot could offer little choice to the receiving colleague than joining the TPLF/EPRDF or flee the country deserting the army so that the TPLF/EPRDF could take the position without a fight. Colonel Tewolde Gebretensay made this public in the recent testimony on EBC's documentary memoir that was aired on 19 February 2017. The Colonel was the then member of the TPLF intelligence unit. He was personally involved in the scheme.

By early 1991, internal and external political circumstances and prospects of the liberation fighters forced the government to table talks with armed liberation fronts. The aim of the talk was the formation of a transitional government, which the latter declined. In February and March 1991, TPLF/EPRDF had overtaken a significant part of the Ethiopian territory in the north-west and south-west. By mid-April, TPLF/EPRDF had taken most parts of Gondar, Gojam, and Wallagga provinces. Liberation fronts of Afar, Ogaden, Sidama, Gambella, Benishangul, and the Oromo were expanding in their respective strongholds (Solan, 2015). The situation forced the *Derg* to reshuffle the government, to offer political concessions, and to propose a talk with the rebels for the formation of a transitional government. The reshuffling brought Lieutenant General Tesfaye Gebre-Kidan, an army commander in Eritrea, and Tesfaye Dinka, former Minister for Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to the position of vice president and Prime Minister, respectively. Yet, it could not restore confidence. Besides, the global collapse of socialism made the government anxious. It swallowed its pride and offered a negotiated settlement of the political crisis. The armed opposition fronts, TPLF/EPRDF, OLF, and EPLF, however, did not accept the proposition. Their prospect to topple the government was stark. They could see columns of the national army and the high-ranking officers defecting. They had no doubt that total victory could soon be in their grasp.

The rebels could see not only that they would defeat the government both politically and militarily, but also that it could be left without any sound possibility to recover. They were sure that it was possible to remove the government from power and they were determined to do so sooner than later. Despite having limited resources, they chose to intensify their fights on multiple fronts. By the end of April, the rebel forces, particularly the EPRDF, were closing on Addis Ababa from multiple directions. By mid-May, all the strings holding the regime had broken. Addis Ababa was only

about 120 kilometers from the southwest, where the progress of the forward rebel army was halted at Ambo area, confronted with the last of the best of the national army and by the bravery of the people of Ambo[12] town and its surrounding, which saw the rebels in the eyes of the *Derg* propaganda.

On 21 May, it became clear that the government had given up. This was the date Mengistu fled the country. He had delegated Lieutenant General Tesfaye Gebre-Kidan. Gebre-Kidan, from his very weak position, called for negotiation. The goal was reaching an agreement with the rebel forces on an immediate national cease-fire and striking a state power-sharing deal with them. Such was never heard from the *Derg* government: it was a very generous offer.

Nonetheless, the EPRDF and EPLF in particular intensified their fight for total control of Ethiopia and Eritrea respectively. They were confident that the government of Mengistu Haile-Mariam had already been defeated in almost every aspect. They could see that the national army has continued to defect in columns. Seeing all these, they wanted no less than the total control of the state power by removing all the semblance of the *Derg* government by force.

Towards the last week of May, the encircled capital became highly vulnerable and Ethiopia and interested outsider parties, such as the USA, stood alert and anxious. The country fell into deep fear over the looming civil war in case there could be a failure of state control by any of the liberation fronts. After seventeen years of *Derg*'s patriotic fanaticism, the public could not expect that it would give up state power easily nor could they assure themselves that any single rebel front or any single coalition of them could have what it takes to stabilize and lead the country. The more it became clear that the capital was going to fall, the more anxious Ethiopia and the international community became. Addis Ababa stood on its nails and braced for the worst. The USA in particular (the UK as well) seemed to be very concerned for death and destruction that might follow in case there would be some patriotic and impulsive armed resistance in the capital. In fact, it was time for the USA to play its lasting role for itself as per its strategic cooperation with TPLF-EPRDF and EPLF. The opportunity was at hand: the USA wasted no time to exploit it.

The Chaos and the "Negotiation"

Under such a background, the genesis of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) started on 27 May 1991. The infamous London

Conference began on this day. The negotiators were the government of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (transformed *Derg*), represented by the newly appointed Prime Minister, Tesfaye Dinka, and the main armed fighters: EPRDF, EPLF, and OLF. Herman Cohen, an Assistant Secretary of the States for African Affairs, represented the USA. The USA, in cooperation with the Foreign Office of the United Kingdom, was the mediator.

Except for the agreement on a cease-fire, the negotiation hardly went ahead. This was mainly because the rebels had an immensely dominant position over the crumbling government. They knew that the capital was easy to take, and it was falling hour by hour into their hands. Only pockets of confused army members and groups of patriotic individuals were determined to fight against the engulfing rebels. Gebre-Kidan had no more army to effectively command.

The same day the conference started, May 27, the news from Addis Ababa was very disquieting. Gebre-Kidan informed the American Embassy in Addis Ababa that the national army was out of his control and robbery had begun in some places in the capital. The law and order in the city had collapsed. Later the same day, Gebre-Kidan fled to the Italian embassy for safety together with some of his colleagues: Hailu Yimenu (Vice President), Captain Berhanu Bayeh (former minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Lieutenant General Hadis Tedla (Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces) (Muteki, 2015).

In addition to the close follow-up of the events in Ethiopia through the Carter Center[13] (Mole, 2014), the US embassy in Addis Ababa immediately informed Mr. Cohen of the new development in Addis Ababa. Negasso G. Solan recapitulates the report: "the defence and the security system had collapsed and that there was no government. Addis Ababa was without any administration, security, and police and that there was danger of looting, destruction, and killing" (Solan, 2015, para. 14). It was clear that if law and order could not be restored at once, the human cost could be unbearably high. The report of the embassy was extremely alarming to both negotiating sides and to mediators.

This critical report, though expected, might have forced the USA to change its position suddenly. The USA at once took the position of an advisor to the rebel groups because there was not any more effective government in Ethiopia. After facilitating the departure of Mengistu Haile-Mariam, the USA must have a reasonable blueprint of what should happen if the situation would not deteriorate rapidly. Ethiopia, however, was descending into emergency alarmingly fast. Its change of position, therefore,

was an effective acknowledgment of reality. Cohen announced this acknowledgment by discrediting the government negotiators at once.

The rebel groups, particularly EPRDF, received an endorsement from the USA to move into the capital and control the government. This was made clear when Meles was asked to take "state responsibility" (Lewthwaite, 1991). According to Negaso G. Solan's report of that moment based on what Meles Zenawi had told him later, the announcement was a little dramatic. Mr. Cohen simply called Meles (the leader of EPRDF) and told him to take Addis Ababa where, upon receiving the good news (the approval of the USA), Meles was "very emotional and wept because of happiness" (Solan, 2015, para. 14). In reaction to the US exclusion of OLF from national power-sharing, a few days later the OLF made its disappointment clear saying, "We feel we have been left out" (Minorities at Risk Project, 2004). With its highly disciplined army, the ebullient EPRDF simply walked into the capital city with almost no resistance and gained control of it in a matter of hours.

The USA, likewise, gave the green light to EPLF to take Asmara (Eritrea). The EPLF had already controlled Eritrea fully as a *de facto* government. EPLF had captured Asmara, the capital of the Eritrean province of Ethiopia, a weak earlier. The EPRDF, in return for the assistance of EPLF to overthrow the central government of Ethiopia, had recognized Eritrea's right to self-determination, i.e., independence from Ethiopia (Baissa, 1998). Thus, the momentary partition of Ethiopia between EPRDF and EPLF went very well.

The USA also tried to show its half-hearted support to the OLF. The support was not for the OLF to play one of the key roles as one of the political partners to the state power but to take part in the democratization process of Ethiopia that it had wished would happen under its political parenting. Lencho Lata, the then chairperson of OLF, later reported "words of encouragement and assurances" were conveyed to the OLF from George Bush, the then president of the USA, through Mr. Boshwitz, a senator from the State of Minnesota, on the USA's commitment to peaceful democratization in Ethiopia (Lata, 1998a).

The USA "Enthroned" EPRDF

Starting from the early stage of division within *Derg*, "the United States favored the Amhara–Tigrayan faction" (Mantzikos, 2010, para. 13). The leadership of Mengistu and his ally of early years, Haile Fida, an Oromo founder of AESM (MEISON), soon overcame the effect of this favoritism.

The favoritism that was manifested during the "London Negotiation," in addition to other factors, was the continuation of this old favoritism. Neither the *Derg* nor the OLF could welcome such favoritism, which, with other developments in the meanwhile, was translated to the USA's endorsement of Ethiopia for EPRDF. The political act of the USA, asking the EPRDF to take state responsibility in Ethiopia, while the freshly agreed cease-fire was in effect (Minorities at Risk Project, 2004), was a big blow to the government of Tesfaye Gebre-Kidan. Protesting it, the disappointed Prime Minister walked out. OLF was also not happy with the US endorsement of EPRDF to take state power unilaterally. OLF had issued on 18 April 1990 a 'transition period peace proposal,' which included installing UN-mandated provisional administration where an independent transitional body, a Provisional United Nations Administration, that would facilitate power transfer to an elected people's representatives.

The exclusion of OLF from taking the national power must have sounded strange. There could be two reasons for the US to do so: the obscurity of the Oromo nation and its struggle to the West and misleading representation of the Oromo in EPRDF. The former reason is historical. Either the Western diplomats were not well aware of the existence of the Oromo nation or the struggle of the Oromo people before the May 1991 London Peace Conference (Lata, 1998b). Agreeably, Lata (1998b) suggests this puzzling obscurity was at least due to two reasons: first, Ethiopia was treated as "an extension of the Middle East" and studied more as part of the Orient than part of Africa due to its being considered as an "ancient Christian kingdom" and the Semitic language of the state and its Church; second, "the paucity of Oromo among the ranks of scholars engaged in the study of societies of the Horn of Africa" until the early 1990s (p. 127).

The presence of OPDO in EPRDF might also have been misleading to the USA in excluding the OLF from taking state power. The fact that there was an Oromo representation in the EPRD could have influenced the decision of the USA. It might have thought that OPDO was a genuine representation of the Oromo or representative enough of the Oromo nation and the struggle of its people. By assuming so, it might have downplayed the importance of OLF. The TPLF also might have played its winning "card" that it had formed a year ago, the OPDO, very well in presenting it as a better representation of the Oromo nation than OLF. The OPDO was formed by the TPLF, as was the EPDM (later ANDM), for the political tactic to present itself the opportunity of earning support from the Oromo and to rule the Oromo in the name of the sized "tool" it had formed for the same purpose. The US might have been tricked into thinking that the OPDO in the EPRDF was a genuine representation of the largest nation in Ethiopia. Regardless of

the reasons, the OLF saw its best first moment of international recognition and its worst first moment of being excluded from taking state power during the "London Negotiation" despite representing and commanding the support of the largest nation who occupy the largest and the most endowed territory in Ethiopia.

On 27 May 1991 Addis Ababa fell, hence Ethiopia. That night, starting at 2:00 am local time, the EPRDF fighters moved into Addis Ababa under its military leadership of Tsadkan Gebretensay, Hayelom Araya, Abebe Teklehaymanot, and Samora Yunus. On the morning of 28, May 1991 at 7:00 am local time, the EPRDF army took control of Addis Ababa. At this historical moment, both the *Derg* government of the People's Republic of Ethiopia and Addis Ababa fell to the rebel expectedly, but quietly and abruptly. That moment marked the formal end of the *Derg* regime and made the delegates of the government in London irrelevant.

The moment brought relief to Ethiopia and the friends of Ethiopia. It was a huge relief for the Ethiopian peoples in general and the Addis Ababa residents in particular because it was the expectation of many that there may be lots of blood shade in the city. The city residents took to the street in a celebratory mood, though it was more of an outbreak of relief from the trepidation than a heartfelt celebration. A little part of the celebration was to give a semblance of recognition to the diehard rebels who overthrew the tyrant government. The people were happy simply because the trepidation that an inner-city battle that could cost the lives of hundreds of people and cause destruction of properties worth millions of dollars was no more. Across the country, a mixed feeling of uncertainty and hope started to air. Friends of Ethiopia from around the world also must have felt relieved when they learned that the capital fell peacefully.

The same day, the USA represented by Mr. Cohen and now acting as an advisor, convened the meeting of the rebels in London. The rebels agreed to two fundamental frameworks of transition: the formation of the provisional government of Ethiopia under the leadership of EPRDF and the formation of an inclusive transitional government of Ethiopia. Mr. Herman Cohn, in his press release later that day clearly outlined the US position. According to his press release, the US insisted that a transitional government must be formed in earnest with five goals: first, "assumption of legal and political responsibility for Ethiopia"; second, "use of existing civil administrative structure to form a society broadly representative of the diverse political group"; third, "hold free elections within 12 months"; fourth, "establishment of Constituent Assembly to create a new Constitution"; fifth,

"guarantee of the due process of law to persons accused of offences (including the possibility of amnesty)" (Human Rights Watch, 1994, p. 11).

More than a decade later, former US Ambassador to Ethiopia, Ambassador David H. Shinn, summarizes the involvement of the US in Ethiopia. In his 2014 paper titled *U.S. Policy in the Horn of Africa*, Shin openly admits that his government was involved in the political arrangement for Mengistu Haile-Mariam to flee the country and for the EPRDF to take political power in Ethiopia. He wrote, "In 1991, the United States played a key role in helping to broker the departure of Mengistu from Addis Ababa, the replacement of his regime with EPRDF, and independence of Eritrea" (Shinn, 2014, p. 2). The ambassador also highlighted the personal ties that were established. He states, "The United States quickly developed cordial relations with both Ethiopia and Eritrea and strengthened personal ties with Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and Eritrean President Isaias Afeworki" (Shinn, 2014, p. 2).

Provisional Government

The Preparation to form the Transitional Government

After the fall of the central government in Ethiopia, the rebels agreed in London to cooperate for the peaceful formation of a new government. According to the agreement, a transitional government would be set up through an all-inclusive peace and reconciliation conference that must be held in three months. Other agreements in this frame of transition include a free democratic, internationally monitored election within one year and the acknowledgment of the right of secession of Eritrea. As a deterrent from possible deviation from the agreement and as a diplomatic measure, the USA declared the policy of no cooperation with EPRDF if democratic processes would not be followed in the political transition in the country (Mole, 2014). EPRDF, EPLF, and OLF agreed to hold a National Peace and Reconciliation Conference in Addis Ababa no later than 1 July. The purpose was to set up the transitional government of Ethiopia.

Accordingly, the process of setting up an inclusive transitional government of Ethiopia began in earnest. The agenda for the transitional

government and how much inclusive it should be however pre-decided by EPRDF, EPLF, and OLF. Former president of the Ethiopian Federation, Negaso Gidada Solan, citing Gebru Asrat (2014), explains that Meles, Esaias, and Lencho representing EPRDF, EPLF, and OLF respectively met in Senafe in Eritrea and planned the conference. In this meeting, the influence of the EPLF on the content of the Transitional Charter of the TGE appears to be very significant. The motivation for the EPLF to influence the Charter in as much as it could in the way it would not question the aspired independence of Eritrea and create a threatening power to its future emanated from its determination for the independence of Eritrea. According to Lencho Lata, who represented OLF in the meeting, though EPLF opted to have a direct influence on the administration of post-Mengistu Ethiopia, it could not do it directly. Leta (1998a) explains:

> Hence, they [EPLF] opted for behind the scenes partnership to effect a transition to democracy in Ethiopia and an amicable detachment of Eritrea. It was with this aim that the EPLF offered to host a meeting in Senafe, Eritrea, in late June 1991 to prepare the ground for the July conference. The outcome of this meeting was the drafting of the Charter. In the deliberation during the drafting of the Charter, the EPLF played a key role to ensure that as many OLF concerns as possible were accommodated. (p. 66)

From these accounts of the Senafe meeting, it is clear that the agendas, the participants, and the content of the Transitional Charter of the 1-5 July 1991 National Conference on Peace and Reconciliation were pre-engineered by EPRDF, EPLF, and OLF. In this meeting, the EPRDF, EPLF, and OLF decided on the "list of organizations and individuals who would participate in the conference" and on "drafting of the transitional charter to be presented at the conference" (Solan, 2015, para. 14). Kifle Wodajo (2005), the chairperson of the Constitutional Commission of the TGE, however, reported this account in a slightly different version. He explained that the meeting was held in Asmara [Senafe] to decide on the mechanism of allocation of seats to participants and the Asmara meeting drew up the agendas for the conference.

The July 1991 National Conference on Peace and Reconciliation

After one month of taking the state power, the EPRDF managed to organize a national conference in Addis Ababa. The conference was organized within TPLF/EPRDF's political conviction of national self-determination of NNPs and restructuring of the state into an ethnonational federal arrangement. TPLF/EPRDF invited selected opposition political organizations, armed, and not armed, from abroad and from within the country. Most of the political organizations and armed fronts that had the political goal of national self-determination were invited to the conference. The conference was an assorted collection of prominent individuals and political organizations, where the latter, as a precondition, had to be an ethnic-based organization (Aalen, 2002; 2011). Only political organizations that were "willing to submit to the TPLF/EPRDF and refrain from putting up any kind of challenge" (Lata, 1998a, p. 75) were declared as peace-loving by the EPRDF. The established political organizations, which had the propensity to take the state restructuring process back to the centrist and tried and failed nation-state building, were excluded systematically. TPLF labeled all political organizations that challenged its ideology and self-determination of NNPs categorically as anti-peace and anti-democratic. The Conference was, thus, said to have been constituted from "peace-loving and democratic forces" (Peaceful and Democratic Transitional Conference of Ethiopia (PDTCE), 1991, p. 2).

The TPLF was but cunningly brutal in defining the constituents of the conference. It feared the loss of its built-up dominance. This was because of its minority position in the EPRDF standing for only about six percent of the population. As the dominant front in EPRDF, TPLF selectively invited weaker, newly formed ethnic political groups, excluded the stronger and experienced would-be highly competitive pan Ethiopian parties (Gudina 2011 cited in Mole, 2014). Nonetheless, the turnout was remarkable. Above 500 delegates took part in standing for political movements, fronts, and organizations of NNPs. EPRDF also invited twenty-two international bodies and governments to observe. In total over thirty political parties were represented: some of them were created by EPRDF from national movements created by their respective elites residing in urban centers immediately after the fall of the *Derg* regime to have wider ethnic representations in the conference (Vaughan, 1994).

This brief conference determined the future of Ethiopia. It was known as the National Conference on Peace and Reconciliation (NCPR). It lasted

only for five days from 1-5 July 1991. Those five days however determined the future of Ethiopia. The conference approved a charter for the transitional government and formed an interim legislative assembly known as the Council of Representatives (CoR). The CoR adopted the Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia.

Transitional Period Charter and the Inauguration of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia

The charter was more of a pact among different national factions than a contract between the people and the transitional government. It served as an appeasing treaty for conflict resolution and peace-making among antagonistic self-proclaimed representatives of national groups. It was only to serve as a covenant among popular political representations. Its stated purpose was "laying down the rules governing the transitional government as well as setting down the principles for the transitional period" (PDTCE, 1991, p. 2). Based on what the Conference achieved, this was oversimplified.

Even though over five hundred representatives were present on the NCPR, EPRDF dominated the finalization of the Charter. The OLF also had a less significant role. The two were the only strong and experienced parties that had clearer national political programs to have a bigger say. It is no wonder that the Charter reflected most of the political agendas of the OLF and almost all of the political agendas of TPLF-EPRDF. The dominance of the two however was not balanced. Vaughan (1994) observed the Charter, which was outwardly the product of national deliberation of multiple parties, finally reflected a one-party dynamic. OLF, from its weaker position, played only smaller parts while EPRDF had the lion's share in the design of the charter. From the EPRDF, TPLF was the doctrinarian. Aalen (2002) asserts that the charter was "more a result of agenda predetermined by EPRDF and partly by the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) rather than a pact between all organizations that participated in the conference" (p. 41).

The Charter made clear that the future direction of Ethiopia would be dictated by the TPLF/EPRDF's ideology. It made this very clear by explicating, among others, democratic rights, principles guiding foreign policy, structure, and composition of the transitional government, and the transitional program. According to the Peaceful and Democratic Transitional Conference of Ethiopia (1991, p. 1), the moment of the ratification of the Charter was seen: first, as an "opportunity to rebuild the

country and restructure the state democratically"; second, as a reflection time for "healing of wounds," third, as fortuitous for "establishing and maintenance of good neighborliness and cooperation" among the nations, nationalities, and peoples, a period of fortitude to safeguard "the rights and interests of the deprived citizens"; fourth, as a "new chapter in the Ethiopian history in which freedom, equal rights, and self-determination of all the peoples shall be the governing principles of political, economic, and social life." The Charter, in its *Article two,* sub-articles *a, b*, and *c*, effectively declared a representational federal form of government by affirming and guaranteeing the rights of NNPs to self-determination. Every nation, nationality, and people are guaranteed the "right to preserve its identity," and "administer its own affairs within its own defined territory and effectively participate in the central government on the basis of freedom, and fair and proper representation, and exercise its right of self-determination of independence" (PDTCE, 1991, p. 2). With such hasty declaration and guarantee of the rights of nations, nationalities, and peoples to self-determination that could result in the complete disbandment of the NNPs of Ethiopia, the process of restructuring the country into a form of a representational federal system, within its all perspectives was indicative of national and linguistic geography, was embarked on.

The NCPR approved the transitional Charter, which was drafted by EPRDF, EPLF, and OLF in Asmara or Senafe in Eritrea (Solan, 2015; Wolde, 2005), with minor changes. The charter brought fundamental changes to the political tradition of the country by significantly deviating from the political tradition that the Ethiopian NNPs had experienced both under the imperial and the socialist government. The transitional charter departed fundamentally from the earlier political tradition of the country in enshrining, "the supremacy of the law, power-sharing, the construction of a multinational state, and the establishment of a just peace" (Lata, 1998a, p. 56) in the document that would be the foundation of the Constitution of the Ethiopian Federation. The CoR rushed the Charter to press. Only seventeen days after approval, it was published and came to full effect on 22 July 1991.

The EPLF had consolidated the *de facto* independence of Eritrea and was only interested in making it a *de jure* through the formalization of the secession of Eritrea in a referendum that the TGE was committed to organizing. It saw the NCPR and the transitional charter as an internal affair of Ethiopia that only has to be closely watched from the point of the interest of ensuring the *de jure* independence of Eritrea, which was guaranteed singlehandedly by EPRDF. The EPRDF, with the CoR absolutely dominated by Meles Zenawi, was fully determined to ensure the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia,

making Ethiopia purposely or inadvertently the country of the largest landlocked population in the world.

The Council of Representatives (Transitional Parliament)

The NCPR elected representatives from among its participants to serve as the interim legislature for the transitional period. The eighty-two initial elected members formed the Council of Representatives (CoR) which was dominated by TPLF/EPRDF. EPRDF had thirty-two seats[14] in the CoR. Members of TPLF, the dominant minority group in EPRDF, its agents in OPDO, and EPDM held the majority of these seats. OLF held twelve seats. Parties from the diverse ethnic minority groups that "did not have any popular base or prehistory before the conference was initiated" (Aalen, 2002, p. 41), held the remaining thirty-three seats. In other words, the fronts, movements, and Organizations that had little or no history of the armed liberation struggle and have had little or no contribution to the overthrow of the *Derg* regime had a second-class role in the conference. They were allowed only to share the rest of the seats as an inclusive gesture of the EPRDF to incorporate them into the national transition.

The CoR elected its leadership that would be a free ride for Meles. It elected Meles Zenawi (TPLF) its chairperson and speaker of the CoR. It elected Fekadu Gedamu (Guragie) and Tesfaye Hadisu (Kembata) vice-chairperson and secretary, respectively. These two juniors, however, had neither the experience nor the personal will and the content of character to bring balance to the highest echelon of the CoR. They were carried away by Meles, the man who had led the army that just overthrew the *Derg* government and enjoying the total submission and admiration of the TPLF army and all the organizations that were created by TPLF, both before and after the fall of *Derg* as his unhesitating comforters. Meles Zenawi appointed Tamirat Layne, an Amhara from EPDM (later ANDM) a Prime Minister. It was a nominal position in a presidential system; nonetheless, it gave the impression that the Amhara were the second in power in the TGE. This, in addition to the dominance of EPRDF in the CoR, gave Meles the power to control the CoR totally. The CoR was simply a free ride for TPLF's Meles.

Table 2

Member of the Council of Representatives and their seats in 1991

	Representation	No. of seats
1	Ethiopian People's Democratic Front (EPRDF)	32
2	Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)	12
3	Sidama (National) Liberation Movement	4
4	Afar Liberation Front (ALF)	3
5	Islamic Front for Liberation of Oromia (IFLO)	3
6	Oromo Islamic Liberation Front (OILF)	2
7	Benishangul People's Liberation Movement	2
8	Gambella People's Liberation Movement (GPLM)	2
9	Guragie Nationality	2
10	Hadiyya Nationality	2
11	Kaffa People's Democratic Movement (KPDM)	2
12	Kambata People's Representatives	2
13	Omotic People's Representatives	2
14	Western Somali Liberation Movement (WSLM)	2
15	Wolaita People's Representatives	2
16	Adere People's Representatives	1
17	Agew People's Democratic Movement (APDM)	1
18	Burji People's Democratic Organization (BPDO)	1
19	Ethiopian Democratic Action Group (EDAG)	1
20	Ethiopian Democratic Council (EDC)	1
21	Ethiopian Democratic Union	1
22	Ethiopian National Democratic Organization (ENDO)	1
23	Gedeo People's Democratic Organization (GPDO)	1
24	Isa and Gedebursi Peoples Movements (IGPM)	1
25	Oromo People's Liberation Front (OPLF)	1
26	The Somali Abo Liberation Front (SALF)	1
27	University Teacher's Representative	1
28	Worker's Representatives	1
29	Yem Nationality Movement (YNM)	1
	Total	87

Note. Adapted from Abraham (1994, pp. 21-22).

The TPLF/EPRDF was clearly the dominant voice in the transitional process, including at the July conference and in the CoR. The views of other parties, particularly those that were created by TPLF were hardly taken into consideration; and TPLF/EPRDF's agenda for the transitional period was adopted largely unopposed and unmodified (Vaughan 1994 cited in Aalen, 2011). Western countries observed this closely. However, because they threw their support behind EPRDF, none of them spoke against it strongly enough.

In 1991 Human Rights Watch observed this fact in its report published the next year stating that "EPRDF has to a large extent monopolized government operation, with other organizations assuming a more token role" (Human Rights Watch 1992, para.12).

To achieve convincing representation of Ethiopian NNPs in the CoR, the EPRDF helped form and included more minority organizations and moments to the CoR after the NCPR. Organizations and movements that stood for the Agew, Burji, Gedewo, Kaffa, and Yem peoples and nationalities did not participate in the July conference. They were formed later by the encouragement and support of TPLF/EPRDF dominated transitional government in the consecutive months in a similar fashion and in the same orientation some others such organizations were formed during June 1991. They were added to the already elected CoR by the announcement of the transitional government on 28 September 1991 (Abraham, 1994). It was only by then that the total members of the CoR reached eighty-seven. The eighty-seven-member CoR formulated and adopted the national agenda of the transitional period. Representations of the political forces in the CoR and their respective number of seats in the council at the end of September 1991, according to Kinfe Abraham (1994) was as in Table 2.

Immediately after the formation of the Meles led TGE, the issue of the formation of the all-inclusive national army surfaced and further divided EPRDF and OLF to a breaking point. The EPRF and the OLF could not agree on the composition and structure of the defense force. EPRDF wanted to transform its Tigrayan dominated army to the national defense force led by its army chiefs. The EPRDF was the biggest armed group in the TGE with the triumphant sentiment of victory, the pride of owning and leading the process of reconstruction of the country and offering the national political bargain to other political elements in the country. As a result, EPRDF was in a stronger negotiation position. OLF, on the other hand, suggested that the national defense force should be composed of all liberation front armies that took part in the war against the Mengistu Haile-Mariam regime. This was an idea that all the liberation fronts would maintain their respective armies in their respective territories during the TGE in some form of con-federal structure among the armies, where a council of the leaders of the forces or the CoR would have the commanding authority over all the armies. The aggrandized EPRDF was uncompromising: Thus, the suggestion of the OLF was not accepted.

Instead, the OLF was cornered to enter a very risky arrangement. According to Lata (1998a), the then Chairperson of OLF, the OLF entered into a very risky agreement of "adopting the TPLF army as the defense force

of for the transitional period" (p. 66). OLF was influenced by several factors to enter into the risky deal: first, it was discouraged by the universal disapproval of continued armed struggle at the time; second, it counted on the promises of many governments and their agencies to restrain EPRDF; third, it had developed confidence in the support of EPLF during the drafting of the Transitional Charter and the promise of the EPLF leaders to stand by the OLF in case of TPLF's aggression, including in arms (Lata, 1998a, pp. 60, 66).

The Total Rejection of Legendary Ethiopia in Post July 1991.

The politicization of ethnicity (nationalism) and the aggressive promotion of ethnic nationalism led to the outright rejection of the Abyssinian-centred mythical and legendary history of Ethiopia. The Abyssinian pseudo-history has been transformed gradually into modern Ethiopian history since the formation of modern Ethiopia. Though all the NNPs of modern Ethiopia are Ethiopians, most of them have no joint history with the kingdom of Abyssinia before its expansion under *Atse* Menelik II to modern Ethiopia. The claim of historical "unified nation-state building" by *Atse* Menelik II and *Aste* Haile Selassie I have already been effectively retold and rewritten with its proper name by many of the non-Abyssinian NNPs. Since the fall of *Derg* in particular, many NNPs not only rejected the Abyssinian-centred Ethiopian historiography but also sought for its correction where it must be acknowledged that there had been Abyssinian settler colonization in Ethiopia. Through the process, the manipulative mythologies and traditional stories of the Kingdom of Abyssinia and the Ethiopian historiography that was based on them have been exposed irrecoverably.

The alleged long political history of modern Ethiopia was reduced to a history of just a little over a century, only to the history of modern Ethiopia itself. This was an assertion that, indeed, modern Ethiopia did not exist before the late 19th century. EPRDF, on its part, was adamant that modern Ethiopia existed only for about a century and existed only after *Atse* Menelik II built it by forcefully incorporating the southern, western, south-western, and eastern NNPs of Ethiopia into the Abyssinian kingdom in the last few decades of the 19th century. Except for conservative Abyssinian elites, including proponents of *ancient Abyssinian Ethiopia* and the Abyssinian

Church, the mother and the most benefactor of all the legends and myths, the Ethiopian NNPs joined in unison in rejecting the myth of modern Ethiopia existing any time before *Atse* Menelik II would build it. Nationalist organizations continued to declare the rejection emphatically at every important political occasion and media opportunity.

The profound lack of consensus on the history of modern Ethiopia has been brought to the front in the post-1991 national movements in Ethiopia. The nationalist's quest to rebuild the historical foundation for their causes, on one hand, and the Abyssinian fundamentalists' stubborn adherence to Abyssinian mythology-cum-history-cum-Ethiopian history, on the other hand, appeared to be an unresolvable contraction of the post-1991 discourse of political history in Ethiopia. The suppressed history of ancient, medieval, and early modern kingdoms of the southern peoples of Ethiopia started to come to the front. These histories, however, professionally unattested, became massive input for the new national political propaganda. Every NNPs of modern Ethiopia, except core Abyssinians, aspired very emotionally to bring back their past liberty and egalitarian self-governance. This was in stark contradiction to the views of the centrist reactionaries, like AAPO, who was controlled fully by the dissenting Amhara elites and agents of the Abyssinian Church. The centrist reactionaries not only wanted to keep the mythologies of the kingdom of Abyssinia as a history of Ethiopia but also promoted them as historical facts. Also, they always show an undeserved aspiration for the return of the Amhara cultural and linguistic dominance. The contradiction in the history of modern Ethiopia and the conflicting aspirations of NNPs could not have been starker at any time than in the immediate post-1991 political atmosphere in Ethiopia.

Ethiopia descended suddenly into the chaos of the identity politics of greenhorns. Contrary to the aspiration of the centrists and reactionary Abyssinian forces, the suppression of the histories, languages, cultures, traditions, and identities of the NNPs of Ethiopia in the past has now been lifted. Abyssinian political and religious elites have always worked hard to suppress or distort or erase the history of other NNPs of Ethiopia so that their history only would continue to dominate Ethiopian history and historiography. As the only group that have composed history in the name of the multinational country, the damage they have cause to the other NNPs of Ethiopia in this regard is incalculable. In an apparent reaction to the misdeeds of the Abyssinian elites, the NNPs of Ethiopia imploded into their political instincts with the aspiration of self-determination. The intensity of the implosion appeared to have changed the course of the flow of time itself. The very recent past of the apparent national unity of the country appeared

to be a long-forgotten time in history while the propaganda of the past few months seemed to have existed for many decades and have encompassed several generations. Every NNPs and community became active in politics and everything of identity appeared to have become political and everybody appeared to be into it, everywhere.

Table 3

Recognized NNPs before the Ratification of the Constitution

Afar	Dime	Keficho	Sheko
Agew	Disenech	Kembata	Silte
Aide	Dizi	Komo	Shekocho
Alaba	Gamo	Konso	Shinasha
Amhara	Gawda	Konta	Sidama
Anyuaa	Gedo	Kore/Ama	Surma
Arbore	Gidicha	Kunama	Tenbaro
Argoba	Gidole	Male	Tigre
Beja	Gnangatar	Mao	Tsemay
Bencho	Gobeze	Melon	Wolaita
Berta	Gofa	Mezengir	Yem
Besketo	Gumuz	Mursi	Zeise
Bodi	Gurage	Nao	Zay
Burji	Hadiya	Nuer	Zelmam
Busa	Hamer	Opio	Agew/Awi
Chara	Harari	Ori	Agew/kamy
Dawruo	Irob	Oromo	

Extremely antagonistic political outlooks, with stronger ethnic affiliations, characterized every post-NCPR (July 1991) political debate in Ethiopia. The political atmosphere grew to have no converging character that breathes unity of the NNPs but dis-unity and individual aspiration focused on the legitimization of national self-determination. Ethno-national identity rather than national unity and national citizenship rather than civic citizenship were the priority, particularly among the non-Abyssinian sub-national polities. Political divorce instead of supporting the *status quo* was the aspiration of the majority of the national liberation fronts. The pan-Ethiopian national identity of "One Ethiopia" was threatened by most of the

newly emerging nationalists. It is also detested strongly by well-organized national liberation fronts who believed that the "One Ethiopia" was a colonizing power. It was a critical time in the historical momentum of the formation of a new form of Ethiopia or, as it was believed by many, the closure of the last chapter of the history of Ethiopia as "One Ethiopia," or just Ethiopia.

Ethiopia needed a solution to its imploding political problem before it was too late. The country was a cracking mass with no one there even to try to stop it. No other possibility than the restructuring of the country into a federation could be imagined reasonably. Instituting a federal arrangement was thought the best choice to avoid the total disintegration of the country. No other arrangement could positively transform what was referred to by many as "prison house of nationalities" (see Abbay, 2004, p. 595; Berhe, 2009, p. 63; Debelo, 2007, pp. 29,101; Hameso, 1996, pp. 2,11; Jalata, 2005, p. 84; Marcus, 1994, p. xi). Ethiopia was on a one-way political street and it must move forward; it must move faster to avoid catastrophes.

Multiple factors, all together, formed the foundation of the political environment from which the "new Ethiopia" was to emerge. These factors include: first, the international legal and political backgrounds (the UN Charter, the African Charter and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action); second, strong ethnic-based political orientation of national political forces; third, the aspirations of most of the armed national liberation fronts and movements for national self-determination, with the conviction of the EPRDF for national self-determination; and fourth, the dominance of EPRDF in the TGE. Such international legal and political background and the internal political dynamic were all comforting to the TPLF/EPRDF.

Under these circumstances, the process of the formation of "new Ethiopia" started with the generous provisions of self-determination rights for the NNPs of Ethiopia, as it was enshrined in the Transitional Charter, and the recognition of separate identities of over sixty NNPs (see Table 3). This not only gave the legal backing but also reassured the conviction of both EPRDF and its affiliates for the sooner realization of the federalization project. The local and international political sentiments continued to influence greatly the process and the content of the Constitution that would establish the FDRE, the Ethiopian Federation. The Federation would, in turn, tacitly but officially proclaim that the empire state of Ethiopia is no more. In other words, the formation of the Ethiopian Federation was the end of the failed Abyssinian-centered nation-state building project.

Ethiopia needed a solution to its imploding political problem before it was too late. The country was a cracking mass with no one there even to try to stop it. No other possibility than the restructuring of the country into a federation could be imagined reasonably. Instituting a federal arrangement was thought the best choice to avoid the total disintegration of the country. No other arrangement could positively transform what was referred to by many as "prison house of nationalities" (Abbay, 2004, p. 595; Berhe, 2009, p. 63; Debelo, 2007, pp. 29, 101; Hameso, 1996, pp. 2, 11; Jalata, 2005, p. 84; Marcus, 1994, p. xi). Ethiopia was on a one-way political street, and it must move forward; it must move faster to avoid catastrophes.

Multiple factors, all together, formed the foundation of the political environment from which the "new Ethiopia" was to emerge. These factors include: first, the international legal and political backgrounds (the UN Charter, the African Charter and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action); second, strong ethnic-based political orientation of national political forces; third, the aspirations of most of the armed national liberation fronts and movements for national self-determination, with the conviction of the EPRDF for national self-determination; and fourth, the dominance of EPRDF in the TGE. Such international legal and political background and the internal political dynamic were all comforting to the TPLF/EPRDF.

Under these circumstances, the process of the formation of "new Ethiopia" started with the generous provisions of self-determination rights for the NNPs of Ethiopia, as it was enshrined in the Transitional Charter, and the recognition of separate identities of over sixty NNPs (see Table 3). This not only gave the legal backing but also reassured the conviction of both EPRDF and its affiliates for the sooner realization of the federalization project. The local and international political sentiments continued to influence greatly the process and the content of the Constitution that would establish the FDRE, the Ethiopian Federation. The Federation would, in turn, tacitly but officially proclaim that the empire state of Ethiopia is no more. In other words, the formation of the Ethiopian Federation was the end of the failed Abyssinian-centered nation-state building project.

In the post-TGE, Ethiopia would emerge differently. Just as the Russian Empire and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) are no more but the Russian Federation, the Empire of Abyssinia/Ethiopia and the "nation-state" Ethiopia are no more but the Ethiopian Federation. The former is a federation of equal Republics, Territories, Regions, Cities of Federal Importance (Moscow and St. Petersburg), Jewish Autonomous Region, and Autonomous Areas. The latter is a federation of equal Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples. Notable is, however, many nations, including

Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan have declared independence from the former, whereas, only one nation, Eritrea, has declared independence from the later. Yet, the latter's character has been changed fundamentally: it is no more a nation-state where many nations and nationalities were forced to assimilate to the dominant Abyssinian nationalism but a multi-national state where competing nationalism is blooming in a federation of nations, nationalities, and peoples. Competing nationalism is incredibly challenging, but the same challenge would sustain the federation in which no single nation could dominate but hold together by the love of Ethiopia.

The TGE and the Beginning of the Federalization Project

All to the measure of EPRDF: Obstinate Beginning

The transition from the provisional government to the transitional government was smooth and on time. The provisional government of EPRDF ruled the country very briefly from 28 May until 15 August 1991. Its tenure ended when the CoR was formed on 15 August 1991. The CoR, as I have mentioned above, set up the TGE with an eighty-seven-member[15] council, according to the Transitional Charter. It elected a Tigrayan chairperson of TPLF and EPRDF, a president, who assumed the role of head of the government and head of the state. It also elected an Amhara chairperson of EPDM (later ANDM) Prime Minister. This was as per the power-sharing agreement that stipulated the posts should not go to the same party or nation.

Nevertheless, it was not satisfactory for the Oromo nation because it excluded an Oromo representative from all these important posts at this very formative moment of the Ethiopian transition. It, however, appeared that the Oromo were compensated partly because the CoR elected more Oromo ministers to the 17-member Council of Ministers (CoM). Initially, the CoM of TGE was composed of six Oromo, four Amhara, and two Tigre ministers

and one minister each from Afar, Somali, Kembata, Aderie, Wolaita, and Guragie NNPs. The Oromo, in general, were not disappointed very much, at least until the OLF and, consequently, the minsters in its name were purged out of TGE a year later.

At the time of the formation of the TGE, there was optimism for peace and transformation in Ethiopian politics. The aim of the TGE was "to decentralize authority and provide the major ethnic groups and peoples of Ethiopia with the opportunity to develop politically, economically and culturally" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of FDRE, 2012, History 1000 BC-1991, par. 16). This, in other words, meant effecting a genuine democratic transition in Ethiopia with four central concepts, i.e., supremacy of the law, the formation of a joint government, democratic state restructuring, and attainment of a just peace, as its corners stones (Lata, 1999). This comforted the key political forces in the country. With this aim, the designing of the new national federalism through a new Constitution, according to the provisions in the Charter, started in earnest. The people hoped that the transition would finally culminate in the ratification of a new Constitution and a peaceful transfer of power from the TGE to an elected government. The TGE set the transition period to not more than two and a half years.

Effecting a genuine transition, however, proved to be an extraordinary task. This was primarily because of a lack of a democratic tradition in the country in general and distrust among the members of the TGE in particular. The country had no experience of democratic government. Despots had ruled it since its formation about a century ago. As a result, democratic culture was non-existent. Besides, both pan-Ethiopian and nationalist political organizations could not trust each other within their blocks. The animosity between the nationalist (ethnic-nationalists) and nation-state unionists was growing. These also, in part, have to do with a lack of cooperative and democratic culture in the country. It was almost impossible for the political entities to agree on one single policy or vision for the country. Thus, effecting genuine political transition was incredibly challenging.

The growing dictatorship tendency of EPRDF was also a contributing factor to the challenge. Gradually, TPLF/EPRDF started to lose credibility on its commitment to genuine democratic transition and its integrity became doubtable. In as much as one could interpret that it regretted its call to all "peace-loving forces" for participation in the reconstruction of the country when it invited them to the July 1991 National Conference on Peace and Reconciliation, TPLF/EPRDF started to change its mind on the roles the participants could play in the real reconstruction of the country. It started to impose itself as dictator of the transitional process, in every aspect of it. TPLF-EPRDF, thus, became an insider obstacle to the success of the TGE

in effecting the democratic transition. One participant-observer of this change of approach by the TPLF dominated EPRDF, Lata (1999), latter comments: "A growing gulf thus developed between its pronouncements and actual practice" (p. 25).

When the TPLF/EPRDF started to dominate the TGE and denied its other members their fair participation, most of the members of the TGE felt cheated by the TPLF/EPRDF. They could not make their voices heard in the TGE as it was engrained initially in the transitional charter. This was against the plurality of participation and decision-making that the charter promised in the process of genuine exercise of self-determination of NNPs.

As a result, dissatisfied members of the TGE decided to leave. In June 1992, OLF, the strongest party next to EPRDF, left the TGE being dissatisfied with its role in the government and blaming a systematic manipulation by the TPLF led EPRDF. This was after the EPRDF army (now transformed to a national defense army) attacked OLF military camps and political bases across Oromia, resulting in many casualties and purge of the OLF army. AAPO[16] also withdrew from the TGE during the 1992 pre-election campaign alluding to the harassment and intimidation from EPRDF, which it claimed, could not allow a free and fair election. Sidama Liberation Movement (SLM), EDU, Ethiopian Democratic Action Group (EDAG), Gedeo People's Democratic Organization (GPDO), Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), and the monarchist Moa Anbessa Party (MAP) also withdrew from the TGE and the Constitution Commission (CC) during the snap election.

Consequently, the EPRDF, through defiance of the initial conviction to the plurality of participation and non-democratic and forceful means of self-assertion, re-emerged as the most dominant party. This was not only because it has made its army the *de facto* national defense army in August 1991[17] and hence the only party in control of the security of the country, but also as the single dominant party with total control of the TGE. Furthermore, it has already excluded systematically pan-Ethiopian parties from the TGE (Aalen, 2002). The most notable of these was EPRP. Its exclusion was probably due to the long-time hostility between TPLF/EPRDF and EPRP. The others were AESM and WPE. Through the elimination and exclusion of other parties, TPLF/EPRDF became the rule maker of the TGE.

On the other hand, it was evident that had TPLF/EPRDF not taken the role of national leadership, including the peace and security of the citizens, with the post-July Conference crisis of voluntary withdrawals, exclusive walkout, and political purges that took place in the TGE, the most likely result could have been political chaos and civil war. According to an

assessment of Human Rights Watch in the year 1992, EPRDF was the only group with a sufficiently clear and comprehensive command structure to operate as a functioning political party (Human Rights Watch, 1992). The dominance of the TPLF/EPRDF in the TGE, therefore, was not based only on tactical maneuvers and power play but also on merits and potentials to keep peace and lead the nation through the transition.

This made the role of the president of TGE in EPRDF dominated CoR highly deterministic in reshaping and remodeling the structure of the Ethiopian society and its government. It allowed Meles to redesign the socio-political structure of the Ethiopian society almost single-handedly and based on ethnolinguistic identities by putting aside the crosscutting issues like historical, religious, cultural, and traditional unity among some of the NNPs. Under the iron fist of Meles Zenawi, the TPLF/ EPRDF led TGE embarked on tactful re-carving of the country based on national structuralism according to the right to national self-determination and the vision of TPLF/EPRDF for the future of Ethiopia.

Strategies and Tactics of TPLF/EPRDF for Total Dominance

During the TGE, the EPRDF worked towards becoming the uncontested dominant front. To achieve total dominance in the political spectrum of Ethiopia, EPRDF first established itself as a non-contested dominant party in two ways: by deep rooting itself into rural communities and by widening its base among the dominant national groups. In the first, it aimed at controlling the population base by deepening itself to the rural communities. In the latter, it aimed at gathering alliances of nationalist organizations through outpost proxy organizations.

Controlling the Population Base through Purpose-Fit Coalition

The TPLF had ample experience of forming a purpose-fit coalition to reach its political goal already before the formation of the TGE. It had successfully done so in preparation to take state power. That has assured its dominance in EPRDF. The process of building dominance began in the 1980s but was formalized in 1989 when TPLF formed EPRDF. It started the process of building EPRDF first by allying with EPDM in 1985. EPDM

was a splinter group from EPRP. EPDM, after being nursed by TPLF for years, harmonized its political program with that of the TPLF. The strategic advantage of TPLF was to have the representation of the Amhara people, the second-largest national group in the country. Finally, the EPDM, according to the strategy of TPLF, became Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM) during the TGE. The combined representation of the population and the territory under TPLF and EPDM (ANDM) was still less than the population and the territory that an Oromo organization would represent. The TPLF, therefore, needed representation from the Oromo people. It could not win the OLF to its game. It had to create a new PDO that would stand for the Oromo people. Hence, it formed the Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO)[18] in 1989. It formed OPDO, in collaboration with EPDM, from among Oromo war prisoners under its control and Oromo soldiers defecting from the *Derg*. It did so after the prospect of cooperation with the OLF, the oldest liberation front in Ethiopia[19] was proved unworkable. In doing so, the TPLF suddenly had PDO that represented, at least nominally, the single largest national group, the Oromo, and the would-be largest state in Ethiopia, Oromia. By the beginning of 1991, TPLF had formed a coalition, under its terms and political program, which stood for the Tigray, Amhara, and Oromo nations.



Figure 1. Ethiopian population distribution in States and City governments

Note. Compiled from Central Statistical Agency, Summary Statistical Report, December 2007, (CSA, 2008).

The main drive behind the formation of a purpose-fit coalition during the liberation struggle was the insecurity of TPLF. It emanates from the numeric minority position of the TPLF in the representational system. Holcomb (2004) explains that because of the realization of its representational minority position in the opposition camp to take the leading role, TPLF needed to transform itself into an apparent wide representation using its dominant position in the armed struggle. To achieve an apparent representation of the majority, it started to create the People's Democratic Organizations (PDOs) from highly vulnerable groups, mainly war prisoners, who were at its mercy for their lives. The prisoners represented the diverse Ethiopian NNPs. However, they had neither the political understanding nor the vision or the understanding of the reality of the NNPs they would stand for. Nevertheless, they surely would obey the TPLF and serve as its instrument to draw the dearly needed "representation" of their respective NNPs, at least because they were formed in the names of the NNPs.

TPLF created the PDOs in preparation to take the leading role in Ethiopian politics for its interest. It started to establish them primarily in pretensions to take state power. It was anxious least it could not get the alliance of the experienced pan-Ethiopian and national liberation fronts and political parties to form an amicable front against the *Derg*. The TPLF established PDOs to replace those very independent liberation fronts, such as the OLF, and pan-Ethiopian parties, such as EDU. After their formation, the PDOs proved to be instrumental in positioning the EPRDF as a multinational organization representing most of the NNPs of Ethiopia and in defeating *Derg* militarily.

The formation of a purpose-fit coalition continued after the fall of *Derg*. After taking state power in 1991, the TPLF dominated EPRDF added Southern Ethiopian Peoples' Democratic Front (SEPDF). The SEPDF was a union of PDOs of the smaller southern Ethiopian nations and nationalities. This gave EPRDF the representation of over 90% of the Ethiopian population where the leaders of the respective national parties became candid disciples[20] of Meles Zenawi. After the formation of EPRDF, the TPLF has been using the OPDO as a strategic tool to remain dominant in EPRDF. Besides, it would use OPDO to help EPRDF win in consecutive national elections.

The formation of SEPDF from multiple but small EPRDF affiliated parties in the south of the country was critical to EPRDF. The consequent inclusion of this coalition of many parties to EPRDF and eventually into TGE in the place of the disfavoured Southern Ethiopian Peoples'

Democratic Coalition (SEPDC) became the sealing lead to the EPRDF's as a dominant party in the new "democratic" Ethiopian Federation. The SEPDC was formed on 11 March 1992 from members of political parties that had seats in the CoR, the *de facto* MPs of the TGE. They were Burji People's Democratic Organization (BPDO), Gedeo People's Democratic Organization (GPDO), Gurage People's Democratic Organization (GPDO), Hadiyya National Democratic Organization (HNDO), Kaffa People's Democratic Union (KPDU), Kembata People's Congress (KPC), Omo People's Democratic Union (OPDU), Sidama Liberation Movement (SLM), Wolaita People's Democratic Front (WPDF), and Yem National Democratic Movement (YNDM). The formation of SEPDF and its inclusion in EPRDF provided the latter an apparent representation of the lion's share of Ethiopian peasants. The EPRDF now represented, nominally, about ninety percent of the Ethiopian population. SEPDC would remain a formidable opposition to SEPDF and hence to EPRDF.

The political program of TPLF/EPRDF for Ethiopia received an external endorsement late during the TGE. The TPLF elites were very careful in building political ideology, organizational structure, and broad party-base that would serve their strategies and vision. However, they had little assurance that their peasant-based approach would sustain them in power as the dominant ruling party. An academic assurance came soon enough to encourage them that they were on the right track. In 1993, Samuel P. Huntington, a professor of political science at Harvard University, suggests that Ethiopia represented an opportunity for "peasant-based dominant party democracy" (Holcomb, 2004, p. 132). This was an assuring avowal for the TPLF and EPRDF[21] leaders. It, however, appears to be not without solicitation. Meles Zenawi, Chairperson of TPLF and EPRDF, who read and liked the works of Huntington during the armed struggle, had invited him to Addis Ababa after he had become the president of the TGE for a talk meeting. Huntington went further than the suggestion and tipped the TPLF to justify its already established undemocratic and unilateral political practice when he made several conclusions in his report entitled *Political Development in Ethiopia: A Peasant-based Dominant-Party Democracy?* According to Lata (1999), Huntington made three conclusions: First, conditions in Ethiopia were not favorable for the development of constitutional democracy. Second, the achievement of democracy must be balanced against other goals of the time, which included TPLF/EPRDF's objective of maintaining power, maintaining the remaining of Ethiopia together, and promoting peace and economic development. Third, a dominant-party system, instead of a multi-party system, could have notable advantages to the country. Except the first,

the rest would be taking into account the fact that the visit of Huntington was financed by USAID, a branch of the US government, and he had meetings with the CC, Lata (1999) argues that his suggestion to the TPLF/EPRDF should be taken no less than the recommendation by the US government.

Ensuring Domination through Satellite Parties

The EPRDF could not be sure to guarantee its dominance after claiming representation of over ninety percent of the population through TPLF, ANDM, OPDO, and SEPDC. It wanted to assure itself of lasting strategic dominance in Ethiopian politics. As a result, it worked towards having political control in the periphery states where it has no direct representation. This was to target the rest ten percent of the population.

In its bid for absolute dominance, it established affiliated satellite parties in the periphery states: Gambella, Benishangul-Gumuz, Afar, Somali, and Harari. The satellite parties were set up with the encouragement and guidance of EPRDF. Each was set up to serve the strategic vision of EPRDF. They were set up as counterparties to those who oppose EPRDF or as a replacement for the disfavoured parties by EPRDF. As a result, the number of determined opposition parties, which were independent and out of the strategic encirclement of EPRDF, was small.

The affiliated satellite parties competed in their respective marginalized states. Even though not formally members of EPRDF, they could not be independent of EPRDF. These satellite parties, Afar Peoples Democratic Party (APDP), Somali People's Democratic Party (SPDP), Gambella Peoples' Democratic Party (GPDP), Harari People's Democratic League (HPDL), and Benishangul-Gumuz Peoples' Democratic Party (BGPDP), are strategic partners of the EPRDF. The EPRDF refers to them as "allied parties." Their roles have been maintaining the perpetual dominance of EPRDF as a single dominant party in the federation.

The Confident and Aggrandized EPRDF

Assuring itself political dominance and firm control of the state, EPRDF emerged aggrandized during the TGE. In its new affiliate party formation strategy and the re-engineering of its member parties, the EPRDF not only guaranteed itself a long-lasting dominance in the political spectrum

of the country but also affirmed the continuation of the dominance of the TPLF minority in EPRDF. EPRDF became excessively confident with its position of total control of the TGE. It also reassured itself of perpetual dominance in the precarious political environment by systematically weakening opposition parties. With the cog sure confidence for maintaining the geographical integrity of the country at its own will, under the shadow of "inclusive" TGE, the EPRDF transformed itself from the *dovishness* that it was during the National Conference on Peace and Reconciliation to *hawkishness* it had become after the approval of the Transitional Period Charter.

Curbing Political Promises

The TPLF dominated EPRDF began curbing the political promise of participatory democratic transition that was enshrined in the Charter that established the TGE as soon as it ensured itself full control of the country. The overconfidence of the EPRDF was because of multiple factors. As discussed above, national groups (Oromo, Amhara, Tigre, Sidama, Hadiyya, Wolaita, Guragie, Gamo, etc.) that matter much for the unity or disintegration of the country have been consolidated by representative members of EPRDF. Other peripheral parties that represent the Afar, Somali, Gambella, Benishangul-Gumuz, and the Harari people have been purposely formed as its satellite parties and politically allied with EPRDF. Besides, EPRDF was in total control of national security, national bureaucracy, and the economy. Furthermore, it controlled major public and civic associations and institutions from inside and diplomatic and financial support from the West, particularly from the USA. Under these circumstances and the overconfidence of EPRDF, the promised political process of participatory democratic transition was soon reduced to a mere formality of natural process that serves the preoccupation of the political programs and propaganda of TPLF/EPRDF. Its ultimate effect was the curbing of the first promise of the EPRDF to bring about an effect participatory democratic transition in Ethiopia.

To this effect, the TGE issued several proclamations that further paved the way for national federalism as per the EPRDF political program. Proclamation No. 7/1992 set up national self-government based on Ethno-linguistic geographical boundaries. Proclamation No. 33/1992 set the principles of sharing of revenue between the central federal and regional governments. Proclamation No. 41/1993 defined the powers, duties, and

responsibilities of the central and regional governments. All were complementary parts of the promised democratic and participatory transition but fall short of its first intentions and goals by limiting political participation. This was due to the conviction of TPLF/EPRDF to maintain its upper hand in the TGE and prepare itself for the long-lasting dominance after the transition as a single vanguard party by building a "peasant-based dominant party democracy."

The OLF was the first and the most vocal opponent of EPRDF's backings from its initial promises. As the second dominant political group in Ethiopia at the time and the main opponent of EPRDF, OLF had a strong role in the process of influencing the making of the Transitional Charter. Once the Charter was signed and the TPLF dominated CoR took power as TGE, the OLF developed a strong dislike toward both the EPRDF and the TGE. The response from EPRDF was harassment and intimidation. Though OLF was a party to the TGE, it could not influence it as much as it had wished. OLF's frustration and aversion were further aggravated when it lost hope in keeping the TGE within the spirit of the Charter.

Armed Intimidation During Election

Wherever and whenever opponents challenged it during the run-up to the 1992 election, EPRDF responded with armed intimidation. The EPRDF harassed and intimidated the electorates in all the key districts, which were strongholds of the OLF by aggressively deploying its troops just before the regional and national elections of 1992. This violated the agreement on the encampment of all the guerrilla armies, which was mediated by the US Ambassador Marc Baas. "The Donor Group of Ambassadors" which included that of Canada, USA, UK, Sweden, and representatives of EU and UNDP, noticed the aggression of the TPLF/EPRDF and condemned it but fell short on the follow-up and on ensuring the correction of the breaches of the agreement (Late, 1998a). The main reason why EPRDF intimidated the OLF, including by engaging it with micro battles in some towns, in Oromia was that the OLF had gathered great support and was likely to win a free and fair election. Harassments and intimidations were also reported in other regions, especially in southern Ethiopia where non-member of the EPRDF had more supporters and were expected to win the election.

Earning Reward while Dishonouring Agreement

EPRDF's systemic dominance and firm control of the state appear to have forced the USA to turn blind eye to its wrongdoings. The inclination of the USA towards TPLF/EPRDF became public starting from the May 1991 London Peace Conference. Its dedicated support for EPRDF became evident when it turned deaf ears and blind eyes when TPLF/EPRDF dishonored its "no democracy, no cooperation" ethos. This became even clearer when the TPLF was rewarded substantial economic cooperation agreements with the USA and its allies even though the congressional hearing on Ethiopia had decided the 1992 election was "seriously flawed" (Lata, 1998a, p. 64).

Several factors might have helped the TPLF/EPRDF to be a political force not only to earn compromises and tolerance from the "Donor Group" in general and from the USA in particular but also to be rewarded with supports in the face of breaking pacts and committing crimes. These factors were both internal and external. The internal factors were its very strong military stand at the time of the fall of the government and the political strategy of TPLF in controlling and dividing other nations through the subsidiaries that it had formed in the names of many nations, both within EPRDF and outside of it. One of the external factors was the political favoritism shown by the "Donor Group" towards TPLF/EPRDF. They were convinced that EPRDF was the best prepared political and military force to lead the country. Another reason was the shift of focus from the bilateral and multilateral agreements that TPLF/EPRDF was breaking as attested by the USA Congressional Subcommittee meeting on Africa (Lata, 1998a). The pretext given by the EPRDF was that it was forced to give attention to the immediate challenges that it was facing in keeping peace and security. The third reason was the initial lack of awareness of the struggle of the Oromo nation and the OLF among the US diplomats (Lata, 1998a). Being able to earn rewards, even when dishonoring agreements, from its Western donors and supporters, and using its military force for armed intimidation only emboldened EPRDF to downplay the need for political dialogue with opposition groups (Lata, 1998a) and to dictate its terms while systematically destroying its strong opponents like OLF and AAPO.

Siphoning off Resources from the South

Immediately after taking the state power in Addis Ababa, the TPLF, with the approval of OPDO and EPDM/ANDM, started to engage in shipping some economic resources, including installations, from the south to Tigray. The pretext was that it was necessitated for a speedy recovery of the Tigray region that was devastated the most by the protracted civil war. Tigray region was one of the two main battlefields of the civil wars between the guerrilla liberation fighters and the socialist government over the period of seventeen years. As a result, it was one of the most affected regions of the civil war. The scale of the response from the TPLF to speed up the development of its region at the expense of other regions was however scrutinized both by the public and by opposition parties.

In the view of many disadvantaged nations, nationalities, and peoples of Ethiopia, particularly in the views of the Oromo as represented by the OLF, TPLF grabbed resources from the south in similar fashion European colonialists had dried up some of the riches of their colonies in Africa. TPLF/EPRDF, instead of "phasing out Ethiopia's imperial nature and autocratic political tradition," Lata (1998a) argues, was replacing one form of colonial policy with another, the likeness of French or Portuguese assimilation colonial policy with the likeness of Great Britain's home rule. According to Lata (1998a), "The manner in which resources are siphoned off from the colonial southern regions for the speedy development of Tigray makes the new relationship even more glaringly colonial than what used to prevail" (p. 74).

Forcing the OLF Out of Election and out of TGE

One of the crucial circumstances where EPRDF showed its dominance and force was in ousting the OLF from TGE. OLF withdrew from the electoral contest in June 1992 on the ground of allegations of widespread harassment, intimidations, and systematic abuse by EPRDF in general, its security forces, and its member organization, the OPDO, in particular. Following the withdrawal from the election contest, OLF was forced systematically to leave the TGE. The reason OLF left the TGE was however much bigger and wider than the reasons why it withdrew from the election. Despite the declaration of the self-determination of NNPs entrenched in the Transitional Charter, the "disparity between policy declaration and actions" forced the OLF to withdraw from the TGE (Baissa, 1998). The withdrawal of OLF from the election contest and the TGE was followed by some armed

clashes between the army of the EPRDF, which had just become the national army, and the fighters of OLF that had left their camps in some parts of Ethiopia. The clash brought back the memory of the recent civil war in the periphery into the center for few weeks in July and August 1992. After this sporadic armed conflict, over 20,000 members, supporters, and sympathizers of OLF suffered unlawful imprisonment.

Most of the Oromo political elites would agree that the withdrawal of OLF from TGE was the biggest mistake ever committed by the OLF leadership. Apologist politicians would argue that there were not compelling misconducts and harassments or threats from EPRDF that could call for the decision of withdrawing from TGE. They point out that were the OLF leadership had a good focus on the long-term goal of achieving the national self-determination of the Oromo people, through non-armed political struggle based on winning the heart and mind of the Oromo, running away from the TGE could not be taken as a better option. At the very time, the hearts and minds of the Oromo were starting to embrace the political ideal and conviction of OLF, the OLF leadership lost sight of the bigger picture of struggling peacefully for the Oromo, being within and with the Oromo people. The decision of OLF to leave the TGE exposed the Oromo to further division and continued to serve the intentions and goals of the EPRDF.

The OLF, however, claims that it had contributed its share positively towards the democratization process during its time as part of the TGE. Some of the contributions, as listed by Lata (1998a), one of the prominent leaders of OLF during that time, include (a) the drafting of the Electoral Law of the 1992 election of people's representatives at regional and district level, (b) the toleration of non-Oromo political groups to operate in Oromia with exception of few cases of conflicts, (c) the recommendation of the encampment of all former guerrilla troops to hold a peaceful election, (d) the establishment of direct cooperation with other political groups based on direct talks, and (e) advising the formation of the Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Coalition (p. 69).

Forming Party Owned Mega Companies

After securing the state power, TPLF focused on designing a mechanism to transform its temporary political dominance in EPRDF to lasting economic dominance in Ethiopia. To do so, it started to establish business companies owned by the party and registered with the name of most

of the senior members of TPLF as shareholders. It set up such companies in key economic sectors, unwarranted by the law. Other members of EPRDF also set up such companies. Neither the 1960 Commercial Code that regulates charitable trusts nor the 1993 proclamation that prohibits registered political parties from owning for-profit enterprises would stop the TPLF and other members of EPRDF from establishing companies owned by political parties (Abegaz, 2011). In 1995, the TPLF owned companies came under a disguised blanket name of "Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray" commonly known as EFFORT. EFFORT is a holding company for the TPLF owned multi-billion-dollar Business Empire in Ethiopia. Similarly, ANDM, OPDO, and SEPDM established and owned such companies in the name of Tiret, Tumsa (formerly Dinsho), and Wondo respectively though with exponentially declining fractions of the capital of EFFORT.

The lion's share of the start-up capital for EFFORT, Tiret, Tumsa, and Wondo came from donors. The donations were from international donor organizations, national aid agencies, and special donor groups, such as Band-Aid. Some portion of it was from war spoils, which included cash taken from state-owned banks and state property seized during the civil war (1974-1991) by the rebel groups. There was also remittance, however insignificant, and contributions in support of a change of government in Ethiopia from the Ethiopian diaspora during the war that went into the fund. In other words, with the diminutive exception, the initial capitals of the now TPLF, ANDM, OPDO, and SEPDM owned group of companies were, and are, the wealth of the Ethiopian nations, nationalities, and people as a whole or donations and assistances received in their name. None of the start-up capital of these companies came from the parties' elites. Nonetheless, the party elites have systematically channeled the wealth of the nation to companies they own and manage, either directly or indirectly.

Beyond the phony ownership and legality of these so-called "endowment companies," the bigger picture is clear: the TPLF/EPRDF planned and acted quickly to consolidate its political gain, which in its nature is temporary, into an economic gain, which in its nature is long-lasting. The TPLF/EPRDF, trading with and ruling the Ethiopian Federation, began its long journey of securing a lasting dominance of the Ethiopian economy. This is the strategy for the social, political, and most importantly, the economic transformation of its core, the Tigrayan minority, within the Ethiopian Federation and beyond.

The Emergence of Strong Opposition

In reaction to the superciliousness of EPRDF as exemplified in its moves as discussed above, the voices of opposition started to grow louder during the TGE. It was a reaction to the alarming moves of the EPRDF. EPRDF had begun acting against the spirit of the July 1991 Conference and the Charter it had produced. Also, some of the opposition to TPLF/EPRDF and the TGE rejected the national federalization project spearheaded by EPRDF. Some other non-members and most of the members of the TGE accepted, in principle, ethnic-based federalism as a viable solution to the political predicaments of Ethiopia but opposed the way the TPLF/EPRDF dominated TGE has embarked on its implementation. Discontented members of the TGE withdrew in opposition to the way the TPLF/EPRDF started to dominate and manipulate the TGE to its advantage. Through the systematically controlled and dominated political and power machine of the TGE, the TPLF/EPRDF however not only continued to implement its prescribed version of federalism but also effectively equated its survival to the survival of Ethiopia. It turned both the local and international political climates to its ideological conviction of self-determination of NNPs up to secession.

The recent political history of the country offered the basis for the emergence of strong process and program oppositions to EPRDF along the axis of unity-secession. The socialist government had suppressed all national secessionist movements (including that of Eritrean liberation movements) and the non-ethnic-non-secessionist political groups. It did so both militarily and politically. The Socialist regime, chanting the political slogans of "Ethiopia First," "One people; one country," and "Ethiopian Unity" loud and clear in the forefront, introduced the military rule with the borrowed name of "scientific socialism" in which not only central planning and the unitary dictatorship of supreme leadership became evident with an immediate suspension of the constitution. Similar to the imperial regime, the military dictators allowed neither alternative options of national restructuring nor multi-party democracy nor the social restructuring of the country based on nationality. Under military rule, all movements for national liberations were a threat to the territorial integrity and cultural and historical unity of the country. Both armed and non-armed, non-ethnic-non-secessionist political groups were suppressed in the same fashion as the ethnic-based secessionist groups. This was the main cause of the two-decades-long civil war in the country. It was no surprise that the same alignment, along the axis of unity and secession, was prevalent in the political arena of the country after

EPRDF had toppled the socialist government. The opposition, however, took a form of program and process opposition to the national political program pioneered by the EPRDF.

Program and Process Oppositions

The national policy and political programs of TPLF/EPRDF were not free from criticism and opposition both before and after its victory. It took the EPRDF some time to clear the demonizing clouds of the propaganda of the socialist regime against it from the national political atmosphere. Particularly in the parts of the country where it was not active before the victory, the opposition to EPRDF was fierce. Besides, it took EPRDF time to fully introduce its political programs and win the trust of the majority NNPs. Moreover, remnants of non-ethnic and non-secessionist pan-Ethiopian groups, particularly those which had an encounter of armed confrontation with TPLF/EPRDF before its national victory, continued to oppose its political program. These groups gained momentum after the public started to sense the potential disbandment of the country along with national territory starting from the early chaotic months of post-May 1991.

This opposition to national federalization remained the strongest opposition that EPRDF encountered, both during and after the transition. The majority of opposition groups to EPRDF opposed the national federalization project. AAPO and Ethiopian Democratic Union Party (EDUP) have always been hostile to the idea of federalism in general regardless of how it is introduced and implemented (Aalen, 2002). AAPO and EDUP advocate for a unitary nation-state. For instance, EDUP "strongly opposed to 'the rights of nations, nationalities, and peoples to self-determination including secession' and advocated for 'a unitary state with the strong central government" (Aalen, 2002, p. 43), where various groups would have representations. AAPO, however, did not only believe that it was wrong to include a secessionist article in a constitution but also, contrary to reality, viewed Ethiopia as "a nation of one people of different ethnic groups" (Aalen, 2002, p. 43). For EPRDF, however, Ethiopia has always been a multi-national state with much competing nationalism, and national self-determination that would sustain the integrity of Ethiopia could only be achieved through federalism that takes into account the fundamental markers of the identities of the nations and nationalities of Ethiopia.

Opponents of the federalization program of EPRDF were only aspirational. The opposition of AAPO and EDUP to the national

federalization is based on the political ideology of the old regimes, including the monarchy, which had unsuccessfully tried to hold all the NNPs of Ethiopia under the single discomforting wholesale of Abyssinian-centred Ethiopia-nism. The top leadership and prominent members of these parties were former Amhara ruling classes, elites, and members of the old nobility. Their opposition to national federalism may emanate from their aspiration of regaining power and maintaining political dominance in a unitary state.

For the AAPO and its affiliated parties, all formed by Amhara political elites, the U-turn move in Amhara nationalism from multi-ethnic pan-Ethiopia-nism to ethnic Amhara democratic nationalism was hardly acceptable. This was because many of the Amhara political elites had denied the existence of an Amhara ethnicity arguing, "Amharic is a multi-ethnic tongue and the Amhara are people made up of multiethnic groups" (Baissa, 1998, p. 96). That was when they still believed that they could continue projecting their national dominance over the NNPs of Ethiopia under the imperial and the socialist regimes that had made the Amhara culture, language, religion, the way of life, the Empire State's imperial culture, the national language, state religion, and national way of life respectively. During those days, being an Ethiopian is what the non-Abyssinian NNPs of Ethiopia had to earn through their total assimilation to Amharan total dominance by giving up all that was theirs and "becoming" Amhara which was synonymous with becoming Ethiopian. After the struggle of the NNPs of Ethiopia earned them victory over the national oppression of the Amhara and unmistakably proved that it was not the case and asserted their rights to self-determination in the Constitution of the Ethiopian Federation, Amhara nationalism had to take a different but the same course as that of other NNPs of Ethiopia. Thus, when EPDM had to become ANDM in January 1994 to promote Amhara "democratic nationalism" according to the national self-determination central political ideology of EPRDF, AAPO and all other opposition political parties were founded around the elusive political ideal of one-nation nationalism, as opposed to the determined political moves of the multi-nationalism of EPRDF. Those who formed AAPO and other similar parties had expected EPDM, which was formed from the remnant of EPRP under the protection of TPLF; to promote Amhara-centered Ethiopian imperial nationalism.

The other opposition groups to the national federalization project of EPRDF agreed to the federal solution in principle but opposed either the idea of national federalism itself or the way it was introduced and implemented (Aalen, 2002). This opposition group included the latecomer opposition parties, such as the Council of Alternative Forces for Peace and

Democracy in Ethiopia (CAFPDE) that united the SEPDC, Ethiopian Democratic Party, and Oromo National Congress. CAFPDE and EDP opposed the EPRDF's ethnolinguistic criteria for defining the federal territory. This opposition was based on its functionality rather than its underpinning political ideology. They argued that ethnolinguistic criteria cannot be a viable basis for the formation of federal states in highly diverse multi-ethnic and multilingual states like Ethiopia. AAPO, on the other hand, opposed the ethnic-based federalization process because it was serving only the interest of TPLF as a strategy to sustain its dominance. The AAPO, like most other opposition parties, perceived early enough that "EPRDF is a nominal party" with absolute dominance of TPLF (Aalen, 2002). TPLF has the ambition to "build Tigray to a greater, prosperous and wealthy nation and Tigray people to a first-class people in every aspect in the Horn of Africa" (Aalen, 2002, p. 45). These groups of opposition shared a strong view that the declaration of unconditional rights to self-determination in Ethiopia was a political contraption of TPLF dominated EPRDF. The contraption was to gain popular support in all regions as a form of divide and rule strategy. They saw the process of the national federalization project of EPRDF simply as a political strategy for the TPLF to stay in power for the realization of its ambition of sustained dominance than solving the political problem of the country by introducing a genuine form of federalism.

Both the program and the process oppositions to the EPRDF's national federalization project complained about discrepancies on what had been provided in the Transitional Charter and what the TPLF/EPRDF dominated TGE had started to implement. The former opposed the fundamental and the latter opposed the content and character as well as the process of the ethnolinguistic based federalism. Strong opposition emerged, as discussed above after the TPLF/EPRDF became conceited about its total control of the national political space and key resources. By then, it had started to ignore or curb its earlier promises of effecting democratic transition that would engage freely all political forces in the country.

Federalization, the Only Solution

Despite the program and the process oppositions to the national-linguistic based federalization by political opponents of EPRDF, federalism was regarded as the only viable mechanism to keep Ethiopia together. Except for a few opposition parties which opted for the return of unitary nation-state building, most of the opposition parties supported the formation

of the federation, in principle. All the members of EPRDF and its satellite parties fully supported the federalization project as intended by EPRDF. Many political scholars also supported this view (Abbink, 1995; Mengisteab, 1997; Young, 1996). They agreed that national federalism was a logical response to prevent the country from total disintegration by mending the historical legacy of ethnic Amhara and Tigrie dominance and marginalization of the rest of NNPs. They believed the formation of a federation was, in effect, ensuring the continuity of the Ethiopian state. Most importantly, the Ethiopian public was alarmed that the declaration of secession by any of the national liberation fronts could lead to endless civil war. As a result, they welcomed the idea of the formation of the Ethiopian Federation enthusiastically, as it was proposed initially by EPRDF.

The alarmed public was also made to believe that only TPLF/EPRDF could save Ethiopia. This was because TPLF/EPRDF equated its survival to the survival of the country in its aggressive propaganda. It effectively transformed the "national question" in to "existential threat" that could only be contained by EPRDF and made such propaganda the center of its daily mission. The public was kept under continuous fear monger. The formulation of the propaganda was simple: If no TPLF/EPRDF, not Federalism, and if no federalism, no Ethiopia. In such a way, the survival of TPLF/EPRDF, though delusional, started to be equated effectively with the survival of Ethiopia in the minds of the ordinary people. This was to remain the undercurrent propaganda in every political, social, and economic program and policy of TPLF/EPRDF.

Opposition Conferences and the TGE

The emergence of strong opposition during the TGE was able to initiate two opposition conferences, one abroad the other in the country. These conferences, though they had a broad goal and had hoped to reach some sort of negotiated settlement with the increasingly arrogant EPRDF, successes were limited. Yet, they were able to expose the emerging characters of the TPLF dominated EPRDF and the TGE that was dominated by it. The conferences were also the last joint efforts of the opposition groups to push their political program against EPRDF's federalization and to challenge EPRDF on its increasing dominance and political arrogance. The following is a brief overview of the two opposition conferences.

Paris Conference of April 1993

The Paris Conference was an opposition conference organized in March 1993 in Paris, France. The participants were opposition parties who were increasingly frustrated by the emerging despotic character of the EPRDF and its continued effort to narrow the political space in Ethiopia in such a way that it would remain the single dominant party in the country. It resolved, among others, that there was no legitimate government in Ethiopia.

The EPRDF and the TGE took the resolution seriously and demanded that members of the TGE who participated in the conference immediately denounce the resolution and apologize to the TGE. This was the tactic of EPRDF to victimize opposition members of the TGE. HNDM was the first victim. It was the first to announce its endorsement of the Paris resolution. The EPRDF dominated CoR first excluded HNDO led by Beyene Petros, who was also the leader of the SEPDC, from the CoR. Then the TPLF/EPRDF dominated TGE demanded that members of the SEPDC must identify their position vis-à-vis Paris resolution. The demand divided the SEPDC. Four more members of SEPDC, i.e., SLM, OPDF, YNDM, GPDO failed the demand of EPRDF that required them to apologize officially for taking part in the Paris Conference and to denounce the statement of the conference. Instead, they backed the resolution and the stand of HNDO. Thus, they were excluded automatically from the CoR losing their eight seats to EPRDF. KPC, GPDF, WPDF, BPDO, and KPDU denounced the resolution and kept their nine seats in the CoR.

The post-Paris Conference reaction of the EPRDF and TGE produced the needed and timely effect for the EPRDF. Its strategy of elimination or weakening of opposition parties in the run-up to the ratification of the federal Constitution and the consequent first national election that would give some sort of constitutional legitimacy worked very well. It had ended the threat from the biggest opposition, the OLF. It had debased the AAPO. Now, it has divided the second biggest opposition, the SEPDC.

"Peace and Reconciliation Conference" of 1993

The Peace and Reconciliation Conference was mainly the result of an effort by former US president, Jimmy Carter. Carter had tried to achieve a negotiated settlement among the political factions. He had met with the leaders of the main opposition parties in Atlanta. He sincerely believed that an opposition conference could help to bring together the divergent visions of the parties and set some power-sharing framework between EPRDF and

the opposition. The conference was held in Addis Ababa in December 1993. All opposition parties were invited. OLF, AAPO, and SEPDC were among the major opposition parties that took part in the conference.

However, EPRDF was not welcoming. It had openly declared that it was not willing to negotiate on key political issues that it named as fundamental. These issues included abiding by the Transitional Charter and denouncing violence. Contrary to the facts, EPRDF was breaching the Charter in multiple ways. There was little hope for the goal of a fair share of power. Instead, leaders of the opposition political parties felt ubiquitously fear of detention before the conference. EPRDF had sent a shock of fear through the country. It had summarily dismissed forty-two professors (mostly Amhara) from Addis Ababa University on 9 April 1993. It placed thirty-eight more professors on forced probation in connection to expressing anti-government views and signing a letter protesting the use of violence by the EPRDF government against demonstrators. It had also begun a concerted attack on free media that just started to take root. These actions depicted vividly EPRDF in its deed than in its words: no opposition political party could trust it.

EPRDF's denouncing of violence was sardonic. Coming to power by force itself, EPRDF had refused to acknowledge political parties that have maintained armed struggle as an option or did not denounce violence as a party to the TGE. It was demanding the mostly unarmed opposition parties to denounce violence while it was committing violence throughout the country. The government forces attacked not only political party members but also peaceful worshipers. In Gondar city, for example, government forces committed military violence on 7 September 1993 killing at least eighteen Orthodox Tewahdo faithful under the pretext that a priest was instigating violence. Human rights abuses were predominant. Human Right Watch report in 1993 (Human Rights Watch, 1993), Amnesty International report in 1994 (Amnesty International, 1994), and US State Department report in 1993 (U.S. Department of State, 1994) show there were widespread extra judiciary killings, unlawful detentions, abuse of prisoners, election-related harassments, and intimidation of opposition party leaders by EPRDF and the TGE.

ERDF showed its contentment on the NPRCE with its secured dominance and clutch to power by allowing the conference in December 1993. Let alone giving considerations to the wish of the opposition parties for a new deal on power-sharing at the end of the conference, EPRDF neither took part in the conference nor accepted its resolution (Keller, 1995). EPRDF used it as a tactic to lure self-exiled opposition leaders to come into

the country so that it could arrest them easily. It arrested eight of the leaders and members of the opposition who had arrived in Addis Ababa to take part in the conference. The arrested include Lencho Leta and Ibsa Gutama from OLF, Getinet Girma, and Genenw Asefa from EPRP, Mesfin Tefera from EDU, Abera Yemaneab from AESM, and Seyoum Zenebe from *Medhin* Party. This terrorized the participants of the conference and about nineteen of the seventy invited organizations withdrew their participation. Most of the arrested members of the opposition parties were, however, released after renouncing violence and acknowledging that the TGE, under the leadership of President Meles Zenawi, allowed peaceful political campaigns.

Albeit all the intimidations and political neglect from EPRDF, the conference was successful. It formed a loose coalition of opposition parties under a broad umbrella called Council for Alternative Forces for Peace and Democracy in Ethiopia (CAFPDE) as a culmination of discussions both in Paris and in the Addis Ababa conferences. Beyene Petros of HNDO was elected chairperson of CAFPDE. Consequently, CAFPDE held demonstrations, mainly in the capital, in opposition to language policy, the right to self-determination, and the intimidation and harassment from EPRDF and the security forces of the TGE under its control.

Soon, it was clear that CAFPDE was a centralist-oriented coalition. This might have forced the OLF, though it had taken place in both the Paris and the Addis Ababa conferences, to distance itself from the CAFPDE. CAFPDE's intention to contest in the 1994 national election did not materialize owing to the growing division from within and the systematic harassment and intimidation from EPRDF. Yet, it remained one of the main active opposition groups in Ethiopia for a few years.

Towards the end of 1993, four of the TGE member parties were expelled from CoR. The EPRDF saw this as an opportunity for further consolidation of power. It emerged not only as the dominant party in the CoR but also as an absolute majority. It had taken all the government power and started to show its commitment to keeping it by any means necessary.

The Role of Nationalities Politics

Political Motivations

TPLF/EPRDF's ethnic-based (nationalistic) political orientation is the Soviet legacy of Stalinism. The ideological background to the federal model in Ethiopia, Aalen (2011) argues, goes back to the TPLF's inspiration by the Stalinist theory of nationalities. This has been marked clearly in the fact that the TPLF/EPRDF was committed to promulgating the right to secession in the federal Constitution in the same way the constitution of the former Soviet Union gave various republics in the USSR the unpractised right to secede. Indeed, many of the EPRDF leaders, particularly leaders of the TPLF, have confirmed that their political ideology was influenced heavily by the Marxist-Leninist interpretations of national questions of the NNPs.

To hear "from the horse mouth," one of the founding members of the TPLF who was also among its key leadership, Aregawi Berhe, retells the original understanding of the idea of self-determination at the initial stage of the liberation struggle before it was developed to secession:

> With the commencement of the insurgent movement under the TPLF, the idea of national self-determination was understood to mean autonomy or self-rule for the region of Tigray in a would-be democratic, poly-ethnic Ethiopia. Later, in the early days of the struggle, self-determination was stretched by an ultra-nationalist group within the emerging TPLF, to mean secession from the Ethiopian nation-state, with the aim of establishing the 'independent republic of Tigrai', as declared by the 1976 'TPLF Manifesto.' The justification for this secessionist stance was drawn eclectically from the theoretical formulations of Stalin on self-determination. There were no other historical, legal, or political provisions that substantiated the arguments for secession. (Berhe, 2009, p. 7)

In 1985, TPLF had an inner group, which Berhe (2009) called "ultra-nationalist group which promoted the "ideological brand of Marxism–Leninism" with emphasis on Stalinism. This inner group finally established the Marxist-Leninist League of Tigray (MLLT) under the core leadership of Meles Zenawi. MLLT emulated Enver Hoxha[22] style of Albanian Marxism. This was a parallel development to the Eritrean People's Liberation Front

(EPLF)'s clandestine party called the Eritrean People's Socialist Party (EPSP) (Pool 2001 cited in Berhe, 2009) under the leadership of Ramadan Mohammed Nur and Isayas Afeworki, who was trained in China (Berhe, 2009). The MLLT played a vital role, to use Berhe's words, "as lens and compass to guide and control the movement." The political fascination of TPLF by Lenin's ideals is evident during the 1980s when TPLF started to establish its identity boldly and powerfully, coming out from under the shadow of EPLF. The leadership of TPLF (and EPLF) has been influenced with Lenin's perception that "revolution in the modern era cannot be conducted directly by but only on behalf of the oppressed" and that "secrecy should be given precedence over open participation" (Lata, 1999, p. 84) for conducting revolution. The Marxist-Leninist concepts of ethnicity, nationalism, class struggle and self-determination were "extensively utilized by the TPLF to create a broad-based mass movement both during the struggle and after the seizure of power" (Lata, 1999, pp. 9-10). From among these concepts, it is only the class struggle that seems to have been dropped towards the end of the struggle. Class struggle has no reflections on the policies of EPRDF (Aalen, 2011).

Nevertheless, in a departure from Stalin's perception of nationalities, Aalen (2011) identifies two instrumental and primordial elements of contradiction in the EPRDF's approach to ethnicity. The first emerges from ethnic mobilization from *inside* based on people's cultural tradition and knowledge system. The second emerges from *outside* based on fixed characteristics without the involvement of members of the ethnic group. In the first, EPRDF used national identities as instruments of mobilization. In the second, it considered that the vanguard party from outside can grant self-determination to national groups. Aalen (2011) further claims that this contradictory understanding of ethnicity has a strong bearing on the practice of ethnic federalism:

> Self-rule for the ethnic group is not granted because 'self-determination for nationalities' is an end in itself, but because ethnic self-rule is recognized as the most efficient way to mobilize the community, neutralize possible separatist movements, and foster unity and integration. This reflects an instrumental understanding of ethnicity: ethnic identity is not valued for its own sake, or because the category that exists independently of the political mobilization of it, but because it is useful as a tool for achieving other aims. (p. 37).

In summary, TPLF/EPRDF drew its political motivation from "theoretical formulations of Stalin on self-determination" (Berhe, 2009). TPLF leader's political motivations, including that of Meles Zenawi, were fundamentally

Stalin's. They were the Soviet legacy of Stalinism. The political motivation of EPRDF has, therefore, been drawn from Stalin's political ideology of national self-determination. The ideology has, however, been turned and twisted in the hands of TPLF leaders to best satisfy the short-term and the long-term interests of the TPLF and the Tigray people than the interests of the rest of the NNPs of Ethiopia.

Dramatization of Diversity

Dramatization, as a political theory, is "a method aimed at determining the quality of political concepts by 'bringing them to life,' in the way that dramatic performances bring to life the characters and themes of a playscript" (Mackenzie and Porter, 2011, p. 488). It is a method with "the philosopher as director and the philosophical text as a script, with characters and roles that the reader can and must re-enact if the force of the concepts within the text is to be redeployed" (Mackenzie and Porter, 2011, p. 488). It is, thus, a practical, critical, and artistic method (Mackenzie and Porter, 2011). It is used for the determination of concepts with the aim of appreciation of the conditions that give concepts their force and their quality for the explanation of pertinence, relevance, and usefulness of the concepts that provoke thoughts (Mackenzie and Porter, 2011). Mackenzie and Porter (2011) further explicate that dramatization of concepts is a method of intensification. Its use enables the political philosopher to "determine the conditions that give concepts their quality and force." It is a method that enables access to the differential relations that constitute the terrain of the idea in the concept. It helps to create a difference within the idea that the concept expresses "in order to capture the dynamics within that the results of Ideal events," in other words, it is a way of determining the Idea that the concept expresses. "In political theory, dramatization as the method requires that we stage new relations within and between the concepts that animate politics in order to express the indeterminate yet endlessly provocative nature of the idea of the political" (Mackenzie and Porter, 2011, p. 494). This political theory was put to the test in Ethiopia during the TGE.

Nothing has been dramatized in Ethiopia since the fall of the socialist government other than the diversity of its peoples. Every single element that makes one nation or nationality or people different from the other nation, nationality, or people has been magnified and animated in such a way that it appears bigger or deeper than it is. The cultural differences that were about to unify through the evolutionary process that began since the formation of

modern Ethiopia were expounded as separate cultural identities. The languages that were converging to become one were given an idiosyncratic character and varying scripts. The people who had long assumed they were the same were told that they were quite different and cannot even be the same. They were encouraged to identify as separate nations, nationalities, or peoples with no place for mixed identity because of the centuries of intermingling between them. Every social, cultural, or linguistic issue that has characteristics of peculiarity was promoted with highly contrasting expressions. Overarching social institutions and cultural events were systematically demoted. The minor distinctions among people, such as linguistic intonation, the myth of origin, claims of descent, the topography of the cradle land was considered an element that marks identity. Based on such and other mainstream markers of identity, over six dozen of distinct nations, nationalities, and peoples have been identified. Representations of such distinctions were symbolized with sub-national colors and with mostly concocted symbolisms. The intention behind these all was a dramatization of the concept of diversity, which in practical terms meant dramatization of the concepts of nation, nationalities, and peoples. The objective was to convince the public decisively that Ethiopia is a multi-national, multi-cultural, multi-linguistic state where all NNPs must be equal and have an equal right to self-determination, as it was offered by the TPLF/EPRDF. It was, however, all politics, perhaps overdramatized national politics, with calculated benefit primarily to TPLF.

In the Ethiopian political arena during the TGE and afterward, the leader of TPLF/EPRDF presented the diversity dramatization play scripts with an authoritative power to the players. The players were not only selected carefully but also indoctrinated fully and conveniently "made" to fit for the purpose. The players include the leaders of members of the EPRDF, regional chiefs, ministers and state ministers, commissioners, directors, and other appointed actors. The regional chiefs, in turn, repeat the same process of recruiting, indoctrinating, and conveniently "making" heads of their bureaus, *Zonal* administrators, *Wareda* administrators, and *Kebele* chairpersons in the direct subordination and commissioners, chairpersons of councils, heads of regional institutions, etc. in the indirect subordination. At the end of both the federal and regional dramatization, the same people were set as the audience with little or no power to hold opinions against the play or hope to improve it whether it is a policy or a strategy or a program. The diversity dramatization playscript has been played over and over in Ethiopia since the TPLF first scripted it.

The EPRDF made use of dramatization as a method of deep rooting its political ideology. The aim was to underpin its political conviction of national

self-determination during the armed struggle and to gain popular support on its promise of granting the right to self-determination to all NNPs and its fashionable ethnicity-oriented political dynamics. Also, it was to design self-determination into the Constitution and national transitional policies during the TGE. Furthermore, it was to inculcate national self-determination into the national social, economic, cultural, political, and institutional strategies and policies after the transition.

Indeed, dramatization, as political method, has been at work on every politically significant issue in Ethiopia ever since the coming to power of EPRDF. It has been played, first, to constitutionally recognize all the NNPs of Ethiopia as sovereign and, second, to sustain the recognition and the sovereignty of the NNPs as its vanguard. In other words, it was to indoctrinate and sustain its tailor-made political ideology. The bottom line for TPLF in these dramatizations has been that it could fully control the country and remain in control for long.

The Recognition of NNPs of Ethiopia

National politics played a decisive role in the recognition of multinationalism in modern Ethiopia. It was the most decisive victory of the political periphery over the center. The political center was associated with the Amhara who viewed Ethiopia as a nation-state founded on their culture, tradition, and language. This view has been maintained throughout the history of Abyssinia Proper and post-1889 Ethiopia. By 1889, *Atse* Menelik II of Shewa, allegedly an Amhara, took over the state power from *Atse* Yohannes IV of Tigray following the latter's death in action while defending his kingdom against the Mahdist of Sudan. It was since then that the Amhara regained the state power and the leadership to expand and annex other nations and nationalities, finally culminating in the formation of modern Ethiopia. Their elites have also claimed the credit of building modern Ethiopia, even though it was achieved by the collaboration of many other nations. As a result, the political elites of the center had developed a strong sense of Amhara-centric Ethiopian nationalism which fails utterly to recognize other nations or other nationalisms in the country. In their view, all the armed groups were secessionist enemies of Ethiopia and its unity. The armed groups, the triumphant periphery, however, have contrasting views to the center. They, contrary to the center, saw Ethiopia as a multinational state where its NNPs are forced to live as one people adhering to the dominant culture, faith, language, tradition, and history of Amhara, which had gradually

become dichotomous with "Ethiopian" culture, faith, language, tradition, and history. As a result, they opposed the national oppression of Amhara elites and the forcefully imposed spurious "oneness" on the palpable diversity and multiplicity of nations in Ethiopia. They viewed the Abyssinian-centred Ethiopian nationalism as Amhara domination and its associative "one Ethiopian" as a "prison house of nationalities." The lasting recognition which asserted that modern Ethiopia has always been a multi-national state, with a list of sixty-seven NNPs already recognized before the ratification of the Constitution (see Table 3), was a decisive victory of the multinational periphery over the unitary center.

The Perceived Threat to National Unity

The two victories culminated in the outright recognition of the multi-nationality of Ethiopia by the CoR. Ethiopia is no more recognized as a nation-state, but as a multinational state in which multiple NNPs live together. The recognition of the multi-nationality of the people of the country however quickly went to the extreme by recognizing every group that claimed it was different. The "one" Ethiopia at once became so many. Its nations, nationalities, and peoples, all recognized at once as equal and different to and from each other. This evoked unprecedented national and sub-national politics in the country, which, according to the political ideology of EPRDF, had to be recognized as a political mechanism. The EPRDF seemed to have been convinced that "ethnicity cannot be politicized unless an underlying core of memories, experience, or meaning moves people to collective action" (Esman, 1994, quoted in Berhe, 2009, p. 50). The recognition of ethnicity and ethnic political identity, however, transformed the emerging ethnic politics in the country to what Burgess called "political nationality" (Burgess, 2012a, p. 25). All major ethnic groups save the Amhara, at once started to aspire for the formation of their national state. Some already had the political conviction of secession from Ethiopia. Sixty-seven NNPs were recognized before the ratification of the Constitution that established the Ethiopian Federation.

Federalism, it has been argued, is the basis for both safeguarding stability and encouraging conflict in diverse and ethnically divided communities like Ethiopia. This paradoxical argument was in full play during the TGE. Indeed, it has continued to animate the political debate in Ethiopia to date.

During the early days of the TGE, the centrists overemphasized the later argument. The unsettled socio-political environment served as a fertile ground for divisive arguments. The reactionary centrist forces took the firm position that ethnic-based federalism encourages conflict and erodes the national unity of Ethiopia. They argued that Ethiopia should take a lesson from experiences in USSR, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. They appealed to the fact that USSR disintegrated recently into Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. More importantly, they emphasized the ongoing bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia into national republics of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia and the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. They also used the splitting of Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia. They likened the future of Ethiopia under an ethnic-based federation to these bad examples of national federations. The reactionaries viewed the political environment of the time through a very pessimistic lens and expected the fragmentation of the country into its national and sub-national societies. The danger of loss of national unity, to the least, and the loss of Ethiopia, to the most, was the deterrent argument. Such framing of the reasonable threat to national unity was the source of fear. The fear was partly hyperbolic due to the rudiments of the propaganda of the fallen centrist nationalist unity government, which had unsuccessfully endeavored to continue to build the diverse Empire of Ethiopia into a unitary nation-state. The propaganda has continued reverberating in the post-revolution political discourse.

The federalists, on their part, emphasized the first part of the paradoxical argument about the effect of federalism. Thus, they counter-argued with the centrists. Their main emphasis was the fact that the centrist unitary system had proved to be not working and the democratic multinational system was the best available alternative to ensure equality and justice on one hand and the right to self-rule and shared-rule on the other hand. The centrist and the reactionary who equated federalization along the national lines with planning purposely the disintegration of the country opposed it vehemently.

As a result, there was tension between the "centrist" and the "federalist" camps. The former wished to maintain the unitary state system while the latter opted for national self-determination. The uncertainty of what would unfold as the new Ethiopia from the tense political environment was another source of fear by itself. The absence of broad support from the public for the nationally organized minority revolutionaries at the early stage had its part

in the fear. NNPs that were not represented in the revolutionaries, particularly the minorities, had existential fears. However, soon, the latter camp seemed to have emerged victorious from the political tensions, as from the liberation wars, by effectively employing a dramatized propaganda of the oppression of the NNPs of Ethiopia. This probably gave confidence to the unrepresented NNPs to support the EPRDF project of national self-determination. By the end of the TGE, the former camp was not yet fully defeated but remained as a unifying element in the diversity of the NNPs of Ethiopia. Clapham (1994) observed the *centrist--federalist* tension "has not been finally resolved in favor of the latter by the collapse of the Mengistu Haile Mariam's regime, but remains intricately balanced even within the current political structure" (p. 40). The revolutionary forces (federalists) had an unwavering conviction for the federalization of the country that had been pioneered already by the transitional Charter while the isolated elites of reactionary centrist forces had a deep fear that the country could disintegrate along national fault lines. The former saw the right to national self-determination of the NNPs as the source of peace, stability, and national unity. It was an idea that saw freedom, not coercion, as a source of peace and stability in the country. However, such an idea was too far-flung not only for the common citizen but also for the revolutionaries to understand and have faith in it.

In the end, the perceived threat of national federalism to the unity and territorial integrity of the Ethiopian state remained. The fear of the centrist reactionaries was prevalent at all corners and segments of the public outside of the circle of the elite revolutionary democrats of EPRDF. Indeed, the liberation fronts, which had struggled for the liberation of the nationality they represented, were at least indifferent to the fear of the disintegration of the Ethiopian state. As a result, regardless of the theoretical argument for federalism both as a mechanism for peace & stability and a source of conflict & instability, the federalization project remained a threat to national unity in the views of not only the centrist politicians but also the majority of the ancient Ethiopia-nist scholars. Only EPRDF and its affiliates were fully convinced that ethnic-based federalism would serve as a mechanism of peace and stability in Ethiopia.

Some Dispute on the Federalization

The formation of a federation was the best available form of state in post centrist Ethiopia. The political environment of the immediate post-*Derg*

regime did not allow any other genuine form of state formation. Federalism was the only practical solution to strike a tolerable balance between unity and diversity of the NNPs. Besides, EPRDF argued normatively that federalism was to guarantee the rights to self-determination of the recognized NNPs of Ethiopia and to allow them to exercise autonomy, avoid conflicts and civil war among the NNPs, recognize the diversity and unity of the country. This argument appealed to the leaders of the ethnic-based political organizations. Most of the political leaders believed that federalism was an indispensable solution to the national political crisis. Both to keep the Ethiopian unity and to recognize the diversity of its NNPs, a federal political arrangement was the only alternative. With the due compromises, it was desired equality by both national unity and self-determination camps, except extremists in both camps. The inherent moral features of federalism, such as respect, tolerance, dignity, and mutual recognition (Burgess, 2006; 2012) and the recent past historical unity among the NNPs of Ethiopia immensely expedited the formation of the federation.

The type of federalism, which the country should follow, was however not without alternative. The compromising centrist elites and some of the non-ethnic-based national parties were against the irreversibly settling of ethnic-based (national) federalism. They argued it would result in the complete failure of Ethiopia as a state by destroying national unity and social cohesion. In other words, they argued that the *status quo* should be maintained: either the newly established administrative regions under the *Derg* regime should be maintained or the old imperial regions should serve as federal states. By the *status quo*, however, they mean the maintenance of mono language, monoculture, and mono identity – unity – and the imperial territorial integrity. The alternative to ethnic-based federalism, according to the centrist and aspirants of the return of the imperial regime was provincial (territorial) federalism.

This alternative could not be accepted by the majority nor could the ethnic-based federalism and formation of states accordingly could be stopped. The majority of the Ethiopian NNPs who suffered under imperial rule and the *Derg*, with almost total suppression of their languages, cultures, identities, and political and economic rights, was far from considering the alternative as proposed by the Amhara-dominated centrists. They wanted recognition and full exercise of their rights in a country that would not any more treat them as second-class citizens. They saw self-determination as the only working political ideology and national federalism as the only strategy to realize it. The EPRDF had realized and nurtured this ambition and had set it as its political goal for the country. The TGE, which was established and

guided by the transitional Charter, which had already granted the right of self-determination of NNPs, coupled with the dominance of EPRDF that championed self-determination of NNPs, had no other alternative but restructuring the state according to the provision in the Charter into ethnically based states through proclamations it issued consequently.

TPLF/EPRDF and State Formation and Restructuring

The Ethiopian state restructuring during the TGE was partly a shrewd experiment of TPLF/EPRDF. Initially, based on the Transitional Period Charter, the EPRDF[23] dominated TGE dived Ethiopia into 14 administrative units: twelve states and two city governments. It created what appeared to be close to an ethnonational federation. The dominant and authoritarian TPLF/EPRDFF, after clearing out a larger number of the opposition from the TGE, decided to merge four states in the south of the country into another sub-federation within the larger Ethiopian Federation. Accordingly, in 1994, the states of Sidama, Wolaita, Omo, Kaffa, and Guragie-Hadiyya-Kembata were lumped together to form the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Regional State (SNNP state).

The new conglomerate SNNP state was a collection of over fifty ethnic groups. About half of them were no less in any standard from another state to have national sovereignty and hence have their own states. According to the CSA report of the Ethiopian national population and housing census of 2007 (CSA, 2012), the population of former states of Sidama and Wolaita and their total share of the national population are 2.96 and 1.71 million, and 4 and 2.3 percent, respectively. The Garages are 1.87 million (2.5 percent); the Hadiyya is 1.3 million (1.7 percent; and the Gamos are 1.11 million (1.5 percent) (CSA, 2012). Nevertheless, EPRDF merged all into one state with a total population of 10,377,028 as in 1994 (CSA, 2012).

The merge was to serve the interest of TPLF/EPRDF than that of the peoples of the newly formed conglomerate state. The TPLF/EPRDF saw that the challenge to fully control so many states in the south could be dauntingly challenging. The solution was merging them into one. The decision would serve the strategic and tactical purpose of TPLF: sustaining political domination and aspiration to remain in power for a longer time in the federation to be formed. It was the last authoritarian strategic project of TPLF to make a state for its own strategic and tactical purpose. Earlier, it

had encouraged and supervised the making of the Harari, Gambella, and Benishangul-Gumuz states.



Figure 2. Sketch map of states and city governments

The formation of SNNP created an internal struggle among the now merged former states resulting in disunity among them. This was what the TPLF/EPRDF wanted. The disunity allowed TPLF to administer the state itself through appointees where the state government and the regional party, SEDF, an engineered coalition of small weak parties in the state, had little influence; little more than serving as a puppet of TPLF elites who have made them. The TPLF appointee, a notorious person by the name Goytom Bitew who could slap the president of the state in public, was the dictator of the state for years. The SNNP state has been serving as a smaller laboratory for the socio-political and administrative experimentation of EPRDF's Ethiopian empire state restructuring.

Table 4

Population, area, and administrative divisions

States and Cities	Population (2007)	Area (Km^2)	Administrative divisions
Addis Ababa City	2,738,248	540	10 Sub Cities
Afar	1,411,092	97,250	5 Zones, 29 Waredas
Amhara	17,214,056	170,752	10 Zones, 1 Special Zone, 105 Wareda, 78 Urban Centers
Benishangul-Gumuz	670,847	51,000	3 Zone, 18 Worwdas, 2 Special Woredas
Dire Dawa City	342,827	219	4 Districts, 24 Urban Kebeles, 28 Rural Associations
Gambella	306,916	29,783	4 Zones, 13 Waredas
Hariar	183,344	340	19 Kebeles, 17 Farmers' Associations
Oromia	27,158,471	353,690	12 Zones, 180 Waredas
SNNP	15,042,531	112,323	9 Zones, 72 Waredas, 5 Special Woredas
Somali	4,439,147	250,000	9 Zones, 49 Waredas.
Tigray	4,314,456	80,000	4 Zones, 1 Special Zone, 35 Waredas

Note. Based on CSA Summary Statistical Report, CSA, December 2007

Table 5

Distribution of National groups in the City Governments

City Government	National group	Percentage
Addis Ababa	Amhara	48.3 %
	Oromo	19.2 %
	Guragie	17.5 %
	Tigrie	7.6 %
Dire Dawa	Oromo	48.0 %
	Amhara	27.7 %
	Somali	13.9 %
	Guragie	4.5 %
	Others	5.9 %

Note. Compiled based on CSA Summary Statistical Report, CSA, December 2007

In contrast to the formation of SNNP State, the formation of Harari State, with equal rights and voice with all other states, was also more of a strategic dictatorial decision of TPLF/EPRDF than based on pragmatic needs. The former is composed of tens of NNPs, who constitute over ten million people. As mentioned above, the number of nations in SNNPs has a few million population and constitutes a significant percentage of the Ethiopian population. Each of the main nations in SNNP is homogeneous on the criteria that have been employed for the definition of NNP: ethnicity, language, culture, and contiguous settlement pattern. The latter is composed of a mixed population of a few hundred thousand. In 1994, the Harari people were 131,139; they made up 0.2% of the total Ethiopian population (CSA 1994). They also occupy a tiny area of 300 square kilometers (Aalen, 2002). The Oromo have been the majority in Harari State. Other than the despotism of EPRDF, it is impossible to justify the formation of such a microstate where the Harari people are not even the majority and call it Harari State creating a state within another state, within Oromia.

The TPLF, through its purposefully formed EPRDF, continued to enjoy the total loyalty of the states' chiefs in all the states and the advantage of membership and population size in Oromia, SNNP, and Amhara states through OPDO, SEDF, and ANDM, respectively. The loyalty of the satellite parties that TPLF/EPRDF has helped to create in other states such as Afar, Somali, Harari, Gambella, and Benishangul-Gumuz (APDO, SPDF, HNL, GPDF, and BGPDUF, respectively) has remained all-time high. As a result, TPLF/EPRDF's authority had been in earnest certitude in these periphery states during the TGE. The same has continued afterward.

Relying on Humble View for National Unity

The dominant political view at the beginning of the federalization process was unassuming. In the 1990s, EPRDF seemed convinced with the view that granting the rights of self-determination of minorities or aggrieved groups in the inconveniently unified multinational states is economical to the political process and beneficial to the indirect power of revitalizing national unity. The basis for this view is that there could be no mechanism of force but the free will of the concerned NNP, based on the pragmatic benefit of remaining in the unity, which should hold Ethiopia together. Its chairperson later explicated this view simply as the benefit of staying together outweighs the benefit of political divorce for the NNPs of Ethiopia. Thus, what was

needed the most to remain in unity was the constitutional guaranty of all-inclusive equality of NNPs of the country and the human and democratic rights of the people.

Considering this, the argument of An-Na'im (1993) was timely and in line with the political orientation of EPRDF. An-Na'im (1993) argues national unity is desirable because of its propensity for greater security, political stability, and social and economic development. If the constitutional framework of the diverse states guarantee internal self-determination on the principles of equality, justice, shared political powers, a fair share of social and economic development, maintenance and development of distinctive identities for all sections of the population, whether they are nations, nationalities or peoples, An-Na'im (1993) implies, there would be no need for secession. The threat of failure of the state to deliver on these constitutional frameworks, however, could remain a condition for granting of the right to secession. Such a threat is believed to have a positive rather than a negative influence on national unity because it encourages the national state to allow the internal self-determination of nations, nationalities, and peoples. This could consequently discourage secession but strengthens cooperation in building national unity because economic and political interdependence drive the states towards unity and integration rather than towards separation and disintegration (An-Na'im, 1993). This humble theory has prevailed beyond the TGE. The same theory explains why secession has not been the political agenda of any of the states and economic integrations among the national regional states of Ethiopia have continued since then.

Summary

The fall of the socialist government in May 1991 was followed by the formation of the TGE in July 1991. On the eve of the fall of the central government in the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, the major armed fronts had a negotiation conference in London. The participants were the Ethiopian government and EPRDF, EPLF, and OLF. The USA and the Foreign Office of the UK were behind the organization of the conference. The USA had a personal stake in the rebel groups and has since recently supported both EPRDF and EPLF. The socialist government was standing on its nails: it only hoped to have a ceasefire, which could lead to a power-sharing agreement with the rebels. This was not accepted by the rebels who knew that soon the central government will collapse. The fact that the President, Mengistu Halie-Mariam had just fled the country and the capital

was about to fall made the event chaotic. A great danger was looming in Addis Ababa as the government was failing increasingly to maintain peace and order and both civilian and army officials were defecting. Amid this, the USA approving of the EPRDF to take state power in Addis Ababa as a provisional government with the underlying consensus that it would form immediately an inclusive transitional government.

Accordingly, the TGE was formed by the Transitional Charter that was approved at the end of the Peace and Reconciliation Conference held in Addis Ababa from 1-5 July 1991. This conference determined the future of Ethiopia, excluding Eritrea, which was waiting to verify its independence formally via a referendum. Among others, it rejected the legendary ancient and unitary nation-state Ethiopia and tacitly declared it is a multinational modern empire state established at the end of the 19th century. Political forces operating in or outside of the country were represented at the conference. However, the TPLF/EPRDF excluded deliberately some well-established parties, such as EPRP and WPE from the conference. The Charter, which was more of a political pact among the nationalist organizations and heavily influenced by political ideologies of TPLF/EPRDF and OLF, established a very moderate representative but EPRDF dominated CoR, the parliament of the TGE. The eighty-seven-member CoR elected Meles Zenawi from TPLF/EPRDF its chairperson, Fekadu Gedamu (Guragie) vice-chairperson, and Tesfaye Hadisu (Kembata) secretary respectively. Tamirat Layne (Amhara) was appointed Prime Minister, a very nominal position. The CoR was simply a free ride for TPLF's Meles.

During the TGE, TPLF/EPRDF developed a despotic tendency. The transitional period in Ethiopia lasted from July 1991 to August 1995. During this four-year period, the character of TPLF/EPRDF changed dramatically. It became more authoritarian defying its promises, donors, and main political backers. It started to mold the TGE all to its measure. It made use of two key strategies to widen its political acceptance throughout the country: controlling the population base in the core states where it has representation through the coalition, EPRDF and ensuring further dominance in the periphery states where it has no representation through the formation of satellite parties that must ally with it. Both strategies helped EPRDF to dominate in the political arena. As soon as it ensured its dominance, EPRDF employed imprudent political tactics to purge political opponents from the TGE. It curbed its political promise for fair participation and development of participatory democracy, intimidated opposition including with threat of arms, shipped some economic resources to the north (to Tigray), forced most

of the oppositions out of the 1992 election and out of the TGE, formed a for-profit business in the name of members of EPRDF, against the laws, mostly out of public resources but owned, at least in part, by its political elites, and outplayed donors who would have kept it in the line by frustrating and dishonoring them.

The change of character of EPRDF attracted more and more opposition during the TGE. Fundamentally, there were two types of opposition: process opposition and program opposition. The former opposed the political program of EPRDF because of the process that it followed, including the federalization process that was undergoing. The latter group opposed the content (federalization) itself. In general, the former opted for non-ethnically based federalism while the latter opted for maintenance of a unitary nation-state. From both groups, a strong coalition of opposition emerged. The first group was however stronger. These coalitions tried to organize conferences to reach a resolution against EPRDF and the EPRDF dominated TGE. This angered EPRDF and brought unwelcomed consequences. EPRDF was able to purge most of the participants of both the Paris and the Addis Ababa opposition conferences out of the CoR and hence out of the TGE.

In the meantime, EPRDF intensified the politics of ethnicity in the country. This was based on turned and twisted Marxist-Leninist interpretations of the national questions of nationalities. It employed artful dramatization of Ethiopian national, cultural, and linguistic diversity. This led easily to the recognition of over sixty NNPs in Ethiopia before the approval of the new Constitution.

The consequence of this recognition of diversity would show in the Constitution that recognizes all NNPs in Ethiopia as equal and sovereign and affirms constitutionally the tacit total rejection of the legendary unitary Ethiopia by the Transitional Charter. The recognition also implied the sovereign NNPs could declare their independence as they wish, i.e., could secede unconditionally. These recognitions, however, raised the challenge of keeping the territorial integrity of Ethiopia. The dominant TPLF, however, continued the mostly ethno-linguistically based federalization process relying on the humble view of the benefits of upholding Ethiopian multinational union voluntarily. By the end of the TGE, Ethiopia had been restructured into nine national regional states and two city governments under the new Constitution that established the FDRE. By the end of the transitional period, the TPLF/EPRDF dominated TGE had changed the social and political fabric of the Ethiopian peoples and the soul of the Ethiopian state.

Notes to Chapter 3

[12] The Ambo people, from all levels of society, fought the advancing EPRDF fighters gallantly to stop them from "dividing and selling the country": the price of which they have been paying to date for a quarter of a century through economic and infrastructural marginalization and state-sponsored political terrorism from vindictive EPRDF government. The EPRDF elites remember bitterly their fallen comrades who fall at Ambo in the hands of the Ambo people after the national army fled right on the eve of the victory of taking the state power country.

[13] It is a non-governmental organization set up and headed by the former president of the USA, Jimmy Carter.

[14] In his interview published online on www.satenaw.com on Saturday 12 March 2016 Negaso Gidada Solan (Solan, 2016), reported that OLF, TPLF, EPDM, and OPDO were allotted 12 seats each, 36 in total. Solan served not only in the Constitutional Council that drafted the constitution of the federation but also as the chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly that approved the constitution. He would also serve as the first Head of State (President) of the federation.

[15] From the 87 members CoR, EPRDF had 37% occupancy in 1991. However, in 1992, it reached 51% occupancy after the forced expulsion or voluntary departure of some of the frustrated members of the TGE (Lata, 1999, p. 27).

[16] AAPO, formed as an ethnic Amhara party by a former physician of *Atse* Haile Selassie I, Asrat Weldeyes, transformed itself into AEUP (All Ethiopia Unity Party), a pan-Ethiopian party, in 2002. The move was in preparation for a better chance for the 2005 national election. For the same reason, it once again formed the CUD (Coalition for Unity and Democracy) joining like-minded political elites and their parties. Indeed, the strategy worked. CUD at least won the election in several cities across the country. Its win in Addis Ababa was a total knockout for EPRDF who, in the end, emerged aggregate winner amid controversies of the election. According to the final official result of the 2005 election, the legislative seats were won in descending order by EPRDF (327), CUD (109), UEDF (52), SPDP (23), OFDEM (11), BGPDUF (8), ANDP (3), SMPDUO (1), HNL (1), ANDO (1), and independent (1)

[17] By the time the TPLF/EPRDF controlled Addis Ababa in 1991, but 11 of its 15-division army were also strictly Tigrigna speaking divisions. Though it was announced that the defense force would be restructured to represent the NNPs of Ethiopia, this proportion was maintained throughout the transitional period until May 1995 election (Lata, 1999, p. 36-37).

[18] It was not uncommon for Abyssinian political elites to make use of Oromo as their complementary partner in their party by establishing an Oromo wing or sub-organization. The EPRP had set up an Oromo People's Liberation Organization (OPLO) and AESM had established the Oromo National Democratic Organization (ONDO) (Mole, 2014, p. 49). TPLF, in collaboration with EPDM, established OPDO. The objective in all the cases has

been the same: to divide the Oromo people and share some support of the Oromo for themselves while denying OLF sole representation of the majority Oromo.

[19] There were many Oromo revolts before the formation of OLF. The Raya Oromo revolt in the 1930s and the Bale Oromo revolt from 1963 to 1970 (led by Wako Gutu) are some of them. Under the Empire of Ethiopia, all revolts represented popular sentiments against the colonization, linguistic and cultural suppressions by the Abyssinian kingdom, and "the dissatisfaction of an ethnic group that had long been oppressed by the Amharic ethnic center" (Arnold, 2005, p. 249).

[20] The leaders of the political organizations that TPLF has created are referred to contemptuously as "disciples of Meles." They are said to diligently keep the words used by Meles Zenawi in their political conversation, act like him when in office, and execute his orders sharply, serving him only as a means through which he rules the people in their names. Some of them are said to almost worship him.

[21] EPRDF remained to be a peasant-based dominant party to date. Wherever its candidates lost an election to the opposition in the last five rounds of a national election, they lost in urban centers and the capital city. It branded itself as a party of the peasants. Most of its declared over four million party members are based in the countryside. It was only recently that it started to attract students and unemployed youth with the promise of jobs and memberships to small-scale enterprises and associations that it has started to organize.

[22] Enver Hoxha was the leader of the Albanian communist party during the Cold War.

[23] More than twenty years after the official deceleration of the Ethiopian Federation with the coming into effect of the federal constitution in 1995, EPRDF is still ruling it, sometimes "winning" the regular national elections 100%. In reports of independent international human rights and political rights organizations, Ethiopia has never been free from human rights abuses, political harassment, corruption, lack of good governance, and public resources misappropriation, even for a single report, under the long years of the government of EPRDF. Yet there have been significant improvements in the welfare of most of the Ethiopian peoples in the past two decades under the leadership of TPLF-EPRDF. The national infrastructure, health care, education services, urban development, national economic capacity building, and international relations are among the areas of high success.

Chapter 4

Federalism and Ethiopian Federalism

Oppressed NNPs of Ethiopia have always aspired for national self-determination. Most of the NNPs of Ethiopia were forced to give in to the rapidly expanding and increasingly powerful kingdom of Abyssinia during the second half of the 19th century, ultimately forming the Empire of Abyssinia (later Empire of Ethiopia). Even though they remained together to date under the forced nation-state building projects of the subsequent governments, their sentiments of nationalism and their aspirations for national liberation or self-determination remained at an all-time high. These aspirations were particularly high among the excessively oppressed NNPs. These sentiments and aspirations, after a century-long struggle, in varying forms, resulted in the overthrow of the last centrist government in 1991. This was achieved because it had been impossible for the Abyssinian total assimilationist and for the socialist mono-culturist central governments to undermine or suppress the ever-growing movements of nationalism in Ethiopia. The movements emerged from the brutality with which the Empire was built and the manner with which it has been governed since then.

The Abyssinian Empire was made of multiple nations that have recent memory of their independent existence as republican states or kingdoms with reasonable liberty of their people and sovereignty of their rulers. After their subjugation, the NNPs remained together in exclusive class and national oppression. They had to endure the class and national dominations under imperial rule, until 1974. A faint element of the oppressions continued during the socialist regime, until 1991. The abolition of class oppression and the

introduction of land reform were the biggest changes that the later government introduced. These, however, were not enough: too little to convince the NNPs to give up their quests for national self-determination nor would it mask enough the authoritarian oppression that the socialist dictatorship had introduced. The NNPs of socialist Ethiopia had no choice but to revive their quests for their national identities and fight for their national liberations, organizing themselves into several armed national liberation fronts and organizations. The revival of the national identity of the NNPs and their quest for national liberation, after all, was the main cause of the fall of the socialist government and the formation of the present federation. In this federation, the NNPs have assured themselves the right to national self-determination in the voluntary federation they have formed. The Constitution of the federation is a testament to this magnanimous achievement.

The imperial state could not extinguish the national liberation struggles that were sparked by a few core nations of the empire state of Ethiopia. The quest for national liberation and national self-determination by the major nations of the empire state of Ethiopia started to attract similar interest from some relatively smaller nations and nationalities in the 1960s. As the number of nations and nationalities who openly sought national liberation or self-determination grew, the centrist government started to characterize their quests as "ethnic" rather than as "national," and as "secessionist" rather than as "nationalist." The "question of nationalities" that was promoted by the Ethiopian Student Movement (ESM) in the context of national self-determination and the formation of the Ethiopian republic, was labeled categorically as "narrow nationalism", "tribalism", "anti-Ethiopia", and "anti-unity" by the highly frustrated imperial government. These were part of the exertions of the ruling elites to continue promoting the purpose-built "unifying" legend created by Abyssinian elites as a ploy political tool for subjugation of the non-Abyssinian NNPs and as the source of its little regarded legitimacy.

By the 1960s, not only the old imperial cronies but also the new generation of Abyssinian elites had realized the political, social, and economic paybacks of the purpose-built legend. Besides, the Abyssinian elitist narrative of "re-unified former territories" and their political discourse of "ancient kingdom of one nation," as opposed to the historical reality of the non-Abyssinian NNPs before the formation of the empire, have started to produce some results among some quarters of the society in the south. Multiple nations in the south were indoctrinated with the political notion that they were part of the kingdom of Abyssinia and hence were Christian already before the 16th century. The narrative and the discourse had received wider

acceptance first among the European supporters of the openly colonial project of *Atse* Menelik II. Following the elevation of the Empire of Abyssinia to the membership of the League of Nations in 1923, the acceptance of such narrative and discourse had gradually become commonplace among the rest of the Western world. Thus, the national liberation movements must first tackle the convoluted narrative and the disgruntled discourse. Simply because the imperial government had it in writing, which the nationalists did not have, and the Western copyists had replicated it, tackling it became an upstream swim. Thus, the imperial regime was reaping the benefits of the purpose-built legend.

The military socialist regime that abolished the monarchy in 1974 and took the state power did little to change the narrative or the discourse. Both continued during its seventeen years of dictatorship. It strengthened both the narrative and the discourse, in some respects, to make the NNPs of Ethiopia into a classless, mono-cultural, and mechanical society piloted by the central command. The characterization of the NNPs of the empire state as "ethnic" rather than "national," and the mortification of the cause of their struggle as "secessionist" rather than as "nationalist" by the central commanders of the socialist regime, as did the imperial elites and their Western resonators, continued unrelentingly.

As a result, the national liberation struggles of the NNPs of Ethiopia for self-determination could not be distinguished for what they were until late. It took the world so long to realize the true character of the constituents of the Ethiopian empire state or the cause of the struggles of the NNPs in Ethiopia. Their quest for national self-determination received little moral or material support or political recognition until the concerted bitter struggle of some of them could finally topple the central socialist government by force in 1991. After they have subsequently formed the Ethiopian Federation, which has recognized the right to self-determination of NNPs, which includes the unconditional right to secession, the world has begun to realize that Ethiopia is one of the rightly multi-national states.

Nonetheless, not many scholars agree on the nature and the nomenclature of Ethiopian federalism. Some scholars view Ethiopia as an ethnic federation and characterize its federalism as ethnic-based. Only a few political scholars have emphasized that Ethiopia is a multi-national federation with existed and emerging nationalism. The nature and character of Ethiopian federalism are not easy to conceive. However, making further elaborations could help to come to a consensus. In line with this, I shall elaborate on the meaning of federalism, national self-determination, and Ethiopian federalism in this chapter. Also, I will discuss, among others, the

ethnic orientation that underlies Ethiopian federalism, the recognition of national diversity, the principles of Ethiopian federalism, and whether Ethiopian federalism fits Alfred Stepan's categorization. This could supply content and clarity on the underlying factors of federalization in Ethiopia and help interested people to have a better understanding of Ethiopian federalism and the formation of the states of the federation.

Federalism: An Overview

Humans are naturally social. As social, they are associative. Throughout their history, they have developed varying and layered forms of association. They have experienced early forms of the association including extended family, band, clan, tribe, and nation, which continue to influence and advanced their art of association. For the effectiveness of their associations, they have developed the art of association, which is a polity, and the study of it, which is politics. They have developed policies such as the nation-state, state, empire, and federations. Every art of the earlier smaller polity and their respective achievements have been kept as cumulative memory of the latter bigger polities. The study of these polities also makes up their politics. As the polities grew, the more sophisticated their politics have become. In this section, I shall focus on the last form of polity, federation, which has gained tremendous momentum in the 20th century and its politics, federalism.

History reveals that smaller polities were under the control of bigger polities where varied political arrangements were at work. Those forms of political arrangement involved an agreement where one party agreed to accept the supreme authority of the other while keeping a reasonable amount of autonomy. As humanity learns from histories of ancient empires and their recent contemporaries, paying regular tributes, providing services, and abiding with the orders and policies of the ruling polity had been a common trend. Those empires were force-federated groups of formerly sovereign territories. The majority of them had their kings, other forms of a traditional autonomous administration, or were republics. The division of the territory of the force-federated empires had an imprint on their former lessor polities. They were based on historical jurisdictions, geography, culture, language, and ethnic compositions. In such empires, multi-cultural, multi-lingual, and multi-ethnic societies were federated to form a union of polities, like the way the multi-national federations have been formed in modern days.

The practices of federative arrangements are ancient. Those early types of federative arrangements were dissimilar to modern federation only

because of the lack of modern ideas of democracy, democratic institutions, and democratic political processes and practices. These ideals joined with the federalism theories that have been in the making since the 18th century, have transformed the force-based-federated imperial arrangement of the ancient into a modern bargain-based federal arrangement. In the historical form of force-based arrangements, empire building was triumphed either through conquest where the conquered had little or no political authority except arranged under the will of the conquerors or through a peaceful union of kingdoms or members of the families of their sovereigns, as in arranged (forced) political marriages between members of two dynastic rulers to form a bigger dominion, where political authorities were shared in some way among the nobles of the joint families. In its modern sense, state-building federative arrangements are understood as an idea built on contradiction as an attempt to bargain a political compromise between the opposing values of unity and diversity (Turton, 2006). The essential difference between the two can be reduced to democracy and democratic practices. In our time, democracy has enabled the formation of free bargain-based federal political orders.

Federal Political Order

A political system that has both elements of unity and independence is referred to as a federal political order. It can be understood simply as a political partnership. A federal political partnership may take the form of federation, confederation, unions, constitutionally decentralized unions, confederacies, associated states, condominiums, leagues, joint functional inter-governmental organizations, or a hybrid form of the federation (Watts, 2005). Table 6 illustrates examples of federal political orders. Note that the dates in parentheses indicate the year of establishment of the first ethno-federal or autonomous entity that was still in existence after 1900 and where "*" appears, the society is ethnically diverse (that is the indigenous minority population constituted at least 25 percent of the total population in 2000), but the constituents are not minority homelands.

The first two federal political orders have been, at times, confusing. They were used interchangeably in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Karmis & Norman, 2005) before they gradually developed distinguishing features. The key distinguishing feature between these forms of federal political orders is how much of the elements of unity and the elements of independence are kept by the state governments and the central government.

The more the states hold more of the elements of independence, the weaker the central government would be, and hence the federal arrangement is a confederation. The more power is given to or maintained by the center, the more elements of unity are held at the center and the more the constituent states are politically integrated with the center, and hence the federal arrangement is a federation. In other words, when the sovereign power lies with the state governments, the federal arrangement is a confederation; when the sovereign power lies with the federal government, the federal arrangement is a federation.

Table 6
Federal political orders

Ethno- federation	Non-Federal States with Autonomous Ethnic Regions	Federation
Austro-Hungary (1867-1918) Canada (1867-) USSR (1922-91) Yugoslavia (1945-92) Pakistan (1947-) Burma / Myanmar (1948-62) Indonesia (1949-50) Ethiopia (1952-62) India (1953-) Nigeria (1960-) Malaysia (1963-5) Tanzania (1964-) Czechoslovakia (1969-92) Spain (1978-) Belgium (1980-) Russia (1991-) Serbia-Montenegro (1992-2006) Bosnia (1995-)	United Kingdom (1707-) Russian Empire (1809-1917) Ottoman Empire (1832-1913) Finland (1922-) Denmark (1948-) Italy (1948-) China (1951-) Uganda (1962-67) Sudan (1972-83, 2005-) South Africa (1972-94) France (1982-) Philippines (1990-) Azerbaijan (1991-) Georgia (1991-) Tajikistan (1992-) Ukraine (1991-) Uzbekistan (1991-) Moldova (1995-) Papua New Guinea (2000-)	United States (1789-) Switzerland (1848-) * Argentina (1853-) Venezuela (1864-) Germany (1867-1938, 1949-) Brazil (1891-1934, 1946-) Australia (1901-) Mexico (1917-) * Austria (1918-38, 1945-) Libya (1951-63) Malaya (1957-63, 1965-) Mali (1960-60) * Cameroon (1961-72) * United Arab Emirates (1971-) Comoros (1978-) * St. Kitts-Nevis (1983-) Micronesia (1986-) * Ethiopia (1995-) Russia (1991-)

Note. Roeder (2009, p. 31), based on data from Elazar (1994), Lake and Rothchild (2005), Lemco (1991), Roeder (2007), and Watts (1999).

Confederation

A confederation is a weaker form of federal political order where the center has extremely limited or no power to act against the interest of the

member state. It is a voluntary membership of states where they maintain a veto power and are free to exit the political order at any time. The less power the center has, the weaker the federal order is. The central government of the confederation acts mainly and exclusively in the areas of joint defense and joint foreign policy. It is a voluntary form of the federation where sovereignty stays fully with the member state and the central government runs based on the assembly of the delegation of the states. In such a case, every delegate is answerable to the authority of the delegating state. The central government of the confederation lacks an independent fiscal or electoral base, and only exercises authority delegated up to it. This authority is not only binding only on member states, not on citizens, but also subject to member states' veto (Føllesdal, 2014).

Federation

A federal political order with a stronger center and with more elements of unity kept by the central government is described commonly as a federation. In such a federal arrangement, the federal government has the power to act against the interest of the constituent members in limited areas of action, where the states have ceded their power to the central government. Traditionally, these areas of action include national security and defense, international trade, foreign policy, immigration and nationality affairs, economic and legal affairs, and national standards. The member states are subordinate to the central government in such areas and the ultimate authority lies with the central government. In other areas, the state holds the ultimate authority. Traditionally, these areas include education, health, language policy, and local culture and traditions. The power share between the central and state governments is, however, not always clear nor does there exists a universal definition of the federation.

Defining Federation

Scholars have defined federation with varying areas of emphasis. For Burgess (2006), a federation is simply "a particular kind of state" with "distinctive organizational form or institutional fact" the primary purpose of which is "to accommodate the constituent units of a union in the decision-making procedure of the central government by means of constitutional entrenchment" (p. 2). Thus, he defined federation as a particular kind of

liberal democratic federal state that has a formal written constitution and legally recognized differences and diversities enshrined in its various forms and levels of autonomy (Burgess, 2006). With conceptual distinction that he believed can help explore the concept of the federation from "sub-state nationalism and multinationalism" and federation as "national and multinational sate." Burgess (2012a) redefines federation as "a federal state, that is, a particular kind of liberal democratic state, which is characterized by the formal written constitutional entrenchment and legal recognition of differences and diversity that are enshrined in various forms and levels of autonomy" (p. 25). For Fessha (2010), functionally defined, a federation is "an institutional arrangement that involves at least two territorially based orders of government with self-rule and shared-rule incorporated into the system on some constitutionally entrenched basis" (p. 28). For Loughlin (2008), who heavily focused on the federal system than the federation, "a federation is an established federal system" (p. 475). Kefele (2009) and Smith (1995) focused on institutional arrangements that must exist in the federation to define it. According to Kefele (2009), more than other things, a federation is an institutional arrangement. Smith also deeply focuses on institutional arrangement. But he takes into consideration its effect on recognition of diversity, structure, legalization, and institutionalization of diversity. For Smith (1995), a federation is a political institutionalization for acknowledgment of diversity in addition to serving as an organizing principle for the celebration of both unity and differences in the polity.

The attempts to define federation, as seen in the examples above, have been far from supplying a thorough meaning that encompasses the varying characters of federations. One of the structurally characterizing definitions of a federation, as one form of federal political arrangement, comes from R. L. Watts. Watts (cited in Bhattacharyya, 2010) defines a federation as "a compound polity combining constituent units and a general government, each possessing powers delegated to it by the people through a constitution, each empowered to deal directly with the citizens in the exercise of … its legislative, administrative, and taxing powers, and each directly elected by its citizens" (p. 13). Such federations have common structural characteristics that, according to Watts cited in Bhattacharyya (2010), include:

1. Two orders of governments, each of them acting directly on its citizens,
2. Formal constitutional distribution of legislative and executive authority, and allocation of revenue resources between the two orders of government ensuring some areas of genuine autonomy for each order,

3. Some provision for representation of distinct regional views within the federal policy-making institutions, usually in the shape of a federal second chamber of Parliament,
4. A supreme written constitution not unilaterally amendable and requiring the consent of a significant proportion of the constituent units,
5. An umpire in the form of court or a referendum in order to rule on the disputes between governments, and
6. Processes and institutions to facilitate inter-governmental collaboration in the area of overlapping jurisdiction (p. 14).

In this view, a federation may be defined as a voluntarily negotiated or bargained federal political order among sovereign states or autonomous nations or peoples where the member states, or nation, or peoples have traded off part of their sovereignty, autonomy, and authority permanently with a central government they instituted willingly in return of better protection and welfare of the united people by signing a legal contract commonly known as the constitution. The constitution articulates the structures, the powers, the authorities, and the responsibilities of the central government, the state governments, and the local governments to each other and the people. The constitution also articulates the rights, freedoms, and obligations of the people in their relations to the federal government, the state government, the local government, and each other.

Origin of Federalism

As the challenges in defining federation, there are challenges to defining federalism as well. As a result, there is no one all-satisfying definition of federalism. Federalism is, however, better understood by first having a close look into its origin and then by exploring how people understand it in contexts.

The basic idea of federalism may be as old as communal human history. It must have started with the formation of pacts among extended primitive families to achieve cooperation against the challenges of life. The recorded earliest concept of federalism is however to be found in the religious scriptures in its theological form. Notable early record of such arrangement is found in the Bible about covenants between Abraham and Abimelech (Genesis 21: 27), between Abimelech and Isaac (Genesis 26: 28), and between Laban and Jacob (Genesis 31: 44) to form trust-based peace and cooperation between themselves and their families. Later, the tribes ff Israel were thought

to have established the first confederal system some three millennia ago (Watts cited in Bhattacharyya, 2010) with which they formed a pact among themselves. Based on these and other biblical evidence, Daniel Elazar (n. d) claims that the modern "federal" idea has its root in the Holy Bible. He points out that its first usage was for a theological purpose: to define the partnership between God and the people. However, Elazar argues, that gradually led to the usage of the idea in the form of the covenant (or federal relationship) first between individuals to form a political body, which was later compounded to polities transforming the usage of the term "federal" from theological to political predominance (Elazar cited in Bhattacharyya 2010).

The origin of federalism as a non-theological but related political idea may be in the origin of confederal arrangement where small families or groups of people represented by the head of the family or leader of the group started to form a pact among themselves for their socio-political common good. The famous Mayflower Compact of 1620 that started the ideals of federalism in American history at the very start of the American Founding Era (1620-1789) supports this position. It has an especially important contribution to the development of classical federalism. Drake & Nelson (1999) identified that it had three important effects: "First, it created a new people since not all aboard the *Mayflower* were Pilgrims. Second, it created a government when it combined into a "civil body politick." And third, it established fundamental values, which would be changed into bills of rights, as well as the commitment of a people" (pp. 12-13). The compact was written by the Pilgrims, a radical Puritan group wishing to create a new city of God run by the prescriptions of the Bible. According to Drake & Nelson (1999), they meant "people had agreed to combine themselves into a "civil body politick" not only formed "indivisible groups, yet one that provided liberty" (p. 12), but also "modeled after the language of church covenant" (p. 12) and hence the choice of the word covenant, which in Latin is *foedus,* showing lasting agreement instead of the temporary contract.

Etymologically, the term "*federal"* comes from the term "*foedus"* (Bhattacharyya, 2010, p. 11; Drake & Nelson, 1999, p 12; Karmis & Norman, 2005, p. 5; Ostrom, 1991, p. 9; Rodden, 2004, p. 489; Gamper, 2005, p. 1299). *Foedus* means "covenant" (Gamper, 2005, p. 1299). More elaborately, it means "an alliance among individuals or collectivities aiming at the promotion of both specific and common interest" (Karmis & Norman, 2005, pp. 5-6).

It took centuries for "*foedus*" to become "federalism." The origin of the idea of federalism may have far-reaching roots in early Abrahamic religious history. The secularization of the concept of covenant or compact took

many centuries during which many thinkers like Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Montesquieu, and Madison played a significant role (Bhattacharyya, 2010). An exclusively secular and political idea and usage of the term "federalism" is thus relatively recent.

The origin of federalism as a political ideology however is only as old as the United States of America that was formed in the 1780s. The practical political use of the concept of federalism is dated to the late 18th century, particularly the duration between 1778 and 1798. Its political origin is rooted in the belief of the eighteenth-century American political thoughts that multiple independent levels of governments can legitimately exist within one big polity (LaCroix, 2011). The first known use of the term "federalism" according to Marriam-Webster Dictionary is in 1787. It was the year of the constitutional convention in the USA. Its first use was associated with pact or covenant which was more of religious (theological) than secular.

The first round of intellectual debates during those two decades culminated in the opposed *federalist* and *anti-federalist* arguments. The former advocated for the formation of the federal government that would have the power over the states: it saw the formation of such government as a guarantor of the safety and security of the states. The latter advocated for the sovereignty of the states and saw the formation of a strong central state as a threat to the freedom of the states. During the campaigns of the two opposing ideal camps in the preceding year of the ratification of the constitution of the USA, Alexander Hamilton (1755-1804), John Jay (1745-1829), and James Madison (1751-1836) built a strong theoretical foundation for American federalism.

This foundation has remained almost intact in its classical theoretical form but, through time, it has developed more features. Since then, the grooming thoughts of national leaders and political and sociological theorists have further developed the concept of federalism. Throughout the development, it shaped the concept of government, politics, and political system that has adopted it as a core principle of intergovernmental relations in federations.

The driving ideology for American federalism was rooted in the need for a union of the newly emerged thirteen states from the British colony in North America to stand together to defend themselves and cooperate for their welfare by constituting a distinct central government that would have just enough power to do so. First, they formed a confederation. The confederal government had no real power and hence it was weak. Then, they formed a federation with the necessary power for national defense and cooperation. For these purposes, the federal government needed power; the

constituent gave it just as much power was necessary. In doing so, the states ceded part of their power and rights to the central government for the good of cooperation and common security. Such an arrangement was heavily guarded with the "doctrine of interposition" to protect the rights of the constituent states.

Meaning of Federalism

Today, the common dictionary meaning of federalism focuses on the distribution of power in the government. It defines it as, "the distribution of power in an organization (as a government) between a central authority and the constituent units" ("Federalism," 2015). The concise encyclopedic entry of Merriam-Webster's dictionary makes further elaborations. It defines it as a "political system that binds a group of states into a larger, none centralized, superior state while allowing them to maintain their own political identities." The dictionary suggests that better understanding of the modern meaning of federalism may be inferred from its characteristics and principles, which include a written constitution, distribution of powers, diffusion of power among the constituent elements, territorial divisions, consent driven changes, a sense of common nationality, and direct lines of communication between the citizens the governments. To understand the meaning of federalism, one needs to give attention to the multiple definitions that have been offered based on these inferences.

In recent years, federalism is defined commonly from closely related legal and governance points of view. From a legal point of view, federalism is the allocation of authority and responsibility to various levels of government in a federal system of constitutional political arrangement. It is a system of government where the citizens have two legitimate agents (the local and the central legislatures) and two authorities over them (the federal and local government). From a governance point of view, federalism is a system of public governance of a multinational state that is politically, economically, and security-wise centrally united but administratively, socially, culturally, and territorially autonomously divided. The national political power is divided between the central, usually referred to as the federal government, and the sub-national unit usually referred to as state government. It is a political system that employs the principles of legal recognition, specific self-rule, and generally shared rule.

Federalism may also be understood as two tiers of political governance over a united political entity under a common constitution. These political

entities may be independent states, confederated states, autonomous self-administering territories, or semi-independent regions. Let us refer to these political entities simply as "states" for the convenience of the discussion. The state government rules over the state polity and shares the ruling of other member political societies of the federation through representation in the central government. A member state in the federation is entitled to double legitimate rules: self-rule for state sovereignty and shared rule for national sovereignty--the first based on natural right, the second based on positive law. At the same time, the citizens are responsible for two governments: the state government for rights in state and the federal government for national rights. A federal state is thus any state that has a federal constitution, two levels of government ruling the same territory and people, and a guaranteed autonomy and practice of democracy, including democratic elections to the state executive (Hale, 2004). Accordingly, the federal ideal is "generally conceived as a compromise, conveyed by the image of check and balances between unity and diversity, autonomy and sovereignty, the national and regional" (Smith, 1995, p. 5) with two essential attributes of "structurally dispersed political power among many centres of authority and constitutional mandate guaranteeing the legitimacy of the authority of the various centres and their claims of right against the central government" (Selassie, 2003, p. 57).

Federalism in its orientation can also be conceived as both a territorial and non-territorial arrangement in multi-ethnic societies (Smith, 1995). In the former, the state is organized based on territory and government power is distributed both over territory and population groups that inhabit the territory. In the latter, state power is not territorially limited and government power is distributed to overpopulation groups only. The latter conception is also known as extra-territorial or personal federalism. Some scholars suggest the latter as a solution for ethnonational conflicts in small multi-national federations.

Federalism can also be understood as a political ideology. It holds the idea that the "organization of human affairs is best reflected in the celebration of diversity through unity… [but] it is difficult to defend [it] as a free-standing ideology" because, as such, it is "best considered as an amalgam of doctrines, beliefs, and programmatic considerations" (Smith, 1995, p. 4). It needs to be supported by institutional arrangements to be an independent political ideology. Then it "can be conceived as both universal and particular in scope" (Smith, 1995, p. 4). The important distinction however has been made between ideological federalism and its "institutional construct." The former has centralist, de-centralist, and balanced orientation (Kefele, 2009)

while the latter refers to the institutional arrangement by which the central government has regional units that it must take into consideration in the federal decision-making process based on legal and constitutional arrangements that are agreed between the units and the central government, or in other words, the federal political system. As such, "federalism has been represented as decentralizing and centralizing ideology and doctrine of balance" (Smith, 1995, p. 5).

Federalism can also be understood as an institutional arrangement. As such, it focuses on what it does as a process rather than what it distributes. In this sense, "Federalism is not a particular distribution of authority between governments, but rather a process—structured by a set of institutions—through which authority is distributed and redistributed" (Rodden, 2004, p. 489).

Federalism can also be viewed as a mechanism of layered nation-building. Schuck (2006), for example, views federalism as a technique of nation-building. By federalism, he means a system of division of political authority between the federal and state government in such a way that the people mutually belong to the citizenship of both governments and are governed by both governments. Federalism is also associated with the idea that results in the promotion and formation of federations (Burgess, 2006).

Federalism can also be understood as a normative concept. Fessha (2010) explains, "federalism as a normative concept has two essential aspects: autonomy and union. The first refers to "self-government and making self-rule possible": the second refers to "co-management of the whole society and about the desire of the whole society and about the desire of people and polities to come or stay together for common purpose" (p. 26). As normative concept federalism combines the principle of autonomy and union of "at least two constituent parts that are not wholly independent but together form the system as a whole" (Gamper, 2005, p. 299). It is a political system with an enter play of balance between self-rule and 'shared-rule' (Kefele, 2009).

The general understanding of federalism may have been enhanced through inferences, but its universal definition has remained less than satisfactory. Understanding of the meaning of federalism differs based on whether it is seen from the perspectives of constitutional law, political science or economics; even then, differences in approaches to federalism theories as an overall principle or as a pragmatic concept of sovereign or non-sovereign state makes the understanding even more difficult (Gamper, 2005). Federalism has been understood differently across the spectrum of social sciences. It is one of the social science concepts that has produced multiple variations and adopted with different perceptions and political goals. There have been multiple approaches to interpretation and orientations of the idea

of federalism. These approaches and orientations have introduced certain clarity in the dynamics and discussions of federalism. Nevertheless, the definition of federalism has remained unsatisfactory. In fact, "there is no settled common denominator of 'federalism'" (Gamper, 2005, p. 1297). Many agree that federalism has suffered ambiguity of meaning (Angew, 1995; Elazar, 1987; King, 1982; Levy, 2007; Smith, 1995; Watts, 1998). Works in political science offer an "incomplete or insufficiently broad" definition of federalism by "focusing too exclusively on the model offered by the United States" (Stepan, 1999, p. 21).

The concept of classical American Federalism dominates the federal conceptions around the world. The United States model of federalism, with all its ambiguities and obscurities, has been the oldest and the most successful form of federalism that has ever been put to practice. That however undermined other smaller successes of the practice of federalism in Australia, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, and Canada and gave the impression that federalism has been an American-only political system. This, in turn, may have influenced political scientists to look at federalism through the lenses of the American federal system. Federalism however has had variants and varied practical applications across the world.

Federalism and Formation of Federal States

Federalism is a necessary form of political arrangement that prescribes the formation of states to share the sovereign power from a devolving or consolidating central state so that they serve for the preservation of the liberty of its inhabitants. In the classical federal arrangement, like that of the USA, federalism is commonly understood as a theory of government that uses power to check power amid opposite and rival interests where no single body exercises supreme control or has a monopoly over the use of force in society (Ostrom, 1991). This means, federalism "offers no less than an enabling basis for the development of self-organizing and self-governing capabilities under conditions of equal liberty and justice" (Ostrom, 1991, p. xi).

Federalism is also viewed as a normative concept that, preserved by the constitution, secures the liberty of the citizens from the diffused sovereignty to the constituent states (Althouse, 1993). The states, therefore, serve as an alternative form of government that retains and helps diffuse power for the sake and benefit of the citizen (Althouse, 1993).

The formation of federal states can also be viewed as the outcome of the recognition of rights of territorial, national or personal (extraterritorial)

self-determination of nations in a devolving multinational state that had been a unitary political system. Such formation of a federal state, which is based on recognition of diversity, provides the states with the opportunity to preserve the liberty of their people. It minimizes inter-nation (inter-diversity) conflicts and helps develop a cooperative and democratic political culture in the federation.

Paradoxically, the same act of recognition of diversity could also be a threat to the federation when nations that have emerged in this process aspire to secede. The underlying paradoxical reality is that the same reason for dissolution remains valid for staying together. This has made the duty of maintenance of a federation particularly challenging. The maintenance must deal with an unnoticed dynamic process of continuously balancing the factors that, at the same time, hold together and pull it apart. These paradoxical forces and the associated dynamism of maintenance have been influenced by the upkeep of federations starting from their formation. Both the paradox and the dynamism of federations were observed and brought to the attention of scholars and statesmen in the 1960s by Trudeau in 1968 and by Wheare in 1962 (Burgess, 2012a).

The formation of a federal system has historical, strategic, and re-cognitional foundations. Historically, federal systems originated in four principal ways: first, when former colonies voluntarily came together to federate (Switzerland and the United States); second, when an imperial rule formed a federation for the strategic reason (Australia and Canada); third, when a nation-state created a federal system based on cultural diversity (Belgium) or political line (the USA when expanding westwards to create new states); fourth when a military conquest formed an arbitrary administrative division (the case of post-World War II Germany) (Schuck, 2006). Strategically, federal systems have been formed to achieve economic and political synergies (former USSR, Russian Federation, EU,) and social integration and administrative efficiencies (UAE, European Union, Ethio-Eritrean Federation of 1952). In the modern world, most federal systems have been formed based on the demand of the national groups through the legal recognition of national diversity (Ethiopian Federation, South African Federation).

State formation in federalism is understood widely as an outcome of a bargaining process among constituent members. The members constitute the binding result of their bargain in the Constitution that forms the basis of the federation. Thus, the formation of a federation could be understood as the direct result of a freely negotiated contract among the bargaining parties, where they voluntarily enter a binding contract. Such federation is referred to as a bargain federation. The bargain has remained the dominant

explanation for the formation of mostly 'coming together' federations (United States of America, Australia, and Switzerland) and partly 'holding together' federations (Spain, India, and Belgium).

However, some scholars (for instance, Stepan, 1999; Ziblatt, 2004) question the broader applicability of the bargaining model. They suggest a third form of federation. This third form of the federation could be identified as 'putting together' federation or coercive federation (Stepan, 1999). Stepan (1999) views federalism as purpose-based fitting into a sort of continuum with a voluntary bargain at one end and coercion at the other end. Accordingly, federalism is a dynamic and goal-oriented political design by which states maintain the balance between sovereignty and individual identity, on one hand, and the benefit of synergy, on the other hand, for different reasons and to achieve different goals (Stepan, 1999). Ziblatt (2004) also suggests what is known as the "infrastructural model" of a federation. Studying the nineteenth-century divergent result of state-building processes of political cores of Prussia (Germany) and Piedmont (Italy) under similar historical context and common ideological preference for federalism, Ziblatt (2004) argues against the voluntary contract view and claims that all states (unitary or federal) are formed through a combination of coercion and compromise. According to Ziblatt (2004), federalism is possible if the pre-existing units of a potential federation have the infrastructural capacity for governance, highly institutionalized, and deeply embedded in their societies. Thus, according to Ziblatt (2004), the origin of federalism is in the infrastructural, institutional, and societal cohesion of a polity. In the absence of these, the core of the constituent units would dominate the weak subunits and a unitary state would be the outcome (Ziblatt, 2004). In both arguments, the state design with overt or covert coercion is responsible for the formation of federations. Hence, federations that are formed under the influence of such forces could better be identified as 'putting together' federations.

Considering this theoretical overview, where does Ethiopian federalism stand? I would try to answer this question in the following sections, however varyingly. As it has been acknowledged already, Ethiopian federalism poses unique normative and theoretical challenges. The ethnic orientations that define Ethiopian federalism, together with the concept of self-determination might help.

The Concept of Self-determination

The concept of self-determination, as it applies to the demand for self-administration in Western political history, could be traced back to the historical struggles for the rights of the people under the absolutist monarchy in medieval Europe. The declaration of independence by British colonies in North America in the late 18th century is considered as one of the pivotal actions for an assurance of the right of self-determination of nations.

The historical inspiration of self-determination in the 19th century, according to McWhinney (2007), is however clearly traceable to the French Revolution during the early Napoleonic Era for its concept of popular sovereignty and its philosophical imperatives of liberalism, nationalism, and independence. In the post-Napoleonic era, the concept of self-determination focussed more on nationalism in Europe with the political objective of liberation of societies that emphasized more on liberating themselves from the rule by others, hence transforming the concept to *national self-determination* of people who identify themselves as culturally and linguistically closely related. The result was "ethno-culturally homogeneous nation-states" (McWhinney, 2007, p. 2).

In the early years of the 20th century, two Russian revolutionaries offered a more systematized and theorized approach to the concept of self-determination. Stalin in 1913 and Lenin in 1616 synthesized theoretically compellingly the concept of self-determination as the national rights of nations. The ideal was debated before and during the First World War at least in Russia and most parts of Europe until before it took the final shape. Lenin's conception of the concept as ethnic nationhood is considered as the "first compelling enunciation of the principle of self-determination of peoples at the international level" (Antonio Cassese cited in Vyver, 2011, p. 351).

Immediately after the end of the First World War and following the disintegration of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungary empires, there was a surge of appetite for both the practice and the legalization of self-determination around the world. Though Woodruff Wilson had the conviction for achievements of national aspirations of people and saw self-determination as an imperative and inevitable principle of action, his proposition to include the principle of self-determination in the Charter of the League of Nations in the immediacy of post-World War I did not succeed (Vyver, 2011). He, however, succeeded in transforming it to a universal right in his address to his joint session of Congress on 11 February 1918.

The meaning of self-determination started to shift gradually in the 1930s and 1940s. Before the Second World War, there was little practice of self-determination (Shaw, 2003). The switch from the concept of 'national self-determination' to the concept of 'people's self- determination,' however, took place only after the Second World War (McWinney, 2007). The UN system brought it to international law through its Charter and Covenants. Cop and Eymirloglu (2005) point out that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Civil Rights were perhaps the most crucial phases in the evolution of the concept of self-determination in the arena of international law.

Ethnic Orientation that Defines Ethiopian Federalism

Ethnic orientations are classified broadly into three: primordial, instrumental, and constructivist. The NNPs in Ethiopia have experienced these forms of ethnic orientation at different times, some more than the others, and, at times, with a significant level of overlapping and crosscutting influences. Primordial orientation has remained an overarching ethnic orientation due to its very nature. The other two come and go as the political atmosphere continued to change. Constructivist and instrumentalist ethnic orientations are more of a history than a reality in the Ethiopian Federation. I shall briefly discuss these ethnic orientations in the following section.

Instrumental Ethnic Orientation

Instrumentalist orientation views ethnicity as an instrument to achieve certain goals. It is an orientation constructed primarily politically over time by leaders through the mobilization of the people for their political and material goals. It is constructed by intricately associating ethnic bonds to larger political and social projects but also economic goals, to a lesser extent. This kind of ethnic orientation is not common in post-1991 Ethiopia because there has been little incentive for the NNPs, who are now legally, culturally, socially and linguistically equal to each other and are equally sovereign and equally entitled to have the right to self-determination, including secession.

In the historical Abyssinia and pre-1991 empire state of Ethiopia, instrumentalist orientation had a significant political role than the primordial

or constructivist orientation. It served the purpose of "systematically blurring descent and enabling individuals to associate themselves of their most important forebears, or indeed with people from whom they were not descended at all" (Clapham,1994, p. 29). After the colonial expansion of the kingdom of Abyssinia under the leadership of *Atse* Menelik II and the subjugation of the non-Abyssinian NNPs, this orientation served both the subjected people and the settler colonialists to forge an Abyssinian instrumentalist identity in the new Abyssinian Empire. To achieve a material, gain through having access to the land that was taken away from them and achieve political power through having an imperial appointment in the new empire and better social status and class through the adoption of Abyssinian religion, language and culture, some non-Abyssinian in the annexed territories emulated an Abyssinian identity in purely instrumentalist orientations. Because of such emulation and instrumentalist orientation, an instrumentalist Abyssinian identity emerged among the non-Abyssinians. This went to the extent that people, from both the aristocracy and the commoners, contravened their primordial identities by choosing an instrumentalist descent.

A striking illustration of an instrumentalist choice of decent, even in the so-called "Solomonic" family, is observed by Clapham (1994) when he notes instrumentalist choice of descent by non-other than *Atse* Haile Selassie I:

> Emperor Haile Selassie's father's father was Oromo; his father's mother was Amhara; his mother's father was Oromo; his mother's mother was Gurage. In a patrilineal society, he would have been classed as Oromo, in a matrilineal one as Gurage; but to all intents and purposes he was Amhara, and it was his descent from his father's mother, a member of Shewan royal house, which provided the genealogical basis for his claim to the imperial throne. (p. 29)

Fitawrari Waldemika'el Gudisa of Shewa Oromo (father of Ras Mekonnen) and Dajazmach Ali Abba Jiffar of Wollo (Warra Iluu) Oromo and Ali Gamchu, father of Yeshimebet Ali, mother of *Atse* Haile Selassie I, were respectively the paternal and maternal side grandfathers of *Atse* Haile Selassie I.

Constructivist Ethnic Orientation

The constructivist orientation holds that "ethnicity is neither immutable nor completely open" (Lake and Rothchild cited in Kefele, 2009, p. 40). In

much of recent Abyssinian history, constructive regionalism (the territory inhabited by sub-ethnic groups or a combination of many subgroups or multi-ethnic groups) or sub-national ethnicity was used as the categorization of both the people and the political dominance. The power sources of such constructive regionalism were based in Shewa, Wollo, Gondar, or Gojam for Amhara ethnic group; and they saw each other as rivals with distinctive features that they have constructed as sub-ethnic characteristics. In Tigray, similar categorization construction existed among Adwans, Tembenians, Endertans, and Agames. In Oromia, the Shawa, the Wollo, the Arsi, the Borana, the Harargie, the five Gibie states, and Wallagga had constructivist orientations to their inter-ethnic groups in addition to the crosscutting moiety and sub moiety orientation. This became magnified particularly after they fell victim to the settler colonization project of *Atse* Menelik at the end of the 19th century. Under the Empire of Abyssinia (before 1930) and the Empire of Ethiopia (after 1930), the Oromo became used to such constructed and imposed regionalization largely due to its service to the "divide and rule" policy the Abyssinians had implanted among them. Such constructivist orientation in Amhara, Tigray, Oromia, and others, did not only serve as one of the bases for regionalization (provincial compartmentalization) during the imperial and socialist eras but also remained to influence the socio-political relationship within the national group in the present federal structure.

Regardless of the historical existence of other ethnic orientations in post-1991 Ethiopia, Ethiopian Federation could be defined and understood, largely, from the point of view of primordial orientation. This orientation defines the present national federation. It derives from such primordial ethnic orientation and political ideology of national liberation groups and the ideological conviction of the party that took the power of the state forcefully and led the politico-legal process of the formation of the federation.

Primordial Ethnic Orientation

Primordial ethnic orientation, which is also called naturalist or socio-biological orientation, supposes that ethnic identity is given or natural (Berghe and Geertz cited in Kefele, 2009). Primordial ethnic orientation is overpowering, non-rational, and highly emotional, inexplicable, and immutable. It is unbreakable with modernization. Civilization has little to do to change or to influence it. In short, it is a natural trait wired into human DNA. Primordial traits of ethnic orientation are "inborn common culture, custom, and language, psychological makeup and identities" (Aalen, 2011, p.

38). This orientation has "greatly influenced the popular perception of ethnic identity and political discourses" (Kefele, 2009, p. 38).

Ethiopian ethnic elites and ethnic-based parties have used the primordial orientation of ethnicity to mobilize the public for political purposes. They used the mobilization to regain the lost identities of the member of their ethnicity to the historically dominant group, the Amhara. Identities were "lost" due to instrumental orientation of ethnicity in the past, largely because of the total assimilation policy the Amhara-centred state had employed starting from the formation of the Abyssinian Empire in the late 19th century.

The political hysteria and trumped-up controversy over the "missing" of over two million Amhara in the 2007 National Housing and Population Census Report were due to the regaining of "lost" ethnicity because of such mobilization. People from other ethnic groups who had claimed Amhara ethnicity in the past for its instrumental purposes (or simply because becoming a Christian and speaking Amharic was equated constructively to becoming Amhara and being Habasha) now no longer have such instrumental goals. They have primordial ethnicity to subscribe to for that purpose. They do not anymore count themselves as Amhara. Because of this comeback to own ethnicity of non-Amhara who had use Amhara ethnicity for instrumental purpose in the past has created the "missing" few million populations on the recent census. The next census is expected to yield more "missing" Amhara. This is because, as self-awareness of the instrumentally misidentifying people has improved due to nationalities-based politics in the last decade, the prospects of more people to identify themselves with their primordial ethnicity has only been growing. Some Amhara political elites, however, continued to use the "missing Amhara" deliberately as an instrument of social mobilization of Amhara people for the political mobilization of fringe Amhara communities who have long been misinformed as if a secrete genocide had targeted Amhara people since the formation of the Ethiopian Federation resulting in the "missing" population.

The primordial orientation of ethnicity is the main basis to claim rights and benefits in the current federal structure that gives recognition not only to the already identified ethnic groups but also to those who may identify themselves as a distinct ethnic group in the future according to Article 47 (2) and (3) of the Constitution. The ethnic qualification has been the key instrument for the formation of special administrative districts within regional States and representation in the House of Federation. Because ethnic orientation has become the mode of both state restructuring and political orientation since the formation of the Ethiopian Federation, primordial

ethnicity shall continue to serve as an instrument to political, social, economic, and cultural rights.

This primordial ethnic orientation stands out from the political landscape of the Ethiopian Federation. The attempt to build an instrumentalist orientation of ethnicity by the Abyssinian elites after the formation of the Abyssinian Empire in the late 19th century by *Atse* Menelik II (r. 1889-1913) appears to have been ineffective. It took no time to bring primordial orientation of ethnicity to the spotlight and restructure the Ethiopian people solely based on such ethnic orientation since the introduction of national political orientation immediately after the fall of the centrist socialist government in 1991.

The basic criteria to belong to an ethnic group in multi-ethnic Ethiopia have been consolidated to patrimonial birth descent in post-1991 Ethiopia. People who are borne of mixed ethnicity are left to choose from the two ethnicities that they share. Because of the highly patrimonial kinship structure, people from multi-ethnic backgrounds choose to identify with the ethnicity of their father rather than that of their mother. This, however, does not mean that there are no people who chose the matrimonial ethnic line for instrumental purposes. The motivation for it could be a cultural or linguistic preference, even conformity to a group, religion, or neighborhood, rather than political.

Primordial Orientation of Ethnicity as the Basis of State Restructuring

At its very introduction in Ethiopia, national federalism appeared to be the only solution for multinational Ethiopia. It was the only workable political arrangement, nationalist politicians argued, that could support the unity of Ethiopia and acknowledges the diversity of its peoples. The public also seems to have believed so. This belief is held valid for more than twenty years of the experiment. The experience has shown that the Ethiopian federalism, with some heavy-handed push from the dominant ruling party, has successfully averted the likely civil war resulting from the national declaration of internal independence or secession, and secured the peace and stability of the country. The radical and innovative approach to organizing Ethiopian society along ethnic lines and acknowledgment of ethnic identity and ethnic self-determination seems to have worked well for Ethiopian post-socialist socio-political situations. The political success has, in recent decades,

started to manifest itself in economic success as well. However, more remains to be accomplished in building democratic and constitutional culture and in effectively implementing the promises enshrined in the federal Constitution. It is not yet time to celebrate the success of ethnic-based federalism in Ethiopia.

For over twenty years, the EPRDF government has been struggling to balance the internal paradox of its undemocratic, non-liberal, and authoritarian party character with accommodation of the rights and freedoms of every nation, nationality, and people of Ethiopia. The paradox appears to be serving the very purpose of the TPLF's minority dominance in EPRDF and sustaining its otherwise threatened existence. The mechanism of achieving the purpose has been by systematically transforming the federation that was thought initially to be based on the free will of the NNPs of Ethiopia into an authoritarian dictatorship of the EPRDF. Systemic and institutional erosion of the rights and freedoms that the Constitution enshrined through one dominant party mechanism, both at federal and state levels, has proved to be effective for the purpose.

Every federation is different in effectiveness and efficiency, historical background, and success. There cannot be any single best and most effective form of federalism. They are only as good as their purpose and design. Each federal system is unique in that it is "the product of historical political and cultural circumstances that cannot simply be exported from one state to another" (Schuck, 2006, p. 10). These federations are both long existed and recently formed. The former federations are known commonly as classical federations. They include the USA (1789), Mexico (1824), Venezuela (1830), Switzerland (1848), Argentina (1853), Canada (1867), Germany (1871), Brazil (1889) and Australia (1901). The latter are 20th-century federations. They include Austria (1920), India (1950), Malaysia and Nigeria (1963), United Arab Emirates (1971), Pakistan (1973), Spain (1978), Russia, and Belgium (1993), Ethiopia (1995), and South Africa (1997). Some federations have collapsed (USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia) while some have been transformed in many ways: Libya and Indonesia became unitary states; Singapore was expelled from Malaysia; Bangladesh seceded from Pakistan; Eritrea finally became independent from Ethiopia, which annulled the Ethio-Eritrean federation which only lasted from 1954 to 1963.

In addition to the historical backgrounds that led to the formation of the Ethiopian Federation, the ideological conviction of the dominant political party, TPLF-EPRDF, that initiated the political bargain and monitored the formation of the federation in light of its political ideology, has tremendously influenced the type of federation the Ethiopian Federation has become.

Because of the underlying political ideology, the Ethiopian Federation differs from other forms of federations.

Turton (2006) identifies three consequences by which the ideological basis of the Ethiopian model of federalism differ from that of Western and non-Western models of multinational federalism: first, autonomous status was not so much 'achieved' by ethnically defined regional subunits, as 'thrust upon them', or 'captured' by a local elite, regardless of popular demand; second, it was decided that each major national group should be dominant in one, and only one, regional state; third, it was decided that each of these states should be named after its dominant national group.

This makes the Ethiopian Federation unique among the family of federations around the world. Using Bhandari's self-explanatory perspectives to define the nature of Ethiopian federalism, it is neither "orthodox" nor "illiberal" nor "separatist"; it is rather a mix of "pragmatist" and "liberal" (Bhandari, 2014, p. 75). As such, Ethiopian federalism will remain to be a pioneer. Its long-term success, however, is still to be seen. Until the ideological and legal foundations that have formed it would be substantiated by critical empirical studies, it would only remain a pioneering experiment.

Ethiopian Federalism and Alfred Stepan's Taxonomy

The categorization of Ethiopian federalism into Alfred Stepan's 'coming together', 'holding together' or 'putting together' federalism (Stepan, 1999) has steered some debates. Some scholars and commentators argue it belongs to the first, to the second, and the third. There is no agreement among scholars of federalism on where Ethiopian federalism belongs convincingly in these categories.

'Coming together' Federalism

One of the prominent Ethiopian scholars, Andreas Eshete, (cited in Kefele, 2009 and Fessha, 2010), argues that Ethiopian federalism is a 'coming together' federalism. According to Eshete, this is because it emerged after the total cessation of the unitary government that was overthrown by the struggle of the peoples of Ethiopia, who fought for and politically asserted their rights

to self-determination, including independence. He views Ethiopian federalism as a coming together of the Ethiopian NNPs, where they negotiated the federation as reflected in the Constitution that has placed authority in them as bargaining sovereign groups. Similarly, another Ethiopian scholar, Fasil Nahum (cited in Fessha, 2010), argues that the Ethiopian people were first organized in their national-linguistic group before coming to the political negotiation that culminated in the ratification of the federal Constitution. This implies the precedence of the autonomy of the national-linguistics groups to the onset of the bargain that resulted in the formation of the federation.

Both Eshete and Nahum appear to argue that the Ethiopian Federation is a total remaking out of the sudden dissolving conglomeration of nations, nationalities, and people who inhabited collectively the region known formerly as the Empire of Abyssinia but later Ethiopia. They draw the basis for their argument heavily from the Transitional Charter of July 1991. The Transitional Charter was the reflection of the reconfiguration of the disintegrating state into "a composite of sovereignties of each of the component nations" where each nation, nationality, and peoples agree voluntarily to forsake some of its inalienable rights "for the good of each other and all other concerned peoples" (Lata, 1998b, p. 52). Based on this assumption of the sovereignty of the nations, nationalities, and peoples, the July 1991 Peace and National Reconciliation Conference was aimed at bringing together the country which was falling apart into a new form and shape than as holding it together as it was. At the time, the nations, and nationalities, which were represented by their respective liberation fronts or other forms of political organizations, were understood to have inalienable sovereign rights. Besides, there was a broader assumption that the fall of the central government was the same as the fall of the state on the eve of the suspension of the socialist constitution, the *de facto* secession of Eritrea, and the total control of the rest of the country by the armed groups.

The Conference was considered by most of the armed groups as a form of voluntary coming together of triumphant sovereign nations to take hold of the good of being and remaining together as a group of sovereign neighbors bounded together by the principles of voluntary union. Their voluntary union was trusted to form constitutional, social, and legal contracts. Hence, it is no mistake, being in the political spirit of the time, if some scholars, such as Andreas Eshete, argue that Ethiopian federalism is a 'coming together' federalism.

There is also another argument. The Ethiopian federalism could be considered a 'coming together' federalism based on two overlapping and very broad assumptions. The first overarching assumption is that Ethiopia has

been a state of multiple nations. These nations had their sovereignty before the making of modern Ethiopia through conquest and territorial expansion. The fallen governments continued their quest to build one nation-state from the diverse multitude of these formerly sovereign nations by force. Now, that force was no more, the state was no more: there was no subduing binging force. The Ethiopian state, thus, was reconfigured to nations, nationalities, and peoples momentarily and they, based on their sovereign will come together and formed the new union that would become Ethiopian Federation. The second broad assumption was that the sudden fall of the government in May 1991 constituted the fall of the Ethiopian state. The fact that the fall of the government was achieved by the armed struggle of fronts or organizations which had the political objective of liberating their nation from the Ethiopian state, gave these armed groups and the nation they represented the anticipated political victory of being liberated. The suspension of the constitution and the total collapse of the national defense forces also gave the impression that the Ethiopian state was no more. Most of the Ethiopian NNPs felt liberated immediately and some started to organize themselves as independent people straightaway, a nation-state, even though none of them opted for political divorce instantly, except Eritrea. The victory of the armed groups and their triumph over the fallen oppressive government gave some of the armed groups the impression that control of the central state power by the EPRDF could not have stopped them to declare independence. The total control of the state (People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE)) was not yet settled fully by July 1991. Also, PDRE was seen by most of the NNPs as the recent embodiment of the political and social cruelty of Abyssinian rules after *Atse* Menelik's settler colonization. The settler colonization had expanded the Abyssinian kingdom more than threefold, in just three decades. Though EPRDF had controlled Addis Ababa, it was not able to have total control over the whole country. The Transitional Charter, in its effect and very content, only affirmed these broad assumptions and made them legal.

Nevertheless, it is questionable whether these assumptions-based arguments to position Ethiopian federalism as 'coming together' federalism were well connected to the social and political reality of Ethiopia as may be understood from the point of view of the none-armed political groups. Even though it is historically correct that the Ethiopian empire was built through conquest and territorial expansion in which many formerly independent nations were colonized by the Abyssinian kingdom, several nations and many nationalities never wanted to liberate themselves from Ethiopia. Indeed, EPRDF, the force that took state power following the fall of the central

government, did not have the political ambition of declaring the independence of the nations represented by any of its members. Thus, even though the majority of the NNPs of Ethiopia had aspired to be liberated and fought for many years to achieve that, the quest for national liberation of any nation or nationality, except Eritrea, was far from being universal and realizable at the time of the fall of the government. The quest of the majority of the nations, nationalities, and peoples was internal self-determination.

A closer look into the social and political situations in Ethiopia in the immediate post-1991 Peace and Reconciliation Conference reveals a different reality. First, the fall of the government did not necessarily mean the fall of the state. The government may have fallen overnight but the states did not. For the state to fall, it naturally takes a long time. The momentary frailer of the state to supply security to its people cannot be considered as the fall of the state. A failed state is not necessarily a fallen state. Second, the fall of the government in Ethiopia did not result in the state of anarchy or the total collapse of the state services either. The culture of peace and avoidance of political conflicts has helped the Ethiopian NNPs to keep their peace, security, and stability during the political transition. The culture of peace and avoidance of conflict have been embedded in the cultures and traditional institutions of the Ethiopian NNPs. Among the Oromo nation, in particular, the traditional socio-political institutions command more respect than the state and the state institutions. The administration of justice and the provision of social security services have been mostly in the domain of traditional institutions. Thus, it is impossible to assume unmistakably that the state had fallen within one month, following the fall of the government in May, at least not in as much as to allow the confidence to claim that by July 1991, the representatives who took part in the Conference acted as representatives of sovereign nation, nationalities or peoples. There is no evidence to claim that the Ethiopian state was no more after the May 1991 fall of the socialist government or by the time the Peace and Reconciliation Conference was held in Addis Ababa in July 1991.

The political progress after the Conference suggests that the Ethiopian NNPs were together and chose to remain together. Except for few political organizations that were taken hostage by the personal views of their elite leaders, all the NNPs of Ethiopia as well as the international community, showed no disagreement with the content and the effect of the Transitional Charter. The Charter did not assume the Ethiopian state had fallen. In other words, it did not stipulate that it was forming a new state. It was a document that aimed at the political and social restructuring of the existing state. The Charter commanded massive support from the Ethiopian peoples and was the first light shining over the Ethiopian dark political horizon of the time.

The TGE that the Charter set up was acceptable to all the political organizations and all the Ethiopian NNPs. Although the TPLF-EPRDF took the TGE hostage and some political organizations were forced to leave the TGE, the Ethiopian NNPs remained with TGE that saw into the formation of the Ethiopian Federation by the 1995 constitution. Perhaps, these were the reason why Fessha (2010) holds "positing of Ethiopian federalism as coming-together federalism is no more than a constitutional fiction" (p. 194).

'Holding together' Federalism

Even though there are political views which tend to endorse 'coming together' as the basis for the formation of the Ethiopian Federation, its opponents question the integrity of the continued affirmation that Ethiopia disintegrated momentarily after May 1991 and reintegrated immediately in July 1991, or more so in 1994 after the ratification of the Constitution. They argue Ethiopia was rather held together than came together during the transition; hence, it fits 'holding together' rather than 'putting together' federalism. The radical political elites of the former insist that the Ethiopian NNPs had liberated themselves and were each sovereign before they voluntarily came together to form the federation where they have enshrined their sovereignty in the Constitution. Such resolve may make political rather than practical or legal sense. The political argument is likely to stay around as long as the current federal arrangement is in place.

Some scholars of federalism also argue against the categorization of Ethiopian federalism as 'coming together' federalism and argue for its categorization as 'holding together' federalism. Fessha (2010), for example, finds the argument for the 'coming together' federalism and the categorization itself unconvincing. This is mainly because neither the national-linguistics groups that negotiated the Constitution were sovereign nor the constituent members of the Ethiopian Federation were "previously sovereign polities" nor had any part of Ethiopia declared independence nor the state had ceased to exist. For Fessha (2010), these features are important to distinguish 'coming together' federalism from 'holding together' federalism as defined by Alfred Stepan (1999). Moreover, he considers the constitutional bargain not as a compact among "sovereign ethnic communities" that inhabit the country but as a political compact among the major political forces of the country (Fessha, 2010).

Keller (2002) and Fessha (2010) concur that the goal of a 'holding-together' federation, however, was maintained in the case of Ethiopian federalism. Fiseha, (cited in Kefele, 2009) and Fessha (2010) suggest that Ethiopian Federalism fits well into Stepan's model of 'holding together' federalism. In such federalisms, "polities came to the decision that the best way . . . to hold their countries together in a democracy would be to devolve power constitutionally and turn their threatened polities into federations" (Stepan, 1999, p. 22). According to Fessha (2010), Ethiopian federalism held together with the Ethiopian state from the danger of disintegration by devolving the state power to the sub-national groups. Keller (2002) also agrees that, at the very beginning, Ethiopian federalism was 'holding together' federalism.

'Putting together' Federalism

Kefele (2009) on the other hand, argues that advancing Ethiopian federalism either as 'putting together' or 'holding together' federalism overlooks the imposition of the new political order by EPRDF, almost single-handedly. He suggests that Ethiopian federalism fits neither 'coming together' nor 'holding together' federalism. He argues, even though Ethiopian federalism initially started as 'holding together' federalism when, initially, EPRDF showed genuine bargain involving multiple political forces, which did change later. After its full control of the state power, EPRDF became the architect of the federation transforming it from a 'holding together' federation to a 'putting together' federation. He, therefore, suggests that Ethiopian federalism, as is, is better described as a 'putting-together' federalism. Keller (2002; 2003) supports this view.

This argument, however, appears to be less convincing. First, the course of the transition and the criteria that demark the distinction are not clear. Second, according to Stepan (1999), 'putting together' federalism is said to be formed when "a heavily coercive effort by a non-democratic centralizing power" is employed "to put together a multinational state, some of the components of which had previously been independent states" (p. 23). Even though it is evident that EPRDF exercised some coercive power in its undertaking of total reorientation of the society and the politics in Ethiopia, its approach was neither heavily coercive nor had a significant element of a non-democratic centralizing power. This was true at least during the critical early years of TGE when the federation was in the making. Also, there were no multinational states that were to be "put together" by force, by the TGE

or the EPRDF. Both coercive capacity and political strength were necessary from the group that took the state power to hold the country together in the Ethiopian circumstance of 1991(Keller, 2002). The utilization of some coercive power by EPRDF during the formative years of the Ethiopian Federation, therefore, should be seen not as an imposition of a 'putting together' federalism but as the requirement to hold the country together from some secessionist liberation fronts.

Alternative Taxonomies

Devolution-Recognition Federalism

Ethiopian federalism is better characterized by the devolution of central power and recognition of national diversity than by any of Stepan's models. The fall of the centrist government opened up an ever-expanding political crack along with ethnic lines and claims to national self-determination of NNPs, including threats of secession. It was immediately clear that the Ethiopian state would never be the same and there was no going back to the nation-state illusion. At the same time, except few, the NNPs of Ethiopia were reluctant on the political agenda of national independence. They were valuing the common history and social connections among them. However, they were committed to internal national self-determination and recognition of their identities in a new multinational Ethiopia. Accordingly, most NNPs of Ethiopia demanded nationality-based autonomy. This was an immediate call for the devolution of central power to ethnolinguistic territories that have already identified themselves as nations within the Ethiopian state. The new political arena was where every NNP is recognized as they wish to be recognized with their self-described identity, which was based on ethnic/national identity. What took place during the transitional period was the devolution of the historically centralized state power to the emerging ethnically based autonomies. This, in effect, was public recognition of the NNPs in the country that has long been associated superfluously to the illusory Ethiopian nation-state. This led to the devolution of the unitary and centrist state power to multiple and federal and state powers. The result has been the recognition of every nation, nationality, and people as sovereign polities in the country. This has been achieved through the legalization and

institutionalization of national symbolism, national name of the state, state flags and quotes of arms, national state anthem, national public holidays, the official use of the national languages, and the right to advance the national culture and identity in the new federation. Ethiopian federalism is, therefore, *devolution federalism* in its process of formation and diversity *recognition federalism* in its result, which may be called *devolution-recognition federalism*.

Diversity Recognition Federalism

Recognition of minorities is part of the genuine recognition of diversity. In Ethiopian federalism, the minorities not only have equal rights but they are equally sovereign. They have come out to the light from the shadows and impositions of the majorities but also have their part to play as an instituted polity in the formation and governance of the federation. The care for its minorities only makes Ethiopian federalism a noble approach to the formation of such a voluntary union of political equals.

Nonetheless, at the same time, it could be the care and protection that it has provided to the minorities that could make the Ethiopian federalism short of being defined as typical multinational federalism where, theoretically, only those polities who qualify as "nation" form a federation. The multiplicity of ethnicity or diversity of nationalities may not be particularly important to qualify a federation as a multinational. The most principal issue to consider in qualifying federalism as genuinely multinational should not be the multiplicity of its ethnic composition or the diversity of its nations. It should rather be how its diversity (multi-ethnic/multinational) is recognized and territorially designated into self-governance units as nations under one or two crosscutting and fundamental unifying factors. In this regard, Ethiopian federalism is pioneering. Article 46 of its Constitution asserts, "States shall be delimited on the basis of the settlement patterns, language, identity, and consent of the people concerned" (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE), 1995, p. 17). Accordingly, Ethiopian federalism has instituted nine national regional states. However, none of the national regional states are ethnically homogenous in true sense.

Table 7.
Distribution of NNPs in the Federal States

State	NNP	Per cent	State	NNP	Per cent
Afar	Afar	91.8	Oromia	Oromo	85.00
	Amhara	4.50		Amhara	9.10
	Argoba	0.92		Guragie	1.30
	Tigrie	0.82		Others	4.60
	Oromo	0.70	SNNP	Sidama	19.34
	Wolaita	0.45		Wolaita	10.71
	Hadiya	0.01		Hadiyya	8.02
Amhara	Amhara	91.2		Guragie	7.52
	Oromo	3.00		Gamo	6.96
	Agew/Awi	2.70		Kaffinno	5.43
	Kimant	1.20		Silte	5.36
	Agew/Kamyr	1.00		Gedeo	4.92
Benishangul-Gumuz	Berta	26.70		Kembata	3.81
	Gumuz	23.40		Goffa	2.39
	Amhara	21.69		Dawro	3.29
	Oromo	13.55		Bench	2.33
	Shinasha	7.00		Amhara	2.79
	Mao	0.60		Ari	1.89
	Komo	0.20		Oromo	1.57
	Agew-Awi	4.22		Konso	1.46
Gambella	Nuer	40.00		Alaba	1.35
	Anyuak	27.00		Kore	1.01
	Amhara	8.00		Me'enite	1.00
	Oromo	6.00		Others	14.37
	Mezengir	5.80	Somali	Somali	95.6
	Kaffa	4.10		Oromo	2.25
	Mocha	2.00		Amhara	0.69
	Tigrie	1.60		Guragie	0.14
	Others	5.50		Others	0.63
Harari	Oromo	52.30	Tigray	Tigrie	94.98
	Amhara	32.60		Amhara	2.60
	Harari	7.10		Erob	0.70
	Guragie	3.20		Kunama	0.50

Note. Compiled based on CSA Summary Statistical Report, CSA, December 2007.

This recognition and the subsequent state and social restructuring in Ethiopia, however, have been challenging theoretically. The problem has been clearly showing the specific type of federalism it espouses. Whether it infers sub-national federalism or multi-national federalism or both is not clear nor does the Constitution provide any significant clue. The politics that led to the formation of the federation, however, based its ideological foundation on the national self-determination of NNPs, including secession. That too falls short of articulating clearly which type of federalism the nations, nationalities and peoples who decide to remain together would follow. Historical, socio-economic, territorial, cultural, and ideological driving forces for the formation of the Ethiopian Federation and the post federation political dynamism have continued to give the impression that the Ethiopian federalism is neither multi-national nor sub-national. Ethiopian federalism cannot be categorized exclusively to either sub-state nationalism or multi-national nationalism nor does any of the existing theoretical conceptualization of federalism exclusively stand for Ethiopian federalism. The concept of multinational or national federalism may not be validated in its pure theoretical standing. As a result, Ethiopian federalism is not yet settled conceptually in a distinctive category with which scholars of federalism could define it fully.

However, focusing on what it does, Ethiopian federalism can be justified as diversity recognition federalism. It recognizes the nations, nationalities, and peoples of Ethiopia as political entities and their rights to self-determination, including secession. It also recognizes their linguistic and cultural diversities and their rights to self-rule and shared rule. The Constitution of the federation is primarily a codification of these recognitions. These recognitions are in sharp contrast to the political ideologies and policies of the former imperial and socialist governments. The very turning point that marks Ethiopian federalism and what it achieves is the recognition that Ethiopia is a diverse state, i.e., its recognition of diversity: the rest were consequences. Thus, I may comfortably refer to it as *diversity recognition federalism*.

'Ethnic' Diversity Recognition Federalism

Recently, a new form of identification of federalism seems to have emerged. The disintegration of the former socialist unions into its national components as independent states or ethnically recognized states under a

new form of union and the challenges of ethnic diversity in many states around the world have given the underlying pragmatic backing to the new form of federation. In former colonial states, where the national borders were drawn arbitrarily dividing ethnic communities and nations between adjacent countries, the challenges of national or ethnic diversity have been on the rise. The new form of federalism appeals to such diversity and challenge. Fessha (2010) names this new form of federalism as an "ethnic model of federalism." Fessha (2010) argues that it is inevitable for multi-ethnic states to recognize its ethnic plurality as an important institutional principle through its "constitution, other important documents or state symbol" based on the "political relevance of ethnic identity" (Fessha, 2010, pp. 3-4) to respond to the challenges of ethnic diversity. According to Fessha (2010), this is because empirical examinations have shown that states which have suppressed ethnic diversity have not achieved common national identity and the state cannot remain neutral to ethnic relations. This ethnic diversity also includes national diversity however centralist ideologues try to undermine it. There is little or no significant difference between ethnic and national identity in countries like Ethiopia. In the Ethiopian context, the so-called "ethnic model federalism" is fundamentally *national diversity recognition federalism*.

National Federalism

The quest for national self-determination is as old as modern Ethiopia itself. The empire-building project of the Abyssinian king, *Atse* Menelik II, in the late 19th century, which would establish modern Ethiopia, involved annexation and conquest of other formerly independent nations and their subsequent compulsion to assimilate to one dominant Amhara identity and culture. However, these formerly independent nations have kept all or a significant part of their identity and culture. Within the dominant Amhara-centred Abyssinian identity and culture, which became mainstream identity and culture of the empire state of Ethiopia, their identities and cultures have been referred to as ethnic identities and cultures. Abyssinian elites and their copyist Westerners have been referring to the non-Abyssinian minority nationalities as ethnic groups. They have been struggling in varying forms for the full restoration of their national identity and culture. They also value the fraternity they have developed among themselves in the empire. Their demand for internal, not external, self-determination must have emerged from this sense of fraternity among them. Their quest for autonomy,

however, was never negotiable nor was the goal of their demand for internal self-determination any less than the restoration of their full national identity.

All politically organized national groups in Ethiopia have had historical nationhood, a well-developed nation or sub-national autonomous identity. Ideally, national federalism is a political arrangement where each of the federal states is composed of a nation. This is not exactly the case in Ethiopia. Four of the states are multinational in the true sense. Also, ideally, ethnic federalism is a political arrangement where all federal states are formed based on ethnic identities. In the current definition, however, it is a federal state in which "at least one constituent territorial governance unit is intentionally associated with a specific ethnic category" (Hale, 2004, p. 167). All states in the Ethiopian federation are 'intentionally associated' with one or more nations, nationalities, or people. In this case too, by definition, Ethiopian federalism is not ethnic federalism because no constituent state officially identifies itself as an ethnic state. The official name of the states in the federal Constitution is a *national regional state*. The official name of Afar State, for example, is Afar *national regional state*.

The term "regional" in the appellation, however, has been controversial. The states are not regions of one centralized state in any way nor do they directly stand for any of the historical regionalization (administrative provinces) of the former unitary state. The genuine intention to include the term in the description was part of the attempt to introduce clarity by differentiating the national states and their level of autonomy from the central federation. Its main function appears to be making clear that the states were not formally independent.

It however does not stand against the fact that the people after which the states are named have been nations. They were nations who had some autonomy within the kingdom of Abyssinia or were kingdoms, Emirates, or republican states or had a traditional government system outside of it before the formation of modern Ethiopia. Thus, overall, Ethiopian federalism is better conceived and more exposit as *national federalism* rather than ethnic federalism, and its constituent states are better understood as *national states* rather than as ethnic states.

National Diversity Recognition Federalism

As I have highlighted above, there are alternative appellations for Ethiopian federalism. There exists no single widely accepted nomenclature for Ethiopian federalism. The alternatives include ethnic-based federalism,

national/nationalities federalism, devolution-recognition federalism, diversity recognition federalism, ethnic model/ethnic diversity recognition federalism. None of them is final. Though they could be used alternatively based on what aspect of the federation needs to be emphasized at a time, as I have employed them in this work, an overarching appellation may be suggested. Guided by constitutional pact theory of federalism, and what the federal Constitution does in (a) recognizing all the nations, nationalities, and peoples of the federation as sovereign, (b) granting the national right to self-determination (c) envisioning upholding their inconvenient union, Ethiopian federalism is better described as *national diversity recognition federalism*.

Principles of Ethiopian Federalism

Federalism may have implicit and explicit principles and sub-principles based on its foundations and its daily operations. Most common principles, like the principle of separation of powers, have been adopted from classical American federalism by most federations. Other principles, like the principle of subsidiarity, political dignity, national autonomy, self-rule, and shared-rule are among the recent developments. In the contemporary federalism debate on principles of federalism, more principles have emerged. They are oftentimes confusingly similar in terminology and mean only slightly different things in the context they apply. Systematic categorization of the principles into a category of alternative principles has been useful to understand the type of federalism that has been built on those principles.

Inman and Rubinfeld (1997) have identified three alternative principles of federalism that are competing for the efficient achievement of government goals: economic efficiency, political participation, and protection of rights. These principles are economic, cooperative, and democratic. Their distinctions are drawn upon who makes the policy decision in the federation under the condition of a highly decentralized and constitutionally constrained government. According to the first principle, policies are decided by an elected or appointed central planner. According to the second principle, they are agreed to unanimously by the elected representatives from each of the lower-tier governments. According to the last principle, a simple majority (51 percent) of elected representatives agree to policies from lower-tier governments.

These principles assume automatically that the central state powers are highly decentralized, the member states and local governments have developed the necessary competencies, and the powers of the governments

are limited by the Constitution. In other words, it presupposes that the federation is advanced. In such federations, these principles could also be models of federalism because they involve decisions about institutions of federalism. Ethiopian federalism, however, is a new beginning and a new form of federalism. As a result, it must base its principles on fundamental issues that might be assumed simply as commonly and fully understood backgrounds in other older federations; hence no more considered as critical.

The Constitution of the FDRE is built on four central principles: the sovereignty of the NNP, the right to self-determination, equality, and equity (Zimmermann-Steinhart & Bekele, 2012). The first two are related to the group rights of NNPs. The first principle gave the NNPs sovereign power. Based on this principle, the principle of self-determination gave all the NNPs of Ethiopia unconditional right for self-determination at the local level (self-administration), at the regional level (state formation) and the federal level (secession and independence). The last two principles are related to the individual rights of the citizens and the rights of NNPs. The principle of equality guarantees the democratic equality of all persons (of every age, gender, background, nationality, culture, language) and their religions, rights, and freedoms. The last principle provides for the just and equitable share of the national resources and the national services by all people in a way it ensures equitable development across the states and the NNPs.

Nevertheless, it is clear from the implementation of the federal principles so far that more than these principles, even when considered in total, the ideological conviction of TPLF/EPRDF that has heavily influenced the first two principles has been the driving force behind not only the Constitution but also every dynamics of the Ethiopian Federation at large. The heavy influence from the ruling party, EPRDF, however gradually diminished the day-to-day application and the initial ethos of the first two principles through the subsidiarity that it has introduced in the federal system by withholding constitutionally entrenched sovereign power from some members of the federal state fully or varyingly partially. Gambella, Benishangul-Gumuz, Afar and Somali states have been under the political and policy supervision and leadership of the federal government. They form "emerging states," and thus are considered impolitely not yet able to exercise self-rule. The federal government has also been highly involved in the internal affairs of the SNNP state for effective control of the state that has over 50 NNPs and is often prone to conflict because the second principle, the principle of self-determination (self-rule) is not implemented fully. No state is immune to the heavy influence of the federal government on the self-rule of the states wherever co-operation and co-ordinations are needed.

Summary

In this chapter, I have provided an overview of federalism. I have attempted to depict the natural formation of federations in antiquity and the origin of federalism. Though federalism has its origin in theology, it has been around as political order in varying forms since the formation of polities. I have highlighted that modern federalism is a political order where unity and autonomy are interplayed. I have taken two federal political orders, confederation and federation, to illustrate the point. Yet, I have elaborated that there is no uniform understanding of federalism today among political scholars and the available definitions of federalism are less than satisfactory.

Besides, I have attempted to bring some conceptual clarity to Ethiopian federalism and state formation in the federation. I have presented a brief conceptual overview of federalism and the formation of a federal state. In doing so, I have attempted to illustrate: first, federalism is a necessary political arrangement when a central state is devolving or consolidating political power; second, federalism and state formation in federalism, in general, are the result of the bargaining process, though not every federation or state is the result of one; third, many factors, such as history, strategy, and recognition, can affect the formation of federal-state; fourth, in some cases, federalism could be recognition of national diversity, which, paradoxically, could be a threat to the unity of the federation.

Furthermore, I have attempted to elucidate that Ethiopian federalism is unique. It is NNPs-centred federalism. It is motivated by the concept of national self-determination. This is perhaps the reason why its principles are the sovereignty of the NNP, the right to self-determination, equality, and equity instead of the government goals oriented common principles: economic efficiency, political participation, and protection of rights. The primordial orientation of ethnicity does not only define it but is also the main basis for the formation of the states. Even though some argue to place in one, it does not fit perfectly into any of Alfred Stepan's Categories of federalism nor does other alternatives fully satisfy its uniqueness. Alternatively, it could be referred to as ethnic-based federalism, diversity recognition federalism, devolution-recognition federalism, ethnic federalism, ethnic diversity recognition federalism, and national federalism. Though they could be used alternatively, from the point of view of what Ethiopian federalism does for the nations, nationalities, and peoples of Ethiopia, as set out in the Constitution, *national diversity recognition federalism, recognition federalism* for short, appears to fit Ethiopian federalism better.

Chapter 5

Features of Ethiopian Federalism

In this chapter, I shall enumerate some features of Ethiopian federalism and discuss them briefly. In a few instances, however, I shall discuss the features in greater detail. I shall do so particularly when the feature is related to the historical background of federalism and when more explanation is helpful for better understanding. The endeavor is neither presenting a comparative analysis nor offering a complete theoretical explication. It is to provide a simple description and explanation as part of an attempt to understand Ethiopian federalism.

Radical, Pioneering, Divisive

Ethiopian federalism is radical and pioneering: radical, because "it has introduced the principle of self-determination for federated units"; and pioneering because "it has used ethnicity as its fundamental organizing principle" (Turton, 2006, p. 1). In doing so, it is viewed as an innovative and timely solution to the political crisis that followed the collapse of the socialist regime and the existential threat posed by armed national liberation organizations (which toppled the government by force) to the continuity of the Ethiopian state. This view is supported by the formerly oppressed NNPs of Ethiopia. They have struggled for long for it and they appear to be satisfied with the right to national identity, voluntarily formed political arrangement, equality and sovereignty of NNPs, the right to form a self-administering unit in the federation, and the right to secede from the federation when disadvantaged. On the other hand, some people view these very features of Ethiopian federalism as divisive. This view is held strongly by the political and religious elites of those who were privileged during the former regimes and are aspiring they come back. They argue both its radical solution and pioneering approaches are divisive. The ethnic-based politics

and "ethnic-nationalism" as well as the unconditional right to "ethnonational" independence, have created division not only among "ethnicities" but also among families. They fear it could be a potential for loss of national unity and continued ethnic tension. Nonetheless, the Ethiopian Federation has succeeded fairly in the last two decades not only in maintaining unity but also in increasing political participation, self-rule and shared-rule, political competition among its constituents, and in improving the wellbeing of citizens.

'Ethnic-based' Federalism

Ethnic identity is resilient than political identity. Political identity is an identity based on voluntary membership to common views, aspirations, and ideologies. As such, it is external, dynamic, and flexible. Anyone may have a socialist, conservative, liberal, and other political identity but not anyone can have, for example, Maori, Flemish, Egbo, Zulu, Punjabi, Sami, or Kurdish identity. Such an identity is an inborn national identity, otherwise known as an ethnic identity. It is an inborn, rigid, and inflexible identity. Yet it is the strongest bonding factor in society. As a result, it is an easy and expedient basis to build a political community. This is precisely because "it often provides the unconditional and blind support and loyalty of ethnic members who view themselves as family members" (Selassie, 2003).



Figure 3. Ethnic groups in 1963 and the Federal States Since 1995

Note. Deiwiks (2011, p, 92, 34), respectively.

Politicized ethnicity provides a sturdy foundation for a polity. Members of the ethnic-based polity have both political and ethnic goals. Their support for their ethnic party and its political programs stays unwavering because of perceived self-worth and freedom of building their own generational flourishing political community. As a result, politicizing ethnicity has been a laid-back mechanism of setting up a political society in multinational communities. Ethiopia is one of those multinational societies where an almost ethno-neutral trend of political orientation has been transformed radically and rapidly into affectionate, sentimental, and ethnocentric politics. Ethiopia further institutionalized such politics into ethnic-based federalism that inaugurated the Ethiopian Federation in 1995 with the adoption of a new Constitution.

Demarcation of states and administrative boundaries in Ethiopian federalism is based primarily on ethnolinguistic settlement patterns. Though there is no mention of ethnicity in the Constitution and so far the Ethiopian state and governments do not want to be identified as such, no one denies that it is the direct result of the national agenda of ethnically based party systems. The system evolved from an ethnic-based armed liberation struggle that toppled the central government in 1991. Under the *Derg* regime, ethnic identity was given minimal attention in public social relations. The public had begun not to mind the ethnicity of the person or the group of persons in social interactions. That indifference has been reversed since 1991. The victory of the national liberation armies (ethnic-based armies) over the centrist oriented unitary government and the consequent encouragement and organization of more ethnic-based political parties by the city-dwelling ethnic elites in the country resulted in the recognition of ethnicity both as to the mode of social life and politics in Ethiopia during the transitional period, 1991-1995. Such recognition of ethnicity at its deepest level downplayed other traditional identities in the country and raised it to the primary mode of social relations and political representation. Constituent states of the federation are formed based primarily on ethnonational identities.

Instrumentalization of Nationalism

The natural tendency of humans to associate primarily with their closest likes has taken a new shape and new dynamics in Ethiopia transforming the mode of social relations into national segregations. It is now not uncommon that national favoritism prevails in social associations, public organizations,

businesses, and varying partnership endeavors across Ethiopia with no exception. National identity now runs parallel to civic identity in Ethiopia. In the political sphere, it has built an impregnable curtain against a pan-Ethiopian political identity. Politics is no more viewed beyond one's own national identity or nationalism. The government and the ruling party have promoted "national" nationalism for over twenty years now. The ruling party (EPRDF) and the governments it formed have encouraged the formation of national political parties. A nation, a nationality, or a people that does not have a national political party designated to its name is considered not represented in the governments; and fallaciously presumed that its rights, therefore, are not respected fully. The priority, then, tend to be the formation of national parties that are divided and often in conflict with the few weak pan-Ethiopian parties because, in the eyes of the national parties, the pan-Ethiopian parties are centrists who work towards the return of the oppressive unitary government. It appears that the deep recognition of national identity has made the country irreversibly fractured along ethnic lines, making it impossible to rebuild the pan-Ethiopian political and national unity. The employment of nationality as the primary factor for the formation of the federation is argued to be the very threat to the functioning of the federal system (Negussie, 2006)

Thus, Ethiopian federalism has instrumentalized nationalism. It has done so in multiple ways. First, nationalism has become the primary marker of identity and organizing, and structuring factor of society. Second, it has transformed cultural identity into a political and national identity. Third, nationalism has become the main instrument of political mobilization and the sole basis of the federalization process. Fourth, nationalism has become the means of claiming equity. Fifth, nationalism has been transformed into social class identification. These instrumentalizations of nationalism in Ethiopia have not only started to shape public self-perceptions of citizens, in general, but also dominate the socio-political thoughts of both Ethiopian and non-Ethiopian scholars.

Group Rights Supersedes Individual Rights

Ethiopian federalism recognizes a wide array of individual rights commensurate with the international human rights conventions, international laws, and some good practices of liberal democracies. It lists the column of such rights in the Constitution. Throughout Articles 14-44, the Constitution deliberates on these rights. The Constitution also declares, "All

the sovereign power resides in the Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples of Ethiopia" (FDRE, 1995, p. 4). This means, even though individual rights are respected, it is the group rights (the rights of NNPs) that supersedes. In other words, it is the group (nation, nationality, or people) that is sovereign, not the individual.

A Hybrid Political Order

The Constitution establishes the FDRE as a hybrid political order. The Ethiopian federal system stands between the Federation and Confederation on one hand and between centralism and de-centralism on the other hand. FDRE is a federation because it has both federal and state structures where governments are elected directly in both cases, and both have joint authority over the citizens. The House of Federation is the representative of the sovereign NNPs of the federation. On the other hand, the Constitution also grants secession to the member states. The member states are free to leave the federation at any time, according to the procedure stipulated in the Constitution. The existence of the federal state is dependent on the willingness of the states to remain in the federation. Both theoretically and constitutionally, the federal government is weak and dependent by design. Moreover, the federal government is the government of the NNP, categorically than that of the citizen, directly. As such, the present Ethiopian political order is neither a federation nor a confederation. It is a hybrid political order formed based on pragmatic political solutions than theoretical wholesomeness. Therefore, Ethiopian federalism could be classified as a hybrid form of federalism with many characteristically Ethiopian features that, in structural terms, resemble other federations around the world (Keller, 2002). As a hybrid, it stands somewhere between classical federalism and confederation.

Asymmetrical, Except Politically

Ethiopian Federalism is politically symmetrical but highly asymmetrical in other aspects. Political symmetry has been achieved by design. The Constitution provides for it. According to the Constitution, all NNPs are equal and sovereign. More importantly, all the State Councils (state Parliaments), according to Article 50(3) of the Constitution, have equal

supreme powers and, as a Council, they have an equal vote in the federation. In other aspects, Ethiopian federalism is asymmetrical. Within the federal system, the states vary very significantly in their political readiness and competence, geographical size, population, level of economic development, modes of life, diversity of the nations, nationalities, and states, and endowment of natural resources. Oromia, Amhara, and Tigray states have demonstrated their political readiness and competence for effective self-rule. Other states have been in the guided process of developing their readiness and competence. The SNNP State has come a long way in this regard. Oromia State covers more than thirty-five percent of the total 1.12 million square kilometers of the geography of the federation while Harari State is only 340 square kilometers. The states of Amhara, Tigray, and Oromia were politically ready for self-rule while other states had to be mentored by the EPRDF and assisted by their neighboring Tigray, Amhara, or Oromia states to build political capacity to administer their affairs. The national population and housing census report of 2007 (FDRE Population Census Commission, 2008 (December)) shows that over twenty-seven million[24] people live in Oromia State while less than two-hundred-thousand people live in Harari State. The variation of the level of economic development among the states is significant. The periphery states are underdeveloped. Adverse climatic conditions have repeatedly affected Tigray and Somali states. Afar and Somali states have been inconvenient for a sedentary way of life that has been common in the highland states of Amhara and part of Oromia. The Tigray State was the most affected by the close to two-decade-long civil war. The states also greatly differ in the general mode of life of their population. In the states of Afar, Somali, Gambella, and parts of Oromia and SNNP States pastoralist mode of life dominates, while sedentary agrarian mode of life is predominant in the rest of the states. Some of the states have diverse nations, nationalities, and peoples. For example, the SNNP State is the hub of over forty-five different NNPs. Other states, like Tigray, Amhara, Oromia, Somali, and Afar, have one dominant ethnic group and minority nationalities or peoples. The states also vary significantly in their natural resources' endowment. The state of Oromia is the most endowed while the states of Tigray, Somali, and Afar are not so endowed. Yet, regardless of such variations (asymmetries), all states have equal political power conferred to them by the Constitution.

Anti-dictatorship Features

Ethiopian federalism has the feature of protecting its NNPs from the tyranny of dictatorship. The decentralization of power to regional states and the self-rule of the states within their own established cultural, linguistic, traditional, socio-economic, political, and modes of life gives little room for the authoritarian centralist tendency to dominate the states and raise itself to a tyrant dictator. The states have already built both the identity and the political power to easily resist and fend off any encroaching authoritarian tendency from the central government. The Constitution has conferred supreme power in the states to the Councils of the states in its article 50 (3). No federal tyrant can have authority over the states unless the State Councils allow it. This can be viewed as an anti-dictatorial feature built in the Ethiopian federal system. Nonetheless, the experience of the last decades also shows that a highly centralized dominant party system can influence the State Councils through the party structure to allow the central government to meddle with their affairs.

National Elitist's Influence

Having an inbuilt anti-dictatorial feature, however, does not mean that the elitism in the central government cannot adversely affect the autonomy of states. Since their very establishment, EPRDF elitists have muddled in the affairs of the states and dictated the regional states. These elites occupied the heart of the new federal system as its architects and builders. The prominent of these elitists have been the veterans of the TPLF guerrilla army and their closest circles. They have an extraordinarily strong feeling of ownership of the federal system. They show this sense of ownership in every way possible, and sometimes with dramatizations. Though the fact of the matter is evident that they had a very significant role in the leadership of the struggle against the socialist regime, their grip on the off-scene dictations on the affairs of the regional states to date is very much far away from their prime time of influence. Their influences are still visible particularly in Gambella, Benishangul-Gumuz, Afar, and Somalia states, which are the periphery states and have been identified as emerging states.

National Citizenship

Failed nation-state building projects and failed civic Ethiopian nationalisms during the imperial and socialist governments have led to the emergence of strong national (ethnonational) citizenship in Ethiopia. Since the formation of modern Ethiopia in the late 19th century, "Ethiopian" citizenship appears to have been reserved only for the Abyssinians. At times, it was used to refer only to Orthodox Christians. Other peoples of Ethiopia were not considered full Ethiopian citizens in the true sense of citizenship. Their differences from the Abyssinians were acknowledged both socially and politically. As soon as they were fully assimilated, i.e., spoke Amharic, became Tewahdo Christian, adopted Abyssinian culture and tradition, and actively engaged in the suppression of their original nationality, however, the non-Abyssinians could also become fully recognized as Ethiopians. Before that, the imperial state gave them the status of a second citizen and marginalized them systemically from the economic and political developments of the Empire. The *Atse* Haile Selassie I government tried to build some sort of unified and modern nation-state Ethiopian nationalism by introducing economic and political measures. He introduced some capitalistic modes of economic development that increased the economic participation of the citizens wherever some factories and farms were established, and trade started to flow in and out of the country and within the country. He also introduced a symbolic constitutional political order (constitutional monarchy) that granted Ethiopian citizenship to all the "subjects" of the Empire. The efforts, however, were too little and too late to spark a sense of common nationalism based on economic and political development and among the NNPs of the empire. After the removal of the *Atse* and the abolishment of the monarchy, the *Derg* regime imposed yet a new form of citizenship on the NNPs of the People's Republic of Ethiopia. It denied the diverse moral, religious, and cultural values of the society and replaced it with twisted centralized socialistic values of uniformity and political progressivism. The political elites promoted civic and communitarian nationalism as statist nationalism. This was in utter disregard to the emerging cultural nationalism among the Ethiopian NNPs of the Empire state. The goal was to build a unitary socialist political nationalism.

In present-day Ethiopia, in turn, the politics of nationalism has replaced the civic and communitarian nationalism that had begun to take root during the *Derg* regime. The imperial and socialist territorial conception of nationalism, based on common laws and shared Abyssinian culture and Abyssinian conception of "Ethiopian" nationalism, is no more an organizing

principle in the Ethiopian Federation. Instead, a new form of nationalism, which is based on native identities, the genealogy of descent, and the history of national self-determination struggles that have politicized nationalism and national territories, has become the new form of nationalism. National identities are serving as the basis of social structure and socio-political mobilization of the people. Since the introduction of nationalism as the primary social restructuring and socio-political mobilization tool in the Ethiopian political discourse, citizenship and nationalism have become highly contested political objects. If one asks Ethiopians who they are, people would first mention that they are from their state; not from "Ethiopia" and may mention Oromia, or Amhara, or Tigray, or Somali, or Harari, or Gambella, etc.; then, they would mention that they are Tigre, Oromo, Amhara, Guragie, Adere, Afar, Gumuz, Hadiyya, Konso, Kunama, Gedeo, etc.[25] The response could look like this: I am from Oromia, I am an Oromo or I am from South, I am Sidama. Some would mention that they are not Ethiopians voluntarily but *Somali,* or *Oromian*, or *Afari*, or *Tigraway*.[26] Yet, some others would mention, with a tone of detest, that they are not *Habasha*, if they are from outside of the historical Abyssinian territories, Abyssinia Proper. What is common among these peoples is that: their national citizenship supersedes their *Ethiopian nationalism*. The response from the historically Abyssinian territory would excitingly be the opposite.

The deep nationalization of politics in Ethiopian federalism has led to strong national nationalism, where people affiliate themselves primarily to ethic/national citizenship than to federal (national) citizenship. National citizenship has become a defining feature of Ethiopian federalism. Some scholars claim that the Ethiopian "legal structure of citizenship has been altered" (Smith, 2013, p. 45) after the introduction of national (ethnic) nationalism. Under Ethiopian federalism, every citizen is a national citizen. This citizenship appears in every local identification card issued by the state administrations. The dual citizenship concepts, common to the dual-mode of federal systems, where citizens primarily identify themselves as a citizen of the federal government (Ethiopian citizenship) and secondly as citizens of the state (national citizenship), are absent in Ethiopian federalism. The new orientation of national citizenship has produced a social and political outlook of narrow nationalism and national favoritism, both in the social, political, and economic spheres. The long-term implications of this orientation on the unity and sustainability of the federation, though needs an independent study, should not be overlooked.

Nation-State Homeland

The Ethiopian national (ethnonational) federalism borrows the idea of nation-state[27] constituted from a single national group that followed the French Revolution. The nationalism of the French Revolution lost its initial test, as many nations both in Europe and around the world became multi-national nations a century and a half later. As the idea of nation-state lost the taste in Europe, countries, both in Europe and around the world, became highly engaged in inventing a new form of national identity, constructed national identity. Globalization, with its diverse and far-reaching consequences, has ever placed the viability of the nation-state as a normative form of state in question. After globalization began to be a reality, social movements around the world have pushed the states to recognize their minority nations and acknowledge their multinational characteristics. This has given federation an advantage as the most accommodative form of state across the globalizing world.

In Ethiopia, the nationalism-based nation-state idea has gained momentum among some national groups like the Oromo, Tigre, Afar, and Sidama since the 1970s. It was first employed as a means of organization and mobilization of resistance to the assimilation policies of the imperial regime and later as an organizing unit for the national liberation struggles of nationalities. Such sub-national identification and mobilization gained momentum after the end of the Colonial Era in Africa. This impetus was put to a momentous end in 1995 by the constitutional entrenchment of the right to self-determination of the NNPs of Ethiopia. This has resulted in the formation of a "home state" for major national groups under the federal arrangement.

There is latent energy behind some of the states formed predominantly from one dominant national group, such as Tigray, Oromia, Amhara, Somali, and Afar state for aspiration for a national homeland (national nation-state), independent of the instrumentally constructed Ethiopian nationalism. Such states may see the current federal arrangement as a transition period to full their quest for independence. The underground ultra-secessionist activists both from the diaspora and from scholarly institutions at home have created strong aspirations of the historically aggrieved and politically informed national citizens to put their nationality first to their shadowy Ethiopian civic nationalism. The current state of the federation simply is the incubation time for total erosion of what the late Prime Minister (Meles Zenawi) and the architect of the Federation once referred to as "benefit of Ethiopia-nism,"

which he had been purporting as the key to maintain Ethiopian unity voluntarily.

For the moment, however, the promise of Ethiopian federalism for the rights of self-determination of its nation, nationalities, and peoples is unlikely to materialize. The full realization of the right to self-determination, aware of the constitutional entrenchment of the right, could produce around eighty states in the federation. Pragmatically, this is impossible. In the present federation, there exist multiple nations without states than those, which have one. On the other hand, Negussie (2006) and Fessha, (2010) recommend the division of the most populous and the largest states like Oromia, Amhara, and Somali into several provincial states, based on historical and fiscal administrative factors. Such a recommendation not only lacks both constitutional and pragmatic ground in the current affairs of the federation but also its primary target is Oromia, and its underlying motive is weakening Oromo nationalism which has been competing with Ethiopian nationalism for over a century.

The aspiration for a national homeland remains a politically dynamic and pragmatically compromising piece on the constitutionally entrenched rights of self-determination of NNPs of Ethiopia. This makes the quest of all NNPs to realize their national self-determination within and without Ethiopia as the probability that would only be realized fully in the distant future and a much-developed federal political culture, institutions, and stronger identity. These should be coupled with economic development and population growth that would sustain the first internal self-determination of NNPs in Ethiopia and then the formation of an independent national homeland for every NNP. In other words, the national independence of the Ethiopian nations will remain "either unattractive or unattainable" (Burgess, 2012a, p. 24).

A Work in Progress

Ethiopian federalism is a work in progress. It is halfway in the realization of the rights of the nations, nationalities to self-determination. In the following paragraphs, I shall explain the reasons why Ethiopian federalism is an ongoing process.

The promotion of nationality politics is yet to achieve its ultimate targets. The political awareness of the self, the political organization of NNP, the rights to equality, and the indoctrination of the people with national politics have been achieved fully. By now, there is no one, mindful of the

politics, and not fully aware of their national belongingness in Ethiopia. The mode of political organization in the country has changed, apparently irreversibly, following a radical move that not only fully recognized sub-national nationalism as the national political framework and constituent polity but also as the source of sovereignty. Nationalism, therefore, has become not only the clustering factor of the polity for the rights granted by the Constitution, both to individuals and groups but also the *Leviathan* that stands for the protection of the freedom and sovereignty of the people. Yet, many nations, nationalities, and peoples are demanding their constitutional rights to self-determination, particularly for internal self-determination.

The rights to equality, except for economics and infrastructure, have been advanced. Since the ratification of the Constitution, equality has been, in principle, reflected in the full and free exercise of the freedoms to language, culture, tradition, religion, customs, and way of life of the nations, nationalities, and peoples. It is also reflected in political representation in the House of Federation, the equal power of the states, the local self-rule through democratic, fair and free elections, equal access to the federal and regional government services, and the universal equality of persons in the federation. Economic equality, i.e., fair distribution of economic resources and basic infrastructure, is yet to be achieved. As a result, disadvantaged nations, nationalities, and peoples have continued to be economically marginalized in the federation.

Political indoctrinations have not yet produced the necessary clarity in Ethiopia. The indoctrination works on national politics have been practiced aggressively both by the federal and the state governments and the nation-based political parties across the country. It has been implemented at all ends and through all means, often accompanied by an exaggerated dramatization and with a mix of party politics, government functions, and state structures. The indoctrination has contributed to the deepening of long existed confusion on the distinction between the ruling party, the government, and the states, particularly among the politically less informed and less instructed Ethiopians.

The right to self-determination is in the first stages of the lengthy process. The unconditional right to self-determination, up to secession, is guaranteed by the Constitution. This makes Ethiopia the first country in Africa to openly recognize such rights in its Constitution. Practically, however, even the precursor to self-determination, the national state formation, has been realized fully only by the dominant nations. The reasonableness of granting every national group the right to self-determination is still a challenge. Consequently, the quest for self-

determination by willing nations has been kept on hold. It is often pegged into a superficial and implausibly substitutive granting of self-rule under a bogus and an appeasing name of Special *Zone, Special Wareda,* or *Nationality Administrations* under the established national regional states. Hardly any of these regional states themselves have yet fully gained real for their self-rule.

The central government, though constitutionally limited, is dominating the states in practice. The states have little practical contribution and participation in the making of national policies and strategies. Such key national powers have been retained in the hands of the veteran revolutionary elites of the ruling party, mainly that of TPLF. These elites have developed an adulation of the cult of survivor instinct and existentialism. They pared and paired their survival and the survival of the Tigray people with not only unflinchingly holding on to the central state power but also with continued and sustained dominance in the ruling party that has been in power for over two decades. The mechanism has been through the control of the national policies and strategies that they have continually skewed to their private and ethnonational interests. This group aspires to transform its dominance in the political arena to be an incontestable economic arena in the federation and the Horn of Africa. They are primarily interested in building a haven from the self-induced "existential threats" and help themselves and their state keep their hegemonies for generations. Mostly attributable to these selfish tendencies of the TPLF elites and the nature and the structural organization of the ruling party, the rights of the state to have commensurate contributions in the development of federal policies and strategies have remained constrained.

In general, not because of legal impediments but because of administratively induced constraints and self-interested veteran political elects, the Ethiopian federalism has remained as a work in process with regards to ensuring reasonable participation of the states in the making of federal policies and strategies.

Irregular Representation by MPs

In the Ethiopian federation, the House of Peoples Representative (the federal parliament) is the lower of the two Houses. It has 548 seats. This may expand by a few seats. MPs are elected from the constituencies in a *first-past-the-post* election system. The population that MPs represent in their constituencies however varies from one state to another state and from city government to city government. For example, an MP from Oromia or Afar

State or Somali State represents twice the population that an MP from Benishangul-Gumuz or Harari state represents. Also, the Somali people are the most underrepresented, followed by peoples of Dire Dawa City, Afar State, and Oromia State in that order. It is also a matter of curiosity to wonder why the MPs from Tigray State are ten more than that of Somali state when the population of the two states is very close. One also notes that even though the population of the Somali State is close to twice that of the Addis Ababa City Government, the two are represented by an equal number of MPs. Similarly, even though the population of Harari State is close to one-half of that of Dire Dawa, both are represented by two MPs. Table 8 illustrates this unjustifiable variation based on old census data from 2007.

Table 8

Number of MPs and Population per MPs

States and Cities	(MPs)	Population (P)	(P)/(MP)
Afar State	9	1,411,092	156,788
Amhara State	138	17,214,056	124,740
Benishangul-Gumuz State	9	670,847	74,539
Gambella State	3	306,916	102,305
Harari State	2	183,344	91,672
Oromia State	178	27,158,471	152,576
SNNP State	123	15,042,531	122,297
Somali State	23	4,439,147	193,006
Tigray State	38	4,314,456	113,538
Addis Ababa City Government	23	2,738,248	119,054
Dire Dawa City Administration	2	342,827	171,414

Note. Compiled based on CSA Summary Statistical Report (CSA, December 2007) and the number of MPs from the constituent units of the federation

Non-judiciary Constitutional Interpretation

Representatives of the nations, nationalities, and peoples of Ethiopia constitute the House of Federation (HF). They stand for the respective NNPs from which they are elected or appointed, not necessarily for the

peoples of the federation in general. Every nation, nationality, and people have at least one representative. Also, the NNPs who have a larger population have a greater number of representations per added one million of their population. Whenever a new national group wins the political bid of representation, based on the criterion of being a distinct nationality or people, the overall number of the members of the HF would increase accordingly.

According to the Constitution, the State Councils have the right to appoint or to organize an election of members to the House of Federation. In practice so far, the former, rather than the latter, the approach has been predominant. This has given the impression that the post in the House of Federation is a position acquired by an appointment than an election. Appointments have been made from the members of the ruling party of the state, which have been either the giant members of EPRDF that represent over ninety percent of the population base in Tigray, Oromia, Amhara, and SNPR states or the minority satellite parties, proxies of EPRDF, in Gambella, Benishangul, Afar, Somali, and Harari states. As a result, the House of Federation, under the EPRDF, has been just another party convention that takes place twice a year instead of once every five years.

The House of Federation is vested with the power to interpret the Constitution. According to Article 62(1) of the Constitution, the House of Federation is given the power to interpret the Constitution. Many consider this non-judiciary constitutional interpretation as unusual (Mgbako, Braasch, Degol, Morgan, Segura, & Tezera, 2008; Aalen, 2006, 2011; Balcha 2009; Beken, 2007; Debelo, 2012). The House of Federation has the power to interpret the Constitution through the institutional mechanism of the Constitutional Inquiry Commission. Its interpretation is political than legal. The Commission replaced the constitutional court in other federal systems. Compared to such a house in other federations, the Ethiopian House of Federation is, to use Burgess's phrase, "unique in both its role and its composition" (Burgess, 2012a, p. 31). Because the Constitution, also, to be the master law of the land, is a binding political pact among the NNPs who have formed the federation, the role of interpreting the Constitution is given to the House of Federation. The underlying notion for this has been that the federation is a deal among the NNPs of Ethiopia who knows the most of what they have agreed and what is best for them: they only should be the ones who could give interpretations of their agreement whenever one is needed. This means the interpreters would follow the originalist theory of constitutional interpretation. Based on this notion, the proponents argue that it would be wrong, in principle, to allow a few judges or groups of judges to interpret such a pact. They further argue that multinational federal constitutions, in general, must be interpreted by representatives of the

constituent members of the federation, not by a group of judges. The ruling party that introduced the Constitution, EPRDF, boldly suggests that the Ethiopian model of constitutional interpretation could be an adaptable mode for all multinational federations around the world.

The political interpretation of the Constitution has de-emphasized the legal aspect of the Constitution and emphasized the political aspect of it. There is no other mechanism that could check whether the laws that are passed by the parliament are consistent with the Constitution. The single-party dominated experience of the house of people's representatives has a history of passing all proposed bills by the very centralized and dominating executive with little or no debate, despite the oftentimes bitter criticism from the minority opposition party members on constitutional breach of such laws. The House of Federation has not been interested in crosschecking the breach of the Constitution. Because members of the same political party, the ruling party, dominate both the house of people's representative and the house of the federation and the two houses work in party conformity, it is highly unlikely that any issue arouses any kind of debate between the two houses. It has been busy checking the political meanings and implications of the laws. Its primary purpose has been the maintenance of the political *status quo* and the established model of the relationship of the federation.

The little influence of the House of Federation is on the federal grant formula debate among the states and the resolution of the interstate dispute and conflict. On the former, in its symbolic bi-annual session, the House of Federation debates the basis of sharing of the federal grant among the states. Because it is an issue of sharing of the scarce capital in an annual budgetary supplement from the rich federal treasury, the debate often brings into motion the representatives of the NNPs where everyone wishes to maximize its gain under partly mechanistic budget formulae. On the latter, the house plays an arbitration role in disputes and conflicts between and among the NNPs. The disputes and conflicts between the members of the federation have been related less to political identity but more to border skirmishes. The conflicts have been national and sub-national conflicts but connected to borders, resources, or culture than politics. The House of Federation has played its role in mitigating the disputes and supplying tentative administrative solutions to border disputes.

Other than these little influences, the House of Federation has no legislative role. It has neither legislative power nor the power to have an oversight of the laws. This has earned it the nickname *Tirs-alba Mikir-bet* – the toothless house.

Parliamentarian System, Presidential Powers

Ethiopian federalism has instituted a parliamentary system of government where party-appointed Prime Minister has powers similar to the president of a presidential system. The government in Ethiopian federalism is officially a parliamentarian system. However, it vests traditionally presidential powers on a parliamentarian Prime Minister. The prime minister has enormous powers, a combination of powers of the head of state and head of government. The PM has nearly all the extensive powers that a president can have in the presidential system and enjoys all the defused responsibilities in a parliamentary system. As a result, the president of the Federation is only a symbolic head of state, with no executive power but ceremonial duties. The PM is not elected by the people or by the MPs. The leader of the simple majority party in the HPR becomes a PM. In case there is no single majority, the leader of the coalition of parties that has the mandate to form the government becomes the PM. The members of the HPR are requested to approve the choice of the PM.

Two Types of Local Governments

Ethiopian federalism allows the formation of local government in two ways: through the self-determination of minority NNPs within a majority in multi-national states that are dominated by one major nation and through decentralization of state powers to sub-state districts in nearly homogenous or mono-national states. The former is a result of political remedy to the right of self-administration based on Article 39 and Article 47(2) of the federal Constitution, while the latter is administrative compartmentalization of the State into manageable districts based on Article 50(4) of the Constitution.

The local governments that are formed through the self-determination of minorities are unique. They have the constitutional rights to develop the identity, including language, culture, and traditions of the nationality independent of the state. Such local governments are named special districts or special administrative districts. The special districts could be *zones* (like Oromo Nation Nationality Special Zone), Agew People Special Zone (Awi Zone), and the newly instituted Kimant People Special Zone in Amhara State), *Wareda*, or cities. The Special Zones, the Special *Wareda*, and City governments are semi-autonomous polities within the state where they are formed, or in the case of Federal Cities, they are chartered. The SNNP State has the largest number of *Special Waredas*. The presence of such local

government in the states has given the impression that the multiple states resemble a federal state within a federation because it encompasses multiple such local autonomous governments.

Table 9
Types of administrative units in the Ethiopian Federation

Type of admin. units	Examples
Dominant nations national state	Afar, Amhara, Oromia, Somali, Tigray
False dominant national state	Harari State
Duo-national state	Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella (Nuer and Anyuak)
Special state	Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' State
Mono national Zones	Sidama, Hadiyya, Gurage, Silte, Gedeo, Wolaita, etc.
Directional Zones	East Shewa Zone, South Tigray Zone, West Harargie Zone, South Gondar Zone, West Wallagga Zone, South Omo Zone, etc.
Number zones	Zone 1, Zone 2, Zone 3, Zone 4 in Afar State
Duo-national Zones	Gamo-Goffa, Kaffa-Shakka, Bench-Maji, Kembata-Tembaro,
Special Zones	Oromo Nation Nationality Zone, Awi Zone, Wag Hemra Zone, Qimant Special Zone in Amhara State, and Oromia Special Zone Surrounding Finfinnee (Addis Ababa) in Oromia State
Multi-national Zone	South Omo Zone, North Omo Zone
Special Waredas	Alaba, Amaro, Basketo, Burji, Dirashe, Konso, Konta, and Yem (in SNNP State); Argoba (in Afar State); Argoba (in Amhara State); Mao-Komo and Pawe (in Benishangul-Gumuz);
Multinational city administrations	Addis Ababa City, Dire Dawa City

The extreme case in point is the SNNP state. There are more than 56 NNPs in the state with only five of them having populations of more than one million while thirty of them have less than 100,000 people (CSA, 2007).

It has thirteen Zones and seven Special *Waredas*. Because of its highest number of special *Waredas*, it has the largest autonomous local self-administering governments. The state council has an assembly of the representative of the NNPs of the state, which has a similar function as the House of Federation at the federal level. The Special *Waredas* have equivalent representations and political powers as the Zones in the Council. The South Omo Zone is the most diverse Zone of the most diverse state of the federation. More than half of the NNPs of the SNNP state are found in this Zone. As the SNNP state is a federal state in the Ethiopian Federation, the South Omo is its equivalent in the SNNP state. In other words, it is a Zone of multiple NNPs within the federal state of multiple NNPs within the Ethiopian Federation. Table 9 illustrates the types of administrative units in the Ethiopian Federation.

Local governments that are formed through the decentralization of state power are regular. Their purpose is to allow the people to administer themselves in their localities by devolving the state power. Such administrative districts are Zones, Waredas, Cities, or Sub-cities. Administrative boundaries are marked conventionally based on natural and manufactured landmarks. In Ethiopian federalism, the Zones are intermediaries between the state government and the local government. Both have elected Council, which has the supreme authority. The former has an overarching power over the latter, the likes of which the federal government has over the state governments. The Wareda Councils have similar power, as the State Councils have in the federation.

Centralized Government and Party System

Ethiopian federal government and its inter-sates relations are managed mainly through the "extra-constitutional mechanism" of a highly centralized party system and structure (Negussie, 2006). The party that wins the simple majority votes on the national election constitutes the federal government. To win the simple majority votes, the contending party must win a national election in one of the two most populous states and multiple less populous states. To do so, it must have representations across the country and cultures and languages. Hence, it must be a multi-national (a coalition of parties) or a pan-Ethiopian party. However, the present political system and partly the Constitution do not encourage the formation of pan-Ethiopian parties because every nation, nationality, and people has its party and political

interests among them are highly diverse. The remaining possibility, therefore, is the formation of a coalition of national parties.

Unfortunately, the possibility to win majority votes by forming a new coalition under the current Constitution would be very slim. The EPRDF has monopolized such national parties. It has such parties representing over ninety percent of the people of the federation. The remaining parties have allied with EPRDF and they effectively serve as its satellite parties in the marginal Gambella, Benishangul-Gumuz, Harari, Somali, and Afar states. Consequently, the centralized party mechanism governs the state governments than constitutional mechanisms, and the institutional frameworks of the federal government are designed or bent to implement more of the party mechanism than the Constitution.

Ethiopian federalism and the institutional framework of EPRDF, particularly its 'democratic centralism' are interwoven intricately in such a way that the distinction between the party and the state is blurred. The institutional framework has developed a strong executive with a little check and balance mechanism and the party system, particularly the nature of the ruling party featuring "democratic centralism" and "upward responsibility" in its internal organization together with the blurred distinction between the party and state has made the Ethiopian federal system highly centralized (Aalen, 2011). The democratic centralism of the EPRDF party system is similar to the "principles of democratic centralism" for "the organization and the functioning of the organs of the state" of the former socialist government of the *People's* Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.

The two are the same, both in their source and in their purpose--Marxist-Leninist ideology and authoritarian control respectively. The slightest difference is that EPRDF uses it primarily for party administration purposes while the socialist regime tried to restructure the state with it as a new political system for the new social order it intended to build. Article 4 of the 1987 Socialist constitution preserved the meaning and the application of "democratic centralism" for "organs of state" (Proclamation No. 1 of 1987). The two sub-articles of the Article read:

> 1. In the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, the organization and functioning of the organs of the state are based on the principles of democratic centralism.
>
> 2. All organs of state power, from the lowest to the highest, shall be established by the election. The organs of the state power shall exercise centralism and local initiative. Decisions of higher organs shall be executed by lower organs.

It only takes the faint effort of replacing the "state organ" with "party" to see how it is working in EPRDF and replacing "People's Democratic Republic" with "Federal Democratic Republic" to comprehend how the one-party (EPRDF) led government has centralized state power in the federation. Manifestly, neither the highly centralized state structure nor the one-party dominated system of the government of the socialist dictatorship of Mengistu Haile-Mariam has changed.

Democratic centralism is an idea borrowed from the Marxist-Leninist centralized party governance system initially by MLLT and later by the coalition built by MLLT-TPLF, the EPRDF. Lenin first used the idea to denote party democracy with a strict structural hierarchy for decision-making in the party and "strict secrecy and strict discipline subject to the central leadership of the communist party" (Ostrom, 1991, pp. 8-9). Ideally, it is a party system where democracy and control are exercised in the vanguard party. Free and open discussions are allowed but decisions are taken with the majority vote. Once the simple majority in the party has decided all members of the party and the public are obliged to follow because the vanguard party believes that the majority in the party knows all the best for every citizen. The implementation of such a decision of the party could be on a directive on national policy (a development program, a reform, for example), that is highly structured and organized with a strict restraint. The purpose is to keep the centrality of powers and decisions. Also, it advocates for the strict execution of orders of the party leader by the subordinates with strict hierarchical order and discipline.

EPRDF employs democratic centralism as a mechanism of suppression of internal descent and hierarchical control of the coalition of the national parties that it has created. Berhe (2009), pointing out an example where evidently court rulings have been reversed several times by the order of the TPLF/EPRDF chairperson, the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, claims that EPRDF also controls and sometimes orders the branches of the government (the judiciary, the executive, and the legislature) on behalf of the assembly of NNPs. This is in the same way that the leader of EPRDF has been controlling the member parties and their respective leaders with the principle of democratic centralism.

Ethiopian federalism has instituted a very powerful executive branch of government. The executive of the federal government is composed of the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers is answerable to the Prime Minister, who has more power than a Prime Minister can have in other federal systems. The Council of Ministers has the constitutional right according to article 77(6) of the Constitution to "formulate and implement economic, social, and development policies and

strategies." The state government must implement these policies and strategies uniformly. This makes the economic, social, and development activities in the country centrally planned and centrally directed. The Council of Ministers also sets national standards in health, education, and development. The ministries support an elevated level of uniformity throughout the country. This uniformity of operations and standards has centralized the executive powers of the state's corresponding bureaus in the federal executive. This is what could be called a single template approach to government activities in all sectors across all the regional states. It offers no opportunity for the state executives to do the business of their governments their way. As I have mentioned above, it deprives the states of having contributions in the making of the national policies and strategies.

Ethiopian federalism makes the federal government a cash-king. The federal government takes the lion's share of the national revenue. This has made the states highly dependent on federal government grants for their annual budgets. This dependency incapacitates the states and reduces them to the level of perceiving themselves as serving as administrative agents for the federal government. The situation is worse in the states that have economic disadvantages or have not yet developed their revenue sources. These states are known as emerging states. The Council of Ministers, which draws and implements the annual budget of the nation, therefore has a very significant role in centralizing the budget system and its allocation in collaboration with the House of Federation, which determines the federal government grants sharing formula.

Ethiopian federalism is designed to favor a centralized dominant party system. The party system is another factor that has contributed to the centralization of powers in the federal system. In Ethiopian federalism, as I have mentioned earlier, the party which is most likely to win the national election and hence form the federal government should be based in most or all states. Besides, it should be organized in a hierarchy of upward responsibility. Such precedence in multi-state entails the need to form a coalition from state-based parties because the party system has been organized as such because of the new political culture of the national orientation. To increase the prospect of winning a national election at the federal level, parties must grow their representations and cover multiple states, if not all. It is, therefore, necessary for such parties to have an internal system of "democratic centralism" where the coalition of parties shares the leadership of the coalition democratically and the practice of the centralism puts the leader of the coalition of the parties at the central hierarchy where leaders of member parties report upwards, at least nominally.

The only party that is fit for this system so far has been the EPRDF, a coalition of TPLF, OPDO, ANDM (formerly EPDM), and SEPDM (formerly SEPDF). A coalition of national parties from four major states, which cover about ninety percent of the total Ethiopian population, has been enjoying both systematic and absolute dominance particularly since the inclusion of the SEPDM, an SNNP party transformed from SEPDF. The SEPDF[28] is a coalition of smaller parties in the SNNP State. Such a party system has a strong centralizing effect. This is because it denies any regional party the opportunity to win the national election. Also, it dries up the national support base for bigger parties to form and challenge the ruling party. In other words, its economics of size and economics of representation are the sources of it as monopoly power, which defend it from new entry.

Yet, there is no significant institutional check and balance between the executive and the legislature. The HPR, to which the prime minister is answerable and the prime minister's office are regulated only with the parliamentary principle of regular reporting and answering questions in its sessions. Due to the design of the party system, the ruling party has been enjoying an absolute majority in the parliament for two decades since the ratification of the federal Constitution. Besides, the majority of the ministers have been members of the parliament who are also members of the council of ministers. Their influence in the parliaments has been adding more power for the executive as they have been defending the executive in the legislature and have been playing the role of head leadership to their fellow members of the parliament who have been rubber-stamping the executive in all the cases. The minority opposition groups in the legislature have had pointed out the free ringing of the executive but so far, they have not produced enough voice to alter the *status quo*.

Under such circumstances and with such power and a central party system, the executive branch of Ethiopian federalism has contributed to the development of a highly centralized federal system. This gives the federal executive an extraordinarily strong power to dominate the state government and highly centralize the affairs of the states at the federal level.

Managed Self-determination

Even though Ethiopian federalism has guaranteed the right to self-determination of all NNPs, in practice so fat that right has been managed carefully. Ethiopian federalism, under its vanguard party (EPRDF), has carefully managed the demand of nationalities to self-determination. Aalen

(2011) notes that "using ethnicity as an instrument to promote unity while at the same time defining ethnic groups primordially" (pp. 38, 39) has helped EPRDF to manage national diversity for the end goal of unity and integration in sharp contradiction to the right of self-determination granted in the Constitution. This, however, has not been without a cost. Such a reserved approach to the implementation of the constitutionally entrenched rights of the NNPs to self-determination has resulted in damaging conflicts, particularly where such rights have been kept on hold or denied systematically.

The Danger of Secession in the Name of Self-determination

In Ethiopian federalism, there is a clear danger of the promotion of secession in the name of self-determination. Self-determination and secession have been promoted intentionally as equal and mutually interchangeable concepts. Besides, the Constitution gives the impression that secession is a sub-set of self-determination. Article 39(1) of the Constitution declares, "Every Nation, Nationality, and People in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession." Self-determination is emphasized to include its extreme application of secession. Besides, the process of self-determination of nationalities and peoples in the federal state, self-government, is almost the same as the national self-determination, secession, from the federation.

Such unconditional right to self-determination encourages the NNPs to actively seek secession unless they find *the sustainable* benefit of being in the federation than the benefit of leaving the federation. Particularly for beginner federations like the Ethiopian Federation, where the socio-economic and politico-cultural development varies widely among the NNPs, it remains to be very difficult for the federal government to maintain this ever-shifting and very sophisticated act of balancing of benefits.

The federal government, so far, has managed to hold the NNPs of the federation together. It has done so only temporarily through the policy of fairness and the promise of equitable development whereby the resources scarce and relatively underdeveloped states are benefiting through economic leverage, including federal government budgetary subsidies, at the expense of the relatively advanced and resourceful states. The most negatively affected state in the process has been the largest (in area and population) and the most

resourceful state, Oromia State. This appears to be a temporary "forced" mechanism used by the federal government in contradiction to the genuine principle of Ethiopian federalism. The federal government has come up with the tactical source of legitimacy to do so under the newly emerging economic ideology of "developmental state" particularly since 2006 and its vaguely defined political ideology of "revolutionary democracy" and its party structure of "democratic centralism" of the party since the formation of EPRDF[29]. In other words, the balance of benefit of being in the federation has been maintained against the balance of benefit of being out of the federation by exception and contradiction than by norm and principles of federalism. This, on the other hand, can be seen as the direct effect of the consequences of equating secession and self-determination.

Conflicts and Suspended Conflicts

There have been inter-nation and inter-state conflicts in Ethiopia since the formation of the federation. In contrast to the relatively homogeneous and well-structured national regional states, "conflicts have been violent and widespread in the multi-ethnic regions" (Temesgen, 2015, p. 51) such as SNNP, Benishangul-Gumuz, and Gambella states. There were multiple deadly conflicts in SNNP State. The conflict between Dirashe and Gauwada is one such example. In Benishangul-Gumuz State, there has been increased conflict between the indigenous people and the settlers. The Amhara, Oromo, Shinasha, and Tigre are the settlers. The Berta, Gumuz, Mao, Kwama, Gwama, and Shita are the indigenous people. Such conflict has also been common in Gambella State. There have been large-scale inter-nation conflicts in the state between the Anyuak and Nuer since the early 2000s. The tension between the two has remained high for decades. The Anyuak also had a conflict with Mezengir. Similarly, intra-national conflicts have occurred in most of the pastoralist states of Oromia, Afar, Somali, Gambella, Benishangul-Gumuz, and SNNP states over natural resources like water and grazing land. Inter-state conflicts have, however, been more frequent. Conflicts between the Borana Oromo in Oromia State[30] and Somali clans of Ethiopian Somali State, the Borana Oromo of Oromia State and Konso of SNNP State, Gumuz of Benishangul-Gumuz State and the Wallagga Oromo in north-western Oromia State, the Guji Oromo of Oromia State and Burji of SNNP State in south-central Ethiopia, the Borana Oromo in Oromia State and Gedeo People in SNNP State, and between Afar clans of Afar State and

Ethiopian Somali clans of Ethiopian Somali State in border districts in the eastern part of the country have been inter-state conflicts.

Conflicts have been common throughout the history of the country but an increasing number of them have become aggravated conflicts. They are not primarily the result of the introduction of the federal system as advocates of the unitary state system have argued[31]. The majority of these inter-nation conflicts across the country, however, are attributed to the policy of national federalism. The formation of the federation certainly avoided large-scale national conflicts, in other words, civil wars. However, there are yet areas where the federation is not immune to small-scale conflicts that emerge from disputes on economic resource sharing and political power-sharing. Highly decentralized conflicts in a country with an underdeveloped socio-economic situation and a newly emerging democracy, like the Ethiopian Federation, such conflicts can be expected in the future. Nevertheless, it is also undeniable that increased politicization of nationality and its use as a basis for state formation and claims to the national resources based on national identity has aggravated the intensity of some of such conflicts.

Ethiopian federalism also faces the danger of multiple suspended conflicts. The forceful suppression of grievances by the federal government and the dominant party system can only suspend conflicts. At the early stage of the formation of the federation, there were many inter-nation conflicts on boundary-related claims. It was the time when every state wanted to maximize its territory[32]. Gradually, however, such conflicts were suspended. This was not because the risk of conflict decreases if the boundaries approach a state of perfect congruence with sub-state boundary and national group settlement (Deiwiks, 2011). It was because of the suppression of the marginal rights of such affected people by the federal government led by a dominant party that has ever been in power since the introduction of the national federal system. Such suspended conflicts include, but are not limited to, the claim of Amhara States on Wolkayit and Tsegede districts of Tigray State, the claim of Somali State on East Harargie Zone of Oromia State and parts of Zone 1 and Zone 3 of Afar State, the claim of Oromia State on Siti, Fafen, Nogob, Liben Zone of Somali State, Gedeo Zone of SNNP State, Wollo Zones of Amhara State, southern part of South Tigray Zone of Tigray State, Kemashi Zone of Benishangul-Gumuz State, and Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa City governments, to mention some. Such suspended conflicts have the potential to erupt to violence someday, aggravated by the ethnonational competitive spirit induced by Ethiopian federalism.

Federalism is not a guaranty to avoid conflict but to manage it. Yet, it is only one of the mechanisms to manage conflicts. The very survival of

federal systems depends on their effectiveness to mitigate and manage conflicts. Federal systems thrive "not because they have eliminated conflict, but because they have managed it" (Watts cited in Hale, 2004, p. 172). The key to a federal system to mitigate and manage conflicts lies in its democratic and participatory process of governance. Because the federal government of the Ethiopian Federation so far has reserved the democratization process and has systematically suspended several border-related conflicts, it is far too vague to see the prospect of effective management of conflict in Ethiopian federalism.

Federalism of National Parties

Ethiopian federalism appears to be federalism of parties than that of states. From the point of view of the history of the formation of the federation, it appears that the driving force of the federation was more of the agreement of the members of the EPRDF than the agreements among the nations, nationalities, and peoples of Ethiopia or their respective governments. The formation of the federation as it has become had been the political conviction of EPRDF. This is the main reason why the Constitution itself is considered by some scholars as a political pact between the parties than among the NNPs. The TPLF dominated EPRDF appears to have transformed the pact that took place mainly among its members and its affiliates to a form of federation that has been given an appearance of a federation of governments of existed states. Besides, the state governments were set up during the TGE, which was dominated heavily by the EPRDF. However, even the governments of the key states to the formation of the federation (Oromia, Amhara, SNNP, and Tigray) had less practical and political powers than the parties that represented them in EPRDF. Indeed, states, which did not have representation in EPRDF, were dictated by TPLF/EPRDF. The 1995 Constitution that formally established the federation only recognized the nine national states and the two chartered city governments but all NNPs, including those which could evolve new.

Constitutionalized Political Participation

Ethiopian federalism has instituted political participation of nations, nationalities, and peoples. The Constitution requires the political

participation of all the NNPs of the federation. Except few, these nations, nationalities, and peoples are formerly ethnic societies. Only a few of them fulfil the formal and broader definition of a nation. Yet, all of them have vanguard political parties which are recognized in the political arena as legitimate representatives and hence ensure the political participation of the respective NNP. This was following the constitutional recognition of the rights of self-determination of NNPs, including secession. The Constitution, thus, indirectly transformed the sub-national minority societies into national polities through the instrument of political parties formed in the name of the NNPs to advance their constitutional rights. Hence, it increased political participation by constitutionalizing minorities' rights via the rather than by the formal democratization process.

Summary

Multiple unique and ordinary features characterize Ethiopian federalism. It is radical and pioneering in constituting the unconditional rights of self-determination, including secession, with minimal procedural conditions. It also constitutionalized the political participation of NNPs as they are the sovereign bodies of the federation. In theory, it equates secession to self-determination. This has posed the danger of secession by the name of self-determination. In practice, however, it has been managing self-determination carefully. It is yet a federalization in progress. It is a federation based solely on confessed identity, which, in most cases, is national identity. It is based on the primordial orientation of nationality that has been turned in to instrument for demanding socio-political rights by ethnic nationalist. As such, it is a federation founded on the instrumentalization of nationalism. This is the reason some national groups have a national homeland (nation-state homeland). The federation also tries to entertain both individual and group-based rights, though with a clear inclination to the latter. It is a kind of hybrid system. It is asymmetrical, except politically. The representation of the people by MPs is also irregular across the states. It also has attempted to build anti-dictatorship features in the federal system but with little success so far because of the authoritarian nature of the ruling party. The overt and covert influences of national elites are commonplace in the federation. National citizenship has become an undercurrent to Ethiopian citizenship. Few ethnic nationalists prefer their national nationality to precede their Ethiopian nationality. The upper house of the federation is the House of Federation. It, however, has no legislative power but the power to interpret

the Constitution politically. The federal and the state governments are organized in the parliamentarian system but the Prime Minister has some powers that are more associated with the presidential system. Besides, states have two types of local governments: one formed because of internal self-determination, the other because of decentralization. Both the governments and the ruling party operate with the principle of democratic centralism, a centralized top-down approach. The federation, so far, appears to be a federation of the national ruling parties than a federation of state. This is associated with the process of its formation. The right to political participation of NNPs is constitutionally entrenched rather than democratically reached. Overall, Ethiopian federalism is unique: it is inimitable.

Notes to Chapter 5

[24] Other sources claim that the Oromo population is about half of the Ethiopian population, over 40 million, and its territorial size is 600,000km2 (Mole, 2014, p. 24).

[25] Unlike in Ethiopia, in other federations, for example in the USA, the citizens first would tell you they have a country called America and they are American; then, they would tell you their origin.

[26] Similar tendencies are observed in other federations. In Canada, a growing number of Quebec residents identify with Quebec more than with Canada. Only half of Quebecers are "proud to be Canadian" (Seymour, 2004, p. 15). In Spain, Catalonia, and the Basque, in the UK the Scots and the Irish identify themselves more with their nationality than the federation.

[27] Based on whether it was driven by the national identity or the political state, Michel Seymour (2004).holds that two types of nation-states come into being through two different processes of "nation-state building" and "state-nation building" (p. 3). The former brings about "ethnic" nation-states while the latter brings about a "civic" nation-state. He gave Germany and France as an example respectively (Seymour, 2004, p. 3).

[28] It is constituted from movements, organizations, and fronts of the southern Ethiopian Bench, Burji, Shekicho, Sidama, Tembaro, Wolaita, Yem, Dirashe, Donga, Dawro, Gamo, Gedeo, Gurage, Hadiyya, Kore, Kebena, Kembata, Konso, and other southern Omo people's. It is a coalition of many ethnic "parties." These parties are formed as a front for a strategic reason and under the heavy influence of TPLF.

[29] This argument has been put forward in 2015 with an excuse under the condition of strategic planning of industrial development in African countries with supporting pragmatic evidence from the Experiences of Ethiopia in selected industries by Oqubay (2015), one of the TPLF core leaders for the last quarter of a century in his book Made in Africa: Industrial Policy in Africa (Oxford; Oxford University Press). He argues that in an African and developing countries context, industrial policies need more intervention from the state than the Neo-liberals would agree.

[30] Oromia State has been vulnerable to such conflicts than any other state because of two factors: it is at the center of all and shares borders with all the states except the Tigray States, and it is the most resourceful and the most coveted of all the states.

[31] See, for example, an argument by Siraw Migbarus Temesgen (2015). In his article *Weaknesses of Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia* published in International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention (Vol.4, Issue 11, November 2015), where he, on one hand, argues that the introduction of the federal system has resulted in the generation of multiple communal and identity conflicts. On the other hand, he could not help explaining how the political manipulation of the federal system by the TPLEF/EPRDF for its political gain has been the cause of ethnic tension and conflict among the dominant ethnic groups in the federation.

[32] The most disadvantaged state in the process was the Oromia state. It ceded territories to Amhara, SNNP, Somali, Benishangul Gumuz, Afar, and Gambella states. As the largest state having boundary with all but Tigray State, its leaders seemed to have had no caregiving away a piece to each. The most drastic one was the ceding of the northern Oromia territory to Amhara and Tigray. Sadly, the Oromo of northern Oromia now constitutes one special administrative zone in Amhara State. Worse, the Rayya and Azzebo Oromo of southern Tigray are incorporated systematically and strategically to masked Tigrie identity.

Chapter 6

Conceptual Challenges of Describing Ethiopian Federalism

Scholars of federalism do not agree with one description of Ethiopian federalism. They have suggested varying adjectives to describe it. The underlying difficulty lies on one hand, in the attempt of the scholars to pin Ethiopian federalism into an already available description or theory of federalism, and, on the other hand, in mixing the background that resulted in the formation of the federation and the outcome of the federal bargain. The former emerges from a lack of normative theories to guide or engage the formation of such a federation. Consequently, every scholar who has tried to deal with Ethiopian federalism tried to find his explanation of the federal package. They have done so based on the theoretical fringes of classical federalism, common sense, and observations of the formation process of the federation as an outsider. The latter seems to have been the result of confusing the historical events that have shaped the formation of the federation and what the Constitution has granted to the diverse peoples of Ethiopia as inalienable rights. As a result, no one has produced a definition of Ethiopian federalism that could unite the scholars.

Though some strongly support the identification of Ethiopian federalism as ethnic federalism, it is questionable whether such federalism could exist. Theoretically, as I have also mentioned earlier, "a federal political system in which component territorial governance units are intentionally associated with specific ethnic categories" (Hale cited in Smith, 2013, p. 80) is ethnic-federalism. In the practical world, however, it is impossible to support the purity of an ethnic or national assemblage into an exclusive

territory in the formation of federal states. Indeed, most federations have tried to avoid intentional ethnic territories in the formation of the states of their federation. Instead, they heavily depended on the ethnic-neutral basis, such as historical and geographical factors. In doing so, they depended on an artificial and arbitrary basis for the restructuring of the society that has little or no connection to primordial, cultural, linguistic values, or "psychological make" up of the society.

Socio-political structures that are built in such ways stay superficial. They fall short of going deep to distinctly form the society into a state that they just believe theirs and form the government that they truly consider self-rule. This is because it would not allow them to organize based on their distinct societal values, culture, traditions, and sense of nationalism. A federation that is formed in such a way fails short of genuinely recognizing the diversity of the member states and remains to be an arrangement primarily for administrative convenience.

Many factors have continued to influence some scholars to think, however mistakenly, that Ethiopian federalism is ethnic. One central factor has been the fact that national liberation fighters (which these scholars would call ethnic liberation fighters) and the coalitions of some of them (EPRDF) overthrew the unitary government and offered the federal bargain that formed the federation. The same coalition led and oversaw the transitional government during the political bargain that has produced the federal Constitution. The coalition also remained in power since then. Additional factors, which are still connected to the EPRDF, are the transformation of the politics of the country into national (nation and nationalities) politics and the subsequent formation of many political parties in the country based predominantly on national affiliations. Though the national liberation struggle of few nations overthrew the former regime, those national liberation fighters tried to make the process of the formation of the federation as inclusive as possible. This is manifest in the founding Constitution where all NNPs, regardless of whether they have formed their state or not and whether they have a representative party or not, were a party to the Constitution and member of the federation. The Constitution recognizes them all. Indeed, most of the states are multi-national and the two city governments are mixed at best. Taking only the prompting national politics and its influence in the process of the formation of the federation as its essence, naming the federation as such, confusingly, instead of what the federation is and what it has made a reality as its outcome, could only be considered as committing scholarly injustice. In the following sections, I shall discuss some of the conceptual challenges of describing Ethiopian federalism.

Ideological Foundation

The very first conceptual challenge of Ethiopian federalism emanates from what it has inherited from EPRDF. The EPRDF, the primary architect of the federation, has effectively transferred its party ideology to the core foundation of the federation. The ideological foundation of Ethiopian federalism is thus revolutionary democracy. It is an unsettling reformed concept in EPRDF. It is a type of democracy that appears to be understood fully only by a few members of the party. Only these few elites can play it and with it. Most members of the party have expressed their frustrations repeatedly over the "lost" and confusing meaning of the ideology. It is only understood as an inbreed concept by few core political circles who are themselves oftentimes seemed to be confused because of not being able to catch up with its dynamic "meaning" within the party or because of a misunderstanding of the new adapted meaning as it oftentimes goes through strategic and tactical changes. The only person in the party leadership who was supposed to have understood and been able to explain its meaning as it is used by TPLF-EPRDF was the long-time leader of the party, the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. However, Zenawi had never offered a formal and comprehensive written definition or explication of the ideology. This is perhaps it has none. However, he was able to play it and play with it to the effect of convincing a few of his internal emulators and one or two external admirers or confusing less experienced politicians and economists alike.

EPRDF claims to be both revolutionary and democratic at the same time and on the same footing. The claim of being revolutionary serves the purpose of portraying the party as not based on nationalist and separatist ideologies but as the representation of the collective revolution of the NNPs of Ethiopia. The claim of being democratic serves the purpose of appearing to be democratic in its internal operation and outward self-presentation. In this case, the "revolution" always stays active and alive. This would allow the party to resort to violent suppression of opposition groups and dissidents, both armed and peaceful, under the pretense of standing guard to the "democratic" government. This card has been played multiple times so far. Besides, it helps the TPLF political elites to maintain their dominance in EPRDF. The top party leaders, with threats of "revolutionary" measures of purging "anti-revolutionary elements" and the principle of "democratic centralism," totally control the other members of the coalition (OPDO, ANDM, and SEPDM). Whenever it is necessary, only for its own strategy and dominance, the TPLF invokes the revolutionary nature of the party. Regardless of whether it casts a shadow on the non-existent internal

democracy of the party, revolutionary measures supersede the democratic principles and the party's top leader emerges invincible and the most powerful to get his wills done with the swift mechanism of "democratic centralism."

Because of this revolutionary nature of the party, and the assumption that a "revolution" is still going on, it is sometimes confusing whether the operational mechanisms of the federal and state governments are also revolutionary or democratic or, more confusingly, both. This is aggravated by the fact that the distinction between the ruling party and the government has not been made clear in the country so far and the semblance of it has been eroded during the last twenty-five years of the rule of EPRDF. Over the last quarter of a century, there were clear incidences where the EPRDF-led government openly manifested itself as more of a revolutionary than a democrat. This has been so when EPRDF is challenged by a strong opposition that it feared could threaten its grip on the national power. The actions of the EPRDF-led government in the aftermath of the 2005 national election and during the 2016 public uprising were two typical examples of the EPRDF government taking a bloody revolutionary action against its own people. The former was where it was spared from losing power barely. The latter was when the Oromo and the Amhara stood to the political, economic, and military domination of the minority TPLF harboring itself in its disguise called EPRDF. The revolutionary actions of the EPRDF government might have saved it just barely both times. The recent killings (2015/2016) of a few thousand and imprisonment of several thousands of Oromo youth (*Qeerroo* and *Qarree*) who protested the so-called Addis Ababa Master Plan was another such revolutionary action taken on the Oromo people. The Master Plan would have displaced millions of Oromo from their livelihood and led to permanent loss of their ancestral land from around Addis Ababa city. It would also have expanded the city; twenty times its present size, according to estimates.

The ludicrousness of trying to keep revolution and democracy as mutually supportive and normative political concepts directed the EPRDF leader to yet another absurdity. In analysis and understanding of the political economy of development, Meles Zenawi, and consequently his party, openly argued there is no relationship between democracy and development. He even tried to present his version of a totalitarian government where democracy is not necessary at all to achieve economic development. In this view, he preached revolutionary-democratic policies as a "developmental government" and his party as a "developmental party" and the federation as a "developmental state."

Owing to the lack of formal definition of "revolutionary democracy" of EPRDF and the ensued confusion, some Ethiopian political scientists have tried to characterize it from its practice. The most notable among them is Merara Gudina, one of the most vocal of all opposition political party leaders in the last two decades. Gudina characterizes EPRDF's revolutionary democracy in his recent book in Amharic language *የኢትዮጵያ ታሪክ ፈተናዎች እና የሚጋጩ ሀልሞች፤ የኢህአዴግ ቆርጦ ቀጥል ፖለቲካ።*, which may translate to *Challenges of Ethiopian History and Contradicting Visions: The Forged Politics of EPRDF.* According to Gudina, the "revolutionary democracy" of EPRDF has the following characters [Translation from Amharic] (Gudina, 2015, pp. 73-75):

- Its source is the Maoist philosophy of socialist China that ardently believed "political power comes from the barrels of guns."
- It allows the unity of action and direction between state institutions and the government. Thus, state institutions and their employees become agents of the ruling party (government) and the civil servants cannot be free from the politics of the ruling party. As a result, political conviction rather than merits dictate the state institutions and the duties of the civil servants.
- Its core is based on the concepts of "democratic centralism" and unitary or dominant party system.
- Its goal is total control of the government and the state powers by building around itself only those forces that were organized around actual or potential benefits from the government.
- It promotes one dominant party leadership of the government. Hence, it checks the development of other parties. Other parties are expected to serve the dominant party. Their role is not to be strong contenders to the dominant party.
- It discourages the development of strong state institutions that play a significant role in the check-and-balance of political powers and effective implementation of representational democracy. Hence, the ruling party dominates both the legislatures, the executive branches of the government, and the state institutions.
- It discourages civil society formation and operations, free press, and other democratic institutions.
- It does not fully respect the political, property, and civil rights of the citizens.

This founding ideology of the Ethiopian Federation has been guiding the broad political and economic policies of the federation for over two decades now. The political side of this ideology has been motivated by the "National Question" and the "right to self-determination" of NNPs that is now constitutionally entrenched as the inviolable right of NNPs. As such, revolutionary democracy is pro-group right and discourages liberal democracy, which is pro-individual right. The economic side of the ideology has never been free from state intervention. The state, both as an economic player--solely owning the key economic sectors of telecommunication, electric energy production, and distribution, water supply, etc. through state-owned corporations and enterprises--has been an interventionist and intrusive in the market mechanisms and the economy. Its economic policy slightly shifted over time though. First, it promoted a free-market economy. Later in the late 1990s and early 2000s, it emphasized pure capitalism and started privatization of selected state-owned enterprises, just as neo-liberal capitalist states have done. Since 2006 however it has been promoting a "developmental state" economy (fiercely opposing neo-liberalism) and state intervention both as an economic active player and as an economic regulator and facilitator. No one knows what would come next. Because the political side of the party's ideology of revolutionary democracy, which guides the economic side of the political economy is not fully settled, the economic policies of the federation continued to shift, regardless of the constitutionally entrenched economic policy of the federation. The political and economic dynamism has been intended to accommodate internal political and economic dynamics as well as the demands of the global political economy while maintaining the faulty party ideology and the interests of TPLF-EPRDF.

The TPLF-EPRDF has continued to search for an economic policy that ensures the dominance and sustainability of the political and economic supremacy of the minority Tigrayan group. Thus, it shows a confusing tendency of being politically socialist while it is economically capitalist. As an attempt to find a way out of this confusing political economy that it has built in the past decades, the TPLF-EPRDF government has branded itself as a "developmental government." By doing so, it has pulled itself to the club of "developmental economy" that has been promoted by eastern Asian countries with significant success since the end of the Cold War. The leadership of EPRDF as long as the "developmental state" policy continues to benefit the masses; the regime is legitimate and even "democratic" in the measure of mass participation (Arriola and Lyons, 2016).

Etymological challenge

Amid the theoretical challenge on how Ethiopian federalism should be defined and understood, it may be helpful to have a closer look at the ethnology of the very term "ethnic" and its evolution to "ethnicity." This is in search of the meaning of "ethnic" so that it might help in the attempt to bring some clarity to the actual meaning and theoretical foundation of Ethiopian federalism, although Ethiopian federalism is officially not ethnic federalism some who mostly disapprove of it have continued to refer to it as such.

A study of the etymology of the term "ethnic" using dictionary definitions may help to understand its contextual use. The term "ethnic" originated from Late Latin *ethnicus* and from Greek *ethnikos*, which meant *ethnos* or race ("Ethnic-group", 2015b). In the English language, the term appeared to mean, in the late 14th century Scottish, 'heathen' or 'pagan.' This was perhaps because of the Septuagint translation of Greek *ta ethne* from Hebrew *goyim*, plural of a *goy*, which means non-Israelite nation or gentile nation. In its religious connotation after the emergence of Christianity, the term "ethnic" has an archaic meaning referring to people who are neither Christian nor Jewish. In other words, in older definitions, the term "ethnic" carried convocational meanings like obsolete, pagan, and heathen but also synonymously defined as native, national, and indigenous ("Ethnic-group", 2015c). In the late 15th century, the term denoted "band of people living together, nation, people," or "people of one's own kind" ("Ethnic-group", 2015d) as an "ethnic" group. Over time, the term "ethnic" has evolved into "ethnicity." In modern times, appearing in the Oxford English Dictionary in 1972, it means "pertaining to or characteristic of a people, especially a group sharing distinctive culture, religion, language, or the like ("Ethnic-group", 2015a). "Ethnicity" gradually came to mean "identity with or membership in a particular racial, national, or cultural group and observance of that group's customs, beliefs, and language" ("Ethnicity", 2015b). This gave it its cultural definition. Accordingly, in 1930s Europe, it meant "different cultural groups"; but in 1950s America, following the distinctions made among the people of America in 1850s, it took the more pragmatic sociological and anthropological definition and meant "racial, cultural or national minority group" ("Ethnicity", 2015a).

The use of the term "ethnic" as an adjective to describe a political process or entity is not yet settled theoretically. It suffers from both polysemy and synonymy (Green, 2006). With these polysomic and synonymic, as well as "developmental" and progressive shifting and snapping

of meanings, the ethnology of the term "ethnic" offers little help in characterizing Ethiopian federalism. The federalization process did not solely follow ethnicity (nationalism), as there are no ethnically homogenous states in the federation. Indeed, all the states and the city governments are multi-national, some only more so than the others. However, five of the states are formed based on the predominant nation; yet the demarcation of the borders of the states was not necessarily based on cultural or linguistic predominance. These prove that the term "ethnic" cannot be a proper adjective to notionally describe Ethiopian federalism or its governments nor can any modern federation be defined effectively as an ethnic federation. The descriptor "ethnic" appears to be an obsolete term to define any modern federation. Its continued use to describe or name federations would be uncomplimentary and theoretically pretentious.

Nationality and Ethiopian Federalism.

When singularity of nationality is expected, it is impossible to define federations like Ethiopian theoretically, but it is conceivable to refer to it as ethnic-based, in as much as referring to it as nationalities-based. Smith (2013), for example, agrees that Ethiopian federalism can be referred to as ethnic federalism. However, he sees a problem in calling the state ethnic federation "since in reality all states are ethnically mixed" (Smith, 2013, p. 5). This is an issue seeking perfection rather than denying recognition.

The NNPs of the Ethiopian Federation have been mixing not only socially and culturally but also genetically. Due to over four hundred years of recorded history of intermarriage between the Oromo and the Abyssinian, for example, it is difficult to say that either the Gojam Amhara are not Oromo or the Wollo Oromo are not Amhara. Hodson's assertion, "It is extremely difficult to give an intelligible account of the physical differences between Abyssinian and [Oromo] because by now, owing to intermarriage, many Abyssinian families have nearly as much [Oromo] blood in them as the [Oromo] themselves" (Hodson, 1927, p. 17), could be true in this regard.

There is no single state in the Ethiopian Federation that is constituted purely from a single national group. All the neighboring national groups have intermarried to a varying degree. No national group in the federation is free of ethnic fusion. The level of "national purity" among the federation may, however, vary significantly. In rare cases, there is no single dominant 'national' group in the state. In the special case of Harari State, the population size of minority Harari (Adere), after which the state is named, is

even less than the population size of the Oromo, one of the other ethnonational groups of the State. They are not even the second majority, let alone vying with the absolute majority. Similarly, the "city-states" (officially City Governments) of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa have no specific ethnonational affiliations; they are nationally heterogeneous. They are mixed.

Such "mix," however, is relative. First, not every national group is proportionally mixed. The deepest mix is prevalent between Tigrie and Amhara, Amhara, and Oromo, and other NNPs who have had long social connections and have lived in adjacent territories. Other NNPs of Ethiopia have not been mixed as these or the mix is very insignificant. Second, even if they are mixed, such a mix has never mattered to the NNPs because none of them has been more contented with struggling to maintain national purity than nurturing harmonious coexistence.

The present Constitution also advances nurturing coexistence. Every citizen of the federation has a constitutional right to live wherever they want to and to set up a family with their choice of partner. There is no restriction, whatsoever, but cultural and language barriers prevail. Besides, the very reason for the formation of the Ethiopian Federation is maintenance and unification than segregation and secession.

It is, therefore, nearly impossible to describe Ethiopian federalism fully based on the concept of a singularity of nationality (or ethnicity).

Multi-Ethnic vs. Multi-National

Some scholars come close to defining Ethiopian federalism as ethnic federalism. Selassie (2003) does not doubt that Ethiopian Federalism is ethnic-based federalism. "Organization of the Ethiopian state is founded upon ethnic federalism, which uses ethnic groups as units of self-government" (Selassie, 2003, p. 54). Keller (2002) went a step further and called Ethiopian federalism "officially billed as a form of ethnic federalism" (p. 45). Both Selassie and Keller are close to genuineness, but they shy away from assertively describing Ethiopian Federalism as "ethnic federalism." They, however, allude to the underlying fact that the federation was formed based on national factors, which is a fact. The descriptors "ethnic-based" and "a form of ethnic" are informed mainly by the recent history of the Ethiopian NNPs where a presumptive nation-state of Ethiopia was believed to have been formed with an Abyssinian identity and nationalism at its center. This was reducing all other NNPs to the status of ethnic groups in Abyssinian-Ethiopian nationalism. To a lesser extent, it is informed by the

ethnicized politics in the country both before and after the formation of the federation.

One simple fact is enough to disqualify the attempt to label Ethiopian federalism as ethnic: the concerned party does not identify itself as such. The constituents of the Ethiopian Federation identify themselves as nations or nationalities or peoples, not as ethnic groups. The Ethiopian government has never identified federalism as ethnic federalism; nor do the states call themselves that they are ethnic states. All the states of the federation are known officially as "National Regional States." Indeed, as I have noted above, there is no mention of the word "ethnicity" or "ethnic" in the Constitution. In the Constitution, the NNPs of Ethiopia are the founders of the federation. The defining expression of the Constitution, "nations, nationalities, and people," is used extensively wherever a description of the constituent states of sub-states or minorities is needed. The term "ethnicity" is also absent from the grammars of both the federal and state governments. The term is also absent from the languages of the ruling party. Only reactionary opposition politicians, who oppose the federation and see it as a threat, frequent it. In general, there has been a deliberate avoidance of the term "ethnic federalism" in the political language in Ethiopia because the constituents of the federation do not call themselves with that name. However, this does not mean that ethnicity did not play a role in the development of national movements and the process of the formation of the federation.

Scholars emphasize both the "ethnicity" and the "multi-nationalism" of the Ethiopian Federation. Smith (2013) points out that "most have referred to Ethiopian federalism as ethnic federalism" in line with general typologies by identifying, a federal state in which "at least one constituent territorial governance unit is intentionally associated with a specific ethnic category" (Hale, 2004, p. 167) as an ethnic-federal state. This is an overly broad definition. Abbink (2006) refers to Ethiopian federalism as ethno-regional federalism. Kymlicka (1995), on the other hand, identifies Ethiopian federalism as multinational federalism. Negaso Gidada Solan, former president of the federation, in his recent work suggests ambiguously that Ethiopian Federation is "multination democratic state-nation" (Solan, 2015). This nation-state is what would be built in the future or in the process of being built. These varying perceptions have some things in common: the former two emphasize ethnicity (multi-ethnicity) and the latter two emphasize the fact that the Ethiopian Federation is composed of many nations that are politically equal and equally sovereign.

However, multi-ethnicity may also be multi-nationality, theoretically, and the two may be used interchangeably in the practical situation of the

Ethiopian Federation. Some believe that "almost every federation in the world is a multi-ethnic one" (Fiseha, 2006, p. 137). This belief is based on the supposition that modern states are not formed from a single nation but from multiple national groups with ethnic cleavages or, simply, the diversity of nations that make up a federation. Similarly, it can be said, almost every federation is a multinational federation because multi-ethnicity could also be multi-nationality. The biggest difference being the former emphasizing more on the share of common distinctive culture, language, and way of life among a group of society while the latter draws more attention to common aspiration, common history, and past or present political independence.

In summary, multi-ethnicity and multi-nationalism make little sense to conceptually distinguish Ethiopian federalism as multi-ethnic or multinational federalism.

Three Circle Federalism

The constitutionally granted sovereignty of NNPs and their right to self-determination up to secession (through the agency of the nation or the nations which constitute a constituent state) in the Ethiopian Federation bring yet another form of federalism into consideration. This form of federalism, though only marginally backed by scholars, is known as "three-circle-federalism." It is a form of federalism "with the federation and the constituent units (and their respective constitutions) on an equal level, beneath the stat as a whole (or the overall constitution of the federal state)" (Gamper, 2005, p. 1301).

This form of federalism has contextual and structural relevance to Ethiopian federalism. Ethiopian Federation is structured in such a way that it has the House of Representatives of NNPs (House of Federation) and the House of People's Representatives (Federal Parliament). Every state has its constitution and the State Council. The State Council has constitutional power (both at federal and state levels) to declare self-determination, including secession. The federal Constitution provides for the powers and functions of both federal houses. The power to interpret the federal Constitution is entrusted to the House of Federation. These power structures have been designed based on the context that the Ethiopian Federation shall continue to be the embodiment of historical Ethiopia. This is where the constituent states have the constitutional right to national internal and external self-determination, on one hand, yet the federal Constitution remains the supreme Constitution, on the other hand, limiting

the sovereignty of constituent states in a way that such arrangement poses intricate theoretical and practical challenges to fully understand Ethiopian federalism.

According to Gamper (2005), a compromised "three-Circle" theory by Hans Kelsen appears to have achieved a compromise between the monistic and dualistic theories of federalism, even though the legal order of the last is unknown. The theory recognizes not only "the legal order of the central [federal constitution] and constituent units [state constitutions], but also the legal order of the state as a whole ["Overall Constitution"]" (pp. 1303-1304) while disregards the statehood and sovereignty (Gamper, 2005). However, Gamper (2005) admits, "there are only rare instances, where overall constitutional law may be formally detected within the framework of federal constitutional law, e.g., if joint constitutional laws of the federation and the constituent units are necessary for certain amendment procedures" (p. 1304).

Considering the "three-circle theory," looking closely into the Constitution of the Ethiopian Federation may help to understand Ethiopian federalism better. There are two constitutional orders in the Ethiopian Federation: the federal Constitution and state constitutions. The former has been considered a unique Constitution because of its overarching provisions. Thus, it may be considered as a combination of a "normal" federal Constitution and something beyond it, perhaps an "overall constitution." To try to determine if this is the case, it would be necessary to investigate the provisions of the Constitution of the federation that appear to be beyond the "normal" provision of a federal Constitution as it is commonly known.

The following are some of the indications that the Constitution of the Ethiopian federation is a combination of a federal Constitution and an "overall constitution." First, the preamble begins with "We, the Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples of Ethiopia" . . . instead of "We, the people . . ." The preamble, in this sense, acknowledges the Constitution is a form of a pact among the NNPs ("overall constitution") where the aspect of the pact among the NNPs is more important than the aspect of the people in general regardless of being a member of a "nation" or "nationality" or "peoples." Second, Article 39 (1 and 4) of the Constitution provides for the right to self-determination, including secession, and outlays its implementation procedures. The Article not only has a characteristic of being one step above the "common" constitution but also has a unique characteristic: the implementation of the Article cannot be affected even during the state of emergency (Art. 93(4c)). The Article protects itself from the state of emergency. Hence, the right to self-determination, including secession, can be implemented during a state of emergency. This is unique even from federal constitutions that explicitly provide for the constitutional possibility

of the potential disintegration of the state that it forms. Third, the Constitution gives the key sovereign powers to the House of Federation. In Article 8, the Constitution gives sovereignty to the NNPs of Ethiopia. Sub-article one of this article states, "All sovereign power resides in the Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples of Ethiopia." According to this Article, regardless of whether the "nations," "Nationalities" and the "Peoples" have their states or not, whether they are minorities or majorities in a particular state or city or local administrative sub-units, they are sovereign so long as they can fulfill the definition provided according to Article 39(5). It also set up the House of Federation which is composed of representatives of NNPs (Art. 61(1). The House of Federation (HF) has key powers. It has the power to interpret the Constitution (Art. 62(1)), to decide on "the issues relating to the rights of Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples to self-determination, including the right to secession" (Art. 62(3)), and to determine "civil matters which requires the enactment of laws by the House of People's Representative" (Art. 62(7)). These provisions have made the HF a truly Upper House. The provisions genuinely "overall" provisions giving a clear indication that the Constitution has a part that can be ascribed as "overall constitution" put together within the customary tradition of a federal constitution. Fourth, the Constitution of the federation also constitutionalized the "national policy principles and objectives" in its tenth chapter (Art. 85-92) not only for the federal government but also as it uniformly applies to the constituent states and any level government--federal, state or local. These provisions appear to belong to the "overall constitution." Thus, it is possible to argue that the Constitution of the Ethiopian Federation is a composite constitution that has the character of a combination of "overall constitution" and a federal constitution.

Furthermore, the distinction between the two can be formally detected not only as illustrated above but also from the provision of the Constitution that entrenched the necessity of the joint approval of some amendments by the State Council, House of Federation, and House of Peoples' Representative, or House of Peoples Representative and House of Federation. The Constitution clearly states that not only the amendment (Art. 105) but also the initiation of the amendment (Art. 104) could be conducted only when the two houses approve the amendments according to Article 105 of the Constitution. According to this article, every amendment on the "fundamental rights and freedoms" and the very initiation of the amendment (Art. 104) and the amendment (Art. 105) could be made only in the procedure that first it is approved by a majority of State Council (Art. 105(1a)). It is only then that they could be approved by a two-thirds majority vote of the House

of Peoples Representative (Lower House) (Art. 105(1b)) and by a two-thirds majority vote of the House of Federation (Upper House) (Art. 105(1c)). Other articles of the Constitution would be amended when the joint session of the House of Federation and the House of Peoples' Representatives approved the amendments by the two-third majority (Art. 105 (2A)), and when "two-third of the Councils of the Member States of the Federation approved the proposed amendment by majority vote" (Art. 105 (2B)).

Consequently, the Ethiopian federalism may be considered conveniently as "Three-Circle-Federalism" from the constitutional law point of view. This is based on the existence of provisions within the federal Constitution of the Ethiopian Federation that otherwise could be considered part of an "overall constitution" because of their broadness and uniqueness compared to the constitutions of other federations. Besides, because of the necessary conditions entrenched in the Constitution for the approval of some procedures and the initiation and amendment of the Constitution by both the Upper and the Lower Houses of Federation.

"New Federal Model"

The theoretical challenge that Ethiopian federalism poses has forced even the most erudite scholar of federalism to call it the "new federal model". Burgess (2012a,) on the other hand doubts that the applicability of the concept of multinational federalism to practical reality in Ethiopia because concrete empirical destination could not be found and conceptual validity could not be reached. Burgess (2012a) argues that the conceptual problem is the result of an attempt to "define some socio-political categories that are themselves inherently problematic" (p. 43). Burgess (2012a) also argues that article 39 of the federal Constitution contains the conceptual and organizational principles of the multinational federation because it contains key concepts that comprise multinational federalism in the multinational federation. Burgess (2012a) also argues Ethiopian federalism falls short of being identified as multinational federalism because it has not yet fully developed the criteria of "liberal democratic political culture." Hence, it still conforms to the typical model of other African states that have prioritized "regime security, political stability, and state unity" over "civil society, political trust, power-sharing, genuine participation in multiparty democracy and rule of law" (Burges, 2012a, p. 35). Pending its further development to fit into the existing conceptual denomination, as are known to the scholars and practitioners of federalism, Burges (2012a) prefers to call Ethiopian

federalism a "new federal model" (p. 35). This reservation seems to be reasonable, as the Ethiopian Federation is a pioneer in many ways; for example, in constitutionally granting self-determination, including secession, of NNPs and in constitutionally granting sovereignty to the NNPs instead of to the people.

Middle of the Road Federalism

Ethiopian federalism is unique. It is federalism that has constitutionally entrenched not only the sovereignty but also the unconditional right to self-determination of the NNPs. According to Article 8 (1) of the Constitution, "All sovereign power resides in the Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples of Ethiopia." The relevance of this sovereignty of NNPs poses theoretical challenges to define Ethiopian federalism within the prevailing theoretical frameworks. According to the Constitution, the Ethiopian Federation is constituted from states that are formed based on "settlement patterns, language, identity, and consents of the people" (Art. 46 (2)) and "have equal rights and powers" (Art. 47(4)). The sovereignty of NNPs is also entrenched in the Constitution. Nonetheless, sovereignty may not necessarily apply to all states in that same sense as to nations, nationalities, and peoples. This is because only five of the nine states are excluded from a single absolute majority nation. The rest is made up of multiple nations, nationalities, and peoples. Yet, there is no limitation or restriction against states constituted from a nation or nationality or peoples or from a mix of these to exercise sovereign rights, including secession (Art. 39) as a nation or as a nationality or as a people. Thus, the member states of the Ethiopian Federation are constitutionally sovereign states with shared-rule and self-rule provisions entrenched in the Constitution. Consequently, it can be argued that the federal state in the Ethiopian Federation is no more than a delegation of power by the states. In other words, state power in the Ethiopian Federation resides in the constituent states, not in the federation.

From this perspective, the Ethiopian Federation could be explained using dualistic theories of federalism than using monistic theories of federalism. The former is based on the assumption that constituent members of federal states are states themselves while the latter is based on the assumption that only the federal state (the federation) as a whole is a state (Gamper, 2005). In line with the former assumption, constitutional compact theory regards only the constituent states as "true bearers of sovereignty" while in the line with the latter assumption monist decentralization theory

regards the constituent units neither as a state nor as sovereign but just as decentralized units (Gamper, 2005). The former theory serves as the basis for the theoretical background of the Ethiopian Constitution and the federation it forms while the latter serves as the foundation for the pragmatic implementation of the Constitution in the federation.

These theories do not define but provide the two ends of the spectrum of Ethiopian federalism. These two ends are the confederal state and the unitary state. Ethiopian Federation is located somewhere between the two on the spectrum. Thus, both theories fail short of locating Ethiopian federalism at a fixed place on the spectrum. In other words, based on established assumptions and theories, the sovereignty of the NNPs and their constitutionally guaranteed right to self-determination does not make any easier the challenging task of defining the form of Ethiopian federalism theoretically.

A Socialist Federation?

Ethiopian federalism resulted in the formation of the Ethiopian federation. Some scholars consider the Ethiopian Federation as a socialist federation. Such considerations appear to be influenced heavily by the historical political economy of Ethiopia. Socialist ideology has little to do with the real animating forces of Ethiopian federalism, which is competing for nationalism. Yet, Abebe (2014), for example, is convinced that the Ethiopian Federation is a socialist federation. He dubs Ethiopian federalism simply as "multicultural federal arrangement" intending to undermine the historical existence of NNPs in Ethiopia and try to depict the national diversity in the Ethiopian Federation simply as cultural diversity that has no significance than language diversity. He further considers the Ethiopian Federation as "the last post-cold war socialist federation."

Abebe (2014) maintains that the Ethiopian Federation has directly adopted the fundamental principles of socialist federation: sovereignty and equality of nations and their rights to self-determination. In the argument, (Abebe, 2014) makes many interesting points: One, the vanguard party, EPRDF, strictly controls the federation "granting the regional units only the right to exercise the cultural and linguistic rights rather than providing proper autonomy" (124-125) and "the power of regional units granted under the constitution is indirectly taken over by the central government through party centralism" (124-125); two, the federal government remained the sole distributor of resources, political power, and settler of the regional

boundaries in case of self-determination and secession; three, the Ethiopian Federation not only suffers from "lack of proper separation of power between the legislature, executive, and the judiciary organs of the state" but also from "lack of genuine democracy" (p. 124-125). In his view, the only additions to the Ethiopian Federation are the revised ideological versions of revolutionary democracy and the relatively recent addition of the doctrine of the developmental state. Otherwise, (Abebe, 2014) concludes, Ethiopian Federation is "the last cold war socialist federation" (p. 124), a conclusion that he heavily emphasized by making it the title of his book.

The ruling party's political ideology, which complicated both the formation of the federation (restructuring of the state) and the process of the making of the Constitution of the federation, has made it difficult for Abebe (2014) and others to settle the conceptual foundations of the Ethiopian Federation. The distinctions between the ruling party and the government, the ruling party structure, and the state structures, as well as the party's "democratic centralism" and the country's federalism, have been blurred. This has been because the same party that offered the ideological foundation for the formation of the federation has been in power implementing the same ideology for about a quarter of a century. This has only aggravated the conceptual confusion both on the federalizing process (federalism) and the federation (the state) has become a challenge to scholars. Nonetheless, neither is Ethiopia a socialist federation nor was the federalization process aimed at creating a socialist union.

Nationalities Federalism

Ethiopian federalism is a new experiment in the school of political philosophy. As it is today, the Ethiopian Federation is not a clear multinational federation that is formed by the agreement of all formerly independent or fully evolved *national* states, nor does its federalism federalism of shared-rule and self-rule of robust nation-states, nor do all NNPs of the federation have an equal level of self-determination, nor is the politics of the federation free from both national and sub-national orientations. The politics in the federation is only starting to shape and sharpen itself toward becoming a full-fledged national politics based on the underlying fundamental principle of national self-determination of NNPs. The federalism and the federation in Ethiopia are, thus, not multinational in the true sense. Such a political mechanism of organizing a very diverse nation, nationalities, and peoples into a federation democratically is out of the common categories of federalism

that one could find commonly in the federalism literature. Being the first of its kind and being at its early development as a process, makes Ethiopian federalism difficult for political theorists and scholars of federalism to give it due attention in considering it as an alternative, perhaps an advanced alternative, a form of federalism, both at theoretical and empirical levels. Perhaps, because of such lack of consideration, scholars have been giving it different names.

From among the variety of names that have been linked to Ethiopian federalism so far, none of them could fully describe the reality or capture copiously the historical context out of which it has emerged. Based on the effort placed on the characteristics of the constituent members of the states of the federation, some descriptions appear to be decent than others. Perhaps, "multinational federalism" is more descriptive than "national federalism", "ethno-regional federalism," "ethnic-based territorial federalism," "ethnic federalism", "ethnic-based federalism" or "ethnolinguistic federalism." None of the latter groups supply more than a merely proximate description of what Ethiopian federalism truly is. Because it is composed of many nations, nationalities, and peoples, "multi-national federalism," however, describes very significant aspects of Ethiopian federalism.

Yet, it is recognized that not all members of the federation are nations. From about the eighty recognized NNPs of the federation, the majority are technically nationalities and peoples, i.e., minorities. There is however not an official separate definition of "nation," "nationalities" or "peoples" in the context of Ethiopian federalism. The Constitution defines all of them at once in Article 39(5). According to this article, "Nations, Nationalities or Peoples" are "a group of people who have or share [a] large measure of a common culture or similar customs, mutual intelligibility of language, belief in a common or related identity, a common psychological make-up, and who inhabit an identifiable, predominantly contiguous territory."

It is worth having a close look at what affective and political societies mean before looking for a slightly better nomenclature for Ethiopian federalism. First, let us distinguish between the affective community and political community in connection to federalism and the formation of the federation. When an effective community, related to each other based on common descent, language, culture, and mythological bloodline, forms a polity, the polity is affective. Such polity could be expressed as a national polity. It may be able to have a national political identity. Whereas, when people who are not related by common descent, language, culture, and mythological bloodline but organize only because they have common aspiration or have a common objective of achieving a common political

good, they are a political rather than effective community. Such political communities could be expressed as civic polities. It may be able to build a civic nationalism. In this view, particularly since the 1960s emergence of ESM, civic nationalism is on the decline in Ethiopia. The majority of the Ethiopian cultural communities have been transformed very systematically and instrumentally into affective societies since 1991. These effective societies are nationalities. As a result, the national and sub-national politics in the country has since been based on nationality politics. A federal arrangement that is formed by agreement of national effective polities, by definition, can be referred to as *nationalities federalism*. Similarly, the federation they form can be referred to as *nationalities* federation.

Nationalities federalism may be referred to as ethnic federalism by some, which it is realistically not. This has been the case among some circles in Ethiopia who have continued to associate Ethiopian federalism with former communist federations, such as Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR, looking for an associative gloomy prospect for it. There are similarities between such federalism and Ethiopian federalism about state formation. However, in the former communist federations, ethnic-federalism was when the constitutive sub-units were defined by a designated cultural community that is constructed upon a purposive coincidence between the geographical distribution of nations and the spatial designation of political institutions (Bunce, 2013). In Ethiopian federalism, the foundation for the formation of the state was much more than culture. Many of the states in Ethiopia are intentionally associated with the dominant national group of the state but there are many cultural groups within each. It is only based on a minimal definition of an ethnic-federal state (which I have mentioned above) a state in which "at least one constituent territorial governance unit is intentionally associated with a specific ethnic category" (Hale, 2004, p. 167), that Ethiopian federalism could be considered as ethnic federalism. In Ethiopian federalism, the closest to such a governance unit is the Harari State. Even though democratically it is home of the absolute majority Oromo (52.3%) and the Amhara (32.6%) are the second majority, Harari State is intentionally associated with the minority Adere (Harari) people who are less than a tenth (only 7.1%) of the population of the state (see Table 5).

This is not disregarding the fact that most of the states in the formation are associated with specific national groups but because these national groups are nations or a combination of nations or a union of NNPs. The Oromo, the Amhara, the Tigre, the Afar, the Somali are nations and hence their respective state is a national state. The Benishangul-Gumuz State and the Gambella States are duo-national states of the Benishangul and Gumuz and

the Nuer and Anyuak respectively. SNNP State is a special state composed of a union of multiple NNPs. There can be no single state in the federation that is constituted exclusively from one single nation, nationality, or people. Each state may encompass other minorities who have been integrated over a long time through the causes and courses of life with the dominant national group(s) after which the state is named. Varyingly, all the states are an amalgamation of a few or many nations, nationalities, and peoples. These are practical cases of multiple nations and nationalities in the Ethiopian federation. Besides, the primary organizing force of most of the nations, and hence their states, has been their history of nationhood or their emerging sense of nationalism than anything else. Yet, most importantly, the politics that animated Ethiopian federalism and has resulted in the formation of the Ethiopian Federation is nationalities politics. Thus, from a realistic point of view, Ethiopian federalism and the Ethiopian Federation are better described as *nationalities federalism* and nationalities federation respectively.

Nationality vs. Ethnicity

A greater number of national groups in Ethiopia do not share common descent, common history, and common homeland. The larger nations have multiple ethnic groups, lineages, and clans within themselves. As such, they are defined better as nations than as ethnic groups. In this sense, a dictionary definition of a "nation"-"an aggregation of persons of the same ethnic family, often speaking the same language or cognate languages as a large body of people, associated with a particular territory, that is sufficiently conscious of its unity to seek or to possess a government peculiarly its own ("Nation", 2015) – fitly apply to most of them. Accordingly, their federation should be defined as a federation of nations, not as a federation of ethnic groups.

Nevertheless, it appears that the past and the present nationhood of the NNPs of the Ethiopian Federation have been overlooked by scholars of federalism. This could be the reason why the Ethiopian Federation has been widely portrayed as "ethnic" federation in the mainstream federalism literature, almost invariably both by Ethiopian and by non-Ethiopian scholars of federalism. This description, however, does not reflect and represent the historical and official self-characterization of the Ethiopian nations, nationalities, and peoples and *their* federation. Some elucidation on this point may help to clarify why the nomenclature "ethnic federalism" falls short of capturing fully and representing fairly the reality of Ethiopian federalism.

First, most of the member states of the Ethiopian Federation and some of the nations, nationalities, and peoples of the SNNP State were historically great nations, having effective states and governments before their annexation by the Abyssinian kingdom in the late 19th century. These include the Oromo, Amhara, Tigrie, Afar, Somali, Benishangul, Gumuz, Gambella, Harari, Sidama, Hadiyya, Wolaita, Konso, Burji, Gedeo, Gamo, and Kaffa, to mention some. The Kaffa kingdom, for example, had been a well-organized monarchy starting from the 13th century CE. Until *Atse* Menelik II subdued the kingdom in the late 19th century, as per its recorded history, twenty successive kings had ruled it. Other smaller nations (in population and geographical territory) also had their own traditional but independent self-administrations. Already before the formation of modern Ethiopia, all were polities: they were nations. Being forcefully incorporated into the militarily powerful Abyssinian kingdom to form the empire of Abyssinia-cum-modern Ethiopia, in which they have had little or no political, social and economic participation and integration but only held as "prisoners," cannot make them less of the proud nation they were about a century and a half ago.

Second, the multiple formative ethnicities, main tribal lineages, and clan branches of a few of the constituents of the federation are a characteristic of a nation than a mere ethnic group. The most notable among them is the Oromo nation. The Oromo are structured into binary, balanced moieties with multiple lineages of inter-moieties and intra-moieties that form yet another many sub moieties from which several main and sub-lineages and main and sub-clans are formed mainly across modern Ethiopia and Kenya. Such social structure effectively organized the Oromo, more than forty million strong, into effective polity under their republican *Gadaa Democracy*. Though not as extensive and as pervasive as in the Oromo nation, such structures are prevalent among other larger NNPs of the Ethiopian Federation. The Amhara nation, even though it is a relatively politically constructed nation, also appears to have at least four sub-branches: Gondarie, Wolloyie, Gojamie, and Shewa. These Amharan branches appear to have achieved a formative ethnicity as a result of achieving distinctive and diverging subcultures of their own but unified only with their Amharic language and Christian faith. Similarly, such branches exist among the Tigrie nation. The Agamie, Temben, Adwa, Enderta, Aksum, Rayya, for example, are much more than just territory markers. They are formative sub-national ethnicity as defined in the Ethiopian context. These mostly great nations who have their ethnic sub-unit from within, however formative, cannot be considered simply as ethnic from without nor can their higher-level structure, their nationality, be reduced to their lower structure, ethnicity. With an

acknowledgment of the existence of minority nationalities within the Ethiopian Federation which may not be defined as nations, all constituent nations of the states of the Ethiopian Federation are neither merely ethnic nor fully nations.

Third, the populous nations of the federation stand against the diminutive characterization that ethnic groups are. Each of over a dozen of the NNPs of the Federation has a population of more than one million. These include the Oromo, Amhara, Somali, Tigrie, Sidama, Guragie, Wolaita, Hadiyya, Afar, and Gamo (see figure 4). Based on the census report of 2007, while the Oromo and the Amhara are close to thirty and twenty million respectively, the Somali and the Tigrie are close to five million. The Sidama people are about three million. Guragie and Wolaita are about two million each. The Hadiyya, Afar, and Gamo are about one and a half million each. Even though the size of the population may not be a guarantor for nationhood, these population sizes are too large to be considered as minority ethnic groups in a presumable one nation. These NNPs have more population than small countries around the world. Besides, if Ethiopian federalism were ethnic federalism it would not have the structure of the state as is but at least ten states for the ten most populous "ethnic" nations. These many nations of massive populations, which have now formed a federation, cannot be comprehended fully with the nomenclature of "ethnic federalism" unless the appellation is based on a fallacious assumption.

Fourth, these millions of people are not connected only with elements of ethnicity such as common language, culture, and way of life but also with stronger elements of nationalism, which includes common political history, common aspiration, national patriotism, and a strong sense of past and present nationhood. These are clear to the nations of the Ethiopian Federation. They make them more of a nation than an ethnic group. The Oromo, for example, is a great nation that introduced the earliest republican democracy several centuries before the formation of the USA and had governed themselves as a nation for many centuries by instituting a purely republican and limited government under their brand of socio-political system, the *Gadaa System*. The southwestern section of the Oromo nation had also set up at seven Oromo monarchies in Gibie and Leqa regions similar to that of Abyssinian monarchies during the 19th century. The Amhara are also a great civic nation that had a powerful kingdom and authoritarian state structures for many centuries in Abyssinia Proper. The Tigrie is also a great nation that had once vied with great powers, such as the Greeks, the Romans, and the Persians, in international commerce, civilization, and military power. Adare people have been a great Islamic nation that excelled in commerce, literary works, and Islamic traditions in east Africa. Similarly, many of the

nations in the SNNP State (Kaffinno, Wolaita, Dawuro, Sidama, Hadiya, Konso, Denakil (Afar), Konta, etc.) have been great nations who had their respective kingdoms, some many centuries old. Reducing these great nations to an ethnic group and calling their federation an "ethnic federation" is like taking a stand deliberately on the wrong side of history.



Figure 4. Top ten populous nations in the Ethiopian Federation
Note. compiled from the CSA report (CSA, 2007).
* The percentages are calculated from the total population. Other ethnic groups are excluded from the total.

Fifth, formerly independent nations and kingdoms, not ethnic groups, constitute the Ethiopian Federation. As I have highlighted above, most of the NNPs of Ethiopia do have a national history: they do not have an ethnic history; nor have they ever called themselves ethnic groups formally but nations. Officially, there is no mention of ethnicity in the Constitution or any other official documentation of the federation. Neither the governments nor the people of Ethiopia see their federation as ethnic. The people of Ethiopia understand themselves as nations, nationalities, and peoples and most of them proudly call themselves so. They never called their federation an "ethnic federation" because they believe they are not. Only Abyssinian elites who wish the return of the assimilationist imperial regime often use the application to diminish the successes of federalism. Calling one by its proper name or

the name it wants to be called with is a proper thing that every person, a scholar, or a commoner, should adapt.

Sixth, the nations, nationalities, and peoples of Ethiopia maintained their true understanding of the "self" when they, through their representatives, declared themselves as "We, the Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples of Ethiopia …" in the preamble of the constitution that established the federation in 1995. This notion does not only actualize the common fiction of "We, the People …," common to the constitutions of other federations but also clearly portrayed the historical backgrounds of the NNPs of Ethiopia. It also signifies that the Ethiopian Federation is an agreement among all the NNPs of Ethiopia who all are sovereign and equal.

Thus, with utter disregard to the above commendable historical and practical factors, the theoretical portrayal of the Ethiopian federalism as "*ethnic federalism"* serves neither justice to the NNPs and their governments nor captures fully the reality of the Ethiopian competing nationalisms in its true sense. As discussed in chapter 4, the more sensible way to identify Ethiopian federalism remains to be the name that means what it truly is: *national diversity recognition federalism*. The cornerstone in Ethiopian federalism is not the formation of the states but the constitutional recognition of the sovereignty of the all the nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia and their inalienable right to self-determination, including secession. This, put simply, is par recognition of the diversity in the federation. Thus, not only the Ethiopian federalism is aptly *national diversity recognition federalism* but also the Ethiopian Federation is a federation *of nations, nationalities, and peoples.*

National Diversity and Its Recognition

The best understanding of what Ethiopian federalism truly means could only be inferred from the Constitution that has established the federation. This is because both the definition and operation of federalism are formulated in the historical condition that gives rise to the original contract, the constitution (Rodden, 2004). The particular historical conditions that prompted the formation of the Ethiopian Federation were both armed and peaceful demands of the NNPs of Ethiopia for internal or external national self-determination from where they were integrated forcefully ("unified") into the imperil state that attempted to build a unitary state (nation-state) from the multinational state. The unitary state was built from formerly independent or semi-autonomous NNPs who had their varying forms of political systems (monarchy, republic, sultanate, emirate, traditional) through

the conquest and annexation by the Abyssinian kingdom from the mid-19th to early 20th centuries.

These NNPs, after witnessing national exploitation and operation under few successive Abyssinian monarchs and the military socialist dictatorship for more than a century, finally succeeded in defeating the centrist unitary government in 1991, mainly through the political and military leadership and sacrifices of EPLF, EPRDF, OLF, and others. Based on their free will, these NNPs decided to continue their recent common history, political and economic union, and the growing fraternity among them. They decided so by transforming their short historical connections and harmonious diversity into visions of unity and the goal of "building one political and economic society" under a federation. They, however, have made clear: if the situations do not allow the actualization of the vision and the goal, their right to leave the federation is guaranteed, unconditionally. Thus, in the true sense, the Ethiopian Federation is the federation of all the NNPs who are equally sovereign.

From the perspective of the historical conditions that prompted the formation of the federation and the politico-legal contract of the NNPs for the formation of the federation, it is evident that the Ethiopian Federation is a federation of equal NNPs. Under this situation, it does not matter whether they may be called nations, nationalities, or peoples. Of course, such distinctions have not yet been made official and institutional but only perceived. There is no separate definitions of a nation, a nationality, or a people in the Constitution or based on the constitutional context or interpretation. It is inferred that separate definitions may follow population size in descending order. In other words, the political and legal status of the NNPs is equal. The Constitution unconventionally and proactively provides for such equality for all NNPs regardless of whether they have already formed their national state, or self-rule through sub-national self-determination within a national state or in a state of NNPs (SNNRP), or yet to become so. One can infer from the Constitution that the Ethiopian Federation is the federation of political and legal equals. As such, Ethiopian Federation may be called a multinational federation and Ethiopian federalism may also be called multinational federalism.

Beyond the historical conditions that prompted the struggle of the NNPs and the struggle that ultimately gave rise to the constitutional contract, what should be noted is the full recognition of the diversity of existing and evolving NNPs of Ethiopia by the Constitution. The Ethiopian empire state had only caged the diverse NNPs together in a futile effort to hammering out a nation-state from them through forceful and aggressive total assimilation

programs. The constitutional recognition of the nations, nationalities, and peoples of modern Ethiopia with their distinctive historical, cultural, linguistic, and traditional identities and their consequent institutionalization into the present federal system makes the heart and the soul of the Ethiopian Federation. Operationally, the federation is a union of NNPs who, in addition to the common history and culture that have been developed in the past century, have their own distinctive historical, cultural, linguistic, and territorial identities according to which they take part in the self-rule and shared-rule principle of the federation. The Constitution recognizes the legal and political equality of NNPs with coextensive recognition of their linguistic, cultural, and traditional diversities. In this sense, Ethiopian Federalism may be better defined and comprehended as *national diversity recognition federalism*.

National diversity recognition federalism may be defined as a federal political order of a willingly united multinational society that constitutionally recognizes the sovereignty, the political equality, the right to self-determination including the right to secession, and the overall cultural, linguistic, and religious diversity of the constituent nations, nationalities, and peoples and organize them into constituent states based on existed historical statehood, traditional society, distinct national identity, or common or related social, cultural, and linguistic identities within a contiguous territory for their democratic and republican self-rule and shared-rule.

Summary

In this chapter, I have attempted to shed some light on some of the conceptual challenges of describing Ethiopian federalism. I have probed the ideological foundation of federalism, the etymological challenge in connection to the term 'ethnic', nationality and Ethiopian federalism, the concepts of multi-ethnic vs. multinational federalism, three circle federalism, "new federal model", middle of the road federalism, socialist federation, national federalism, diversity recognition federalism, and national diversity recognition federalism in an attempt to instill some conceptual lucidity to Ethiopian federalism. The overall analysis suggests that *national diversity recognition* or *recognition federalism*, in short, describes Ethiopian federalism better. Every federalism that recognizes constitutionally the sovereignty and the right to self-determination of the diverse nations, nationalities, and peoples in a particular political dominion and form constituent states based on such recognitions may be defined as *national diversity recognition federalism*

recognition federalism. More elaborately, I have defined it as a federal political order of a willingly united multinational society that constitutionally recognizes the sovereignty, the political equality, the right to self-determination including the right to secession, and the overall cultural, linguistic, and religious diversity of the constituent nations, nationalities, and peoples and organize them into constituent states based on existed historical statehood, traditional society, distinct national identity, or common or related social, cultural, and linguistic identities within a contiguous territory for their democratic and republican self-rule and shared-rule. Ethiopian federalism is, thus, *recognition federalism*.

Chapter 7

Practical Challenges of Ethiopian Federalism

In the previous chapter, I have discussed the conceptual challenges of describing Ethiopian federalism and the Ethiopian Federation. In this chapter, I shall try to bring forth the foremost practical challenges of Ethiopian federalism. Even though Ethiopian federalism is one of the noble forms of federalism that has been instituted to solve the political, social, and economic quandaries of the NNPs of Ethiopia and the disobliging quests of some of the NNPs for national liberation that could lead to the obliteration of modern Ethiopia, it is not without some challenges to fully realize it. Its experimentation has exposed multiple practical challenges.

The Autocracy of Titular State

Federalism depends on the territorial definition. National diversity recognition federalism takes the territorial definition one step further by qualifying it with the relative homogeneity/diversity of inhabitants. Accordingly, the Constitution of the FDRE defines nations, nationalities, or peoples as "who inhabit an identifiable, predominantly contiguous territory" (Art. 39 (5)). This definition neglects people who have moved and settled or would move and settle in territories outside of what this part of the definition describes.

There has been a continuous movement of people and a mix of national groups in the territories (states) of the Ethiopian Federation. In some parts of Ethiopia, the bulk of the population has moved voluntarily or has been

moved by the government, particularly from the historic north to the south, southwest and east during the last century. The late 19th century Abyssinian conquest of the southeast, and southwest of modern Ethiopia resulted in gradual demographic change. Since the 1870s, army garrisons (*Ketema*) started to be built in territories taken from the Oromo and others to the south of Abyssinia Proper. As a result, in the second half of the 1800s, largely Amhara and some Tigre nationals had moved *en masse* to the newly annexed territories both as privates in search of a better life, and as appointees to administer the new territory. Their settlement was all over the expanse of the added territory where they imposed their language, culture, tradition, and religion among the local people. They have intermarried with the local people and have adopted the local traditions to an extent. Particularly in urban centers, they make up the elite sections but also the significant size of the population. It is very common to find an unexpectedly large population of Amhara in peripheral cities like Jijiga, Dire Dawa, Harar, Arba-Minch, Dilla, Gambella, and Assosa, to mention some. In predominantly pastoralist areas of the east, south, and west of the country, which covers about sixty percent of the total territory, people have been on a continuous back and forth motion across the state boundaries in search of pasture and water. It has become hard to tell the boundary itself in these states because of juxtaposing national groups. Besides, in connection to the recurrent drought and famine in the northern part of the country, the *Derg* government had moved people from the present Tigray and Amhara states and settled them in the southwest. They constitute a significant part of the population, for example in Gambella State and Benishangul-Gumuz states. Moreover, there has been a continuous movement of people from rural areas to the cities crossing geographical areas. In Addis Ababa City (Finfinnee), the majority of the city residents are Amhara nationals despite its location in the heart of Oromia State and being the capital of Oromia State. Amhara State shares no administrative border with Addis Ababa. The Tigraway (Tigaru) has become the fourth-largest group, following the Oromo and the Guragie of the SNNP State. Yet, the Tigray State shares no state border with Oromia.

With such movement of people across state boundaries and a mix of national groups throughout the country, depending on the habitation of predominantly contagious territory for the delineation of state boundary poses the challenge of the creation of unnecessary minorities of one national group in the territory of another state. One such challenge is the case of national Oromo who is cut off from their "mother state" and included in Amhara State. They are nationalities of a nation in another state. They, however, have limited self-administration right in Amhara State where their

self-administration is described as Oromo *Nation's Nationality Administration Zone* otherwise known as *Kemisie Zone*. Yet, they must abide by the laws and the policies of the state on which they have little say. In cases where the size of such a population is not significant enough to demand the right of self-administration, which is mostly the case in the Ethiopian Federation, their political and social rights are limited significantly. This is because they must abide by the standards set by the majority of people in the state where they live. If not managed well and democratic practices were not advanced, this might lead to the tyranny of the majority. The notion of minority self-rule within a titular state might not work. Some minority peoples, or small segments of a nation residing in the state of another nation, or those who, dictated by their way of life, move continually across state borders living in a fragmented temporary settlement, could not establish their local government or "mother state" to exercise their right to self-rule in the federation. In other words, because they are not numerically or technically fit to establish their special district for local self-administration, they may be exposed to what is referred to as "local tyranny" (Fiseha, 2006, p. 136).

This has been one of the unavoidable drawbacks of the Ethiopian Federation. There is a strong voice, based on the experience of "ethnic federation" in the USSR that the same fate might await the minorities outside of their titular state. In the case of the USSR's ethnic-federalism, Broers (2005) observes, non-titular "ethnic groups tended to become marginalized over time and seen as immigrants regardless of their settlement history" (p. 7). The Amhara political elites fear that the same is happening or will happen in the Ethiopian Federation. There are also scholars of federalism who share this fear.

Nevertheless, as long as the individual rights and liberties of these people are respected everywhere, the challenge of people who reside outside of their titular state in federations like that of Ethiopia will only remain a challenge to which no federation is immune. The principle of "minority rights, majority rule" might work well enough in such cases. However, it needs an appropriate political ideology and bottom-up approach to self-administration, both of which are not the *modus operandi* in the Ethiopian Federation at present.

Challenge of Drawing National Borders

When territories are built around national groups, it cannot be a fixed boundary, nor can it be an exclusive territory. As the members of the national

group move or expand or contract due to both natural and man-made factors, the border continues to change with them. This is clear particularly in pastoralist regions and in metropolitan settlements. In the former, movement of people in the way of life. In the latter, the socioeconomics of urban life dictates the formation of cities from a mix of multiple national groups. Moreover, the social inter-mix among the neighboring national groups continues. People from the adjacent national group intermingle both genetically through inter-nation marriages and socio-economically through economic or social interdependence of some national groups. These factors blur the political border, at least for political and administrative purposes, which should exist and always remain "visible."

In rare cases, the political borders among the members of the federation tend to remain unchanged. This occurs when borders among the members of the federation are not dependent on the national line but the constructed geographical categorization of the state. In other words, it occurs when borders are constructed with no relationship to identity. This is when borders are demarked based on natural or historical factors instead of national markers like language, culture, ethnicity, or sense of common psychological belongingness, and such markings are intended for the sole purpose of administrative conveniences. In such cases, there would be less national conflict on the national border.

Because borders are made based on marks of identity, the Ethiopian Federation has been experiencing multiple conflicts that have emanated thereof. Border conflicts between Somali and Oromia, Somali and Afar, Oromia and Benishangul-Gumuz, Oromia and SNNP states have been caused largely because of border issues. The standoff between Amhara and Tigray State on the Wolqayit-Tsegede district is another example. The intra-state borders themselves, in some cases, have resulted in inter-nation conflicts (conflicts between two national states). This was quite common where sub-national, nationalities, or peoples have designated districts or borders within the state. The SNNP, which has the largest of such borders, has been riddled by such conflicts, however minor. The Gambella State has experienced repeated conflict between its two largest national groups, Nuer and Anyuak. Such border-related conflicts do not seem to abate any time soon under the present political bordering of the federation.

Most of the recent border conflicts in Ethiopia can be attributed to the challenge of drawing a neat political border separating adjacent national or sub-national groups. On one hand, the formation of the federation is based on the self-identification of peoples into national and sub-national groups (NNP) that have been used as the basis for a political bargain and the

restructuring of the state. On the other hand, such restructuring is used as an instrument of access to national resources, rights, and political identity, self-rule, and shared rule. National markers have become the lifeline of the politics of the federation. Yet, none of them could allow a clear border. This paradoxical problem has remained one of the challenges of the federation. Such borders are far from being clear and neat and they continue to be the source of conflict.

Politics of Exclusion and Divergence of Ideologies

The Ethiopian Federation is riddled with growing politics of exclusion among its youth and diverging political ideologies among its political elites. The highly nationalities-oriented politics in Ethiopia has produced a new variant of young national political elites. These young politicians have developed the tendency of political exclusion of the "other." This goes to the extent that they tend to impose on "others" their political ideology while expecting others to deny theirs. Such tendencies are clear in states that are dominated by a single majority national group. The reflection of the same is being observed at the level of inter-state (federal/national) politics. The intensity is even growing strong here. Pan-Ethiopian politicians sometimes exclude not only the interest of few millions of people but also the interest of an entire nation-state or state due to their self-centered choice of political ideology. This has been observed among the political elites who stand guard to the Abyssinian anachronistic nationalism. Thus, they become unacceptably exclusive and hardly unite the NNPs of the federation. Aspirants of both liberal federal states within one Ethiopia and a united nation-state of Ethiopia are no different on the scale of the exclusion of their political ideology. Similarly, those who are in favor of the current socialist-style national federation and those who aspire for the USA model of federalism are divergent. The divergence becomes clearer when it comes to the choice of political ideology. The former perceives revolutionary democracy as an indispensable form of ideology. The latter considers liberal democracy as a solution to all the problems of the present federation. The divide and exclusion have only been growing. It only continues to bread particularly among the new generation of politicians.

Unfulfilled Self-Determination

R. Lansing may have accurately described in 1921 what federalism does to the members of the constituent states when it has constituted some form of the right to self-determination when he said, "the phrase [self-determination] is simply loaded with dynamite," as it will only "raise hopes which can never be realized" (Lansing, quoted in Brilmayer, 1991, p. 177). Such is the state of current affairs in the Ethiopian Federation. The most important promise of the federalization project in Ethiopia has remained unfulfilled. The 1991 Charter that established the TGE explicitly affirmed the rights of NNPs to self-determination in its *Article two* (PDTCE, 1991). Consequently, the 1995 Constitution of the federation grants an unconditional right to self-determination to all NNPs of Ethiopia, including the right to secession, in its Article 39 (FDRE, 1995). Although Ethiopian federalism has made many steps forward towards the realization of self-determination of the NNPs, many nations have yet to achieve self-determination, internal or external. This means any "nation," "nationality," or "people" who would fulfill the mainly primordial definition of nations, nationalities, or peoples as provided in the Constitution can demand the right to self-determination. So far only nine regional states have been formed based on, or related to, this provision. The promise of the Constitution for unconditional self-determination, even for the internal self-determination, has remained unfulfilled for desiring NNPs.

In a country with over 80 NNPs, the right to self-determination, in its fullest sense, has remained only a hope. Pragmatism, resource constraints, and growing interconnectedness and interdependence among the NNPs in Ethiopia would only make both internal and external self-administration unrealizable. Pragmatically, internal self-determination of some of the NNPs, particularly for those minority nationalities and peoples, is not attractive. Self-determination requires economic and institutional resources and capabilities that are lacking in those NNPs. Even when there are sufficient resources and capabilities, self-determination may not be a strategically viable option, particularly if the existing federal arrangement is providing sufficient democratic participation, peace, stability, and law and order where the fundamental and democratic rights of the minority nationalities are respected in the sub-national state they reside in. With such an assumption, the federal government is no more encouraging internal self-determination. Wherever the NNPs have chosen internal self-determination, the federal government and the state government support an alternative to self-administration of the NNPs. This alternative has been the formation of a special *Zones* and special

Wareda within their present state. This has made the formation of a new member of the federation impossible. Provided the federation abides with the Constitution and the federal government respects full fundamental and democratic rights of the people and the NNPs, external self-determination (secession or "political divorce") would no more be attractive. No nation has the resources that could make it self-sufficient. Even for those, which are historically, culturally, and linguistically, distinct for having their own past nation-state or kingdom and have enough resources and competence, secession cannot be a strategically viable option. This is mainly because of the growing economic cooperation which allows equitable share from the national resources of the country and the shared glorious history of Ethiopia. Thus, external self-determination is untenable while internal self-determination is inadequate.

Ethiopian federalism so far granted collective economic advantages to the NNPs by providing mechanisms of shared national resources and corresponding institutionalization and budgetary resources. The interdependence and economic integration among the states have been growing particularly because of centralized policymaking and centralized economic development planning. All the national policies are tuned towards integration and maintenance of unity because they have been designed to serve the purpose of centralizing development programs across all the states. The tools for these five years' national plans, known as Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), are not different from the central plans of the former command economy except in improved bottom-up participation. All the states implement such policies and plan indiscriminately. This has reoriented the states from the first promised political sense of autonomy that was felt strongly in the early 1990s to an economic sense of collaborative national centralism. Now, only the constitutionally entrenched rights of self-determination stand between the Ethiopian Federation and unitary nation-state Ethiopia.

Self-determination has remained only a wish in Ethiopian federalism. Under the present practice of federalism, it is clear that the prospect for the fulfillment of the full rights of self-determination of NNPs, both internally and externally, is gloomy. Neither is the central government ready to allow self-determination nor there are any compelling arguments for the NNPs to opt for it. Hence, the Ethiopian federalization project, as is, is highly likely to remain unfulfilled on the rights of NNPs to self-determination. It only raised hopes of NNPs for self-determination and leaves them in suspension.

Intensified National Loyalty

Ethiopian federalism has resulted in intensified national loyalty that, in turn, has started to erode national unity. This is because of its national orientation and institutionalization of its periodical elements. This intensified national loyalty is conceived by Abyssinian-centred unitary Ethiopia-nist politicians as damaging to the "Ethiopian" identity and the Ethiopian nation. This is because it reduced the collective identity of Ethiopians to national grouping through the instrumentation of the Constitution (Mehretu, 2012). Though how it can destroy the Ethiopian identity is less clear, such intensified national loyalty is likely to compromise the negotiability of federal systems as one or more national groups in the multi-national federalism may be uncompromising in their demands based on their identity, culture, and values that maybe are not compatible with such demands of another national group. The challenge to the negotiability of the federal system might lead to the weakening of the federal government. This, in turn, might continue to weaken the unity of the federation.

However, under the present socio-political condition, one also observes that the NNPs of Ethiopia do not only differ but also share many commonalities, including overlapping identity, language, and culture that have been infused in the generation, at least, since the mid-19th century. Ethiopian NNPs have so far kept their respect for each other's identity, culture, and values under the federal system. One study conducted in one of the federal universities has shown that not only the majority of the students show a favorable attitude towards other ethnocultural groups but also that attitude is independent of one's national background (Semela, 2012). The Federal government (Ministry of Education) assigns involuntarily all students to these Federal universities. As a result, Federal universities are considered the national melting pot in the country. Though this is far from conclusive to all NNPs of Ethiopia, it is a sign that nationalism in Ethiopia is not animosity.

Nevertheless, in times of inter-nation conflict, the potential danger of national gravitation cannot be undermined. Intensified national loyalty could serve as a promoter for all-out hostilities towards other national groups and could oblige an aggravated secession. The best way to avoid inter-nation conflict is through recognition of nationality, and legalization and institutionalization of the rights of national groups in a democratic process. Recognition of self-determination of all the NNPs and effective implementation of the principles of shared-rule and self-rule appears to be

the foremost working mechanism to eliminate inter-nation conflict in the present Ethiopian context.

Intensified national loyalty has less of a constructive impact on the shared-rule of the federation. The House of Federation is a direct representation of NNPs of the federation. The executive of the federal government is also composed of representatives of NNPs. The right of NNPs to shared rules is implemented through these two institutions. Besides, the NNPs have the right to take part in the administration and governance of federal institutions, state-owned corporations, ministries, and other federal civil services offices in or outside of their national state. Intensified loyalty to one's own national state (National-Nation-State) may polarize the federal government (shared rule) resulting in the formation of non-constructive national cleavage and competitions. Nationality and national representation may also be manipulated. Evoking national representation in the federal government in the past has vitiated the confidence of the public in the federal government. It also allowed the dominant Tigrayans to consolidate their dominance through national manipulation for political gain.

Potential for Inter-nation Conflict

Ethnic-based federalism (recognition federalism, in our case) has a mixed record of accomplishment concerning conflict regulation in multi-ethnic societies (Deiwiks, 2009). It has been both the cause and the effect of conflict. Ethnic-based federalism has been "recommended for countries torn by ethnic conflict" (Hale, 2004, p. 165). It has also been one of the causes of the disintegration of some of the former socialist countries (USSR, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia). Most of the secessionist conflicts have taken place in federations and, paradoxically, in ethnic-based federalism, ethnic groups may find exactly those conditions that had allowed the accommodation of various ethnic groups conducive for secession (Deiwiks, 2011). In modern days, some ethnic-based federations, for example in Spain, Canada, Nigeria, and Ireland, separatist tendencies are threatening traditional national unity; so that the federal government has to vigilantly monitor and manage such tendencies.

The Ethiopian Federation is built around the core nations, and it is susceptible to inter-nation and intra-nation conflict. It is built around the Oromo, Amhara, Tigray, Afar and Somali states at the federal level. In another state, the states are formed around two or more core national groups.

In Harari State, the state is formed around the Harari and the Oromo. In Gambella State, the core nationalities are the Anyuak and the Nuer. In Benishangul-Gumuz State, the Gumuza and Berta are the core nationality. In SNNP state, the Sidama, the Hadiya, the Wolaita, the Guragie, and the Gamo are the core nationality. Such a structure, where the federation is formed around the core nations among the states and around the core nations, nationalities, and peoples within other members of the federation, does not appear to be a safe structure both for the unity of the federation as well as the interstate and intra-state peace. It is a potential for the large-scale danger of violent conflict. Hale (2004) suggests a contrary structure to the reality of the federal system in the Ethiopian Federation: "the chances of avoiding the most horrific large-scale violence and the prospects for sustained state unity in divided societies are improved significantly when ethnonational systems are crafted without core ethnic regions" (p. 193). Besides, some researchers have observed that Ethiopia lacks a "democratic system of governance and inclusive and sustainable pan-national identity" that are the basic conditions for moderating ethnic conflict (Aalen, 2006, p. 260). National politics and the nationalization of social relations and political representation have also built some national tensions in the country. Inter-nation conflicts have been prevalent in Gambella and SNNP states. Intra-national conflicts have been noted along the Temben-Adowa-Aksum, Gondar-Gojam-Shewa-Wollo, and Arsi-Shewa-Wallagga axis of old rivalry in Tigray, Amhara, and Oromia state, respectively.

Nonetheless, Ethiopian federalism also has apologists. Nationalist political circles in Ethiopia believe that the dominant party system is the main reason for peace and political "calm" in Ethiopia. However, many blame the ruling party (EPRDF), particularly the TPLF which controls EPRDF, for political manipulation (including by manipulation of history and production of conflicts) to sustain its hegemony by weakening inter-regional state and inter-nation cooperation. According to Temegen (2015), "the political manipulation of contentious historical relations among different groups as 'divide and rule' principle of the EPRDF government blurred commonalities and aggravated national tensions and confrontations especially among the politically dominant national groups, the Amhara and the Oromo" (p. 51). Conflicts, real and imagined, have been produced by the TPLF to divert pressing political issues or to continue the strategy of wakening the political power of the majority nations by dividing their representatives. The apologists also believe the dominant party system is a better option for the Ethiopian Federation.

The potential for national conflict has become one of the characters of the Ethiopian Federation that has been ruled by one unpopular dominant party since its formation. In recent years, the public has developed a strong dislike for the dominant party system and its political and social strategies. This became evident since the crisis that followed the contested result of the 2005 national election between the ruling party and a coalition of parties for unity and democracy (CUD). In the recent past, there is a growing tendency of conflict among some NNPs and many more NNPs are demanding internal self-determination within their respective states. This has resulted in some minor conflicts: such conflicts are likely to aggravate. Besides, as the ruling party is becoming so corrupt and started to grow so ineffective, there is a growing tendency of some ethno-nation and pan-Ethiopian groups to take up arms to topple the government by force. So far, with all its drawbacks, the ruling party has kept the hope that NNPs have the right to self-determination. The future of Ethiopian federalism and the recognition of self-determination and the peace of its NNPs are uncertain after the dominant party system. It appears conflict is inevitable particularly if the current government collapses. Any large-scale national conflict in the country will have a far-reaching consequence for the federation as well as for national unity.

De-securitization of National Relations and Promotion of Liberal Democratic Values

Ethnic-based (national) federalism is not well accepted across Africa. "This proclivity of African states to deny any constitutional space to claims based on ethnic identity," Selassie (2003) argues, is an unwarranted approach, both as a matter of practical expediency and as a matter of constitutional theory, even if it finds support in the notion of liberal constitutionalism and benign state neutrality" (p. 53). Many scholars would recommend the implementation of ethnic-based federalism in African nations that have failed to build nation-states as the ideological basis to achieve political self-determination and to ensure equality of nations within their multinational states. This is regardless of the fear of African leaders on the ground of security. They fear that it could result in sudden failure of national and inter-nation security. African leaders have pessimistic views on the effectiveness of national (ethnic-based) federalism.

Such pessimism has a shadow on Ethiopian federalism due to two missing elements: "the 'desecuritization' of ethnic relation and the liberal

democratic values" (Kymlicka cited in Turton, 2006, p. 5). The same remains to be among the practical challenges of Ethiopian federalism. The former is manifested in the existing unaddressed grievances of national groups against historically oppressive and presently dominating and marginalizing groups. Nationality is employed as the main collective defense of the elites who have been playing some role in the oppression or domination of other national groups. Minority groups who have been advantaged or privileged in the past or at present and want to keep that advantage or privilege also employ it. The latter is manifested in the very nature of the dominant ruling party that is highly characterized by "democratic centralism" of minority dominance and confusing party ideology. Revolutionary democracy, as the ideology of EPRDF, interplays both dictatorship and democracy for consolidation of power and dominance with the primary objective of remaining in power, even at any daring cost.

Ethiopian federalism has failed to promote liberal democracy and de-securitization of national relations or cannot do both at all. The promotion of liberal democracy focuses on personal liberty and freedom. Ethiopian federalism is based primarily on group rights and hence it is not compatible with personal liberty: group rights supersede individual rights. Besides, the process of democratization is not yet deeply rooted in the Ethiopian Federation. Compared to the introduction of Western multinational federalism in some Western countries, the overall challenges of Ethiopian federalism are the promotion of democratic institutions, the development of a culture of political pluralism, and the promotion and respect for democratic values (Turton, 2006). Also, the politics of nationality has remained the source of security for the NNPs to have a voice and representation in the politics, to have a reasonable share in the economic planning, to have protection both against the government and against other NNPs, and to safeguard current and expected privileges. So long as Ethiopian federalism stays dependent on national politics and the politicization of nationality, it would remain to promote group rights and continue to securitize national relations.

Potential for Disintegration

The recent history of the disintegrated socialist federations, such as Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR, demonstrates that ethnic-based federalism was one of the major causes of their disintegration. Ethnicity (nationalism) played a key role in the dissolution of both the state and the

regime (Bunce, 2013). This would gradually annihilate the colonial and conquest-based, mostly arbitrarily delimited, national borders, which had come directly from drawing boards of European colonial powers and divided many nations into several countries and sub-nations. This could be the consequential effect of freedom.

Ethiopia is susceptible to this consequential effect. For example, the Somali State in Ethiopia is, realistically speaking, a smaller detachment from Somalia where a section of the same clan lives across the national borders. The Oromo of Ethiopia and the Oromo of northern Kenya are the same people with the same language, culture, belief system, social stratification, way of life, and history. Yet, they are divided into two countries because of colonialism. Most of the people of Gambella and Benishangul-Gumuz states share identity with southern Sudanese people. The Afar people of Ethiopia and Eritrea are the same national group. The Somali and Afar of Djibouti and the Somali and Afar of Ethiopia are also the same national group. These peoples share porous national borders where people move across it continually and freely, oftentimes driven by preference of life conditions. There has always been strong affiliation and aspiration, for these peoples to the unit; but the political condition so far did not allow. Presently, however, the aspiration of these divided nations to unite to form a genuine nation-state is strengthened by the possibilities of self-determination, up to secession, offered by the Constitution.

National federalism may prevent national conflicts, but it may not prevent national secession. National federalism confers the liberty to self-rule to the national groups. When a national group is at liberty to administer itself, which is an advancement of liberty. Moreover, "secession is clearly consistent with the advancement of liberty" (Kimenyi, 1997, pp. 108-109). Advancement of political liberty is likely to lead to secession in case there are unresolved grievances. Even though through institutional arrangements, national federalism help fight the civil war (Hale, 2000; Roeder, 2009; Bunce, 2003; Deiwiks, 2011), it can also, in the end, lead to secession. This is because it would be cheaper for the ethnic-federal state to secede than to keep the federation (Carter and Goemans 2011 cited in Deiwiks, 2011). Kimenyi (1997) recommends that African nations must be prepared to accept the reality that, in some African countries like Ethiopia and Nigeria, national conflicts can only be resolved if the group has the option to secede and establish an autonomous nation or join other groups in another country.

Federalism is a double-sided blade that must be managed carefully. It can advance either unity of diversity or disintegration of unity, depending on how it is managed. Ethiopian national federalism is no different. Because of the polar anticipated effect of national federalism, the debate on whether

Ethiopian federalism would ultimately achieve "one political and economic community" as aspired in the preamble of the Constitution or would result in catastrophic disintegration of the federation as warned by some opposition politicians and aspirants of the return of the old regime, time only will tell. As far as the scholarly debate on the outcome is concerned, it is divided as ever as summarised by Deiwiks (2011):

> The scholarly debate on ethno-federalism as a suitable institutional tool to govern multiethnic societies is characterized by diametrically opposed positions. On the one hand, ethno-federalism is viewed as being able to accommodate ethnic groups and their needs for self-determination through the devolution of power. On the other hand, ethno-federalism is believed to promote violent secessionism through exactly the same factors that are meant to appease ethnic groups. (p. i)

However, it is important to note that multiple factors advance unity than disintegration in the Ethiopian Federation. The NNPs of Ethiopia have a shared history of at least one century. Throughout the century, they also have developed elements of common identity from which they would like to keep the better part of it. They have also developed an economic interdependence and a faint system of fair sharing of common resources. The effect of commonly intelligible language and commonly owned culture that they have adapted continues to contribute to their unity. The federal system is capitalizing on these elements to support the unity of Ethiopia while employing national politics for political mobilization.

On the other hand, some factors drop wedge among the NNPs of Ethiopia: First, the historical national oppression of the majority of the NNPs by the historically dominant Amhara and Tigrie; second, the tendency of the same national groups to bring back methodically the old ill dominance in the federation; third, the claims and counterclaims among the NNPs on some key economic resources and territories; fourth, the developmental imbalance among states and NNPs; fifth, systemic transfer of national wealth into the hands of politically dominant Tigrie national group and economic dominance of the groups in the federation; sixth, federal favoritism of some states and religions and consequently some national groups and Christianity.

These dividing factors are not beyond the control of the federal government nor is a unitary nation-state the best option for Ethiopia. Building the culture of genuine democratic participation of the NNPs of Ethiopia at all levels of the federal system would resolve most of the dividing elements. If democratic principles and practices are fully implemented in the federation, there would be no compelling reason for secession. Economic

advantage and exploitation, geographical isolation, the difference in social institutions, religious heterogeneity, population heterogeneity, the existence of independent regional and community governments, gains from commerce and defense are among the factors that encourage regions or sates to unite while retaining a significant level of independence (Kimenyi 1997). Furthermore, national groups do not unite or secede simply because of federalism or because they are distinct. Empirical evidence from case studies tends to discredit the claim that autonomy leads to secession in disaggregation federalism like that of Ethiopia (Ghai, 2000). Ethiopia is a country that has tried and failed on building a nation-state from an aggregation of nations and nationalities. Recent lessons from its troubled politics dictate that Ethiopia has no better choice but to sustain the federation.

The Ethiopian Federation has multiple national states that are posed to maintain the unity of the federation. The National Regional States of the federation has become economically interdependent because of the common share of key economic resources. These resources have been developed under their shred-rule primarily during the past two decades. Besides, no one of the states, at the present socio-economic situation, can self-sustain nor do any of them have the single biggest advantage over the others. Full national self-determination within the Ethiopian Federation is the common aspiration of the NNPs of the federation than secession. The secessionist clause in the Constitution, in this regard, appears to be serving more the purpose of acme of political rights of NNPs than the purpose of encouraging the NNPs to secede.

This, however, does not mean the danger of disintegration is non-existent. "A survey of global patterns has found that all instances of ethno-federal-state collapse since World War II have occurred in countries with core national regions and that no state without one has experienced such an extreme event, be it state breakup or large scale civil war" (Hale, 2004, p. 192). The only core national state that can make or break the Ethiopian Federation, if it decides to secede, is the Oromia State. The secession of Oromia would tear the federation apart. Even though they are not as a core a state as Oromia is, the other states also play an indispensable role in keeping the federation. So far strong secessionist tendencies have been noted only in Tigray, Oromia, and Somali states. It has been only in Oromia state that one finds political parties still contemplating national liberation. This is a great danger that could make not only the federal system but also Ethiopia itself a history. If the Constitution is upheld and the present dominance of the Tigraway elite in the federal government as well as in the regional state is checked, according to the Constitution and the laws, it is less likely that the

majority of the Oromo people would opt for secession. If they can exercise their full constitutional, political, democratic, economic, and civil rights in the federation, there will be little motivation for the Oromo people to pursue secession.

Change of Party Structure or Government

Ethiopian federalism is a political experience under one dominant party. EPRDF has been in power since the formation of the federation. This dominant party built itself around the core political ideology of TPLF. It built itself first, by seeking wider support by establishing national parties for the strategic representation of the dominant national groups in the country. Accordingly, ANDM, OPDO, and SEPDF were formed and became part of the ruling coalition, EPRDF. It did so around the time it was preparing to take control of the state power. Second, it expanded its ideologies by being instrumental in creating more parties that are national in the post-1991 revolution. Accordingly, APDO, SPDF, GPDF, BGPDUF, and HNL were formed and became "affiliated" parties to EPRDF. Third, it built its influences across the country by creating a coalition of small parties with national representation in peripheral emerging states. It built itself in such a way to secure its political ambition of remaining in political power and for tactical use for its continued dominance in the economic sector. EPRDF, through OPDO, ANDM, SEDF, and TPLF rules Oromia, Amhara, SNNP, and Tigray States, respectively. These states have a population of 36.7, 23.3, 20.4, and 5.8 percent, respectively (CSA, 2008). The population of these four states is 86.5 percent of the total population of the federation (CSA, 2008). EPRDF rules the periphery states (Afar, Somali, Gambella, Benishangul-Gumuz, and Harari), through "affiliated" parties. They are represented by APDO, SPDF, GPDF, BGPDUF, and HNL, respectively. EPRDF has been governing the major states (Oromia, Amhara, Tigray, and SNNP) directly and the periphery states through the affiliated parties since 1991.

A highly centralized party command structure has enabled EPRDF to dominate for so long. The strategic manipulation of member parties of EPRDF party structures by the TPLF has been through the principle of "democratic centralism." It is a principle where the entire member parties of EPRDF must implement the programs of the party in their respective states. The same has been mirrored to the affiliate parties. The "affiliated" parties follow EPRDF leadership blindly and implement its programs in the respective states they administered. They are watched for their earnest

following of EPRDF programs through an institutionalized mechanism, known as the Ministry of Federal Affairs. TPLF elites dictated leaders of the affiliate parties on how they should manage their internal affairs. In general, such a structure has allowed EPRDF to bring to action spontaneously political practices that are diverging from constitutional provisions and undermine the legitimacy of the Constitution (Fiseha, 2006). Such strategic and tactical arrangements have given EPRDF a stable mechanism of dominance.

This mechanism of dominance has saved EPRDF in a few elections and helped it to continue to implement national federalism. Because the party base makes up about 86.5 percent of the Ethiopian population in the four key states, EPRDF can survive competitive elections, if it ever happens, by one or two of its members. Often in the past election, the OPDO has been the major advantage in this regard. The EPRDF made and continuously re-engineered "affiliated" parties to serve only the political language of "ethnic and regional representation." Their practical influence, particularly on the 'shared-rule,' has been insignificant. In the local administration, they have a better say; yet they have no policy or program of their own. They only implement the policies and programs of the EPRDF. Their most vital role for EPRDF has been helping secure absolute dominance in the elections. Such carefully and strategically engineered party structure gave EPRDF an absolute dominance in policymaking as well as in making laws that are dictated by EPRDF. Under such a party structure, EPRDF has been able to introduce and largely successfully implement national federalism, its flagship-offer to the Ethiopian people. It is questionable whether the federation will survive any change in the existing highly centralized dominant revolutionary party structure.

Whether this federation would survive under a change of government cannot be known. Many Ethiopian politicians and opposition party leaders doubt whether the Constitution, hence the Ethiopian federalism, would survive the loss of its vanguard party. The ruling party has so far been governing the country through its highly centralized party structure than through the federal state structure and its institutions. The divide on some of the constitutional provisions, mainly Article 39 and Article 40 of the Constitution, was evident during the drafting of the Constitution. One leader of the prominent opposition party, Mesfin Welde-Mariam, commented the constitutional deal is "not worth the paper it is written on" on a televised interview in June 2005. Centrist politicians subscribe to the comment. The latecomer *Semayawi* Party (Blue Party) has already drafted an alternative constitution in 2013, within a year of its establishment. Besides, in the constitutional history of Ethiopia, no constitution has ever transcended the

regime that introduced it. The test of survival of change of government for the Constitution and the federation remains a highly anticipated challenge for Ethiopian federalism.

Ownership of Resources and Taxation

The federal budget system has been favoring one state over the other. So far, Ethiopian federalism has managed to convince or coerce the natural resources endowed states to freely offer the share of their resources, in many forms, to the less privileged states. The *modus operandi* has been that all member states should make use of the natural resources regardless of in which state it is located. The goal of such an approach has been to achieve fair development across the state. The politely so-called "emerging state" or otherwise known as "backward state" or "lagging states" have been heavily supplemented from the federal revenues that have been generated mainly from Oromia state. Under the scheme of precedence of rehabilitation and catch-up in development for civil war-ravaged territories, primarily the Tigray State has been leveraged since 1992 at the expense of other states.

In addition to the federal budgetary allocation system, some states have been disadvantaged because of the simple fact that most of the revenues generated in those states fall under the competence of the federal government. This is mainly because most of the companies usually register in the Addis Ababa City administration as their tax bases (headquarters) but operate in other states. The most adversely affected state in this regard is the Oromia State. Such companies in mining, trade, transportation, large-scale farming, manufacturing, and other sectors have exploited the state but paid the bulk of the taxes to Addis Ababa. The second most affected states are the Amhara and SNNP states.

The most populous states have started to demand their rights to ownership of natural resources that are found in the state and for a fair allocation of the federal budget subsidies. The demand has been publicized manifestly in the recent debate on the allocation of the federal budget in the House of Federation. It is a legitimate demand but also concerning. The present arrangement will not be sustainable. Oromia State, in particular, has come to the point that it no more supports other states that have been grazing on it but milked somewhere else. Similar frustrations are clear in Amhara and SNNP states. Such demand to be able to use its own resources primarily for the welfares of the people's own state is a right for one state but could be a threat to another state and the federal arrangements. The so-called

emerging states would not be self-sufficient any time soon. Thus, they need budget subsidies from the federal government very badly. The federal government not only needs the money to finance the big government but also the power that comes with it, particularly the power to distribute the money. As a result, the tug of war on ownership of resources between the states and the federal governments, including tax incomes, will not go away any time soon. This poses one of the greatest challenges to Ethiopian federalism.

Weak Federal Spirit

Federal spirit is the enthusiasm for cooperation and convergence of aspirations of the member state. According to Burgess (2006), "federal spirit refers to the bonds that unite the political community – the reconciliation of individual and collective needs that bind the political community" (p. 113). This bond appears to be challenged since the formation of the Ethiopian Federation. In the views of old and centrist Ethiopian nationalists, 'sub-state' nationalism has eclipsed Ethiopian nationalism. In the views of the emergent and multi-national Ethiopia-nist, reactionary single-state nationalism is yet to be defeated. The former believe that Ethiopian nationalism was achieved through the nation-state building projects of the successive governments of Ethiopia while the latter believe that there is no Ethiopian nationalism as of yet. The latter, the so-called nationalist, reject the Abyssinian-centered anachronistic nationalism and hope to build Ethiopian nationalism that would incorporate the national values of all the nations, nationalities, and peoples of the Ethiopian Federation. The contradiction has continued to grow since the formation of the federation. This has been reflected in the political actions of the NNPs, the federal and state governments, and some parties in recent years, where the enthusiasm for cooperation has continued to erode and aspirations of the NNPs have begun to diverge.

Summary

Ethiopian federalism is not yet a settled state of a political solution: it is riddled with many challenges. Its ideological foundation, as proposed and promoted by the party that led the bargaining experiment, is shaky. The challenge of drawing sub-national or national border or administrative

boundaries within the federation has proved to be more challenging, at times very dangerous, than anticipated. The case of minorities who inhabit other states that are not designated as theirs is far from resolved. There is the growing political exclusion of cultural minorities in bigger states and national, loyalty has intensified. Neither the quest for the NNPs for internal self-determination nor their aspirations for secession have been fulfilled. The federation has become prone to conflicts. Nationalities polemics and distresses have been on the rise. These have made the de-securitization of national tensions and the promotion of liberal democratic values impossible. Also, there are some indications that the federalization process has created some potential for the disintegration of the federation. The federation appears to be held together by the ruling party that has been in power since the formation of the federation. As a result, whether the federation could survive a change of party structure or ideology or change of government is uncertain. The conscious effort of the ruling party to manage economic resources centrally through the party system has resulted in the infringement of the federal government and party officials in the administration of state-owned economic resources. The federal government has been engaged in planned resource allocation to the states. This has resulted in planned inter-state socio-economic imbalance and developmental inequality. In this process, the Oromia state is the most affected. Furthermore, the lack of democratic institutions or undemocratic practices within such institutions has remained yet another challenge to the federation. Last, but not least, the challenge to the federation is a lack of federal spirit. Both the states and the citizenries of the states focus more on their identities and try to maximize their national and state gains with little regard to the need to continue inter-nation cooperation and making compromises for the basic mode of horizontal inter-state and vertical inter-government relationship in the federation. In general, the Ethiopian Federation has a long way to go until its federalism becomes a settled state of a political solution.

Chapter 8

Concluding Remarks

The concept of national self-determination was the animating element in Ethiopian federalism that formed the Ethiopian Federation in 1995. The concept has been around since the last decades of the 19th century, evolving and expanding. It has been associated with the concept of 'national question' in Ethiopia. The 'national question,' alias national self-determination, had been pending in Ethiopia since the fall of the Abyssinian monarchy. By the early 1990s, when the Ethiopian Federation was in the making, there were supportive international and local backgrounds for the implementation of the rights of nations, nationalities, and peoples of Ethiopia to self-determination, both internally and externally. The international backdrop included the UN Charter, the African Charter, the Charter of Paris for New Europe, and The Vienna Declaration and Program of Actions. The local background included historical settler colonization and national oppression, armed struggles of some nations for self-determination, and the existence of widespread politics of nationality in the country. In the event of the removal of the centrist socialist government by armed liberation forces (EPRDF, EPLF, OLF) in May 1991, the combined effect of these backgrounds offered no other better choice than the formation of a federation: a federation that would not only recognize the multinational diversity of the country, equality of NNPs and their cultures, languages, and identities but also allow self-rule of each and shared-rule of all.

Such recognition and the consequent federal arrangement through the instrument of the federal constitution could only be made possible by setting up a transitional government and having a peaceful transitional period. This transitional period was, however, not free from internal threats of violence

and external influences. The USA was involved right from its very beginning. The TGE began with the July 1991 National Conference on Peace and Reconciliation that ratified the Charter of the Transitional Period of Ethiopia. Council of Representatives (CoR), which was formed according to the Charter, served as transitional parliament during the TGE. The TPLF/EPRDF dominated TGE and the NNPs of Ethiopia rejected legendary Ethiopia in Post July 1991 and began the federalization project. In the meantime, TPLF had built a total dominance by controlling about ninety percent of the Ethiopian population through the systemic formation of subservient ethnonational parties that it had bunched up into a coalition called EPRDF. For the remaining ten percent of the population, EPRDF created proxy satellite parties after it took state power. TPLF aimed to ensure its perpetual dominance in Ethiopian politics through EPRDF and the satellite parties. Once it had achieved an apparent dominance, EPRDF started to curb the political promises that it had made during the early months of the formation of the TGE. It even employed armed intimidation to win the first election. Meanwhile, it was earning rewards from the USA and others even when dishonoring agreement with them simply because it was the foremost party to keep law and order in the country. The opposition parties tried to gather momentum by aligning themselves into process and program opposition but to no significant effect. After petrifying opposition parties and the public, including armed intimidations, EPRDF won the first election comfortably and constitutionalized the recognition of NNPs and their rights to self-determination, including secession. The Constitution was shaped by the political orientation of NNPs. Primordial ethnic orientation shaped influenced the political orientations of the NNPs. Thus, the Constitution was shaped by the primordial ethnic orientations of NNPs.

Yet, Ethiopian federalism is unique. It is exceedingly difficult to describe it fully. It is not purely national. It is not purely multinational either. Relatively uncommon names, such as "new federalism," "three-circle federalism," "ethnic-based federalism," or "ethnic model of federalism" do not fully capture the essence of Ethiopian federalism nor does the etymology of ethnicity could help much. Also, nor does Ethiopian federalism falls exclusively into any of Alfred Stepan's 'holding together' or 'coming together' or 'putting together' federalism. Alternative taxonomies for the federation show towards one very fundamental element of the federation: recognition of the national diversity in the federation. Relying on the fundamental and unique provisions of the Constitution and the very animating socio-political, cultural, and linguistic forces behind the formation of the federation, *national*

diversity recognition federalism, *recognition federalism* for short, could be the best descriptor of Ethiopian federalism.

Ethiopian federalism harbors multiple pragmatic challenges. Among others, it places nationalism first in the way it undermines the overall unity of the federation. It erodes the faint Ethiopian identity that has been built over the last century. It has also resulted in imbalances among the nations and nationalities in economic improvement. The fact that it excessively empowers minorities has become an administrative challenge to the states and a security risk to the people. At the same time, the excessive federal government powers and roles in the state governments have denied the national regional states' genuine self-rule. The fiscal asymmetry and the ambiguity between states and federal government tax rights have also denied states the right to collect enough revenue. The federal system, in general, has become one of the main sources of border disputes among and between multiple states. The increased conflicts among the NNPs on ownership of resources have proved this. Because of the private political and ideological motivation of the political leaders, the federal enterprise, as a whole, is equating the survival of NNPs with the survival of the federal government, which, in turn, has equated national survival with the survival of the EPRDF government or the like of it. As such, it has become a source of disheartening fear that emanates from the politically concocted existential threats. Also, it has excessively increased national awareness and tension in some regions. The underlying ideology of the federation obfuscates revolution, democracy, populism, capitalism: it confuses the people. Besides, it creates more confusion and commotion over the definition of a 'nation,' a 'nationality,' and a 'people' in a way that could continue to disenfranchise the public.

On the other hand, it also has advantages. It has ensured the political equality of NNPs and has constitutionally recognized the right to the secession of NNPs. It has brought faster overall economic growth though it also has widened the inequality. Similarly, it boosted the free development and exercises of the cultures, languages, and traditions of NNPs. Its encouragement of ethnonational socio-political thinking has brought political enlightenment to NNPs. It also ignited the quest in the NNPs for equity in economic development. In doing so, it has created positive economic rivalry among nations and developmental passion in the citizen. It boosted the development of regional capital cities and towns. In the legislative domain, it has built the foundation for constitutionalism and the supremacy of the law. It also revolutionized the political culture: it has deep-rooted in the political culture of nationalities politics and national questions. It has educated the NNPs on freedom, equality, and rule of law from the existing relationships among them. This has hugely increased the political

participation of citizens and created competition of political participation among states and NNPs.

Ethiopian federalism also has significant weaknesses. It is formed mainly based on the ideological conviction of the militarily victorious EPRDF instead of based on a genuinely negotiated bargain. Its formation was dominated by the EPRDF, which not only dictated most of its structure and underlying ideology but also has remained the vanguard of its dictation for a quarter of a century. As such, the federation has failed to develop inclusive and cooperative multi-party democracy. It supplies an insufficient mechanism for check and balance of powers, vertical and horizontal. It does not protect fully the rights of minority groups who live in a state other than theirs. It bestows excessive powers on the federal executives. The operational mechanism of the federation is tied directly to the internal governance mechanism of the ruling party, which centralizes policies and their implementation strategies at the federal level.

Federalism is a system of political organization that stands for unity while supporting diversity. Ethiopian federalism recognizes national diversity constitutionally. However, it has shown its failure to capitalize on the necessary unity. It has been understood, rather, as federalism that stands to preclude the development of civic Ethiopian nationalism. Also, as a federal system, it has been ineffective. The effectiveness of such a system depends on multiple factors. One of these factors is its administration. In such administration, "strong institutions, effective policies, and unifying symbols need to be set in place together with an independent and impartial judiciary system" that "has to be supported by an inclusive constitutional framework, effective enforcement mechanisms, transparent and accountable government" (Temesgen, 2015, p. 53). In this regard, Ethiopian federalism has much room for improvement. Its reliance on informal structure and party mechanism for administration should be replaced by requisite reliance on federal and state institutions and democratic practices.

Ethiopian federalism is still an experiment, but it is proving increasingly to be the only workable choice for the unity of the multinational state. At the very beginning, some people doubted that national federalism, which I call *diversity recognition federalism* (or, simply, *recognition federalism*), is politically correct or practically sustainable in the Ethiopian context. The federation is over a quarter of a century old and is going ever stronger. Some people feared that national federalism might lead to a crisis every time the election year comes around. Unitarist politicians feared that it could result in full-scale national conflict, even in genocide. Yet, the federation has not experienced any national conflict during the elections even though national

political parties dominate the political competition, nor has the federation experienced a single conflict that could aptly be categorized as national conflict. The conflicts in the federation have been caused primarily by resource constraints, not by national hatreds. Indeed, another form of federalism could not have avoided these conflicts. The conflicts have mostly been the result of ill-fated interactions between resource-scarce groups of people. The federation has successfully managed over eighty NNPs relatively safely, peacefully, and comfortably. It has brought a sense of belongingness, equality, justice, and political participation to the marginalized and oppressed NNPs of Ethiopia. These have been continued proof that *recognition federalism* (Ethiopian federalism) is not only politically correct but also, with all its limitations, challenges, and weaknesses that are not much different from any other such system, viable and tenable. The resolve it has brought in solving long-standing national grievances and the socio-political and economic progress that it has brought during the last quarter of a century has proved this. A quarter of a century is not a long time in terms of history, but it is certainly a lengthy period in terms of politics. If it were untenable, the same would have been proved until now.

Perhaps, the present federation is the most tenable political arrangement ever available to the NNPs of Ethiopia. The temptations of going back to the forced Abyssinian-centred unitary Ethiopian nationalism, as the centrist aspirants of the bygone regimes might wish must be repulsed and defended. Similarly, the temptation of going down the road of disintegration that could make modern Ethiopia a history, as anarchists nationalist might wish, also must be repulsed and defended. Not only these two extremes but also any temptations next to them must be repulsed and defended by every NNP. Not because it is the best possible but because it is the most tenable political arrangement, all NNPs must commit to sustaining it to continue enjoying its pragmatic benefits while working jointly to reduce its inadvertent harms. The NNPs of the federation should also aspire to achieve even more by building steadily on it. The collapse of the federation or an attempt to reverse or remake it could cost its citizens so dearly than continuously reshaping it to a perfect federation.

Metaphorically speaking, modern Ethiopia is a living one body with many souls. The body is a multinational federation. The souls are the multiple nation, nationalities, and peoples (multinationalism). The body and the souls are united by national diversity recognition federalism (recognition federalism). The single united body and souls is the Ethiopian Federation. Politics of nations, nationalities, and peoples (nationalities politics) is the blood of the Ethiopian Federation. Currently, it may be bad blood, but it is not immutable. It could be fused progressively with good blood and become

better. The body could also be ameliorated: it is mutable. But it is delicate. Whoever would have the audacity to ameliorate it must be guided by sagacity and work steadily and altruistically. The immutable are the souls. The only guarantee for the continued existence of modern Ethiopia is to leave them as are.

References

Aalen, L. (2002). *Ethnic federalism in a dominant party state: The Ethiopian experience 1991-2000* (Master's Thesis). Chr. Michelsen Institute of Development Studies and Human Rights, Bergen, Norway.

Aalen, L. (2006). Ethnic federalism and self-determination for nationalities in a semi-authoritarian state: The case of Ethiopia. *International Journal of Minority and Group Rights, 13*, 243-261.

Aalen, L. (2011). *The politics of ethnicity in Ethiopia: Actors, power, and mobilisation under ethnic federalism*. Leiden and Boston: Brill.

Abbay, A. (2004). Diversity and state-building in Ethiopia. *African Affairs*, *103*(413), 593–614. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adh043

Abbink, J. (1995). Breaking and making the state: The dynamics of ethnic democracy in Ethiopia. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, *13*, 149-163.

Abbink, J. (2006). Ethnicity and conflict generation in Ethiopia: Some problems and prospects of ethno-regional federalism. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, *24*(3), 389-413.

Abebe, S. G. (2014). *The last post-Cold War socialist federation: Ethnicity, ideology and democracy in Ethiopia*. Farnham, England: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.

Abegaz, B. (2011, April). Political parties in business. Working Paper Number 113. Department of Economics. The College of William and Mary.

Abraham, K. (1994). *Ethiopia from bullets to the ballot box: The bumpy road to democracy and the political economy of transition*. Lawrenceville, NJ, USA: The Red Sea Press Inc.

Althouse, A. (1993). Variations on a theory of normative federalism: A Supreme Court Dialogue, *Duke Law Journal,* 42, 979-1021.

Amnesty International. (1994, January). *Amnesty International Report 1994-Ethiopia.* Retrieved September 25, 2015, from http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a9f512.html

Angew, J. (1995). Postscript: Federalism in post-Cold War era. In G. Smith (Ed.), *Federalism: The multiethnic challenge.* New York, NY, USA: Longman.

An-Na'im, A. A. (1993). National question, secession, and constitutionalism: The mediation of competing claims to self-determination. In D. Greenberg, S. N. Katz, M. B. Oliviero, & S. C. Wheately (Eds.), C*onstitutionalism and democracy transition in the contemporary world* (pp. 105-125). New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.

Arnold, G. (2005). Civil war: Post-colonial Africa. In K. Shillington (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of African History* (Vols. I (A-G) pp. 247-249). London, UK: Fitzroy Dearborn.

Arriola, L.R and Lyons, T. (2016). Ethiopia's 100% election. *Journal of Democracy*, 27*(1)*, 76-88.

Arriola, L.R. (2013). Protesting and policing in a multiethnic authoritarian state: Evidence from Ethiopia. *Comparative Politics*, *45*(2), 147-168.

Baissa, L. (1998). Contending nationalism in the Ethiopian empire state and the Oromo struggle for self-determination. In A. Jalata (Eds.) *Oromo nationalism and the Ethiopian discourse: The search for freedom and democracy* (pp.125-152). Lawrenceville, NJ, USA: The Red Sea Press.

Babalola, D. (2015). The efficacy of federalism in a multi-ethnic state: The Nigerian experience, *Journal of Pan African Studies*, *8*(2), 74-91.

Wheare, K. C. (1963), *Federal Government* (4th ed.), London: Oxford University Press.

Elazar, D. (1987). *Exploring federalism.* Alabama: The University of Alabama Press.

King, P. (1982). *Federalism and Federation.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Riker, W. H. (1964). *Federalism: Origin, operation, significance.* Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

Balcha, B. G. (2009). Constitutionalism in the Horn of Africa: Lesson from the new constitution of Ethiopia. *DIIPER Research Series:* Working Paper No. 15. Aalborg, Denmark: DIIPER & Department of History, International and Social Studies, Aalborg University.

Beken, C. V. (2007). Ethiopia: Constitutional protection of ethnic minorities at the regional level. *African Focus*, *20*(1-2), 105-151.

Berhe, A. (2009). *A political history of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (1975-1991): Revolt, ideology and mobilisation in Ethiopia.* Los Angeles, CA, USA: Tsehay Publishers.

Berhe, A. (2018). The politics of famine, media activism, and donor aid in the Horn. *The Routledge Companion to Media and Humanitarian Action*, 307–320.

Bhandari, S. (2014). *Self-determination and constitution making in Nepal: Constituent assembly, inclusion, and ethnic federalism.* http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-287-005-6).

Bhattacharyya, H. (2010). *Federalism in Asia: India, Pakistan, and Malaysia.* London, UK: Routledge.

Brilmayer, L. (1991). Secession and self-determination: A territorial interpretation. *Yale Journal of International Law*, *16*, 177-202. Retrieved from http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/2434

Broers, Laurence (Eds) (2005). *The limits of leadership: Elites and societies in the Nagorny Karabakh peace process.* London, UK; Conciliation Resources

Bunce, V. (2013, April). Communist federations. Paper to be presented at the Faculty Workshop Series "Constitution-Making," University of Pennsylvania, April 18, 2013.

Burgess, M. (2006). *Comparative federalism: Theory and practice.* London, UK: Routledge.

Burgess, M. (2012). Federalism in Africa: An essay on the impact of cultural diversity, development, and democracy. *The Federal Idea* [A Quebec Think Tank on Federalism], 1-20.

Burgess, M. (2012a). Multinational federalism in multinational federation. In M. Seymour, & A.-G. Gagnon (Eds.), *Multinational federalism: Problems and prospects* (pp. 23-45). Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave.

Central Statistical Agency. (2008, December). *Summary and statistical report of the 2007 population and housing census: Population size by age and sex*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: FDRE Population Census Commission.

Clapham, C. (1994). Ethnicity and the national question in Ethiopia. In P. Woodward, & M. Forsyth (Eds.), *Conflict and peace in the horn of Africa* (pp. 27-40). Aldershot, UK: Dartmouth.

Clapham, C. (2006, March). Ethiopian development: The politics of emulation. *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, *44*(1), 108-118.

Cohen, J. M., & Weintraub, D. (1975). *Land and peasants in Imperial Ethiopia: The social background to a revolution*. Assen, The Netherlands: Van Gorcum and Company.

Cop, B., & Eymirloglu, D. (2005). The right of self-determination in international law: Towards the 40th anniversary of the adoption of ICCPR and ICESCR. *Perceptions* (winter), 115-146.

Debelo, A. R. (2007). *Ethnicity and inter-ethnic relations: the 'Ethiopian Experiment' and the case of the Guji and Gedeo.* (Master's thesis, University of Tromsø, Tromsø, Norway). Retrieved from http://munin.uit.no/bitstream/handle/10037/990/thesis.pdf

Debelo, A. R. (2012). Emerging ethnic identities and inter-ethnic conflict: the Guji-Burji conflict in south Ethiopia. *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, *12*(3), 517-533.

Deiwiks, C. (2009, December). The curse of ethno-federalism? Ethnic group regions, subnational boundaries, and secessionist conflict. A paper presented for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Swiss Political Science Association, Geneva, Jan 7-8, 2010.

Deiwiks, C. (2011). *Ethnofederalism- A slippery slope towards secessionist conflict?* (Doctoral dissertation, ETH ZURICH, Zurich, Switzerland). DISS. ETH NO. 1984. Retrieved from http://e-collection.library.ethz.ch/eserv/eth:4691/eth-4691-02.pdf

Delebo, Lapiso G. (1982 Eth.C.). **የኢትዬጵያ ረጅም የሕዝብና የመንግስት ታሪክ（አንደኛ መጽሐፍ）። አዲስ አበባ ፥ኢትዬጵያ፤ ንግድ ማተሚያ ቤት።**

Delebo, Lapiso G. (1983 Eth.C.). ***የኢትዬጵያ የባር ሥርዓትና ጅምር ካፒታሊዝም 1900-1966*（ሁለተኛ መጽሐፍ）: አዲስ አበባ፥ ኢትዬጵያ፤ ንግድ ማተሚያ ቤት።**

Delebo, Lapiso G. (1999 Eth.C.). ***ኢትዬጵያ ታሪካዊ መሰረቶችና መሳረያዎች ፤ የኢትዬጵያ እና የኢትዬጵያዊያን የመነሻና የማንነት ግንዛቤ።*（አራተኛ መጽሐፍ）፥ አዲስ አበባ ፥ ኢትዬጵያ፤ ንግድ ማተሚያ ድርጅት።**

Drake, F. D., & Nelson, L. R. (Eds.). (1999). *States' rights and American federalism: A documentary history* (Primary Documents in American History and Contemporary Issues*)*. Westport, CT, USA: Greenwood Press.

Elazar, D. J. (1987). *Exploring federalism*. Tuscaloosa, AL, USA: University of Alabama Press.

Ethnic-group. (2015a). In Dictionary.com (Unabridged). Retrieved June 01, 2015, from http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/ethnic-group

Ethnic-group. (2015b). In *Collins English Dictionary* (Complete & Unabridged), (10th ed.). Retrieved June 01, 2015, from http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/ethnic-group

Ethnic-group. (2015c). *In Collins English Dictionary* (Unabridged). Retrieved June 01, 2015, from http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/ethnic-group

Ethnic-group. (2015d). In *Online Etymology Dictionary*. Retrieved June 01, 2015, from http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/ethnic-group

Ethnicity. (2015a). In *Online Etymology Dictionary*. Retrieved June 01, 2015, from http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/ethnicity

Ethnicity. (2015b). In *The American Heritage New Dictionary of Cultural Literacy* (3rd ed.). Retrieved June 01, 2015, from http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/ethnicity

FDRE Population Census Commission. (2008, December). *Summary and Statistical Report of the 2007 Population and Housing Census: Population Size by Age and Sex*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Population Census Commission.

Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. (1995, August). Proclamation No.1, A proclamation to pronounce the coming into effect of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. *Negarit Gazeta (Year I, No. I)*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Berhanena Selam Print Press.

Federalism. (2015). In *Marriam-Webster Dictionary*. Retrieved February 3, 2015, from http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/federalism#

Feeley, M. M., & Rubin, E. (2008). *Federalism: Political identity and tragic compromise*. Retrieved from http://www.press.umich.edu/titleDetailLookInside.do?id=106254

Fessha, Y. T. (2010). *Ethnic diversity and federalism: Constitution making in South Africa and Ethiopia*. Farnham, UK: Ashgate.

Fiseha, A. (2006). Theory versus practice in implementation of Ethiopia's ethnic federalism. In D. Turton (Ed.), *Ethnic federalism: The Ethiopian experience in comparative perspective* (pp. 131-165). Oxford, UK: James Currey Ltd.

Føllesdal, A. (2014, Spring). Federalism. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Retrieved February 23, 2015, from: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/federalism/.

Gamper, A. (2005). A "Global Theory of Federalism": The nature and challenges of a federal state. *German Journal of Law*, *6*(10), 1297-1318.

Green, E. D. (2006, March). Redefining ethnicity. In *47th Annual International Studies Association Convention, March, San Diego, CA. Retrieved from http: personal.Ise.ac.uk/green/ISA.pdf*

Gudina, M. (2006). Contradictory interpretation of Ethiopian history: The need for a new consensus. In D. Turton (Ed.), *Ethnic federalism: The Ethiopian experience in comparative perspective* (pp. 119-131). Oxford, UK: James Currey Ltd.

Gudina, M. (2015). *የኢትዮጵጵያ ታሪክ ፈተናዎች እና የሚጋጩ ሀልሞች፤ የኢህአዴግ ቆርጦ ቀጥል ፖለቲካ*። አዲስ አበባ ፥ኢትዮጵያ፤ Author.

Haile-Mariam, M. (1986). *Ethiopian Herald*. February 25, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Haile-Mariam, M. (1988, July). *Mengistu Haile-Mariam responding to intentional media: Press conference given on May 28, 1988*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Press Department, Ministry of Information.

Hale, H. E. (2004, January). Divided we stand: Institutional sources of ethnofederal state survival and collapse. *World Politics*, *56*, 165-193.

Hameso, S. (1996, November). Towards positive ethnicity in Africa. Retrieved from http://www.academia.edu/3043900/Towards_Positive_Ethnicity_in_Africa.

Hameso, S. Y. (2004). The Sidama nation and solidarity of the colonized nations in Ethiopia. In A. Jaleta (Ed.), *State crisis, globalisation and national movements in north-east Africa* (pp. 165-181). New York, NY, USA: Routledge.

Holcomb, B. K. (2004). Contending democracies: US-sponsored 'democracy' encounters indigenous Oromo democratic forms. In A. Jalata (Ed.), *State crisis, globalization, and national movements in north-East Africa* (pp. 122-165). London, UK: Routledge.

Human Rights Watch. (1992). *Human Rights Watch world report 1992 - Ethiopia*. Retrieved January 8, 2015, from http://www.refworld.org/docid/467fca3fc.html

Human Rights Watch. (1993). *Human Rights Watch World Report 1993- Ethiopia*. Retrieved September 25, 2015, from http://www.refworld.org/docid/467fca5dc.html

Human Rights Watch. (1994). Ethiopia: Reckoning under the law. (Statement by Herman Cohen, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, United States Information Service, Press Release, May 28, 1991). Volume 6, No. 11.

Inman, R. P., & Rubinfeld, D. L. (1997). Rethinking federalism. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, *11*(4), 43-64.

International Crisis Group. (2009, September 4). Ethiopia: Ethnic federalism and its discontent. In *Crisis Group Africa Report No. 153-4*, Nairobi/ Brussels: International Crisis Group.

International Crisis Group. (2012, August). Ethiopia after Meles. *Policy Briefing,* 89, 1-15. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/file/1316/download?token

Jalata, A. (2005). *Oromo and Ethiopia: State formation and ethnonational conflict, 1868-2004*. Asmara, Eritrea: The Red Sea Press, Inc.

Jones, A., & Monroe, E. (1935). *A history of Abyssinia.* London, UK: Oxford University Press.

Karmis, D., & Norman, W. (2005). The revival of federalism in normative political theory. In D. Karmis, & W. Norman (Eds.), *Theories of Federalism: A reader*, (pp. 1-21). New York, NY, USA: Palgrave.

Kefele, A. (2009). *Federalism and ethnic conflict in Ethiopia: A comparative study of the Somali and Benishangul-Gumuz Regions* (Doctoral dissertation). Leiden University, Leiden, Netherlands.

Keller, E. J. (1995). The Ethnogenesis of the Oromo nation and its implications for politics in Ethiopia. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, *33*(4), 621-634.

Keller, E. J. (2002). Ethnic federalism, fiscal reform, development, and democracy in Ethiopia. *African Journal of Political Science*, *7*(2), 21-50.

Kimenyi, M. S. (1997). *Ethnic diversity, liberty, and the state: The African dilemma.* Cheltenham & Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.

King: (1982). *Federalism and federation.* London, UK: Croom Helm.

Kymlicka, W. (1995). *Multicultural citizenship: A liberal theory of minority rights*. Oxford, UK: Clerendon Press.

LaCroix, A. L. (2011). *The ideological origin of American federalism.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Lata, L. (1998a). The making and unmaking of Ethiopia's transitional charter. In A. Jalata (Eds.) *Oromo nationalism and the Ethiopian discourse: The search for freedom and democracy* (pp. 51-77). Lawrenceville, NJ, USA: The Red Sea Press.

Lata, L. (1998b). Peculiar challenges to Oromo nationalism. In A. Jalata (Eds.) *Oromo nationalism and the Ethiopian discourse: The search for freedom and democracy* (pp.125-152). Lawrenceville, NJ, USA: The Red Sea Press.

Lata, L. (1999). *The Ethiopian state at the crossroads: Decolonization & democratization or disintegration?* Asmara, Eritrea: The Red Sea Press, Inc.

Lata, L. (2004). What next in the Horn of Africa? In A. Jalata (Ed.), *State crisis, globalisation and national movements in north-east Africa* (pp. 202-230). New York, NY, USA: Routledge.

Legesse, A. (1973). *GADA: Three approaches to the study of African societies*. New York, NY, USA: The Free Press.

Lenin, V. (1914). On the question of national policy. In *Lenin Collected Works* (Volume 20) (pp. 217-225). Retrieved from http://ciml.250x.com/archive/lenin/english/lenin_on_the_world_revolution_quotations_of_collective_works_1894-1916_first_book.html

Levy, J. (2007). Federalism and the old and new liberalism. *Social Philosophy and Policy*, *24*(1), 306-332.

Lewthwaite, G. A. (Ed.). (1991, May 29). Rebels pledge democracy in U.S. - brokered talks end in agreement after fall of capital: *The Sun*. Retrieved March 24, 2015, from http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1991-05-29/news/1991149072_1_addis-ababa-ethiopians-eprdf

Loughlin, J. (2008). Review: federalism, regionalism, local government: comparative perspectives on transforming the nation-state. *European Political Science*, *7*, 472-482. doi:10.1057/eps.2008.37

Mackenzie, I., & Porter, R. (2011). Dramatization as method in political theory. *Contemporary Political Theory*, *10*(4), 482-501.

Marcus, H. G. (1994). *A history of Ethiopia.* Retrieved from http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft109nb00g/

McWhinney, E. (2007). *Self-determination of peoples and plural-ethnic states in contemporary international law: Failed states, nation-building and the alternative, federal option.* Leiden, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

Mehretu, A. (2012). Ethnic federalism and its potential to dismember the Ethiopian State. *Progress in Development Studies*, *12* (2-3), 113-133. http://dx.doi.org/10:1177/146499341101200303

Melbaa, G. (1988). *Oromia: An introduction.* Khartoum, Sudan: Author.

Mengisteab, K. (1997). New approach to state building in Africa: The case of Ethiopia's ethnic based federalism. *African Studies Review,* 111-132.

Mgbako, C., Braasch, S., Degol, A., Morgan, M., Segura, F., & Tezera, T. (2008). Report: Silencing the Ethiopian court: Non-judicial constitutional review and its impact on human rights. *Fordham International Law Journal, 32*(1), 259-297.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of FDRE. (2012). History. Retrieved January 7, 2015, from http://www.mfa.gov.et/aboutethiopia.php?pg=2

Minorities at Risk Project. (2004). *Chronology for Oromo in Ethiopia.* Retrieved March 2, 2015, from http://www.refworld.org/docid/469f38871c.html

Mole, B. G. (2014). *Historical politics of Oromo Liberation Front: Ethnicity, nationalism, and stability in the Horn of Africa.* (Master's thesis, Norwegian School of Theology, Norway).

Muteki, A. (2015, May 28). May 28/1991 in London. *Satenaw.* Retrieved June 1, 2015, from http://satenaw.com/amharic/archives/7372

Nation. (2015). Dictionary.com (Unabridged). Retrieved June 01, 2015, from http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/nation

Nawaz, M. K. (1965). The Meaning and Range of the Principle of Self-Determination, *Duke Law Journal.* 14 (1/6), 82-101. Retrieved from: http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/dlj/vol14/iss1/6

Negussie, S. (2006). *Fiscal federalism in Ethiopian ethnic-based federal system.* Nijmegen, Netherland: Wolf Legal Publishers.

Oqubay, A. (2015). *Made in Africa: Industrial policy in Ethiopia.* Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. (2012, December). *Charter of Paris for a new Europe (Paris, 21 November 1990).* Retrieved 1 July, 2015 from http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2003/8/8/27f6d664-4466-4fd6-9e23-cd2d84f72cde/publishable_en.pdf

Ostrom, V. (1991). *American Federalism: Constituting a self-governing society.* San Francisco, CA, USA: ICS Press.

Peaceful and Democratic Transitional Conference of Ethiopia. (1991, July). Transitional period charter of Ethiopia. *Negarit Gazeta (50th Year, No.1).* Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Berhanena Selam Printing Press.

Reclus, E. (1892). *The universal geography: The earth and its inhabitants* (Vol. I, North-East Africa; A. H. Keane, Ed.). New York, NY: D. Appleton & Co. Retrieved from http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/Anarchist_Archives/bright/reclus/Earth/africatheearth01recluoft.pdf

Redi, O. (2009, September 21). Ethiopia: Ethnic federalism could lead to election violence. *International Press Service News Agency.* Retrieved 29, 2015, from http://www.ipsnews.net/2009/09/ethiopia-ethnic-federalism-could-lead-to-election-violence/

Ree, E. V. (1994). Stalin and the national question. *Revolutionary Russia*, *7*(2), 214-238.

Regassa, T. (2009). Sub-national constitutions in Ethiopia: Towards entrenching constitutionalism at the state level. *Mizan Law Review*, *3*(1), 34-69.

Rodden, J. (2004, July). Comparative federalism: On meaning and measurement. *Comparative Politics*, *36*(4), 481-500.

Roeder, G. (May 2009). Ethnofederalism and the mismanagement of nationalism. *Journal of Federal and Regional Studies*, *19*(2), 203-219. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13597560902753420

Schuck: H. (2006). Federalism. *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law*, *38*(5), 5-12.

Selassie, A. G. (2003). Ethnic federalism: Its promises and pitfalls for Africa. *The Yale Journal of International Law*, *28*(51), 51-107.

Sellassie, S. H. (1972). *Ancient and medieval Ethiopian history to 1270*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: United Printers.

Semela, T. (2012). Intergroup relations among the Ethiopian youth: Effects of ethnicity, language, and religious background. *Journal of Development Societies*, *28*, 323-354. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0169796X12453782

Seymour, M. (2004). Introduction: Theories and practices. In M. Seymour (Ed.), *The fate of the nation* (pp. 3-16). Montreal, Canada: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Shaw, M. N. (2003). *International Law* (6th ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Shinn, D. H. (2014, October). U.S policy in the Horn of Africa. *IGIS WP 15*, 5. Washington DC, USA: Institute for Global and International Studies.

Smith, G. (1995). Mapping the federal condition: Ideology, political practice, and social justice. In G. Smith (Ed.), *Federalism: The multi-ethnic challenge* (pp. 1-28). London, UK: Longman.

Smith, L. (2013). *Making citizens in Africa: Ethnicity, gender, and national identity in Ethiopia*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Solan, N. G. (2015, September 22). *A constitution for a multi-national democratic state-nation, the case of Ethiopia: Research report for the National Endowment for Democracy (NED)*. Retrieved September 28, 2015, from

http://www.ethiomedia.com/1000parts/a_constitution_for_multi_national_state_nation.pdf

Solan, N. G. (2016, March 12). Ethiopia's constitution: Can it stand the test of time? (Lemma, T., Interviewer). *Satenaw*. Retrieved March 23, 2016 from http://www.satenaw.com/ethiopias-constituion-can-stand-test-time/

Stepan, A. (1999). Federalism and democracy: Beyond the U.S. model. *Journal of Democracy*, *10*(4), 19-34.

Temesgen, S. M. (2015, November). Weaknesses of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia. *International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences Invention*, 4(11), 49-54. Retrieved from http://www.ijhssi.org

Teshome, B. W. (2009). Ethiopian opposition political parties and rebel fronts: Past and present. *International Journal of Human and Social Sciences*, *4* (1), 60-68.

Turton, D. (2006). Introduction. In D. Turton (Ed.), *Ethnic federalism: The Ethiopian experience in comparative perspective* (pp.1-32). Oxford, UK: James Currey.

U.S. Department of State. (1994, January 31). *Ethiopia human rights practices, 1993*. Retrieved from http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1993_hrp_report/93hrp_report_africa/Ethiopia.html

United Nations. (1945, October). *Charter of the United Nation and the statute of the International Court of Justice*. San Francisco, CA, USA: United Nations. https://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/

United Nations. (1970). *UN general assembly resolution: Declaration on principles of international law concerning friendly relations and cooperation among states in accordance with the charter of the United Nations*. New York, NY, USA: United Nations.

United Nations. (2013, June). 20 years Vienna deceleration and programs of action. *1993 World Conference on Human Rights*. New York, USA: Office of the United Nations Higher Commissioner for Human Rights and the United Nations Department of Public Information.

United Nations. (2015*). International covenant on economic, social and cultural rights. United Nations Human Rights Office of Higher Commission for Human Rights*. Retrieved January 15, 2015, from http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx

Vaughan, S. (1994). *The Addis Ababa transitional conference of July 1991: Its origin, history, and significance*. Edinburgh, UK: Centre for African Studies, Edinburgh University.

Vaughan, S., & Tronvoll, K. (2003). The culture of power in contemporary Ethiopian political life. In A. Sisask (Ed.) *SIDAstudies no.10* (pp. 184). Sweden: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA). Retrieved from https://www.sida.se/contentassets/0fc9cb12d56f497585678e561d77dc3b/13797.pdf

Vyver, J. v. (2011). The right to self-determination of cultural, religious, and linguistic communities in South Africa. *PER / PELJ*, *14*(4), 351-379.

Watts, R. L. (1998). Federalism, federal political system, and federations. *Annual Review of Political Science*, *1*, 117-147.

Watts, R. L. (2005). Comparing forms of federal partnership. In D. Karmis, & W. Norman (Eds.), *Theories of federalism: A reader* (pp. 232-253). New York, NY: Palgrave.

Wolde, M. A. (2005). *A critical assessment of institutions, roles, and leverage in public policymaking: Ethiopia, 1974-2004*. (Doctoral dissertation, Stellenbosch, South Africa: University of Stellenbosch.)

Young, J. (1996). Ethnicity and power in Ethiopia. *Review of African Political Economy*, *40*, 531-542.

Záhořík, J. (2011). Ethiopia between constitutional principles and reality. In P. Macha, & T. Drobik (Eds.), *The scale of globalization: Think globally, act locally, change individually in the 21st century* (pp. 374-378). Ostrava, Czech Republic: University of Ostrava.

Ziblatt, D. (2004, October). Rethinking the origin of federalism: Puzzle, theory, and evidence from nineteenth century Europe. *World Politics*, *57*, 70-98.

Zimmermann-Steinhart, P., & Bekele, Y. (2012). The impact of federalism and decentralisation on socio-economic conditions in Ethiopia. *Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal*, *15*(2), 90-117. http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/pelj.v15i2.5

Index

A

Abbay, 67, 68, 233
Abbink, 87, 188, 233
Abebe, 55, 194, 195, 233
Abegaz, 82, 233
Abraham, 3, 4, 62, 63, 117, 233
Abyssinia Proper, 21, 95, 200, 207
Abyssinia-cum-modern Ethiopia, 20, 199
Abyssinian Empire, ***32***, ***35***, ***36***, ***44***, ***109***, ***128***, ***130***, ***131***
Abyssinian monarchy, ***xiii***, ***1***, ***23***, ***226***
Addis Ababa, 5, 18, 23, 38, 45, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 56, 58, 75, 80, 89, 90, 102, 105, 106, 107, 135, 136, 161, 165, 173, 182, 187, 207, 223, 236, 238, 239, 243, 244, 246
administrative challenge, 228
AESM, ***38***, ***39***, ***53***, ***71***, ***90***, ***107***
Afar, 33, 50, 62, 70, 76, 77, 102, 103, 141, 144, 146, 153, 154, 156, 157, 160, 161, 162, 165, 167, 172, 173, 178, 197, 199, 200, 201, 209, 214, 218, 221
affective community, ***196***
affiliate parties, 221
Agew, ***32***, ***33***, ***62***, ***63***, ***141***, ***164***
alpha-omega, ***6***
Althouse, 123, 233
American Embassy, ***52***
Amhara nation, 39, 45, 199
Amhara State, 161, 164, 165, 173, 178, 207
Amhara-centred, ***35***, ***130***, ***143***
Amhara-dominated centrists, ***99***
Amharaization policy, ***19***
Amharic language, ***34***, ***199***
Amnesty International, 89, 234
ANDM, ***6***, ***28***, ***54***, ***61***, ***69***, ***73***, ***76***, ***80***, ***82***, ***85***, ***103***, ***170***, ***181***, ***221***
Angew, 123, 234
An-Na'im, 104, 234
anti-dictatorial feature, ***154***
Anyua, 165, 172, 198, 209
Arabian Peninsula, ***31***
Arba Minch, 207
Arnold, 108, 234
Arriola, 184, 234
Assosa, 207
Atse Tewodros, ***33***
Atse Yohannes IV, ***25***, ***34***, ***95***
Austro-Hungarian empires, ***15***
Ayana, ***ix***

B

Babalola, 234
backward state, 223
Baissa, 15, 17, 18, 21, 53, 80, 85, 234
Baker Yusuf (*Elemoo Qiltxuu*), ***23***
balance of powers, 229
Balcha, 162, 235
Band-Aid, ***27***, ***82***
Bebishangul-Gumuz State, 173
Begemeder, ***31***
Beken, 162, 235
Benishangul, ***20***, ***50***, ***62***, ***76***, ***77***, ***101***, ***102***, ***103***, ***141***, ***146***, ***154***, ***161***, ***162***, ***165***, ***167***, ***172***, ***178***, ***197***, ***199***, ***207***, ***209***, ***215***, ***218***, ***221***
Berhanu Bayeh, ***52***
Berhe, 3, 26, 27, 43, 67, 68, 91, 92, 96, 168, 235
Berta, 172, 215
Bhandari, 133, 235
Bhattacharyya, 116, 118, 119, 235
Brilmayer, 211, 235
Broers, 208, 235

Bunce, 197, 218, 235
Burgess, 96, 99, 115, 122, 124, 162, 192, 224, 235, 236

C

CAFPDE, ***86***, ***90***
Capitalism, 1, 6, 228
Central Statistical Agency, 74, 236
Charter, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 25, 41, 57, 59, 60, 67, 68, 77, 78, 83, 89, 98, 100, 105, 126, 127, 134, 136, 211, 226, 243, 245
Charter of African Union, ***13***
Charter of Paris for New Europe, ***13***, ***18***, ***41***, ***226***
Charter of the United Nation, ***16***, ***245***
China, ***26***, ***92***, ***183***
City Governments, ***102***, ***180***, ***187***
civil war, ***3***, ***4***, ***7***, ***19***, ***27***, ***41***, ***51***, ***71***, ***80***, ***81***, ***82***, ***83***, ***87***, ***99***, ***131***, ***153***, ***218***, ***220***, ***223***
Clapham, 2, 6, 32, 45, 98, 128, 236
clear border, ***210***
Cohen, 4, 35, 52, 53, 55, 236, 240
Cold War, ***1***, ***3***, ***5***, ***6***, ***16***, ***47***, ***108***, ***184***, ***233***
collective defense, 217
colonial policy, ***80***
coming together, ***23***, ***125***, ***133***, ***134***, ***137***, ***227***
command economy, 212
Commercial Code, ***82***
common aspiration, 189, 196, 200, 220
common objective, 196
concept of self-determination, 17, 21, 126, 127
confessed identity, 175
conquest, ***20***, ***124***, ***135***, ***143***, ***203***, ***207***, ***218***
conscious effort, 225
constitution, ***xiii***, ***2***, ***20***, ***35***, ***40***, ***41***, ***60***, ***70***, ***83***, ***84***, ***85***, ***88***, ***91***, ***95***, ***106***, ***107***, ***108***, ***110***, ***123***, ***124***, ***130***, ***132***, ***134***, ***135***, ***137***, ***142***, ***143***, ***144***, ***146***, ***150***, ***151***, ***154***, ***159***, ***162***, ***163***, ***164***, ***166***, ***167***, ***168***, ***170***, ***171***, ***174***, ***176***, ***179***, ***180***, ***187***, ***188***, ***189***, ***190***, ***191***, ***192***, ***193***, ***194***, ***195***, ***196***, ***201***, ***202***, ***203***, ***206***, ***211***, ***212***, ***213***, ***219***, ***220***, ***222***, ***235***, ***244***, ***245***
Constitution, 13, 55, 67, 68, 70, 71, 96, 106, 134, 137, 146, 151, 152, 153, 159, 162, 163, 164, 167, 171, 174, 180, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 203, 204, 211, 218, 220, 222, 227, 235, 238
constitutional history, 222
constitutionalization, 175
Constitutions Inquiry Commission, ***162***
constitutive sub-units, 197
constructivist orientation, ***128***
contiguous territory, 196, 206
conviction, ***6***, ***18***, ***58***, ***67***, ***68***, ***71***, ***78***, ***81***, ***83***, ***94***, ***96***, ***98***, ***126***, ***129***, ***132***, ***146***, ***174***, ***183***, ***229***
Cop, 127, 236
Council of Ministers, ***69***, ***168***, ***169***
Council of Representatives, ***59***, ***61***, ***62***
cultural life, ***20***
Czechoslovakia, ***97***, ***132***, ***197***, ***214***, ***217***

D

de facto, ***41***, ***53***, ***60***, ***71***, ***75***, ***134***
de jure, ***60***
Debelo, 37, 67, 68, 162, 236
Deiwiks, 149, 173, 214, 218, 219, 236, 237
Delebo, 22, 43, 44, 237
democratic centralism, ***167***, ***168***, ***169***, ***172***, ***176***, ***181***, ***183***, ***195***, ***217***, ***221***
democratic participation, 211, 219
democratic principles, 182, 219
democratic rights, xiv, 15, 59, 104, 211
Derg, ***1***, ***38***, ***53***, ***99***
developmental government, 182, 184
devolution-recognition federalism, ***140***, ***147***

Dire Dawa, 102, 161, 165, 187, 207
diversity recognition federalism, ***140***, ***142***, ***147***, ***202***, ***204***, ***228***, ***229***
divide and rule, ***86***, ***129***, ***215***
dominance, 5, 6, 16, 18, 25, 34, 36, 37, 58, 59, 61, 65, 67, 68, 72, 76, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 85, 86, 87, 89, 100, 105, 129, 132, 160, 170, 181, 184, 214, 217, 219, 220, 221, 222, 227
dominant national groups, 7, 215, 221
dominant political party, ***132***
Donor Group, ***78***, ***79***
Drake, 118, 237
Dramatization, ***93***, ***95***, ***242***
dualistic theories of federalism, ***190***, ***193***

E

economic and political interdependence, ***104***
economic dynamics, 184
Elazar, 118, 123, 234, 237
ELF, ***24***, ***25***, ***39***
emerging state, 223
Emirate of Harar, ***20***
Empire State of Ethiopia, 23, 36
empirical destination, 192
encampment, ***78***, ***81***
enforcement mechanisms, 229
ENLF, ***23***
EPDM, ***6***, ***25***, ***27***, ***28***, ***54***, ***61***, ***69***, ***72***, ***80***, ***85***, ***107***, ***170***
EPLF, ***4***, ***6***, ***24***, ***25***, ***27***, ***39***, ***47***, ***48***, ***49***, ***50***, ***51***, ***52***, ***53***, ***56***, ***57***, ***60***, ***64***, ***92***, ***104***, ***203***
EPRDF, 3, 4, 5, 6, 13, 18, 19, 25, 26, 27, 28, 41, 47, 48, 49, ***50***, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 66, 67, 68, ***69***, 70, 71, 72, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, ***88***, 89, 90, 91, 92, ***93***, ***94***, 96, 98, 99, 100, 101, 103, 104, ***105***, ***106***, 107, 108, 132, 135, 137, 138, 146, 153, 154, 162, 163, 167, 168, 170, 172, 174, 177, ***180***, 181, 182, 183, 184, 194, 203, 215, ***217***, 221, 222, 228, 229
EPRP, ***6***, ***21***, ***25***, ***27***, ***39***, ***71***, ***73***, ***85***, ***90***, ***105***, ***107***
equal rights, 15, 16, 17, 60, 103, 140, 193
equally sovereign, 127, 140, 188, 203
equitable share, xiv, 15, 146, 212
Eritrea, ***xiii***, ***6***, ***21***, ***22***, ***26***, ***47***, ***48***, ***51***, ***53***, ***56***, ***57***, ***60***, ***69***, ***105***, ***132***, ***134***, ***135***, ***136***, ***218***, ***240***, ***241***
ESM, ***21***, ***25***, ***37***, ***38***, ***39***, ***40***, ***42***, ***110***
Ethiopia First, ***1***, ***83***
Ethiopian federalism, xv, ***111***, ***125***, ***131***, ***133***, 134, ***135***, 137, ***138***, ***139***, ***140***, ***142***, ***144***, ***146***, ***147***, ***148***, ***150***, ***151***, ***152***, ***154***, ***156***, ***158***, ***160***, ***164***, ***166***, ***168***, ***169***, ***170***, ***171***, ***172***, ***173***, ***174***, ***175***, ***179***, ***180***, ***181***, ***185***, ***186***, 187, ***188***, ***189***, ***190***, ***192***, ***193***, ***194***, ***195***, ***196***, ***197***, ***198***, ***200***, ***202***, ***203***, ***204***, ***206***, ***211***, ***212***, ***213***, ***215***, ***216***, ***217***, ***219***, ***221***, ***223***, ***224***, ***227***, ***228***, ***229***, ***230***
Ethiopian identity, 213, 228
Ethiopian State, ***45***, ***135***, ***242***
Ethiopian Student Moment, ***110***
ethnic federalism, 92, 144, 147, 179, 185, 186, 187, 188, 196, 197, 198, 200, 202, 222, 233, 235, 238
ethnic homeland, ***157***, ***158***, ***175***
ethnic territories, 180
ethnic-based, ***16***, ***37***, ***38***, ***39***, ***40***, ***41***, ***42***, ***58***, ***67***, ***68***, ***83***, ***86***, ***91***, ***97***, ***99***, ***111***, ***130***, ***132***, ***147***, ***150***, ***157***, ***159***, ***173***, ***186***, ***187***, ***196***, ***214***, ***216***, ***217***, ***222***, ***243***
Ethnic-group, 185, 237
Ethnicity, ***28***, ***30***, ***31***, ***34***, ***38***, ***41***, ***131***, ***150***, ***159***, ***185***, ***186***, ***214***, ***217***, ***233***, ***236***, ***237***, ***238***, ***239***, ***242***, ***244***, ***246***
ethnicus, 185
ethnikos, 185
ethnolinguistic identities, ***72***

ethnonational, ***18***, ***21***, ***28***, ***29***, ***30***, ***35***, ***39***, ***41***, ***42***, ***59***, ***60***, ***65***, ***66***, ***70***, ***72***, ***73***, ***74***, ***77***, ***83***, ***84***, ***85***, ***86***, ***94***, ***98***, ***99***, ***129***, ***131***, ***133***, ***140***, ***147***, ***150***, ***156***, ***159***, ***167***, ***173***, ***175***, ***196***, ***208***, ***209***, ***210***, ***214***, ***218***, ***220***, ***224***, ***228***, ***240***
Europe, ***18***, ***29***, ***126***, ***157***, ***185***, ***243***, ***246***
executive branch of government, ***168***
external influences, 227
external self-determination, 189, 212

F

fallacious assumption, ***200***
features of federalism, ***99***
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, ***7***, ***13***, ***67***, ***68***, ***106***, ***140***, ***146***, ***152***, ***153***, ***206***, ***211***, ***238***
federal government, ***146***, ***156***, ***166***, ***168***, ***169***, ***171***, ***173***, ***174***, ***191***, ***194***, ***211***, ***213***, ***214***, ***219***, ***220***, ***223***, ***224***, ***225***, ***228***
federalism literature, 196, 198
federalization process, 86, 103, 106, 151, 186, 195, 225
Feeley, 238
Felasha, ***31***, ***32***, ***33***
Fessha, 45, 116, 122, 133, 137, 138, 143, 158, 238
Fiseha, 189, 208, 222, 238
French Revolution, ***126***, ***157***
Friedrich Engels, ***15***
Føllesdal, 115, 238

G

Gabbar system, ***38***
Gadaa Democracy, 199
Gadaa System, ***200***
Gambella, 50, 62, 76, 77, 101, 102, 103, 141, 146, 153, 154, 156, 161, 162, 165, 167, 172, 178, 197, 199, 207, 209, 215, 218, 221
Gamo, 77, 141, 165, 177, 199, 200, 215
Gamper, 118, 122, 189, 190, 193, 238
Gara Mul'ata, ***23***
Gebre-Kidan, ***51***, ***52***
Germany, ***28***, ***124***, ***125***, ***132***, ***177***
global imperialism, 14
global socialist movement, ***14***
Globalization, ***157***, ***246***
Gojjam, ***31***, ***33***, ***50***, ***129***, ***186***
Gondar city, ***89***
goyim, 185
Great Britain, ***19***, ***22***, ***33***, ***80***
Greeks, ***200***
Green, 185
Gudina, 38, 39, 58, 183, 239
Gumuz, 76, 77, 101, 102, 103, 141, 146, 154, 156, 161, 165, 172, 173, 178, 197, 199, 207, 209, 215, 218, 221
Guragie, ***61***, ***62***, ***70***, ***77***, ***100***, ***102***, ***105***, ***141***, ***156***, ***200***, ***215***

H

Habasha, ***31***, ***36***, ***156***
Hadis Tedla, ***52***
Hadiyya, ***20***, ***62***, ***75***, ***77***, ***100***, ***141***, ***156***, ***165***, ***177***, ***199***, ***200***
Haile Selassie I, ***1***, ***2***, ***22***, ***25***, ***35***, ***38***, ***45***, ***46***, ***48***, ***64***, ***107***, ***128***, ***155***
Haile-Mariam, 2, 4, 26, 239
Hailu Yimenu, ***52***
Hale, 121, 144, 174, 179, 188, 197, 214, 215, 218, 220, 239
Hameso, 4, 67, 68, 239
Harari, 76, 77, 101, 103, 141, 153, 156, 161, 162, 165, 167, 186, 197, 199, 215, 221
historical conditions, ***202***, ***203***
Holcomb, 74, 75, 239
holding together, ***125***, ***133***, ***137***, ***138***, ***227***
homogeneous polity, ***31***
horizontal inter-state, 225
House of Federation, ***130***, ***159***, ***161***, ***162***, ***163***, ***166***, ***169***, ***175***, ***189***, ***191***, ***214***, ***223***
House of Moses, ***32***
House of Peoples Representative, 160, 191
Houses of Federation, 192

HPR, ***164***, ***170***
Human Rights Watch, ***56***, ***63***, ***72***, ***89***, ***239***, ***240***
Hussein Mohamed Ali (*Huseen Soraa*), ***23***
hybrid political order, ***152***

I

ideological motivation, 228
ideological union, 16
ideology, xiii, 5, 6, 7, 27, 28, 39, 47, 48, 58, 59, 93, 133, 167, 172, 181, 184, 194, 195, 210, 217, 225, 228, 229, 233, 235
inalienable right, ***17***, ***20***
indigenous, 172, 185, 239
infringement, 225
Inman, 145, 240
instrumentalizations of ethnicity, ***151***
Intensified ethnic loyalty, ***213***, ***214***
interdependence, 30, 209, 211, 212, 219
inter-ethnic, ***129***, ***172***, ***173***, ***209***, ***213***, ***214***, ***215***, ***216***, ***236***
internal self-determination, 6, 38, 104, 144, 158, 159, 176, 211
Inter-nation conflicts, 215
international conventions, 17
International Court of Justice, ***16***, ***245***
International Crisis Group, 240
international emergency, ***27***
interstate, ***163***, ***172***, ***215***
intra-ethnic conflict, ***214***
Ireland, ***28***, ***214***
Islamic traditions, ***200***
Israelites, ***28***, ***43***

J

Jalata, 67, 68, 234, 239, 240, 241
Jews, ***33***, ***43***
Jijiga, 207
Jimma, 207
Jones, 31, 240

K

Kaffa, ***20***, ***62***, ***75***, ***100***, ***199***
Kagnew center, ***48***
Karl Marx, ***15***
Karmis, 113, 118, 240, 246
Kefele, 30, 116, 121, 122, 128, 129, 133, 138, 240
Keller, 89, 138, 139, 152, 187, 240
Kimant, ***32***, ***33***, ***141***, ***164***
Kimenyi, 36, 218, 220, 240
King, 1, 31, 32, 43, 123, 234, 240
King Solomon, ***1***, ***32***, ***43***
Kymlicka, 188, 217, 241

L

LaCroix, 119, 241
Lasta, ***31***
Lata, 24, 26, 45, 53, 54, 57, 58, 60, 63, 70, 71, 75, 79, 80, 81, 92, 107, 134, 241
League of Nations, ***15***, ***16***, ***126***
Legesse, 241
legitimacy, ***2***, ***7***, ***32***, ***36***, ***43***, ***88***, ***110***, ***172***, ***222***
Lenin, ***2***, ***14***, ***15***, ***26***, ***92***, ***126***, ***168***, ***241***
Levy, 123, 241
Lewthwaite, 4, 53, 241
LFSW, ***23***
liberal democracy, 47, 184, 210, 217
liberation movements, ***14***, ***39***, ***83***, ***111***
local tyranny, 208
Loughlin, 116, 241

M

Macca-Tulama Welfare Association, ***22***
Mackenzie, 93, 242
manipulation, ***4***, ***5***, ***71***, ***177***, ***214***, ***215***, ***221***
Marcus, 33, 38, 67, 68, 242
marginal rights, 173
Marxist-Leninist, ***26***, ***91***, ***106***, ***167***, ***168***
Marxists-Leninist League of Tigray, ***26***
McWhinney, 126, 242
Mehretu, 213, 242
MEISON, ***21***, ***38***, ***53***
Melbaa, 22, 242

Meles Zenawi, ***43***, ***53***, ***56***, ***60***, ***61***, ***72***, ***75***, ***90***, ***91***, ***92***, ***105***, ***108***, ***168***, ***181***, ***182***
Menelik II, ***5***, ***20***, ***22***, ***31***, ***34***, ***35***, ***45***, ***64***, ***95***, ***111***, ***128***, ***131***, ***199***
Mengisteab, 87, 242
Mengistu Haile-Mariam, ***1***, ***2***, ***4***, ***6***, ***18***, ***25***, ***26***, ***46***, ***49***, ***50***, ***51***, ***52***, ***56***, ***63***, ***168***, ***239***
Mgbako, 162, 242
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of FDRE, 70, 242
minorities, 7, 16, 18, 20, 38, 40, 98, 103, 140, 164, 175, 188, 191, 196, 198, 207, 208, 225, 228, 235
Minorities at Risk Project, 4, 53, 54, 242
mixed identity, ***94***
MLLT, ***6***, ***26***, ***27***, ***43***, ***91***, ***168***
modus operandi, 208, 223
Mole, 52, 56, 58, 107, 177, 242
monarchy, ***21***, ***36***, ***37***, ***38***, ***40***, ***44***, ***47***, ***85***, ***111***, ***126***, ***155***, ***199***, ***202***
Monroe, 31, 240
multi-ethnic, ***6***, ***30***, ***32***, ***36***, ***37***, ***38***, ***85***, ***86***, ***129***, ***131***, ***140***, ***143***, ***157***, ***172***, ***180***, ***186***, ***189***, ***204***, ***213***, ***214***
multinational diversity, 226
multinational federation, 189, 192, 195, 203
multi-party democracy, ***83***, ***229***
Muteki, 52, 242
mutual intelligibility, 196

N

Nation, 111, 152, 157, 164, 165, 171, 198, 208, 214, 242
National Conference on Peace and Reconciliation, ***58***, ***70***, ***77***, ***227***
national conflict, 209, 214, 216, 229
national federalism, 85, 87, 142, 144, 189, 196, 202, 204, 218, 222, 229
national group, 19, 73, 133, 157, 159, 162, 173, 186, 187, 197, 207, 209, 210, 213, 218, 219
national political crisis, ***99***
National politics, 215
National Question, ***6***, ***14***, ***15***, ***184***
national regional state, ***144***
national self-determination, ***7***, ***15***, ***21***, ***29***, ***35***, ***36***, ***41***, ***58***, ***67***, ***68***, ***84***, ***85***, ***93***, ***98***, ***110***, ***111***, ***126***, ***127***, ***139***, ***158***, ***171***, ***195***, ***226***
national unity, ***7***, ***65***, ***66***, ***97***, ***98***, ***99***, ***103***, ***104***, ***106***, ***149***, ***151***, ***213***, ***214***, ***216***
nationalism, ***15***, ***34***, ***37***, ***39***, ***40***, ***41***, ***42***, ***64***, ***69***, ***84***, ***85***, ***92***, ***95***, ***109***, ***110***, ***126***, ***142***, ***151***, ***155***, ***156***, ***157***, ***159***, ***180***, ***187***, ***188***, ***189***, ***194***, ***197***, ***198***, ***200***, ***210***, ***224***, ***229***, ***242***, ***244***
Nationalistic federalism, ***197***
nationalists, 23, 67, 70, 111, 175, 224
nationalities federalism, 197, 198
nations, nationalities, and peoples, 17, 19, 28, 29, 30, 31, 37, 38, 39, 41, 60, 69, 80, 83, 84, 94, 96, 104, 135, 142, 153, 159, 161, 174, 195, 196, 198, 199, 201, 202, 204, 205, 215, 224, 226
nation-state, 28, 32, 33, 35, 36, 39, 40, 45, 46, 58, 64, 67, 68, 70, 84, 86, 91, 95, 96, 97, 106, 109, 124, 135, 139, 155, 157, 175, 177, 187, 188, 202, 203, 210, 212, 218, 219, 224
nation-state building projects, 35, 109, 224
Nawaz, 15, 16, 243
Negussie, 151, 158, 166, 243
New Europe, ***18***, ***19***, ***67***, ***68***
new federal model, ***192***, ***204***
non-Abyssinian, ***20***, ***44***, ***64***, ***66***, ***85***, ***110***, ***128***, ***143***
non-judiciary constitutional interpretation, ***162***
Norman, 113, 118, 240, 246
normative theories, 179
Nuer, 141, 165, 172, 198, 209, 215

O

OAU, ***17***

OLF, 4, 6, 7, 22, 23, 24, 25, 28, 39, 50, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 70, 71, 73, 78, 79, 80, 81, 88, 89, 90, 107, 108, 203
OOPLS, ***23***
OPDO, ***6***, ***28***, ***54***, ***61***, ***73***, ***74***, ***76***, ***80***, ***82***, ***103***, ***107***, ***170***, ***181***, ***221***, ***222***
Oqubay, 177, 243
Oromia, ***22***, ***23***, ***24***, ***62***, ***71***, ***73***, ***78***, ***81***, ***102***, ***103***, ***129***, ***141***, ***153***, ***156***, ***157***, ***158***, ***160***, ***161***, ***162***, ***165***, ***172***, ***173***, ***174***, ***177***, ***178***, ***207***, ***209***, ***215***, ***220***, ***221***, ***223***, ***225***, ***242***
Oromia State, 153, 161, 165, 172, 173, 207
Oromo, 5, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 28, 33, 34, 45, 50, 53, 54, 59, 62, 69, 73, 77, 79, 80, 81, 86, 102, 103, 107, 108, 128, 129, 136, 141, 156, 157, 164, 165, 172, 177, 178, 182, 186, 187, 197, 199, 200, 207, 214, 215, 218, 221, 234, 239, 240, 241, 242
Oromo nation, 22, 54, 199, 200
Ostrom, 118, 123, 168, 243
overall diversity, 204, 205

P

pan-Ethiopian, 48, 66, 70, 74, 84, 107, 151, 166, 216
paradox, ***124***, ***132***
paradoxical forces, ***124***
Paris conference, ***88***
parliamentarian system, ***164***, ***176***
patrimonial kinship, ***131***
Peace and Reconciliation Conference, ***56***, ***88***, ***105***, ***136***
People's Democratic Organizations, ***74***
People's Democratic Republic, 4, 104, 135, 167, 168
Peoples' Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, ***2***, ***19***
perpetual dominance, 76, 77, 227
Persians, ***200***
pioneering experiment, ***133***
PMAC, 1
policies, 33, 39, 87, 92, 95, 142, 145, 157, 160, 168, 177, 182, 184, 208, 212, 222, 229
political changes, xiii, 14
political culture, 124, 158, 169, 192, 228
political elites, ***22***, ***35***, ***39***, ***81***, ***85***, ***106***, ***107***, ***130***, ***155***, ***181***, ***208***, ***210***
political framework, 18, 159
political globalization, 16
political ideology, 1, 5, 26, 47, 75, 85, 86, 91, 93, 94, 95, 96, 99, 129, 132, 172, 195, 208, 210, 221
political movements, 13, 58
political symmetry, ***152***
politics of exclusion, ***210***
Porter, 93, 242
post-colonial Africa, 16
Pragmatism, 211
pre-Aksumite, ***31***
presidential system, ***61***, ***164***, ***176***
Prime Minister, ***4***, ***43***, ***52***, ***54***, ***56***, ***61***, ***69***, ***105***, ***157***, ***164***, ***168***, ***176***, ***181***
Primordial ethnic orientation, ***129***
primordial ethnicity, ***130***, ***131***
propaganda, ***xiii***, ***51***, ***65***, ***66***, ***77***, ***84***, ***87***, ***97***, ***98***
provisional administration, ***54***
Provisional Military Administrative Council, 1
public governance, 199
purposive coincidence, 197
putting together, ***125***, ***133***, ***227***

Q

quandaries, 206
Queen of Sheba, ***32***

R

Reclus, 243
Redi, 243
Ree, 6, 15, 243
Regassa, 243
Resolutions of the United Nations, ***13***
revised Marxism, ***6***
revival of the national identity, ***110***

revolutionary democracy, 7, 26, 28, 172, 181, 183, 184, 195, 210
Riker, 235
Rodden, 118, 122, 202, 244
Roeder, 218, 244
Roman Empire, ***29***
Romans, ***28***, ***200***
ruling party, ***75***, ***131***, ***146***, ***151***, ***159***, ***160***, ***162***, ***163***, ***167***, ***170***, ***175***, ***182***, ***183***, ***188***, ***195***, ***215***, ***216***, ***217***, ***222***, ***225***, ***229***
Russia, ***126***, ***132***, ***243***
Russian revolutionaries, ***126***

S

Schuck, 122, 124, 132, 244
secession, 5, 6, 14, 19, 21, 26, 41, 56, 60, 83, 84, 87, 91, 96, 104, 111, 127, 131, 134, 139, 142, 146, 152, 159, 171, 172, 175, 187, 189, 190, 193, 195, 202, 204, 205, 211, 212, 213, 214, 218, 219, 220, 225, 227, 228, 234
Selassie, 1, 2, 22, 25, 30, 31, 35, 38, 45, 46, 48, 64, 107, 121, 128, 149, 155, 187, 216, 244
self-determination, ***5***, ***6***, ***13***, ***14***, ***15***, ***16***, ***17***, ***18***, ***19***, ***21***, ***22***, ***25***, ***26***, ***28***, ***35***, ***36***, ***37***, ***38***, ***39***, ***40***, ***41***, ***53***, ***58***, ***60***, ***65***, ***66***, ***67***, ***68***, ***71***, ***80***, ***81***, ***83***, ***84***, ***85***, ***86***, ***90***, ***91***, ***92***, ***94***, ***95***, ***97***, ***99***, ***103***, ***104***, ***109***, ***110***, ***111***, ***124***, ***125***, ***126***, ***127***, ***131***, ***134***, ***136***, ***139***, ***142***, ***143***, ***146***, ***147***, ***148***, ***156***, ***157***, ***158***, ***159***, ***164***, ***170***, ***171***, ***172***, ***175***, ***184***, ***189***, ***190***, ***193***, ***194***, ***195***, ***202***, ***203***, ***204***, ***205***, ***211***, ***212***, ***213***, ***216***, ***218***, ***219***, ***220***, ***225***, ***226***, ***227***, ***233***, ***234***, ***235***, ***236***, ***246***
self-rule, 16, 29, 38, 40, 91, 92, 97, 142, 145, 146, 149, 153, 154, 159, 160, 180, 193, 195, 203, 204, 205, 208, 210, 213, 226, 228
Sellassie, 43, 244
Semela, 213, 244
separatist, 92, 133, 181
SEPDM, 82, 170, 181
settler colonization, ***20***, ***21***, ***64***, ***129***, ***135***, ***226***
Seymour, 177, 236, 244
shared-rule, 145, 149, 193, 195, 204, 205, 213, 214, 222, 226
Shaw, 127, 244
Shewa, ***25***, ***31***, ***33***, ***34***, ***43***, ***95***, ***128***, ***129***, ***165***, ***199***, ***215***
Shinn, 4, 56, 244
Sidama, ***20***, ***50***, ***62***, ***71***, ***75***, ***77***, ***100***, ***141***, ***156***, ***157***, ***165***, ***177***, ***199***, ***200***, ***201***, ***215***, ***239***
Siemen, ***31***
Smith, 30, 116, 121, 123, 156, 179, 186, 188, 234, 244
SNNP State, 153, 161, 165, 170, 172, 173, 198, 199, 201, 207
social democracy, ***15***
Socialism, 1, 6
Socialist congresses, ***14***
socialist federation, ***194***, ***195***, ***204***, ***233***
Solan, 50, 52, 53, 57, 60, 107, 188, 244, 245
Spain, ***28***, ***125***, ***132***, ***177***, ***214***
special *Waredas*, 166
Stalin, ***6***, ***15***, ***91***, ***92***, ***126***, ***243***
status quo, 1, 21, 46, 66, 99, 163, 170
Stepan, 112, 123, 125, 133, 137, 138, 139, 147, 227, 245

T

tactical changes, 181
Temesgen, 172, 177, 229, 245
Teshome, 245
TGE, ***19***, ***25***, ***51***, ***57***, ***60***, ***61***, ***63***, ***67***, ***68***, ***69***, ***70***, ***71***, ***72***, ***73***, ***74***, ***75***, ***76***, ***77***, ***78***, ***80***, ***81***, ***83***, ***86***, ***87***, ***88***, ***89***, ***90***, ***93***, ***94***, ***95***, ***96***, ***97***, ***98***, ***99***, ***100***, ***103***, ***104***, ***105***, ***106***, ***107***, ***137***, ***138***, ***174***, ***211***, ***227***
The Autocracy of Titular State, ***206***
The Second International, ***14***
three-Circle, ***190***
Tigray State, 161, 173, 178, 207, 209, 223

Tigre, ***31***, ***32***, ***33***, ***37***, ***69***, ***77***, ***156***, ***157***, ***172***, ***197***, ***207***
total assimilationist, ***109***
TPLF, ***3***, ***4***, ***5***, ***6***, ***13***, ***22***, ***24***, ***25***, ***26***, ***27***, ***39***, ***41***, ***42***, ***43***, ***46***, ***47***, ***48***, ***49***, ***50***, ***51***, ***54***, ***58***, ***59***, ***61***, ***62***, ***63***, ***67***, ***68***, ***69***, ***70***, ***71***, ***72***, ***74***, ***75***, ***76***, ***77***, ***78***, ***79***, ***80***, ***82***, ***83***, ***84***, ***85***, ***86***, ***87***, ***88***, ***91***, ***92***, ***94***, ***95***, ***100***, ***101***, ***103***, ***105***, ***106***, ***107***, ***108***, ***132***, ***137***, ***146***, ***154***, ***160***, ***168***, ***170***, ***174***, ***177***, ***181***, ***182***, ***184***, ***215***, ***221***
TPLF elites, 75, 101, 160, 222
TPLF/EPRDF, ***3***, ***4***, ***5***, ***6***, ***47***, ***49***, ***58***, ***59***, ***62***, ***63***, ***67***, ***68***, ***70***, ***71***, ***72***, ***75***, ***77***, ***78***, ***79***, ***82***, ***83***, ***84***, ***86***, ***87***, ***88***, ***91***, ***92***, ***94***, ***100***, ***103***, ***105***, ***174***, ***227***
Transitional Charter, ***25***, ***57***, ***64***, ***67***, ***68***, ***78***, ***80***, ***86***, ***89***, ***105***, ***106***, ***134***, ***135***, ***136***, ***241***
Transitional Government, ***xiii***, ***51***, ***59***
Turton, 37, 113, 133, 148, 217, 238, 239, 245

U

U.S. Department of State, 89, 245
UN General Assembly, ***16***, ***245***
unalienable right, ***202***
United Nations, 16, 17, 19, 54, 245, 246
universal right, 14, 15, 126
USA, ***4***, ***5***, ***46***, ***47***, ***48***, ***49***, ***51***, ***52***, ***53***, ***54***, ***55***, ***56***, ***77***, ***78***, ***79***, ***104***, ***107***, ***123***, ***124***, ***132***, ***177***, ***200***, ***210***, ***227***, ***233***, ***234***, ***235***, ***239***, ***241***, ***244***, ***245***
USSR, ***5***, ***6***, ***26***, ***47***, ***49***, ***68***, ***91***, ***97***, ***124***, ***132***, ***194***, ***197***, ***208***, ***214***, ***217***

V

Vaughan, 40, 45, 58, 59, 62, 246
vertical inter-government, 225
Vienna Declaration and Program of Actions, ***13***
violent conflict, 215
voluntary contract, ***125***
Vyver, 15, 126, 246

W

Waredas, 102, 160, 164, 165, 166
Watts, 113, 116, 118, 123, 174, 246
Western countries, ***62***, ***217***
Western world, ***6***, ***111***
Wheare, 124, 234
Wolaita, ***20***, ***62***, ***70***, ***75***, ***77***, ***100***, ***141***, ***165***, ***199***, ***200***, ***201***, ***215***
Wolde, 60, 246
Wollo, 33, 34, 128, 129, 173, 186, 215
Woodrow Wilson, ***15***
work in process, ***160***
Workers Party of Ethiopia, ***2***
World Conference on Human Rights, ***19***, ***245***
World War II, ***16***, ***17***, ***35***, ***36***, ***48***, ***124***, ***220***
WPE, ***2***, ***3***, ***5***, ***71***, ***105***

Y

Yanjero, ***20***
Young, 87, 246
Yugoslavia, ***97***, ***132***, ***197***, ***214***, ***217***

Z

Zagwe Dynasty, ***32***
Záhořík, 5, 246
Ziblatt, 125, 246
Zimbabwe, ***4***
Zimmermann, 146, 247
Zone, 102, 160, 164, 165, 166, 173, 208

Å

Aalen, 5, 33, 58, 59, 61, 62, 71, 84, 85, 91, 92, 103, 129, 162, 167, 170, 215, 233
AAPO, ***5***, ***39***, ***65***, ***71***, ***79***, ***84***, ***85***, ***86***, ***89***, ***107***